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Abstract   
 
Research suggests that as children develop so too does their ability to identify the 
persuasive intent of advertising, but research examining whether implicit cognitive 
processes play a part in children’s response to advertising has been neglected, as has the 
importance of scepticism. This thesis focuses upon one specific advertising technique - 
pairing celebrities with brands. Studies 1 and 2 presented novel brands paired with either a 
well-liked celebrity or neutrally rated non-celebrity. Findings demonstrated explicit and 
implicit preferences for brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. Study 3 used real brands 
and a scepticism scale. An overall preference for celebrity paired brands was revealed, 
with scepticism to advertising showing to be important. Studies 4 and 5 examined known 
(rather than “well-liked”) celebrities. Brands presented alone or paired with a known 
celebrity were shown, with an explicit preference for brands presented alone being found. 
Study 6 used well-liked and known celebrities. An explicit preference for well-liked 
celebrity brands, yet a brand alone preference for known celebrity brands was shown. A 
small implicit preference for celebrity brands was shown in the known celebrity group, 
also showing high affect-based scepticism was associated with high implicit preference. 
Both high accuracy- and affect-based scepticism was associated with lower brand alone 
scores for the well-liked celebrity condition, whereas findings of the known celebrity 
subgroup seem to suggest that a known celebrity overrides scepticism. Differences across 
age groups emerged. Overall this thesis suggests that the celebrity effect is not 
straightforward – children and young adults respond differently to brands paired with 
celebrities they have high liking for compared with those that are simply known. Explicit 
and implicit responses to celebrity brands can differ, and it may be important to consider 
the distinct effects of both accuracy- and affect-based scepticism on the judgments of 
children in different age group
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1 Literature Review 
 
1.1 Advertising to children 
1.1.1 General Introduction 
Children and young people are considered to be a lucrative market and one that generates a 
vast amount of spending (Clarke & Svanaes, 2012). Children have access to financial 
resources. As well as pocket money and birthday money, children also have influential input 
into the spending of their parents (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2008) and other family members 
such as grandparents (Buckingham, 2009). In 2005, Gunter, Oates, & Blades suggested that 
on average, parents in the United Kingdom spent more than £7 per week extra on food 
shopping when they took their children to the supermarket with them as they “pester” for 
food or toys that they have seen advertised on the television. Pester power continues to 
remain an effective method for children, with more recent research by Childwise (2018) 
estimating that it accounts for £7,960 million per year of UK spending.  
Advertisers who rely upon television commercials have targeted several generations 
of children (Kunkel et al., 2004). At the beginning of the 21st century it was estimated that the 
average child observed approximately 18,000 advertisements each year (Oates, Blades, & 
Gunter, 2001) – a figure which in 2014, was reported to have increased to 25,600 (Common 
Sense Media). In 2002 it was estimated that children and teenagers in the UK and US spent, 
on average, four to five hours every day, outside of school time, watching some form of 
electronic media (Cooke, 2002, cited in Gunter et al., 2005). A more recent Ofcom report 
(2016) supports these findings, highlighting that using digital and electronic media remains 
important to children, with nearly all children engaging with “watching activity” (for 
example, TV, online clips, on-demand channels) at least once per week. On average, it was 
estimated that children spend approximately one hour more at a weekend than a school day 
using media, with children aged eight- to 11-years spending approximately seven hours per 
weekend day watching TV and engaging in online gaming (Ofcom, 2016). It has been 
suggested that the UK transmits more television advertisements than any other European 
country (Layard & Dunn, 2009) and whilst consumption of TV ads may have reduced over 
the last few years, with the increase of Netflix and Internet viewing, there is no reason to 
believe that exposure to ads has reduced significantly in recent years. Whilst watching TV 
remains a daily occurrence for most children (estimated at nine out of ten), the number of 
children who report watching a television has generally decreased in favour of watching 
programmes, YouTube clips and on-demand programmes on portable, electronic devices 
(Ofcom, 2016). Wakefield (2015) reports on a survey conducted by Childwise which 
concluded that in comparison to three-and-a-half hours of TV viewing in 1995, teenage girls 
now spend an average of seven-and-a-half- hours watching screens.  
A recent report highlights how easy it is in our current society for children to watch 
television programmes, revealing that 40% of children aged five- to 15-years now own an 
electronic device on which they can watch television programmes on demand (Ofcom, 
2016).Tablet ownership is on the rise, with 16% of children as young as three-years-old now 
owning their own device. The use of tablets as a way to stream content electronically is 
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above 50% for children of all ages, with 55% of three- to four- year-olds, 67% of five- to 
seven-year-olds, 80% of eight- to 11-year-olds, and 74% of 12- to 15-year-olds now having 
regular access to an electronic tablet (Ofcom, 2016). The results of a survey of the general 
public’s attitudes towards advertising suggested that although most people take a fairly 
benign view of advertising, this may not be the case where advertising to children is 
concerned. Fraser and McBain (2011), for example, stated that whilst advertising causes few 
problems for much of the consumer population (those who can observe it rationally and with 
scepticism), there are some that need to be protected. Young children, for example, are 
considered to be a vulnerable group and a cause for worry. 
Advertising to children has therefore become a cause for concern, with the consensus 
being that children are a vulnerable group that need protective regulations to guard them from 
the effects of advertising (e.g. see Kunkel et al., 2004). Making reference to policy and 
practice concerning advertising in the US, Kunkel et al. (2004) discussed efforts to reduce 
advertising to children. However, for guidelines and regulations to be introduced in an 
attempt to reduce the negative effects of advertising to children, it is necessary to understand 
the processes that determine how advertising affects the judgments, behaviour, and 
perceptions of children (Büttner, Florack, & Serfas, 2014). Heath (2012) has claimed that 
product preference has been shown to be influenced by as little as a single commercial 
exposure, strengthened with repeated exposures with product preferences affecting children's 
product purchase requests which in turn influence parents' purchasing decisions. This points 
to the importance of understanding how children respond to advertising. 
Research has demonstrated that high-exposure to adverts can have a negative effect 
on children’s development, particularly in terms of their response to branded products. In one 
study, for example, Weller (2002) found that children could recognize brands and logos 
before they could read, which in itself is worrying. The increase in popular TV programmes 
and specific TV channels designed for very young children has opened up new promotion 
opportunities for advertising to even younger age groups than before (Hind, 2003, cited in 
Gunter et al., 2005). In 2005, research estimated that in the UK alone two-thirds of children 
aged between seven- and 10-years had a television in their bedrooms (Gunter et al.), and in 
recent years media platforms for advertising to children via the internet, continue to emerge 
(Gunter et al., 2005). It is likely that the number of new advertising platforms will continue to 
increase, as will estimates of the time children spend gaming or using electronic media. 
Following some of the theoretical perspectives of children’s development, it is believed that 
children, more than adults, are susceptible to the seductive influence of commercials and, 
whilst parents can try to monitor the amount of advertisements that children are exposed to, it 
is not always possible for parents to have full control over the content children are viewing. 
Evidence is mixed for the age at which an adult-like understanding of advertisements 
emerges which might protect children from any adverse effects of advertising. Research 
concerning the age at which children’s understanding develops is discussed in section 1.1.2. 
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1.1.2 Recognising ads and understanding children’s selling and persuasive intent 
Advertising to children is becoming increasingly common, especially considering that more 
children than ever now have access to some sort of electronic media on which accessing 
advertisements remains highly likely. Levin, Petros, and Petrella (1982) established that even 
young children can distinguish television programmes from advertising. Researchers claim 
that if a child can make a distinction between advertising and programmes on television, as 
children around the age of five years can (Clarke, 2011), they therefore understand the intent 
of advertising. Research which has investigated the effects of advertising on children has 
tended to focus on children’s knowledge of selling intent (i.e., understanding that ads are 
trying to sell their products) and persuasive intent (i.e. understanding that advertisements are 
designed to persuade you to think or do something). Selling intent and persuasive intent are 
two terms that are used widely throughout the research literature. Young (1990) identified a 
difference between understanding commercial intent behind advertising (intention to sell) and 
persuasive intent (intention to persuade), claiming that children need to understand that 
behind advertising lies a message to promote a product, and that the function of the 
advertisement is to do just that. One such function is to persuade, however the age at which 
children fully understand this remains widely debated.  
Research tends to suggest that at around five-years of age children distinguish 
between television programmes and advertisements, but only in terms of basic features such 
as duration and content, rather than the ‘persuasive intent’ which lies behind the 
advertisement (Butter, Popovich, Stackhouse, & Garner, 1981). Very young children have 
minimal understanding of what an advertisement is (Calvert, 1999), with research suggesting 
that before the age of eight- or nine-years children do not necessarily understand all content 
that they view on the television. Often, very young children have difficulty following a causal 
link between the beginning, middle and end of a programme or advertisement, with a struggle 
to comprehend that characters are fictitious and do not represent everyday life (Wright, 
Huston, Reitz, & Piemyat, 1994). Consequently, young children are able to say how 
advertisements are different from television programmes (e.g. they are shorter, or funnier) 
but not why they are different (Levin et al., 1982). The initial task of children is simply to 
discriminate TV advertisements from the program (Calvert, 2003), a discrimination which 
Kunkel and Wilcox (2001) say takes place at four- or five-years of age. As Gunter et al. 
(2005) identified, children may only have the ability to recognise advertisements solely on 
these bases yet being able to recognise ads purely on these superficial features reveals very 
little about their understanding (Moses & Baldwin, 2005).  
However, Oates et al. (2002) recognised that there is sometimes confusion between 
children’s ability to make a distinction between the programmes they are watching and the 
advertisements contained within them – a conclusion also supported by Butter et al. (1981) 
who reported that many children cannot explain the differences between the two. Findings 
which suggest that children possess a general ability to recognise TV advertisements at the 
age of five- or six-years have also been challenged by research that shows ads in a different 
domain (web adverts) are not recognised until much later (Ali, Blades, Oates, & Blumberg, 
2009). Additionally, Owen, Lewis, Auty, and Buijzen (2013) found that children aged seven- 
to 10-years had more difficulty in recognising advertising and its persuasive intent when it 
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was shown in an embedded format compared to TV advertisements. Inconsistencies in the 
results of previous research highlights the need for a more detailed exploration of children’s 
understanding.   
 Whilst there is much ambiguity surrounding what children understand in relation to 
advertising, literature concerning children’s developing cognitive abilities and the growing 
awareness of the psychological state of others generally agrees that understanding of TV 
programming appears to grow steadily in middle childhood, and continues through 
adolescence (Clarke, 2010). Livingstone and Helsper (2006) stated that throughout childhood 
children develop a critical understanding of advertising, even to the extent where, by the age 
of 12-years, they can start to become sceptical of it. This idea of scepticism is addressed at 
length in section 1.3. Some researchers argue that young children, up to age seven- or eight-
years, ask for items they have seen advertised because they believe that they are being 
informed of the best products to choose; they believe advertisements contain accurate 
information (Liebert & Sprafkin, 1988), which could suggest that children of this age have a 
lack of scepticism. 
Shaffer (2005, cited by Clarke, 2010) acknowledged that between the ages of nine- 
and 11-years, most children begin to understand that the intention of advertisements is to 
persuade, with 13- to 14-year-olds having developed a healthy scepticism about what 
advertisements claim about their products. Lawler and Prothero (2003) also found 
understanding in eight- to nine-year olds, with children of this age demonstrating their ability 
to differentiate between advertising and programming by recognising the relative difference 
in length, content and the overall difference in genre. Lawler and Prothero stated that the 
findings in their study illustrated a fairly sophisticated understanding with awareness on the 
part of the nine-year-old children regarding advertising's persuasive role, as the children were 
in agreement that advertising has a persuasive nature in terms of encouraging people “to buy 
stuff” (2003: 420). When investigating children’s understanding of persuasive intent inherent 
to television advertising, Andronikidis and Lambrianidou (2010) found contrasting results to 
Lawler and Prothero, finding that whilst most of the 10- to 11-year-olds understood the 
persuasive role of advertising, only a few of the eight- to nine-year-olds and none of the 
children younger than seven-years had the same understanding. Similarly, Oates et al. (2002) 
found that only a quarter of eight-year-olds and a third of 10-year-olds referred to the 
persuasive nature of advertising in their studies, with Derbaix and Percheux (2003) providing 
evidence to suggest that even children as old as 10-years may not recognise ‘persuasive 
intent’. Reporting on a range of studies (e.g. Ward, Wackman, & Wartella, 1977), Bjurstrom 
(1994) concluded that we can only be certain that children have developed a deeper 
understanding of the purpose of advertising when they reach 12-years of age.  
It is apparent that there is much ambiguity in the literature concerning when children 
have knowledge of persuasive intent and some of this ambiguity could be reflective of the 
methods used. Some studies used non-verbal test methods, simply asking children to choose 
between pictures of someone buying a product or someone watching TV. It is questionable 
whether image selection is an appropriate measurement for advertising research, with 
Donohue and Meyer (1984) suggesting that the selection of an image alone should not be 
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interpreted as understanding of advertising. Furthermore, Lapierre (2013) stated that there are 
likely to be unmeasured variables contributing to the relationship which are being ignored. 
For example, researchers have pointed out that even being armed with the knowledge that 
advertisers are trying to persuade, children do not become better prepared to resist advertising 
messages. In her work into children’s knowledge of persuasive intent in food marketing 
campaigns, Chernin (2007) found that even children as young as five-years-old possessed 
knowledge of persuasive intent, yet these children were just as persuaded by food 
advertisements as children who lacked this knowledge. This current, on-going ambiguity 
highlights the need for more detailed research, although Kunkel’s (2001) contribution is 
important here. Kunkel argued convincingly that much of the debate in this area is caused by 
measurement error; many researchers appear to treat understanding of ‘selling intent’ as 
being equivalent to understanding ‘persuasive intent’ with the result that children’s abilities 
may be overestimated. Kunkel (2001) demonstrated just how sophisticated adult-like 
understanding of persuasion knowledge needs to be and suggested that, fundamentally, most 
studies do not measure it. Still, adults are considered to possess a range of advertising-
relevant knowledge and skills that researchers can use as comparative benchmark against 
which to assess children’s understanding (Friestad & Wright, 1994; Moses & Baldwin, 2005; 
Wright, Friestad, & Boush, 2005).  
Some campaigns may opt for informing the consumer by including “informative 
intentions” where the advertiser informs of availability of the product, its important features, 
and where it can be purchased (Moses & Baldwin, 2005: 187). Recognition of ‘informative 
intent’ requires acknowledgment from individuals that people differ in their knowledge so, 
whilst some may be ignorant to a particular advertising claim, others may be knowledgeable 
of the information it is providing (Moses & Baldwin, 2005). ‘Promotional intent’, on the 
other hand, requires recognition that one’s own views and interests may differ from that of 
the advertising company, an ability that Moses and Baldwin (2005) acknowledged requires a 
sophisticated understanding that advertising messages may be subject to bias, and 
information surrounding it may not always be accurate. Considering the literature 
surrounding executive functioning (e.g. Anderson, 2002; Diamond, 2002) Moses and 
Baldwin concluded that immaturities in executive functioning skills of children in middle 
childhood or younger, limit the extent to which they can make use of these concepts. 
Executive function is said to follow a prolonged developmental course (Diamond, 2002, cited 
in Moses & Baldwin, 2005) that continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood 
(Anderson, 2002). This is discussed further in section 1.2. 
Evidently this is a research area in which there are many contradictory findings. 
Furthermore, in terms of new advertising techniques this is, the environment in which 
children are exposed to advertising will continue to be fast-moving. The ongoing debate in 
this area provides a gap for examination, as questions remain as to when children truly 
develop the ability to resist any negative effects of advertisements and doubts remain as to 
whether targeting children with advertising represents fair practice (Linn, 2004). 
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1.1.3 Advertising literacy I 
The term advertising literacy has been used to describe the set of knowledge and skills 
individuals possess which allow them to guard against any unwanted effects of advertising 
(Boush, Friestad, & Rose, 1994). Research has tended to focus upon understanding the 
various facets of advertising literacy and identifying how they develop in children and 
adolescents (e.g. Kunkel, 2010; Rozendaal, Buijzen, & Valkenburg, 2011). Typically, 
researchers have proposed several key features of advertising literacy including; the ability to 
recognise advertisements, being aware of the source of advertisements, and understanding 
both the selling intent and persuasive intent behind advertising. Opree and Rozendaal (2015) 
have referred to this knowledge set as ‘conceptual advertising literacy’ (i.e. knowledge about 
how advertising works).  
 There is research evidence which suggests that advertising literacy can be of benefit. 
Austin and Johnson (1997) found that when eight-year-old children were given media 
literacy training whilst watching a video in which ads were present, they were more likely to 
understand the intention of the ads. Furthermore, in a delayed follow up study three months 
later, children who had been given the media literacy training also held more realistic beliefs 
about whether people in ads are representative of real people. These authors concluded that 
describing advertising techniques to children, whilst ads are being presented, enabled them to 
understand the intentions of the advert. Similarly, Roberts, Christenson, Gibson, Mooser, & 
Goldberg (1980) found that children aged six- to 11-years were more sceptical about 
advertising after they had been exposed to similar description techniques upon ad 
presentation.  
 Research by van Reijmersdal, Rozendaal, Smink, van Noort, and Buijzen (2017) 
suggested that children’s processing of advertising seems to be less elaborate than that of 
adults and, in their recent research into advertising literacy, Hudders and Cauberghe (2018) 
provided support for this assertion. Hudders and Cauberghe found that children aged 10- to 
11-years had higher levels of advertising literacy than younger children and that they were 
able to use this knowledge to detect commercial intent in the ads as well as the source of 
brand placement. Rozendaal, Lapierre, van Reijmersdal, and Buijzen (2011) argued that to 
utilise advertising literacy when considering advertisements requires individuals to “stop-
and-think” – a process which is less likely to be seen in young children due to their 
underdeveloped cognitive functioning. It is suggested that younger children are unable to 
shift their attention away from the ad to consider the persuasive intent and apply defensive 
strategies, therefore concurring with previous literature which suggested that advertising 
literacy may not be as beneficial to children as some first considered. 
 Until recently, research into advertising literacy has tended to focus on the immediate 
effect on children’s responses to advertising, with little consideration being given as to 
whether such effects occur at a later time point. De Jans, Hudders and Cauberghe (2017) 
included advertising literacy training in their experimental study to explore the delayed 
effects of such training. Their study with seven- to eight-year-olds and 10- to 11-year-olds 
found that for both age groups advertising literacy training was effective on both immediate 
testing and delayed testing of the effects of product placement. An important finding of this 
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research, however, was that when liking for the ad was low, high advertising literacy was 
related to fewer purchase requests for the product. Yet the same effect was not present when 
liking for the ad was high. If we consider ad liking to be an affective response, the findings of 
De Jans et al. concerning ad liking could suggest that a positive affective response to ads may 
be related to the judgments children and young adults make about brands and products. One 
of the aims of this thesis includes examining the relationship between general liking of 
advertising and brand responses. 
A fundamental problem with the main body of research into advertising literacy is the 
fact that it only draws upon findings based upon children’s explicit judgments and 
preferences. In section 1.2.5 the implications of this in relation to psychological research on 
implicit cognitive processes is discussed. Because of the nature of modern advertising and the 
use of ‘stealth’ techniques (including celebrity endorsement), implicit processes are equally, 
if not more important to consider when examining children’s understanding of advertising. It 
can therefore be concluded that, in terms of cognitive control and development, media 
literacy may have some benefit to protecting children’s explicit judgements yet may only 
have some limited success in protecting children overall as processing may occur in a low-
level implicit way (Büttner, Florak, & Serfas, 2014). As Livingstone and Helsper (2006) 
point out, advertising can influence implicit judgments just as much as explicit preferences, 
yet advertising literacy may not moderate the implicit effects.  
 
1.2 Psychological perspectives on advertising to children 
1.2.1 Piagetian theory and advertising 
Whilst there is no univocal conceptualization in the literature, much of the developmental 
work investigating children’s understanding of advertising has had its theoretical basis in 
Piaget’s work. Piaget’s theory explains the cognitive development of individuals, through 
infancy, childhood, adolescence and adulthood. According to Piaget (1932), as we get older 
we begin to construct ideas of the world around us and we learn that there may be 
discrepancies between what we thought we knew and reality. As we age, we learn how to 
adjust our thinking accordingly - in general, older children are better able to reflect upon their 
own thinking and the thoughts of others, and as such can think in a more abstract way. 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development has provided the basis for the majority of early 
research into children’s understanding of advertising (Raju & Lonial, 1990). Piaget’s 
approach suggests that as children get older and gain greater experience of their environment 
their cognitive abilities develop they are able to understand more about the nature of 
advertising (Pine & Veasey, 2003).  
Piaget (1932) believed that very young children, in the preoperational stage of 
development, are thought to be egocentric, suggesting that younger children struggle to 
accept anyone’s view but their own. Therefore, children in the preoperational stage have 
cognitive skills so limited that they have only a partial understanding of advertising (Johnson 
& Young, 2003), and this reflects in their poor ability to grasp the perspective of advertisers 
(Moses & Baldwin, 2005). In relation to the literature on persuasive intent discussed earlier, 
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Young (2003) applied research findings to the Piagetian theory of development. Generally, 
research (e.g. Gunter et al., 2005; Levin et al 1982) to suggest that young children believe 
advertisements are created solely to generate amusement. This is explained by Piaget as an 
interpretation of reality through their own senses – in short, children are unable to understand 
beyond their own senses (Young, 2003). For Piaget, this is a feature of egocentrism, which 
goes some way into explaining why children provide explanations such as “they’re shorter or 
funnier” when explaining the difference between programmes and advertisements.  
According to Piaget (1932), children in early childhood are not good at picking up 
ambiguities and they are less able to deal with complexity. During the concrete operational 
period (approximately seven- to 11-years of age) children’s thinking develops to a point 
whereby they are able to recognise that multiple perspectives are possible, although Moses 
and Baldwin (2005) concluded that their thinking can only be applied to certain contexts and 
they have limited ability to reason about hypothetical contexts. Children aged seven- to 11-
years, therefore, are still considered to be somewhat cognitively restricted. Consequently, 
researchers have tended to assume it is likely that it is not until children reach the formal 
operational period in adolescence (12-years and onwards) that they are fully able to grasp that 
there are complexities and ambiguities in messages displayed through media. Piaget explains 
that in general, older children are better able to reflect upon their own thinking and the 
thoughts of others, and as such can think in a more abstract way. Therefore, a child would 
only be capable of understanding the persuasive intent of advertising when this stage of 
development has been met (Johnson & Young, 2003). This corresponds with their ability to 
understand more about the purpose and intent of television advertising. Following Lawler 
and Prothero’s (2003) viewpoint, the application of Piagetian theory would suggest that 
children in this age group are able to move beyond accepting advertising at face value and 
become more evaluative concerning advertising messages.  
Extending upon the work of Piaget, John (1999) applied the Piagetian framework to 
propose three developmental stages in children’s understanding of advertising. The first 
discussed is the perceptual stage (aged three- to seven-years), which suggested that children 
can only distinguish visual advertising features. As age progresses children are thought to 
become more analytical (seven- to 11-years) and begin to use manipulative methods to 
request products – an ability which John suggested demonstrates awareness of parental 
viewpoints differing from their own. Finally, around 11- to 16-years-of-age, children become 
reflective and often consider prices, branding and recommendations before purchasing 
products. John (1999) stated that even 14-year-olds are not responding like adults in terms of 
their advertising understanding, but how they are different is not explained. The studies 
reported throughout the current thesis included samples of 14-year-old children in an attempt 
to explore how 14-year-olds and adults may be different.  
Piaget’s work was also influential in the creation of Friedstad and Wright’s (1994) 
Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM). This model suggests that compared with older 
children and adults, younger children find it difficult to appreciate the information contained 
in advertising, and struggle to recognise that advertisers present information from the 
perspective of their clients in seeking to persuade the recipient and influence their behaviour. 
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According to this model, and again in line with Piagetian theory, it is likely that it is not until 
children reach adolescence (12-years and onwards) that children are fully able to understand 
persuasive intent inherent to advertising, and grasp that there are complexities and 
ambiguities in messages displayed through media. Both Piaget and the PKM explain that, in 
general, older children are better able to reflect upon their own thinking and the thoughts of 
others, and as such can think in a more abstract way. This corresponds with their ability to 
understand more about the purpose and intent of advertising.  
The preoperational stage (age two- to seven-years) of Piaget’s theory has been applied 
widely to advertising, with many recognising that the inability to understand different 
perspectives can appropriately be applied to how young children think about advertising – 
children of this age should not be able to understand that their own thoughts and the 
intentions of advertisers may be different (Lapierre, 2013; Lawlor & Prothero, 2003). 
However, beyond the preoperational stage, some now question how appropriate the Piagetian 
approach is to contributing to our understanding of how children interpret advertising (Moses 
& Baldwin, 2005). Researchers have since started to draw upon research conducted in the 
area of Theory of Mind to provide a clearer understanding of children’s understanding. 
 
1.2.2 Theory of Mind and advertising 
Previous research has looked at explaining what children understand about advertising and 
when they have the necessary cognitive skills to buffer against advertising messages 
(Rozendaal, Lapierre, et al., 2011), but very few studies have looked at utilising 
developmental research to explore why children may respond differently to persuasive 
messages (Rozendaal, Lapierre, et al., 2011).  
 Building on the work of Piaget, Theory of Mind is an area of research concerned with 
how an understanding of the mental state of others develops - for example, understanding 
that other people may have a different mind-set to oneself. Generally, research has 
consistently shown that very young children have difficulty with recognising that their 
beliefs, desires and motivations may differ from those around them (Banerjee, 2000; 
Lapierre, 2013). Yet, as age develops, so too does this understanding, and there is 
considerable evidence that skill in perspective taking increases with age (Clark & Delia, 
1976). There is only limited work which has applied a Theory of Mind perspective to explore 
children’s understanding of advertising, but such findings offer valuable results which aid in 
informing the general literature concerning advertising understanding. McAlister and 
Cornwell (2009) used print advertisements to test whether preschool children’s Theory of 
Mind development was linked with their persuasion knowledge of these ads, finding that 
children who performed better on Theory of Mind tasks were more likely to understand the 
advertising campaigns. In a later study, McAlister and Cornwell (2010) tested the effect of 
Theory of Mind on brand awareness. Here, understanding of persuasive intent was not 
measured, but the study found that children with more distinct Theory of Mind abilities were 
more likely to understand brand symbolism. However, as Lapierre (2013) pointed out, the 
children in this sample were only four-years of age and the researchers only tested whether 
children understood that the advertisements were linked to consuming the product, rather 
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than whether recognition of persuasion was understood. As discussed in section 1.1.2, 
recognition of persuasive intent is considered to be a more advanced aspect to comprehend 
and is thought to require a higher level of cognitive development. Research is lacking into the 
examination of Theory of Mind development and advertising understanding in older children, 
and therefore any assumptions must be applied with caution. 
 Research on children’s development of Theory of Mind suggests that one of the first 
skills children develop is to understand false belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). One test 
which is used to examine false belief is the Smarties task – children are shown a Smarties 
box and asked what they believe to be in the box with the answer “Smarties” typically given. 
Children are then shown that the box actually contains crayons before being asked what they 
think the next child will believe is in the box. Five-year-old children who have developed an 
understanding of false belief (Gopnik & Astington, 1988) will answer “Smarties” but 
younger children who have not yet developed an understanding of false belief will incorrectly 
reply “crayons”. Whilst alternative explanations have been proposed to explain this error, a 
common assumption is that younger children mistakenly believe that people have access to 
the same information as themselves, and they therefore assume that the next child to be asked 
will have the same information available as they have (Lapierre, 2013). In a meta-analysis of 
research into false belief tasks, Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) found that typically 
children develop the ability to understand that others can hold false beliefs about events in 
the world between the age of three- and five-years, although Bartsch and London (2000) 
found results consistent with the notion that use of belief information in a task of persuasion 
may develop relatively slowly. Lapierre (2013) argued that knowing that other people can 
have separate beliefs should represent a milestone in understanding persuasion contained 
within advertising, however he goes on to suggest that it is the development of second-order 
beliefs - understanding the belief of another person – which should help children with 
understanding persuasive messages in ads.  
 Understanding bias is considered to be key in understanding persuasive intent - 
considering someone’s biases when trying to understand their actions develops much later 
than understanding first-order or second-order mental states (Banerjee, 2000), but once 
achieved should be beneficial for children’s advertising understanding. Whilst children who 
have knowledge of second-order mental states can recognise that someone is trying to change 
their beliefs, a clear persuasive attempt is needed for them to recognise this (Lapierre, 2013). 
However, as discussed later in section 1.2.5, not all advertising campaigns have a clear 
persuasive message for children to recognise, which could be considered problematic. 
Consequently, Lapierre argued that only children who have an advanced understanding of 
mental states and how they predict other’s behaviour should be able to interpret these 
messages. However, there could be a fairly abstract connection between an ad with no 
product information to thinking about advertisers manipulating us as consumers. The ability 
to recognise manipulation may require affect-based scepticism, which will be addressed in 
section 1.3. 
 Interestingly, Lapierre’s (2013) own work found that Theory of Mind development 
only predicted children’s understanding of advertiser’s selling intent but did not predict 
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children’s knowledge of persuasive intent, a finding which he attributes partly to the 
conceptual differences and complexity of constructs of ‘selling intent’ and ‘persuasive 
intent’. This supports the findings of earlier work of Bartsch and London (2000) who found 
that children performed well on false-belief tasks but poorly on persuasion tasks. As Kunkel 
(2010) noted, it is likely that the development of knowledge of persuasive intent is likely to 
come much later than the understanding of selling intent and that the two types of 
understanding are not arrived at at the same time. However, it may also be that whilst the 
development of Theory of Mind is important in children’s understanding of advertising, a 
more affective response may come into force when considering the effects of advertising 
campaigns. It may be that being aware of second order beliefs is not enough to deal with 
stealth ads. For example, targeting of our implicit cognitive processes may now be one tactic 
of advertising campaigns and, as such, recognising that someone is trying to change beliefs 
may not offer protection. 
 
1.2.3 Explicit and implicit cognition 
As already discussed, studies have attempted to understand what effects advertising has on 
children, although much of this research has focused on explicit knowledge. Explicit 
judgments refer to the thoughts and preferences which individuals are aware of having and 
which they are able to report, for example, when they know which brands they prefer (Lawler 
& Prothero, 2003). However, such studies fail to take into consideration the importance of 
implicit responses which also influence judgments (Donohue, Henke, & Donohue, 1980). 
Although the evidence regarding children’s understanding of persuasive intent is mixed, 
some researchers have claimed that children are unable to recognise the ‘persuasive intent’ of 
advertising until they reach early adolescence (Lawlor & Prothero, 2003). However, this is 
based upon research which assess children’s understanding on the basis of their explicit, 
conscious response – processes which require a high level of cognitive control (Büttner et al., 
2014). Most of the work described in the previous sections is based upon the assumption 
(present in Piagetian theory and the Theory of Mind literature) that cognitive development 
involves an increasing ability to reason explicitly about information. Therefore, the 
development of the skills will inevitably lead to stronger abilities to cope with the effects of 
advertising.  
This view has been challenged, however, by recent research in psychology and 
advertising which has shown how implicit attitudes influence behaviour. Bargh (2004) 
estimated that approximately 95% of our day-to-day decision making is governed by 
impulsive, rather than deliberate processes. With regards to advertisements, implicit 
knowledge concerns the effect that it has on the child without their realisation, which 
highlights the importance of considering and understanding the effects of such processes. For 
instance, one may have an implicit preference for a brand presented in an advertisement 
without explicitly knowing it (Nevid, 2010). For example, using popular celebrities to 
endorse brands may lead to positive feelings towards a celebrity (explicit) being (implicitly) 
associated with the brand, and further it may be the intent of advertisers to capitalise on these 
implicit associations. Importantly, Nairn and Fine (2008) argued that by overlooking the 
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study of implicit processes, researchers fail to grasp how persistent the effects of advertising 
truly are.  
It is important to reflect on the difference between explicit and implicit judgments, as 
Nairn and Fine (2008) stated that adults have very little defence against the effects of 
implicitly acquired affective associations which strongly influence our lifestyles as 
consumers. Therefore, whilst adults and children over the age of 12-years tend to show 
understanding of the persuasive nature of advertisements in their explicit judgments and 
preferences, the implicit affects are likely to apply to both children and adults. This is the 
central issue – whilst we, as adults, might be able to protect ourselves in our explicit 
judgments, protecting against implicit affects could be far more difficult. This is, by default, 
also problematic for children. This is a view supported by Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, 
and Wigboldus (2005) who acknowledged that people often choose products unconsciously, 
with tactics surrounding persuasion often encouraging consumers to act mindlessly in 
response to ads that trigger automatic, subconscious responses to products and brands. 
Further support is provided by Ratliff, Swinkles, Klerx, and Nosek (2012) who studied how 
positive attitudes to a brand could transfer to both the explicit and implicit judgments of a 
second, unknown brand. In terms of implicit judgements, the positive attitudes towards the 
first brand transferred to the second brand, even when it was revealed that this brand actually 
had several negative attributes. Explicitly, however, people responded as expected to the 
second product which was disliked due to its apparent negative features. This offers a first 
glimpse into how individuals may have explicit and implicit responses to advertising which 
are different - an important aspect of this thesis which is discussed throughout. 
Gibson (2008), in his research on mature brands, highlights the need for more 
research which uses implicit measures, claiming that the effects of evaluative conditioning 
would have been signiﬁcantly underestimated in his own research findings had a measure of 
implicit responses not been included. Gawronski (2009) notes that the increased use of 
implicit measures is related to the expanded criticism of self-report methods and our inability 
to accurately observe our own inner thoughts. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) proposed 
that indirect measures of testing provide an ability for the activation of associations in 
memory, which is one reason why implicit measures are more widely used in psychological 
research when assessing mental associations between concepts. Whilst there is a wide array 
of methods which have been used in past research, the most widely accepted methods 
include: the Implicit Association Test (IAT), the Go/No-Go task, and the evaluative priming 
task. 
Implicit judgments are most commonly investigated through the use of the Implicit 
Association Test - a test based on the assumption that people respond more easily in a task 
when they rely on cognitive associations, compared to when they have to process conflicting 
links (Rudman, 2011). IATs work on the premise that when a cognitive association has been 
made, individuals will respond with greater accuracy and with greater speed. Using the 
example of flowers and insects, Rudman (2011) reported that the large majority of people 
find it much easier to associate flowers with pleasant words, and insects with unpleasant 
words. It is much harder for these associations to be reversed, and thus response times are 
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significantly slower for example, when flower / unpleasant and insect / pleasant are paired. 
Implicit attitudes are considered to manifest as judgments that are under the control of 
automatic responses, without awareness from the individual.  
The IAT method has, however, undergone some criticism. Whilst the IAT is designed 
to measure strength of associations, Rothermund and Wentura (2004) suggested that it 
instead measures salience of attributes. The results of four experiments led the authors to 
conclude that the influence of associations could be eliminated by using non-words and 
neutral words in replace of the attributes of positive and negative words, and that the removal 
of these associations still led to faster responses for the recording of salient categories on to 
responses. In sum, it was assumed by these authors that salience attributes, rather than 
evaluative differences, form the basis for IAT effects (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). In 
response to this claim however, Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji and Klauer (2005) offered a 
counterargument to the salience asymmetry interpretation that Rothermund and Wentura 
(2004) proposed, which stemmed from research which has shown that the IAT has high 
construct validity. In studies where groups were expected to respond differently (for example 
smokers versus non-smokers) IAT results consistently showed differences in the direction as 
would have been expected (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).  
Criticisms have also suggested that implicit bias is not strongly related to behaviour. 
Whilst there has been plenty of research that has used implicit tests to explore implicit 
attitudes and preferences, questions have been raised about what these implicit attitudes are, 
and what measures of implicit testing can actually tell us. For example, there is doubt as to 
whether implicit measures predict behaviour, and whether such measures add anything to 
behaviour that can be easily measured using explicit tests only (Gawronski & De Houwer, 
2014). In research looking at phobias however, Teachman, Gregg and Woody (2001) found 
that implicit measures successfully predicted behaviours. They recruited participants with a 
high fear of snakes or spiders and presented them with four IAT tasks. During these tasks 
they were required to categorise words representing fear and anger, as well as images of 
snakes and spiders. Participants were also asked to self-report their fear. Based on the results 
of the IAT, 92% of respondents were categorised into their appropriate fear group that had 
been suggested based on their self-report assessments. Furthermore, the IAT responses 
demonstrated to be good predictors of behavioural approaches to snakes and spiders. In refute 
of the concerns with implicit measures, Banaji concludes that they can “offer a window into a 
mental world to which the conscious mind is not privy” (2001: 145).  
Offering an evaluation of the IAT method, Gregg and Klymowsky (2013) stated that 
whilst the IAT does have drawbacks, the advantages and practical use of the method far 
outweigh these. Social desirability bias, self-enhancement bias and self-ignorance bias are all 
reported as reasons why participants may often engage in deception when providing explicit 
responses in psychological research, often with participants acting in a way not representative 
of their thoughts and attitudes. This has obvious repercussions for the validity of research and 
such biases have an effect on participants’ responses (Gregg & Klymowsky, 2013). These 
biases are not present in implicit tasks.  
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Generally, research with adults that has used the IAT shows the test to have good 
reliability (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014) and validity (McKeague, O’Driscoll, Hennessy 
& Heary, 2013), with McKeague et al. (2013) suggesting that sometimes explicit measures 
are outperformed by implicit measures where measuring behavioural responses is the main 
focus. However, a reported concern relating to the validity of the IAT is that some studies 
report associations between measures of implicit and explicit attitudes whilst others do not 
(McKeague et al., 2013). This criticism, however is a general criticism of implicit tests more 
widely and is argued by Gawronski (2009) to be due to measurement error, rather than any 
lack of correlation being interpreted as a lack of explaining the “unconscious”. This argument 
is presented more thoroughly below, however, a meta-analysis conducted by Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann and Banaji (2009) concluded that the IAT has predictive validity 
independent of the validity of explicit measures, which suggests that the IAT is a useful 
implicit test to use. McKeague et al. (2013) support this claim, arguing that individuals can 
attempt to control responses they are asked to self-report on explicit measures, which could 
go on to explain the absence of explicit-implicit correlations in some reported studies where 
participants may have tried to suppress explicit attitudes. 
The lack of correlations often reported between the results from self-report methods 
and implicit measures can be expected in some studies. For example, in some of the very 
early work that used the IAT (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), the results concerning stereotypes 
and prejudice provided an interesting insight into how explicit and implicit attitudes can 
differ, and formed the basis of the further exploration of implicit testing and what it can tell 
us. However, the lack of correlations between explicit and implicit responses can sometimes 
be problematic for psychological research and call into question the validity of implicit tests 
where explicit and implicit responses are expected to be aligned (Gawronski, 2009). 
Gawronski (2009) reported that the IAT is one of the few methods that has consistently 
shown reliability estimates that are deemed acceptable, with Greenwald and Nosek (2001) 
providing further evidence that the IAT has been shown to be sensitive to individual 
differences, with a number of studies reporting the internal consistency of test-retest 
reliability to be high.  
Perkins, Forehand, Greenwald and Maison (2008) highlight that the IAT can be used 
to separate underlying processes that produce effects traditionally observed with explicit 
measures. Maison, Greenwald and Bruin (2001) explored areas where dissociations between 
explicit and implicit attitudes are expected to be different. Using high- and low-calorie 
products as an example, Maison et al. expected that young women would report high-calorie 
products as tasting good but being bad for their health, and when using explicit measures this 
hypothesis was supported. Implicit attitudes contrasted these findings, however, highlighting 
that young women had more positive attitudes toward low calorie products. Again, research 
of this nature highlights the successful use of the IAT method and gives credit for it being 
used as a method throughout the research presented in this thesis.  
The Go/No-Go task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) follows a similar premise to the IAT 
method in the sense that it measures strength of associations. However, instead of 
participants categorising between two concepts, the Go/No-Go task uses an assessment of 
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absolute associations with a single concept (Gawronski, 2009). The Go/No-Go task requires 
the same response to items that belong to a category (e.g. insects) and an evaluative attribute 
(e.g. good), and no response when items do not belong to the target category and attribute 
(Dimofte, 2010). The Go/No-Go task also has many benefits, one being that the task easily 
assesses the ability of a participant to learn to respond to cues. However, Yechiam et al. 
(2006) report that this test can also be problematic, for example, participants can ignore 
response cues, or may have slow learning rates, which can affect the results of the research.  
Evaluative priming tests are also used to measure implicit attitudes and have been 
used in a wide range of studies investigating a plethora of research interests. Research using 
evaluative priming has been conducted in studies investigating, but not limited to, depression, 
emotion, food preferences, social groups (for example, ingroups and outgroups), prejudice 
and stereotypes (Herring et al., 2013). In evaluative priming tasks, primes (attitude objects) 
are followed by targets (evaluative words) and the strength of evaluative association is 
measured by the speed of target judgment made by the participant (Banaji, 2001). The faster 
the prime leads to responses to positive words is assumed to be associated with implicit 
preference (Gawronski, 2009). Thus, it is assumed within all research using priming tasks 
that response times will be quicker when an adjective has the same bearing as the associated 
prime (McKeague et al., 2013). Banaji (2001) highlights that both the IAT and evaluative 
priming methods share basic assumptions, for example, they both use response times to 
measure the strength of associations, and both use this to explain automatic attitude. 
However, as Gawronski points out, the extent to which the categories are assessed differs. 
The IAT requires participants to practice categorizing the stimuli into its correct category, 
something which is not required during evaluative priming tasks. Therefore, different 
associations are being assessed which, by its very nature, could mean that results may differ 
(Gawronski, 2009). 
Having reviewed the literature on the use of implicit measures, Gawronski, LeBel, 
and Peters (2007) have also offered a review concerning what implicit measures can tell us. 
Gawronski et al. suggest that there is no evidence that indirect measures are “unconscious”, 
with Gawronski (2009) indicating that there is evidence to the contrary. As mentioned 
previously, reporting that there are often low correlations between implicit measures and 
traditional self-reports, Gawronski argues that this could be due to measurement error rather 
than assumptions that implicit tests are measuring the “unconscious”. Instead, Gawronski et 
al. propose that research should label implicit processes as ‘associational activation’ 
(automatic) and explicit processes as ‘propositional validation’ (reflective). This sits in line 
with the APE model of Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) which is discussed in section 
1.2.4.  
Given the overwhelming research conducted by Greenwald and colleagues into 
implicit measures and the use of the IAT, and published empirical studies providing evidence 
for the validity of the IAT (for example, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2011; Gawronski, LeBel & Peters, 2007; Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; and 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2001) it was considered appropriate for the IAT to be used in the work 
discussed throughout this thesis. Gawronski and De Houwer (2014) acknowledged that 
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choosing the “right” procedure for implementing in a research study can be perplexing, 
however they recognise that each implicit measure does tend to lend itself to a particular 
study interest. The IAT, for example, allows for flexible comparison between pairs of 
attributes (which is a main focus for the studies reported in this thesis), and is reported in 
many papers to show a good level of internal validity (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Kim and 
Greenwald (1998, cited in Greenwald & Nosek, 2001) found that participants were unable to 
correctly respond to an IAT measure when asked to show a lack of automatic preference for 
white faces as opposed to black. This research, amongst others, highlights that implicit 
responses are difficult to suppress on the IAT, showing it to be a valid measure of implicit 
attitudes. A further strength of the IAT method is that the overall length of the task can be 
adapted to suit the targeted age group (explored in more detail in section 2.4), with 
increasingly more research being conducted with some very young children.  
 
1.2.4 Dual processing models: research with adults 
The aim of persuasive intentions within advertisements is to attempt to change the conscious 
thoughts or behaviours (or both) of consumers directly, although a secondary aim is to 
influence their beliefs and desirability of a product indirectly (Moses & Baldwin, 2005). Dual 
process models of persuasion suggest that attitude change may occur through two basic 
routes – implicit or explicit (Xu, 2017), and therefore it is important to consider such models 
in relation to how advertising works. 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) predicts that motivation 
and ability influence the likelihood of message elaboration, and that increased elaboration 
enhances persuasion when the message is strong. In advertising, a message is considered to 
be strong if it elicits the positive brand cognitions desired by the message communicator 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Petty and Cacioppo (1986) cite how mass communication 
situations can be conceptualised as evoking one of two routes to attitude change – the central 
route and the peripheral route. The central route involves persuasion through “message 
elaboration”, with the message recipient scrutinizing the content of arguments and then 
changing their attitude on the basis of its merits. The peripheral route involves attitude 
change based on cues irrelevant to the quality of the argument. This model, as adapted to 
advertising messages, is described in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 A dual-processing model of advertising based on Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) 
Elaboration Likelihood Model.  
 
According to the ELM, careful conscious processing of a strong and convincing 
message can lead to persuasion via the central route. It appears plausible, therefore, that the 
impact of advertisements on brand evaluations may be sensitive to the relation between the 
cognitive resources required to process the message, and those made available for processing. 
Under weak-message argument conditions, thoughts may be directed toward elements of the 
message other than those intended by the message communicator. Thus, increased 
elaboration will enhance persuasion when the message is strong and diminish persuasion 
when the message is weak, but only within a certain range of processing motivation. In short, 
the ELM predicts that a strong message processed with high elaboration leads to positive 
persuasion, whilst a weak message processed under conditions of low elaboration leads to a 
more negative response (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
According to Coulter and Punj (2004) the five types of responses most often studied 
in the literature concerning the effects of advertising include affective responses to the ad, ad 
cognitions, attitude toward the ad, brand cognitions, and purchase intention - constructs 
which are all incorporated in the Dual Mediation Model (DMM), which has been well 
supported within the advertising literature. The DMM offers support for the theoretical model 
of Petty and Cacioppo (1988) and hypothesizes interrelationships amongst advertisement and 
brand constructs (Karson & Fisher, 2005). This model draws upon the likelihood of 
generating thoughts in response to a particular stimulus (Coulter & Punj, 2004). When 
exposed to an advertisement, consumer’s brand attitudes can be influenced by many different 
factors – for example, both beliefs relating to the brand and attitudes towards the presented ad 
can be important (Yoon, Laczniak, Muehling & Reece, 1995). Yoon et al. (1995) suggested 
that the DMM has provided clearer understanding of advertising developments, as it offers 
both theoretical and empirical support for the idea that purchase intentions can be mediated 
by ad-induced brand attitudes. For example, offering support for the ELM (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986), research which has used the DMM to investigate advertising message 
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involvement has shown that the relationships proposed by the DMM can be altered 
depending on whether the consumer is engaged with the ad with a high or low level of 
involvement.  
Relating to the ELM of Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the DMM fits well with, and 
offers support for this model. As with the ELM, this model suggests that when elaboration 
likelihood is high, viewers of a persuasive communication are prone to generate a relatively 
large number of advertisement and brand related thoughts, whilst engaging in more effortful 
processing of the displayed message’s content. Conversely, when elaboration likelihood is 
low, few resources are made available for message processing, and brand attitudes are more 
likely to be formed by less effortful message processing. The DMM explains advertising in 
relation to both the central route, where brand cognition is linked to brand attitudes based on 
elaborations made by the consumer, and the peripheral route where information concerning 
brand attitudes and/or benefits do not influence brand attitudes. Instead, the ad cognitions 
links to attitudes about the ad, which in turn link to brand attitudes (Yoon et al., 1995). Both 
the central and peripheral routes, however, depend on an ability to apply cognitive resources 
and motivation to do so. This concept of elaboration and process motivation is something 
which requires further close inspection, particularly within the realms of cognitive resources. 
Buijzen, van Reijmersdal, and Owen (2010) argued that due to developmental cognitive 
immaturity (see discussion in section 1.2), children are more likely to process advertisements 
using lower levels of elaboration. Younger children may not have fully developed resources 
available which, according to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) model (see Figure 1.1), means 
that attitude change will depend upon how they respond to superficial cues. Furthermore, as 
many ads do not contain any information to elaborate, this suggests that, even for adults, 
attitude change could also be reliant on their affective responses to superficial cues. If 
children are more likely to use lower levels of elaborations, as Buijzen et al. (2010) proposed, 
then brand attitudes are more likely to be affected by activated cues such as affective 
associations rather than strong messages. However, the DMM also explains how the central 
route and peripheral route of persuasion can be interrelated (Coulter & Punj, 2004) surmising 
that peripheral processing could also have an impact on the central route to persuasion if the 
persuasive message has been accepted. 
López and Ruiz (2011), in their research into website effectiveness, suggested that 
whilst both the ELM and the DMM have received much empirical support in advertising 
research, the DMM has been considered to be the one that best explains the effectiveness of 
ads because it extends the central and peripheral route processing one step further by 
suggesting that attitude towards the ads influences brand cognitions in a positive way. 
However, as with the ELM, the DMM has largely been tested and explored with print ads and 
therefore may not explain consumer behaviour and attitudes to advertising media that 
consumers are more likely to be exposed to today.  
It is important to note, however, that the ELM was originally created and tested in 
tasks looking at students’ responses to written information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and 
much of the research into the DMM also focuses on print advertisements, which solely 
assesses the conscious processing of information. Therefore, there may be some doubt 
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concerning how well tests such as these fit with how we experience advertising where we are 
not fully focusing on, or even trying to avoid, ads. Whilst the ELM has been useful in 
providing an understanding of elaboration and the importance surrounding the route of 
persuasion, given that ads are not typically attended to in a way that a written task would, it 
may not be the most useful framework to use when modelling the advertising approach. 
Karson and Fisher (2005) importantly distinguished the difference between ads presented in a 
format designed for the television or internet and ads presented in print, suggesting that the 
link between the attitude towards the website and intention to buy gives consumers more of 
an opportunity and motivation to process information more than when they are exposed to 
print ads.  
It is important to consider that whilst advertisements are aimed at influencing 
consumers’ behaviour, not all ads use a direct persuasive attempt. For an attitude to guide 
behaviour, it must have been activated in the first place. Fazio, Chen, McDonel, and Sherman 
(1982) found that attitudes can guide our behaviour and demonstrated that an attitude is an 
evaluation that becomes acted upon. In their research, Fazio et al. presented participants with 
prime/target pairs, with the primes being words referring to attitude objects, and the targets 
being positive and negative adjectives. Participants were required to indicate, as quickly as 
possible, whether each adjective was good or bad. As predicted, Fazio et al. demonstrated 
that participants responded quicker to negative adjectives after negative primes, and positive 
adjectives after positive primes – this is now more commonly known as the affective priming 
effect. Evaluative conditioning is a form of affective priming used in advertising, with some 
advertisements now more concerned with evaluative conditioning of an affect towards a 
brand or product than presenting a persuasive message. One reason for this could be that the 
content of a message could alert the consumer to the intentions of the advertiser, triggering 
feelings of manipulation which alerts the targeted audience to the advertiser’s aims.  
Holding conflicting evaluative responses to the same object is ordinary in everyday 
life, and therefore an important research question concerns the mental processes that underlie 
explicit and implicit evaluations and the causal factors that lead to changes in the two kinds 
of responses. The Associative–Propositional Evaluation (APE) model proposed by 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) explains dissociations between implicit and explicit 
evaluations in terms of their underlying mental processes. In their APE model, Gawronski 
and Bodenhausen distinguish between explicit and implicit processing by proposing that 
explicit evaluations result from propositional processing, whereas implicit evaluations are the 
outcome of associative processes. Many dual-processing models propose the storage of two 
very distinct memory representations, which Gawronski and Bodenhausen highlight to be a 
fundamental difference between such models and their proposed APE model in which 
information is to be assumed to be stored in the form of associations. Any association turns 
into a proposition if it is assigned a truth value (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). In 
support of other research which has examined models of advertising processing, Karson and 
Fisher (2005) also found that the premise of the DMM was the best fitting model to explain 
website effectiveness as intention to buy was more likely to occur when consumers were 
highly motivated to process the advertising claims. However, Karson and Fisher raised the 
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necessity for research to examine the impact of ad attitudes where affect intentions may be 
influenced by factors such as consumer trust or satisfaction. According to Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen, propositional processes are validated by conscious thought and logic, meaning 
that a high level of cognitive resource is needed. This is in opposition to associative processes 
which are based upon the activation of simple associations in memory which result in a 
positive or negative affective response (‘gut reaction’, p62) towards a target item. Much of 
advertising nowadays appears to involve a form of evaluative conditioning aimed at 
influencing associative affective responses rather than propositional reasoning. Therefore the 
APE model does seem a good place to start when thinking about modelling the cognitive 
processes underlying how we respond to advertising.  
The APE model of Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) has received empirical 
support from research by Smith, De Houwer and Nosek (2012). Smith et al. (2012) examined 
whether implicit evaluations are altered by direct appeals in the same way as explicit 
evaluations. Participants were asked to imagine that they were searching online for 
information on laundry detergent and were then asked to read information about someone 
who had experience (either ‘high’ or ‘low’) of the product. Using both explicit and implicit 
measures, the findings of this research highlighted that when participants were encouraged to 
consider information about the source and credibility of the information given, implicit 
evaluations were affected. Smith et al. (2012) make reference to Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen’s (2011) APE model in the discussion of their findings, acknowledging that the 
model allows for the possibility that positive associations could form on the basis of learned 
propositions. According to the APE model, implicit evaluations are assumed to reflect the 
associations that are activated in memory.  
 It seems evident that to push research forward, making links with the APE model 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) would be beneficial, utilising both propositional and 
associational processing. This would capture the distinction between cognitive and affective 
processing much better, as propositional processing involves consciously testing advertising 
information against advertising knowledge, and associational processing would enable 
examination of internal “gut feelings” towards ads. Distinguishing between these two types 
of processing may shed some further light into the importance of scepticism and, therefore, is 
a key aim of this thesis. Recognising an advertising campaign will normally trigger 
propositional processing of the ad, where logical validation using conceptual advertising 
knowledge is activated, especially for those with high conceptual knowledge (i.e. adults) and 
where attention to the advert is high.  
It is also important to consider that some ad events are not recognised. Whilst this is 
more likely for young children, whose conceptual knowledge of advertising is low (see 
discussion in section 1.2), it could also occur in some circumstances in adults. Here, an 
individual’s attitudinal or behavioural response may be determined by their affective 
response to the specific advertising campaign rather than advertising more widely. Where, for 
example, a specific ad automatically triggers a positive affective response, this is likely to be 
transferred onto the brand or product and may override any general negative feelings towards 
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ads (e.g. Forehand & Perkins, 2005, discussed in section 1.4). This is likely to be the aim of 
many advertising campaigns and in particular those using celebrity endorsements. 
This calls into question the assumptions of the ELM and the DMM that effective 
persuasion only occurs via effortful conscious processing. Yoo (2008) argued that measuring 
the effectiveness of ads based on “traditional” cognitive models (that highlight the 
importance of encouraging the effortful processing of ad information), may be problematic as 
ads holding different formats may be undervalued in terms of their effectiveness. In his work 
with Internet web ads, Yoo found that even when little or no attention was given to presented 
web ads, implicit attitudes were subsequently stronger and more favourable towards the 
advertised brand. Similarly, Shapiro, Macinnis, and Heckler (1997) used a typical incidental 
exposure paradigm to show that even when attention is fixed on one task, incidental 
advertising exposure has an effect on later product brand judgments. In this study, a sample 
of young adults were asked to guide a cursor across text on a computer screen, believing the 
task to be concerned with how such activities interfere with reading articles. In fact, Shapiro 
et al. were interested in observing whether ads for products (e.g. a carrot) shown peripherally 
on screen would later show in a brand selection task. More participants in the experimental 
condition (who had target ads presented amongst the text on the screen) stated that they 
would consider purchasing the target products than those who were solely shown text for the 
cursor guiding task. Together, research such as this has shown that explicit, conscious 
memory and/or high levels of attention are not necessary for ads to be effective, providing 
even more support for dual-processing models which emphasise the influence of implicit 
processes.  
Often, persuasive attempts are far subtler. For example, many advertising messages 
instead focus on peer popularity (Page & Brewster, 2009). In children’s advertising in 
particular, many messages rely heavily on cues generating high levels of emotion to excite 
and intrigue younger viewers (Lapierre, 2013) with many ads depicting children enjoying 
playing with the advertised products (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2002; Page & Brewster, 2009). 
Children’s advertisements also frequently feature popular characters that children have a 
strong liking for, again to elicit some sort of emotional response. Heath (2012) has pointed 
out that emotional appeals are an important part of advertising campaigns. However, Heath 
argued that emotional processing occurs implicitly, prior to active, passive processing which 
may or may not subsequently occur. According to Greenwald and Banaji (1995) implicit 
cognitions are derived from past experiences which are unavailable for self-report or 
introspection but which can have a strong influence over our thoughts, feelings and 
behaviour. We may not be aware of our implicit attitudes but they are important in mediating 
how we feel and think about the world and how we respond to advertising. Many advertising 
techniques aimed at children focus upon generating a positive affective response to the 
advertised brand or product.  
 
1.2.5 Dual processing models: research with children 
Most of the advertising literature examining implicit preferences has tended to focus on adult 
samples, even though research suggests that children may rely more heavily on implicit 
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learning than adults, on the basis of explicit processing that takes up resources (Janacsek, 
Fiser, & Nemeth, 2012). Büttner et al. (2014) suggested that children have a limited explicit 
processing capacity when compared to adults, yet conditioning is able to successfully shape 
children’s behaviour in an implicit way. Research by Gibson (2008) demonstrates that, even 
for young adults, implicit attitudes are difficult to overcome. For example, Gibson (2008) 
studied the effects of cognitive load (high or low) and evaluative conditioning on product 
choice in undergraduate students, measuring explicit and implicit attitudes to Coke or Pepsi 
that had previously been paired with positive or negative pictures. Whilst the conditioning 
procedure did not alter the explicit choices, implicit attitudes were altered by the conditioning 
procedure. Students who previously had no strong preference for either brand had changed 
implicit attitudes toward Coke or Pepsi, with a further study showing that brand choice was 
related with these changes in implicit attitudes. Gibson concluded that evaluative 
conditioning was successful in changing implicit attitudes. 
 One of the most basic processes of attitude formation is through mere exposure – 
perceiving a stimulus repeatedly generally makes that stimulus appear more positive (Zajonc, 
1968). Auty and Lewis (2004) have explored mere exposure effects on advertising in children 
aged six- to 12-years – effects that are based on previous activations (Grimes & Kitchen, 
2007) rather than associations or conditioning. Children were presented with an episode of 
Home Alone in which Pepsi either was or was not seen. In a later interview, those that had 
seen Pepsi in the film were more likely to choose Pepsi over Coke, suggesting that implicit 
preferences were key to influencing their choices. In a recent study looking at the effect of 
TV cooking and consumption on children’s food choice behaviour, Ngqangashe et al., (2018) 
found that after being exposed to only one episode of a healthy eating television cooking 
show, children significantly tended to choose a piece of fruit over a cookie upon later testing. 
What is important to note here is that mere exposure effects do not require conscious 
awareness (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980, cited in Gilbert et al., 1998). This research, 
alongside that of Janacsek et al. (2012), suggests that a dual-processing model for advertising 
preferences is also necessary when considering children’s responses, something which is also 
considered throughout this thesis. 
Büttner et al. (2014) devised a dual-step and dual-process model to a) explore 
advertising effects on children from ad exposure through to purchasing, b) acknowledge the 
role of implicit processes during both ad processing and purchasing, and c) provide an 
intervention designed to protect children from the negative effects of advertising, 
acknowledging that much advertising is usually processed implicitly. This model suggests 
that whilst implicit impulses can influence behaviour, they can be overwritten by explicit 
evaluations upon purchasing. One of the main criticisms Büttner et al. formulated is that 
many studies examine explicit and implicit preferences at time of testing, rather than 
following through to time of consumption. This is problematic since many ad campaigns are 
seen ahead of shopping trips or times of purchase and it could be that attitudes and 
preferences alter during this gap. Furthermore, using the classic ‘marshmallow test’ of self-
control (see Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) Büttner et al. noted that success in this task is 
dependent on experimental conditions, and this could suggest that testing children 
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experimentally may not accurately represent the purchasing intentions at times of 
consumption.   
Büttner et al. (2014) concluded that a dual-processing approach is necessary in 
explaining children’s advertising behaviours, with a focus on reducing implicit preferences 
the key to protecting children from being manipulated by ads. Whilst children can be taught 
advertising literacy skills (see section 1.3) to enhance their understanding of persuasion 
knowledge and self-control, these measures may not be enough to protect them from the 
implicit influence on purchasing behaviour. Instead, these authors suggested that 
strengthening children’s implicit self-regulatory capabilities is central to protecting children 
from implicit impulses. Through the setting of parental goals, observing parent’s behaviour 
and narrowing their attention, Büttner et al. claimed that children’s self-control competency 
may provide beneficial defence against the negative effects of advertising. However, this 
research does not consider the effect of emotional responses created by ads (e.g. see Heath, 
2012 - discussed earlier in section 1.2.4) which may override the development of self-control 
processes and regulation and thus reduce the effects of implicit protection. 
 
1.3 Advertising literacy II: scepticism about advertising 
Modern day advertising takes many different forms – including webpages, advergames and 
other formats which are subtler and less intrusive than traditional advertising formats. An 
important skill involved in advertising literacy is the ability to recognise an advertising 
campaign. Whilst some ads aim to present clear information about the brand, others make an 
emotional appeal aimed at generating positive affective response which is then transferred 
onto the brand or product. Furthermore, some forms of advertising are embedded into other 
material such as advergames, and websites, which can generate a positive affective response 
which can transfer onto the associated product or brand (see Hudders et al., 2017). 
 Traditionally, there has been consensus in the literature that adult-like conceptual 
advertising literacy is usually achieved by the age of around 12-years. However, recent 
research has suggested that understanding of advertising that is embedded within non-
advertising content (e.g. advergames, web advertising) may occur later than for more distinct 
forms of advertising such as TV ads (Ali et al., 2009; Nairn & Fine, 2008). As Rozendaal, 
Lapierre et al. (2011) suggested, many ads which are aimed at a child audience are designed 
to be processed in a low-effort way, again calling into question the relevance of media 
literacy training and conceptual advertising knowledge as a measure to protect children from 
advertisers’ negative intentions. Therefore, the persuasive intent inherent to advertising 
campaigns can often go unnoticed. Much of advertising aimed at children does not contain an 
overt message at all, aiming instead to accumulate positive feelings in the child towards the 
brand or product using evaluative conditioning. This makes it difficult for young children, to 
offer a defence to the ad. Hudders et al. (2017) proposed that not only do children have 
limited knowledge of advertising and its intent (which they term dispositional literacy) but 
they also have difficulty applying such knowledge (situational advertising literacy). Chu, 
Blades, and Herbert (2014) have also argued that whilst previous research has shown that 
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children express some scepticism towards advertisements, research has not always 
distinguished between different aspects of scepticism, with Koslow (2001) arguing that 
research often conflates different types of scepticism by incorrectly reporting ‘scepticism’ as 
a general phenomenon.  
Rozendaal, Buijs and van Reijmersdal (2016) investigated whether defence 
mechanisms against television ads could be triggered in children aged eight- to 10-years 
when forewarning of the advertiser’s intent is given. Two different forewarnings were tested: 
one for commercial intent: e.g. “Now it is time for the commercials, but pay attention: 
commercials want you to like and buy their products” and one for manipulative intent: e.g. 
“Now it is time for the commercials, but pay attention: commercials are not always fair, 
sometimes they tell things that are untrue” (pg. 4). In order to test the effects of forewarning 
children during exposure to an advertisement, Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) created a short 
video that included a segment of a popular children’s programme and an advertisement break 
which contained three adverts: one experimental advert for Nutella, and two filler ads. Before 
the advertisement break children were presented with a forewarning (as discussed above), 
and during the break they were prompted to remind them of this forewarning. After watching 
the stimuli video, they completed an online questionnaire which measured their frequency of 
watching television, attitude towards the channel that broadcast the television programme 
shown in the experiment, desire for the advertised product, advertising literacy (conceptual 
and attitudinal), and familiarity of Nutella.  
However, this research is open to some criticism. Whilst findings from the research of 
Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) shows that forewarning of advertising content is beneficial to 
children, it is not clear whether this forewarning extends beyond immediate testing or in 
other contexts. This research was conducted during only one single time period during a day 
at school, and therefore it cannot be inferred that the effects of forewarning are longstanding. 
It is plausible to assume that the effects of forewarning could wear off, and so longitudinal 
research which tests for brand liking at a later time point would be beneficial. This is 
especially true considering products such as Nutella are likely to only be seen when shopping 
in supermarkets, and therefore there is an assumed link between responses to advertising and 
purchase behaviour. It would be interesting to see the impact that forewarning has on later 
shopping exposure. Additionally, this study did not measure actual consumption behaviour, 
but rather asked children “will you ask your parents to buy Nutella spread for you?”. Whilst 
this was intentional due to the fact that the school did not allow unhealthy foods to be 
brought into school, it cannot be assumed that purchase intentions and purchase behaviours 
necessarily match. Future work may benefit from asking children what brands they would 
purchase, or give them tokens to purchase products, so that the effects of forewarnings could 
be more accurately examined, and conclusions could be more grounded within the theory. 
Following from this, Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) highlight their concerns with only testing 
children in a school setting, and question whether lower elaborations levels may be seen at 
home, compared to the school environment.  
The research by Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) does, however, highlight some 
important findings and implications, and the study contributes to our understanding of the 
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role of forewarning children of the intent behind advertisements. The method employed 
represented a format in which children aged eight- to 12-years would usually be exposed to 
products being advertised, and the scales used to measure advertising literacy showed good 
reliability. Generally, a warning about advertiser’s commercial intent activated advertising 
literacy, and raised ability to resist the persuasive message. However, informing of 
commercial intent only informs about an intention to sell, and does not necessarily indicate 
that the advertising message is intended to manipulate or be deceptive. Rozendaal, Buijs et al. 
highlight that scepticism to advertising is important in aiding resistance in children, yet 
existing educational programmes focus solely on increasing children’s knowledge of 
advertising, which their results show may not provide enough of a defence in reducing their 
product desire. This is where, according to Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016), two different 
strands of advertising literacy may become important: conceptual advertising literacy and 
attitudinal advertising literacy.  
 Conceptual advertising literacy is an understanding of selling and persuasive intent 
associated with understanding of commercial intent and is seen as a “cognition-based defence 
mechanism”. Attitudinal advertising literacy, on the other hand, is split into: scepticism 
towards ads (i.e. tendency to disbelieve advertising); and dislike of ads (i.e. negative attitude 
to advertising) and is seen as an “affective defence mechanism” which may be required to 
understand the manipulative intent of ads (Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016). The importance of 
conceptual understanding of advertising has been explained by Rozendaal, Opree et al. 
(2016) who have argued that ‘attitudinal advertising literacy’ may be more relevant in 
determining how individuals respond to advertising. According to Rozendaal, Opree et al., 
attitudinal advertising literacy consists of two components: general scepticism about 
advertising and general affective response to advertising. Scepticism refers to the extent to 
which an individual accepts the accuracy and believability of advertising claims, with lower 
trust in the accuracy of advertising being predictive of a greater resistance to unwanted 
advertising effects. 
 In their study, Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) predicted that warning about 
manipulative intent would arouse children to the fact that they were being manipulated – a 
feeling which tends to be unpleasant and considered unfair by the individuals being targeted. 
Consequently, attitudinal advertising literacy would be activated and trigger negative and 
sceptical feelings towards ads. Many developmental theories (see review in section 1.2) 
suggest that due to underdeveloped cognitive abilities, children’s advertising knowledge is 
somewhat limited and therefore warning would be needed for this activation to occur. On this 
basis, it was therefore expected that forewarning of advertising’s manipulative intent would 
reduce children’s advertised product desire by activating the affective defence mechanism 
known as attitudinal advertising literacy. This is what they found. Although conceptual 
advertising literacy was not increased by a warning of manipulative intent, an increase in 
attitudinal advertising literacy (specifically scepticism) reduced product desire (Rozendaal, 
Buijs et al., 2016). The authors concluded that this supports work such as Buijzen et al. 
(2010) which suggested that children process advertising under low cognitive elaboration, 
and “implies that children’s responses to an advertising message will be primarily based on 
affect instead of rational analysis” (Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016: 9). It is important to note, 
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however, that conceptual advertising literacy was only assessed using two questions: one 
which measured selling intent, and one which measured persuasive intent. The brevity of this 
scale could offer an explanation as to why conceptual advertising literacy was not increased. 
Research with adults (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998; Obermiller, Spangenberg, & 
MacLachen, 2005), has provided some evidence that higher accuracy-based scepticism is 
related to less positive responses to advertising amongst adults, particularly for ads making 
informational appeals (i.e. where information is provided about the product). Consumers’ 
general affective response to advertising may be linked to affect-based scepticism which 
refers to the extent to which an individual holds a general negative orientation towards 
advertising with higher negative orientation also predicting greater resistance to the influence 
of ads. Previous research has suggested that an individual’s affective response to a specific 
advertising event can influence brand attitudes and purchase intention (Batra & Ray, 1986). 
Given the nature of contemporary advertising, much of which provides little or no product or 
brand information, it seems reasonable to suggest that general affect-based scepticism plays 
an important role in filtering its effects. There is currently no research which has examined 
how accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism are related to explicit and implicit attitudes 
to brands and brand choice. This will be explored in the work reported throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4 Celebrity advertising 
McCracken (1989) defined a celebrity endorser as “any individual who enjoys public 
recognition and who uses this recognition on behalf of a consumer good by appearing with it 
in an advertisement” (p. 310). In 2010, it was estimated that advertisements using celebrities 
as endorsers accounted for one-sixth of all global advertising (Mishra, 2015; Shimp, 2010), 
with Boeing and Marcon (2013) estimating that celebrity endorsement in advertising 
continues to rise, even though there is often a high cost associated.  
Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) conducted research into children’s understanding of 
advertisers’ intentions by asking them to identify the intended effects of different tactics that 
advertisers choose to employ. Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. suggested that the age at which 
children reach an adult level of understanding of advertising varies by tactic and generally, 
celebrity endorsement is one of the first tactics understood by eight-year-olds. Based on this 
finding, it is not surprising that Hudders, Cauberghe, and Panic (2015) viewed celebrity 
endorsement as a tactic to which children are not vulnerable. If the tactic of celebrity 
endorsement is the easier tactic to understand, then it could be that children, like adults, can 
defend themselves against the intended manipulation of the celebrity paired brands. These 
findings offer partial support for the work of Livingstone and Helsper (2006) who claimed 
that different processes of persuasion operate at different ages, dependent on levels of media 
literacy. However, according to these authors, although younger children do have some 
advertising literacy, this is generally at a lower level than their older counterparts. Therefore, 
younger children would be more inclined to be persuaded by advertising containing 
celebrities, whereas older children are more likely to be persuaded more by ads that contain 
high quality arguments (Livingstone & Helsper, 2006).  
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There are several reasons why many advertisers choose to use celebrity endorsers 
within their advertisements and there are thought to be many benefits of using this strategy 
for the advertisers who use them. Erdogan (1999) reported that celebrities can impact 
positively on attitude towards brands, purchase intentions, and ad believability. Furthermore, 
celebrities can help advertisements to “stand out” from competitors (Sherman, 1985, cited in 
Erdogan, Baker, & Tagg, 2001), which leads companies to employ celebrity endorsers in an 
attempt to maximise profit (Erdogan et al., 2001). Despite Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan 
(1997) stating that there is no doubt about the positive impact celebrity endorsement has on 
financial returns for the company, there is, however, much debate surrounding the ability of 
celebrities to increase actual purchase behaviour. This leads to an important question 
concerning how the celebrity effect in advertising actually works.  
Research suggests that we, as consumers, can be persuaded by advertising if a 
celebrity is seen to endorse the product (Cialdini, 2001). In terms of the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM), Lee and Koo (2016) stated that celebrity endorsement has 
traditionally been perceived as a peripheral cue. Petty and Cacioppo (1998) predicted that 
motivation and ability influence the likelihood of message elaboration, and that increased 
elaboration enhances persuasion when the message is strong, and weakening persuasion 
when elaboration is weak. Relating to this model, Lee and Koo’s research would suggest that 
using celebrity endorsers could weaken persuasion.  
In a recent review of research on celebrity endorsement, Bergkvist and Zhou (2016) 
noted that although there has been a large amount of research carried out to look at the effects 
of celebrity endorsement, for example on brand attitudes, purchase intentions and brand 
evaluations, surprisingly few studies have looked at the underlying psychological 
mechanisms involved. There seems to be consensus in the literature, however, that a key 
process involved is evaluative conditioning. As described earlier in section 1.2.4, evaluative 
conditioning is a form of ‘low effort’ cognitive processing through which responses to one 
stimulus come to be associated with a target stimulus following pairing of the two stimuli 
(Fennis & Stroebe, 2015). Till and Shimp (1998) described how, in using celebrity endorsers, 
it is expected that consumers’ positive feelings toward a celebrity will transfer automatically 
to the endorsed brand through a process that has been called ‘affect infusion’ (Forehand & 
Perkins, 2005) and research has shown that repeated pairing of celebrities with brands can 
increase brand liking (Till, Stanley, & Priluck, 2008). An important feature of this process is 
that its effects can be seen under conditions involving little cognitive effort.  
Research has suggested that using a celebrity is effective in an advertisement under 
low product involvement conditions via the peripheral route (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 2005), 
especially when a celebrity’s credibility is compared to a non-celebrity with regards to brands 
being endorsed (La Ferle & Choi, 2005). In terms of the ELM, celebrity endorsement has 
traditionally been perceived as a peripheral cue (Lee & Koo, 2016) and research has been 
conducted into the influence of celebrities under different product involvement conditions. 
For example, findings have shown that endorser credibility influences both attitude towards 
the brand, and purchase intention (Goldsmith, Lafferty, & Newell, 2000) when a celebrity is 
considered to be a credible endorser for the brand being endorsed (La Ferle & Choi, 2005) or 
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during times when the celebrity ‘eclipses’ the brand (Ilicic and Webster, 2004) and the 
celebrity has a higher level of involvement in the ad than the product itself (Choi, Lee, & 
Kim, 2005). With reference to the ELM, Hung (2014) proposed that when attention is paid to 
the celebrity then attitude change is likely to occur. 
One reason why celebrity endorsement has been seen to operate best under conditions 
of low involvement could be that a risk to its effectiveness occurs where the targeted 
audience is encouraged to consciously reflect upon the intentions behind the ad under 
conditions of high involvement / high elaboration likelihood. Heath (2012) has argued that 
when the potential for conscious cognitive elaboration of advertising material is high, 
consumers are much more likely to process that material critically and therefore advertising 
may be less effective. For example, when presented with celebrity endorsement consumers 
engaging in conscious reflection might become more alert to the possibility that their feelings 
are being manipulated by the use of a celebrity, recognise the irrelevance of the celebrity to 
an objective evaluation of the product and resist the intentions of the advertiser. This would 
fit with the findings suggesting that the use of celebrities is more effective under conditions 
of low involvement (e.g., Choi et al., 2005) and also points to the important role played by 
implicit (as opposed to explicit) evaluations in influencing consumers’ responses to celebrity 
endorsement.    
Research has been conducted into the impact that negative information about a 
celebrity might have on consumer evaluations of endorsed brands. Boeing and Marcon 
(2013) argued that those who are being targeted in terms of advertising tend to react 
favourably to a product when it has an associated celebrity, although there is also the ability 
to react adversely if the endorser is later portrayed in an undesirable light. Therefore, there is 
an element of risk for companies using celebrities to endorse their brands as any negative, 
public news concerning the celebrity is out of the company’s control and could potentially 
reduce their brand appeal (Money, Shimp, & Sakano, 2006). As one fairly recent example 
showed, immediately following the incident surrounding Tiger Woods, the Accenture stock 
price fell by 2.9% (Thwaites, Lowe, Monkhouse, & Barnes, 2012). Till and Shimp (1998) 
stated that in terms of using celebrity endorsers, it is expected that positive feelings toward a 
celebrity transfer to the endorsed brand through the positive association that individuals build 
– therefore a positive representation of the celebrity leads to a positive evaluation of the 
brand being endorsed. However, in their research, Till and Shimp found that after an 
associative link has been forged between a brand and its celebrity endorser, any future 
negative information of the celebrity lowered brand evaluations. Furthermore, Carrillat, 
D’Astous, and Christianis (2014) found that negative views portrayed of a celebrity endorser 
not only changes attitudes of the endorsed brand, but also the attitudes of competitor brands 
within the same market. 
As discussed in section 1.2.4, a second type of risk can occur within advertising, 
particularly if the targeted audience is required to consciously think too much about the 
intentions behind the ad. In everyday life, it is common for one object to generate conflicting 
evaluative responses, and therefore, an important research question concerns the mental 
processes that underlie explicit and implicit evaluations and the causal factors that lead to 
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changes in the two kinds of responses (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The APE model 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) distinguishes between implicit and explicit processing by 
proposing that implicit evaluations are the outcome of associative processes, whereas explicit 
evaluations result from propositional processing. In relation to celebrity advertising, it seems 
likely that the celebrity effect results from triggering such implicit, associative evaluations. If 
Heath’s (2012) view is correct, therefore, it may be that to some degree the success of 
celebrity endorsement also rests upon not encouraging consumers to engage in explicit 
propositional evaluation of advertisements where celebrity endorsement occurs.  
Research by Forehand and Perkins (2005) has shown how conscious reflection about 
celebrity advertising can impact upon young adults’ self-reported judgments about the 
advertised brand, finding that young adult students were able to recognise that such 
advertising tactics (celebrity endorsement) were used to manipulate their preferences. 
Examining the effects of celebrity brand endorsement upon both explicit and implicit 
responses to the brand, Forehand and Perkins used celebrity voiceovers in ads, and checked 
brand preferences when participants did or did not recognise the celebrity in the ad. As 
discussed previously, many advertisers choose to use celebrities in their campaigns in the 
hopes that positive evaluation of the celebrity transfers to the associated brand (Till & Shimp, 
1998; Till, Stanley & Priluck, 2008), however many of these ads use celebrity images and/or 
visual representation in the form of video campaigns. In both of these instances consumers 
are able to see the celebrity endorser. Advertisements containing celebrity voice-overs, 
however, provide no visual feature of the celebrity, and often fail to acknowledge the 
celebrity’s existence (Forehand & Perkins, 2005). This may mean that consumers are 
unaware that a celebrity is being used within advertisements, and as such celebrity influence 
may occur without knowledge from the consumer. To investigate the effect of ads containing 
celebrity voiceovers, Forehand and Perkins (2005) used both explicit and implicit measures 
to assess whether they prompted participants to align their responses to the advertised 
products with their response to the celebrities. 
Undergraduate students were tested over three different time points. After initial 
ratings of celebrity familiarity, celebrity liking and brand attitudes at time one, participants 
completed a series of IATs at time two. Three weeks later undergraduates watched a series of 
television advertisements and completed further IATs to test the strength of association 
between the brands that had been advertised and the pleasant/unpleasant attributes. To 
complete the experiment, participants were asked to complete a final questionnaire which 
measured brand attitude, celebrity identification and celebrity-brand fit.  
Young adults who were unable to identify the celebrity voice in an advertisement 
altered both their explicit and implicit attitudes to a brand to become more positive, in line 
with the persuasive intent of the advertiser (an ‘assimilation response’). When students 
recognised the celebrity voice within the ad their explicit attitude to the brand became less 
positive (a ‘contrast response’). Forehand and Perkins argued that participants who 
recognised that the celebrity was being used to influence their conscious judgment appeared 
to consciously ‘reset’ their explicit response to the brand in a negative direction. Importantly, 
however, there was no such resetting effect for implicit judgments and implicit preferences 
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remained in line with their attitude to the celebrity. These findings suggest that although 
conscious propositional processing might enable adults to resist the effect of celebrity 
endorsement in their explicit judgments, protecting against its implicit effects could be far 
more difficult. It may be that even adults have very little defence against the effects of 
implicitly acquired affective associations which strongly influence our lifestyles as 
consumers (Nairn & Fine, 2008).  
Forehand and Perkins (2005) acknowledge that the celebrities used within their 
experiment may not have been recognised by participants, and this could have had 
implications on the reported results. Whilst it is suggested that “most” of the participants 
recognised at least “some” of the celebrities, not all participants recognised all of the 
celebrities during the celebrity familiarity stage, and therefore celebrity identification in the 
tasks may not have been possible for some participants at times when it should have been. It 
could be possible that participants who could and could not identify a celebrity differed in 
important ways beyond recognition (Forehand and Perkins, 2005). Future research would 
benefit from implementing a method whereby celebrity familiarity was measured before 
inclusion in explicit and implicit measures. A methodological design personalised to each 
individual participant would ensure that celebrities had (or had not) been identified, thus 
eradicating the concerns of recognition.  
The study by Forehand and Perkins (2005), whilst only correlational in design, lends 
support to the notion that the liking of the person who endorses a brand may affect implicit 
evaluations. This study only used celebrity voice-overs when the majority of advertising that 
consumers are exposed to in society today is visual in its nature. Examining this would 
provide a further insight into celebrity endorsement of brands aiding in the explanation of our 
behaviours and preferences as consumers. It is possible that this may elicit different results to 
those found by Forehand and Perkins. In the design of their study the celebrities were 
‘hidden’ from participants, and this could raise questions as to how representative this study 
was in relation to typical advertising campaigns. Recognition of the ‘hidden’ celebrities in the 
radio ads could have triggered a sense of being manipulated in these participants which then 
led to resistance, however in much of the advertising campaigns that we are faced with as 
consumers, celebrity endorsers are typically exposed. It would therefore be beneficial to this 
research area to extend the examination of explicit and implicit effects of celebrity 
advertising where the celebrity is readily available for the participant to acknowledge. 
The more recent work of Ilicic and Webster (2014) offers some support for the notion 
that celebrity endorsers being exposed may have a different effect on brand attitudes. 
Providing contrasting findings to that of Forehand and Perkins (2005), Ilicic and Webster 
(2014) examined the effects of celebrity ‘eclipsing’ on consumer explicit evaluations of 
endorsed brands. Eclipsing refers to a situation where the presence of a celebrity endorser in 
the advertisement completely overshadows the brand in a way that makes the celebrity the 
focal point of the advert over and above the product being advertised (Ilicic & Webster, 
2014). One of the main findings of Ilicic and Webster’s research was that high eclipsing in 
consumers with strong celebrity attachment enhances brand attitude, regardless of whether 
they perceive the celebrity and brand to either match or mismatch. In contrast to the findings 
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of Forehand and Perkins (2005), therefore, these findings suggest that where there is a strong 
preference for a celebrity this can lead individuals to be more positive in their reasoning 
about the associated brand even when they are aware of the persuasive intent of using 
celebrities in the ads.  
In their review of research in this area, Bergkvist and Zhou (2016) pointed out that 
very few studies have looked at the extent to which liking a celebrity influences the effects of 
endorsement (possibly because of the assumption that it is well-liked celebrities that are 
usually chosen as endorsers). They reported mixed findings in the studies that have been 
carried out, with some studies finding positive effects on brand evaluations (e.g. Silvera & 
Austad, 2004) and others more equivocal (Fleck-Dousteyssier, Korchia, & Le Roy, 2012). 
However, all of the reported studies only assessed participants’ explicit, self-reported 
responses which would be expected to depend upon propositional processing and did not test 
their implicit responses. In terms of Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model (2011), it 
could be that in these circumstances recognising a well-liked celebrity gives rise to 
propositional processing in participants that generates positive thoughts about the celebrity 
which have previously been consciously articulated, thus overriding any concerns about 
being manipulated and reducing the likelihood of participants demonstrating resistance to the 
aims of the advertisement.  
Clearly there is a complex range of factors at work in the effectiveness of celebrity 
endorsement in advertising. One important question that arises, however, concerns the point 
at which the nature of an advertisement or its presentation brings about conscious reflection, 
which leads consumers to resist its intended effects in their explicit responses and whether 
this also impacts upon their implicit responses. In the research carried out by Forehand and 
Perkins (2005), it was enough for young adults to recognise celebrities in audio 
advertisements to cause them to guard against celebrity influence in their explicit brand 
evaluations. However, their implicit responses to the brands remained positive. In Ilicic and 
Webster’s (2014) study, participants’ strong liking for celebrities appeared to override any 
resistance to the ads that could have been engendered by conscious reflection. Further 
research is clearly needed.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
Celebrities are often used in voice-overs in an attempt to promote brands and persuade buyers 
to purchase the product. Therefore, by taking a celebrity (to whom the consumer hopefully 
has a positive affective response) and pairing their voice with a brand may cause the 
consumer’s positive attitude to the celebrity to be generalised to the brand. Because of this, 
voice-overs have the potential to influence the consumer implicitly – their judgments about 
the brand might be influenced without their awareness (Forehand & Perkins, 2005). If the 
same effect was seen for children, then it offers an argument for the long running debate 
surrounding the banning of advertisements that are aimed at children. Advertisements in 
Sweden that are aimed at children under the age of 12-years are banned due to their 
persuasive nature that children are unable to acknowledge and subsequently defend 
themselves from (Pine & Veasey, 2003). Therefore, the fact that the young adults in 
32 
 
Forehand and Perkins’ (2005) study consciously recognised that they were being manipulated 
by the celebrity voiceover, meant that in terms of explicit judgment, they showed a dislike for 
the brand contained within it. Implicitly, however, the celebrity voiceover influenced students 
in a way that they showed a preference for it (Forehand & Perkins, 2005). Thus, whilst the 
young adults believed that they protected themselves against the intentions of the 
advertisements, implicitly they were heavily affected by the advertisers’ persuasion.  
Largely, the literature suggests that individuals are able to protect themselves against 
the explicit effects of advertisements by the age of 12-years-old (see review of literature in 
section 1.2). So, when they know it is a celebrity, they recognise that they are being 
“advertised to” and they can protect themselves. However, this is a problem for children aged 
eight- to 10-years, as they may not be able to counteract explicit effects of advertising due to 
the fact that, according to Piaget and Theory of Mind research, younger children are not good 
at picking up ambiguities. It thus demonstrates the true effects of advertising, even more so 
for children who may not even be able to defend themselves against explicit judgments. 
The research carried out by Forehand and Perkins (2005) suggested that the 
recognition of celebrity voices in an advertisement is a determining factor of whether explicit 
and implicit attitudes towards a brand change for young adults but, so far, we remain unsure 
about children. Furthermore, the work of Forehand and Perkins used celebrity voiceovers, but 
what about when celebrity images are paired with brands? This is something which has yet to 
be studied but would provide a further insight into celebrity endorsement of brands and 
would aid in the explanation of our behaviours and preferences as consumers. When using 
the pairing of images, there should be even more chance of attracting a reset effect. Thus, it 
may be helpful for the eight-year-olds but may also be more likely to lead to lessening the 
implicit effect. This would be especially valid when considering that the large majority of 
advertising that children encounter comes from visual, rather than vocal media. In terms of 
explicit attitudes, recognition of celebrity voiceovers allows young adults to protect 
themselves from their affective responses to celebrities in their explicit brand judgments, yet 
in terms of implicit attitudes, young adults seem unable defend themselves against their 
implicit affective associations. 
Reviewing the literature formulates new research questions: at what age do children 
truly understand the ‘persuasive intent’ of advertising? Can children as young as eight- and 
10-years protect themselves from the explicit effects of advertising, or does this apply only to 
older children and adults? To what extent can children and adults defend themselves against 
its implicit effects? And to what extent does scepticism to advertising and advertising literacy 
buffer the unwanted effect of celebrity advertisements? As a first step to answering these 
questions, the work carried out by Forehand and Perkins (2005) was extended to look at 
advertisers’ use of celebrities in a visual context. This was considered to be an appropriate 
starting point as children as young as eight- to 10-years of age have been previously shown to 
have precocious understanding of advertisers’ intentions in using celebrity endorsement 
(Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., 2011). Furthermore, whilst research has been conducted into 
celebrity voiceovers as a form of brand endorsement, research is currently lacking in the field 
of celebrity images used in advertisements.  
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As discussed throughout this literature review, research and theories which have 
looked at children’s explicit judgments have been somewhat mixed in their conclusions 
concerning the age at which children understand the persuasive intention behind advertising. 
Largely, celebrity endorsement is considered to be one of the first advertisers’ tactics that 
children recognise (Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. 2011) and are not vulnerable to (Hudders et al., 
2017), suggesting that children comprehend why celebrities are used to endorse products 
(Lawler & Prothero, 2003). Although unlikely, it is not unreasonable to expect to see children 
defend themselves against the explicit nature of advertising. Nevertheless, it is beneficial to 
follow up Forehand and Perkins’ (2005) study to investigate the effects of celebrity 
endorsement on children’s implicit and explicit judgments, testing whether even a weak 
connection with celebrity leads to an effect. This requires children of varying ages to be 
studied to address the age at which children are able to recognise explicitly the persuasive 
intent of television advertising - at present this holds much debate. 
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2 Introduction 
 
2.1 Background 
The research for this thesis commenced towards the end of 2012 and focused upon one 
specific advertising technique - pairing celebrities with brands. Research has shown that 
children’s understanding of ad techniques varies, but by eight-years of age they appear to 
have a good grasp of celebrity endorsement (Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., 2011). Previous 
research has only focused upon children’s self-reported responses. Therefore, the research 
reported throughout this thesis examines how and when celebrity advertising influences 
brand judgments in children and young adults (both on an explicit and implicit level), and 
whether the relationship between advertising and scepticism could potentially protect 
children and young adults from the potential unwanted adverse effects of celebrity 
advertising. To date, no research has considered the effect of celebrity advertising on 
children’s advertising judgements in an implicit, as well as explicit, way, and whether 
scepticism to advertising could provide some protective barrier.  
Literature tends to agree that pairing celebrities with brands makes attitudes towards 
those brands much stronger (Erdogan et al., 2001). This is a finding which many studies have 
replicated, and generally research with adults supports this view. Research by Bergkvist and 
Zhou (2016), however, reports mixed findings in studies that have been carried out. Whilst 
some studies have found positive effects on brand evaluations (e.g. Silvera & Austad, 2004), 
others have found more ambiguous results (Fleck-Dousteyssier et al., 2012). Additionally, 
there is literature to suggest that children seem to have a good understanding of the aims of 
celebrity endorsement from the age of approximately eight-years of age (Rozendaal, Buijzen, 
et al., 2011). However, all of the reported studies only assessed participants’ explicit, self-
reported responses which would be expected to depend upon propositional processing and 
did not test participants’ implicit responses. Furthermore, previous developmental work 
suggests that adults and older children should be able to resist the effect of advertisements, 
and this has been linked to developing advertising literacy. Very little is known about the 
implicit effects of celebrity endorsements on children’s and young adults’ responses, nor 
how, or to what extent, advertisement scepticism plays a part in moderating these effects. 
The research within this thesis first involved trialling a specially designed computer 
programme with a sample of young adults, to test the hypothesis that young adults could 
resist the celebrity effect on an explicit, but not implicit, level. However, results from this 
study found that young adults had both an explicit and implicit preference for celebrity paired 
brands, offering some support for Rozendaal Buijs et al’s. (2016) prediction that implicit and 
explicit judgments may interact. These initial results did not replicate previous findings (e.g. 
Forehand & Perkins, 2005), and so the thesis shifted focus to examine why adults were 
susceptible to brands paired with well-liked celebrities, when they should be able to defend 
against advertising’s unwanted effects. Two further studies involved a development of 
materials, so real brands rather than novel brands were used, and the adaptation of a 
scepticism scale was included. Findings revealed that well-liked celebrities and celebrities 
only known (but not particularly well-liked) elicited differing results – when celebrities are 
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considered well-liked the celebrity effect is difficult to overcome on an explicit level, yet 
when the celebrity is simply known, resistance to the associated brand can be established. 
Furthermore, scepticism to advertising seemed to hold some importance. With this finding 
cemented, it was possible to use this knowledge and apply it to investigate developmental 
differences in children aged eight- to 14-years. At the start of this research, explicit, 
conscious preferences were measured, alongside brand preferences and scepticism, and this 
led to the development of a more detailed scepticism scale and the testing of both explicit and 
implicit preferences of celebrity paired brands. 
 
2.2 Summary of Theoretical Framework 
This thesis focuses upon the effect of pairing celebrities with brands upon children’s and 
young adults’ responses to advertising. Young adults were included to provide a benchmark 
against which the development of children’s responses could be addressed. This has not been 
straightforward as theoretical perspectives upon children’s developing understanding of 
advertising is fairly limited and rooted in Piaget’s general theory of cognitive development – 
a theory adapted by John (1999) to formulate a stage like sequence of development. More 
recently, there have been some attempts to explain children’s understanding of ads using a 
Theory of Mind perspective, although the impact of this research has been very limited. In 
line with Piaget’s account of cognitive development, and children’s increasing cognitive 
competence, research tends to suggest that as children develop so too does their ability to 
identify advertising and recognise its persuasive and commercial intent. Following from the 
work of Piaget, Friedstad and Wright’s (1994) Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) was 
created. This proposed that, compared with older children and adults, younger children find it 
difficult to appreciate the information contained in advertising and struggle to recognise that 
advertisers present information from the perspective of their clients in seeking to persuade 
the recipient and influence their behaviour. Building on the work of Piaget, the PKM explains 
that, in general, older children (like young adults) are better able to reflect upon their own 
thinking and the thoughts of others, and as such can think in a more abstract way. Theory 
suggests that this corresponds with their ability to understand more about the purpose and 
intent of advertising. This ability (sometimes called ‘advertising literacy’) Rozendaal, 
Lapierre, et al. (2011) has been seen as providing children and adults with protection against 
advertising’s potential adverse effects. It has been assumed that advertising literacy skills 
require the ability to consciously process information about advertising. 
Little research has looked at whether implicit cognitive processes have a part to play 
in how children respond to advertising and, on this basis, the work of Piaget and the PKM 
may not be sufficient in explaining the celebrity effect. The conscious reflective skills the 
PKM and Piaget suggest are necessary for adult competence, yet modern ad techniques call 
into question the utility of Piaget and the PKM as much of modern advertising is aimed at 
influencing our “gut” feelings rather than our conscious processing. It is important to reflect 
on the difference between explicit and implicit judgments, as Nairn and Fine (2008) stated 
that adults have very little defence against the effects of implicitly acquired affective 
associations which strongly influence our lifestyles as consumers. Advertising campaigns 
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now take various different forms – Internet ads, tailored pop-up ads, embedded ads in games 
- to name just a few, with advertisers using varying techniques to make their ads “stand out” 
from the others. One such popular technique is celebrity endorsement.  
An important question about the celebrity effect in advertising concerns how it 
actually works. Although there has been a large amount of research carried out to look at the 
effects of celebrity endorsement, for example on brand attitudes, purchase intentions and 
brand evaluations, surprisingly few studies have looked at the underlying psychological 
mechanisms (Bergkvist & Zhou, 2016). There does, however, seem to be consensus in the 
literature that evaluative conditioning could be a key process (e.g. Fennis & Stroebe, 2015; 
Forehand & Perkins, 2005; Till & Shimp, 1998; Till et al., 2008). Evaluative conditioning is 
defined as a change in liking, which occurs due to an association with a positive or negative 
stimulus (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). It is important to consider that whilst 
advertisements are aimed at influencing consumers’ behaviour through persuasive intentions, 
not all ads use a direct persuasive attempt. Instead, some advertisements are concerned more 
with evaluative conditioning of an affect towards a brand or product. This can be problematic 
if the targeted audience is required to consciously think too much about the intentions behind 
the ad. Conflicting evaluative responses to the same object is ordinary in everyday life, and 
therefore an important research question concerns the mental processes that underlie explicit 
and implicit evaluations and the causal factors that lead to changes in the two kinds of 
responses (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). This thesis integrates dual-process models 
from the perspective of consumer psychology from relevant theoretical strands such as the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Associative–
Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Both of these 
theoretical models go some way to offering dual-step and dual-process perspectives which 
distinguish between implicit and explicit processing.  
What these models fail to consider are the potential effects that scepticism towards 
advertising may have on children’s judgments. Recent work in the area (e.g. Rozendaal, 
Lapierre, et al., 2011) has suggested that the development of advertising scepticism – which 
some researchers have treated as an affective response to ads – may be important in helping 
children combat the negative effects of advertising. This thesis therefore builds upon theory 
and models provided in existing literature, to enhance the current thinking and research in the 
field of children’s advertising development. More specifically, it looks to propose a new 
model to explain why older children and young adults are less vulnerable to advertiser 
messages by incorporating both advertising knowledge and scepticism (accuracy- and affect-
based scepticism) into the model in a novel way. 
 
2.3 Aims 
The research for this thesis was carried out due to the lack of research exploring the 
developmental nature of celebrity advertising, and the effect it has on children’s implicit and 
explicit brand judgments. Because children’s implicit responses have not been investigated 
previously, there is a need for this research and it is possible that a dual-process model may 
be required. Research suggests that conceptual advertising literacy may not be helpful in 
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guarding against the celebrity effect (Rozendaal, Opree, et al., 2016), but attitudinal literacy 
might. A negative disposition towards ads might be useful. Hudders et al. (2017) cited that 
not only do children have a limited dispositional advertising literacy (e.g. knowledge of 
advertising and its intent) but they also have difficulty applying such knowledge (situational 
advertising literacy). With this in mind, scepticism was also studied. As discussed in section 
1.2, previous research suggests that a dual-process model is needed to explain explicit and 
implicit advertising judgments, but the research in this thesis aimed to look at existing 
models from a developmental perspective, as well as incorporating scepticism into the model 
to explain how explicit and implicit judgments are influenced. In particular, the research 
aimed to achieve the following objectives:  
1. To identify the effects of pairing celebrities with brands on children’s and young 
adults’ explicit and implicit brand responses.  
2. To assess whether, and at what age, children and young adults demonstrate resistance 
to the effects of pairing celebrities with brands. 
3. To explore whether differences occur in individuals’ explicit and implicit responses to 
celebrity paired brands. 
4. To begin to investigate the importance of scepticism in advertising judgments – more 
specifically between different types of advertising scepticism and responses to 
celebrity paired brands. 
5. To begin to develop a new model of advertising response which incorporates the 
effects of ad scepticism in a novel way. 
 
 
2.4 Methods 
The research described in this thesis used a quantitative approach. Explicit responses 
throughout these studies were measured using likert scales presented to participants. These 
scales were either in the form of paper questionnaires, or scales incorporated within a 
computer programme which also served to examine implicit responses. These scales allowed 
for explicit preferences for brands to be calculated, alongside overall brand choice. Many of 
the studies reported previously in the literature review have successfully measured children’s 
explicit preferences and/or attitudes to advertisements through self-report, likert scale 
questionnaires, with relative ease and success (see Hudders & Cauberghe, 2018; Hudders et 
al., 2016; Hudders et al., 2017; Rozendaal et al., 2009; Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., 2011; 
Rozendaal, Lapierre et al., 2011; Rozendall, Opree et al., 2016; and Rozendaal, Buijs et al, 
2016). To measure implicit responses, the studies discussed in this thesis used the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) - a test developed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), which 
assumes that individuals respond more quickly in identifying categories when presented with 
concepts they already associate together, compared with those they do not associate. An 
evaluation of the IAT method, including its reliability and validity was discussed in section 
1.2.3. 
Research by Forehand and Perkins (2005) has provided evidence that the IAT can be 
successfully used with undergraduates in studies interested in brand evaluations, and this in 
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itself offers a valid reasoning as to why the IAT method is employed in the research 
discussed throughout this thesis. The IAT has also been used successfully in research with 
children of varying ages to examine their implicit attitudes on a range of factors such as 
bullying, gender and race (McKeague et al., 2013). More specifically, research has shown to 
be successful in measuring implicit knowledge of advertising to children. In research looking 
at children’s implicit and pre-explicit perceptions of alcohol advertisements, Nash, Pine and 
Messer (2009) highlighted that studies which include an implicit measure are more able to 
capture the complexity of children’s thinking, a view supported by their own research 
findings which demonstrated that using an IAT provided a far richer insight into the 
children’s views than their own verbal reflections. Whilst earlier experiments in their 
research found that older children expressed a dislike for alcohol advertisements (Nash et al., 
2009), the implicit measures in their later experiments highlighted that children of all ages 
had a liking for these ads.  
Similar findings have since been reported by Monnery-Patris, Marty, Bayer, Nicklaus 
and Chambaron (2015) who, in their study into attitudes towards food, found that children’s 
categorizations of nutritional foods increased with age, which for older children contrasted 
their implicit attitudes. Monnery-Patris et al. (2015) suggested that this may be because their 
explicit categorisations involved an awareness and appreciation of social norms, and the 
benefits of some food types were less likely to be reflected in their implicit attitudes. 
Research papers such as these, which have used multiple methods for testing children’s 
attitudes towards advertisements, emphasises the necessity for both explicit and implicit 
measures to be incorporated, in order for accurate information about the impact on 
advertising to children to be disseminated (Nash et al., 2009). Being able to use the IAT with 
children highlights that the IAT is a flexible task that can be used to test associations from 
many different pairs of concepts (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).  
Previous research has been able to successfully adapt the IAT method for the 
appropriate age of the child being tested (McKeague et al., 2013). In more recent research, 
Williams and Steele (2016) has shown that the reliability of the IAT when using child 
samples is as high as when the IAT has been used with adults. A concern of some research 
with children highlights that children aim to please and can therefore be biased in their self-
reporting. The IAT method has been shown to remove this concern (Williams & Steele, 
2016). The IAT is also well suited to being adapted to children of pre-school age. Cvencek, 
Greenwald and Meltzoff (2011) used the Preschool Implicit Association Test (PSIAT) to 
raise an argument against the view that children under the age of six years find such methods 
too cognitively demanding (Castelli, Zogmaister & Tomelleri, 2009). Due to the common use 
of insects and flowers on typical IATs with adults (Rudman, 2011) and children, Cveneck et 
al. (2011) used this stimuli to assess the implicit nature of this attitude with four-year-old 
children. Adaptations such as using images and words narrated to children, shortening the 
length of the trials completed, and response buttons coloured to match each side of the 
screen, Cveneck et al. (2011) found positive implicit attitudes towards flowers, highlighting 
that the IAT can be adapted for pre-school children, and that the adaption of the method 
obtained results in the expected direction, and in line with older children. 
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Finally, and in providing further support for the IAT being an appropriate choice of 
method for the studies reported in this thesis, Gibson (2008) suggested that the IAT method is 
best used in studies within consumer research as advertisements are often based on 
associative learning. As discussed in section 1.4, advertisements are increasingly using 
celebrities in advertising campaigns in the hopes that consumers will transfer the positive 
attitudes of the celebrity to the brand.  
In the current thesis, where the IAT was used, participants were presented with the 
categories ‘Celebrity Brand’, ‘Non-Celebrity Brand’ (or ‘Brand Alone’ in later studies), 
‘Good’, and ‘Bad’ (‘Attributes’), and stimuli from one of those four categories were 
presented one at a time on a computer screen. This follows the standard procedure for 
administering IATs devised by Greenwald et al. (2003). Throughout the test participants were 
required to categorize the stimuli as quickly as possible, making as few errors as possible. 
Participants were instructed to use the ‘Z’ (L response) and ‘M’ (R response) key on the 
computer keyboard to indicate whether the presented stimuli matched that of the category 
presented on the upper-left or upper-right side of the computer screen. The first two stages of 
each IAT were practice trials which aimed to reinforce participants’ recognition and 
discrimination of the good and bad attribute words, and celebrity and non-celebrity (or brand 
alone) brands. In Stage 1, participants used the ‘Z’ and ‘M’ keys on the keyboard and were 
instructed to press ‘M’ (R response) when they saw a bad word, and ‘Z’ (L response) when 
they saw a good word. Participants’ ability to discriminate between celebrity and non-
celebrity brands (or brand alone) was then tested in Stage 2. As before, participants used the 
‘Z’ and ‘M’ keys on the keyboard and were instructed to press the ‘M’ key when they saw a 
brand that had been previously paired with a celebrity, and ‘Z’ when a non-celebrity brand 
(or brand alone) was shown. Each brand remained on screen until participants registered a 
response, and an incorrect response was highlighted using a red cross appearing on the 
screen. Participants were instructed that if a red cross appeared they must respond correctly 
to continue with the trial. 
 Next, the brand IATs were run to assess the strength of association between 
celebrity and non-celebrity brands (or brand alone) and good and bad attributes. Participants 
were again required to press one of the two response keys (‘M’ or ‘Z’) and received 
instructions at each stage upon when to make a right or left response. In the first test trials 
(Stage 3), celebrity paired brands were paired with good attributes (non-celebrity paired 
brands / brand alone with bad attributes). The key orientation was switched followed by 
further practice trials (Stage 4), and then the final test trial (Stage 5) asked participants to 
respond to non-celebrity paired brands / brand alone and good attributes (celebrity paired 
brands with bad attributes). 
 Upon completion of the test trials, a score of “Too Fast” was generated for 
participants who had response times recorded as less than 300ms for more than 10% of their 
trials - as such data was not gathered for these participants. For the remaining participants, 
the computer program automatically generated an individual D-score using the D-algorithm 
following the recommendations of Greenwald, et al. (2003). This was calculated by using the 
average response time from Stage 5 (celebrity brands paired with bad attributes) minus the 
average response time for Stage 3 (celebrity brands paired with good attributes), this 
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difference was then divided by the pooled standard deviation generated at Stage 5. A positive 
score means the items paired in Stage 5 have a weaker association than those paired in Stage 
3, and therefore positive D scores represent faster times for the celebrity brand/good pairing 
and an implicit preference for celebrity brands. 
 Study 1 used an experimental computer-based method to explore the preferences of 
explicit and implicit novel brands (i.e. created by the experimenter) paired with well-liked 
celebrities and neutral non-celebrities in both young adults (n = 70) and young children (n = 
21). After initially rating their preference to celebrities, non-celebrities and novel brands, 
participants were asked to rate the brands again after they had been paired with either a 
celebrity or a non-celebrity (neither liked nor disliked). The computer programme 
automatically selected brands and non-celebrities that the participants had initially rated 
neutrally, and celebrities they had rated as well-liked. Participants were then presented with 
an Implicit Association Test and, lastly, participants were asked to choose their favourite 
three brands from those originally presented. Findings indicated that children and young 
adults had both an implicit and explicit preference for novel brands that had been paired with 
a celebrity they liked and, furthermore, their final brand choices tended to be those that had 
been paired with a well-liked celebrity.  
 Because, unexpectedly, the young adults in Study 1 showed no resistance to the well-
liked celebrities, Study 2 focused on young adults only (n = 59). Study 2 utilised the same 
method as Study 1, with the added inclusion of persuasive taglines to accompany the novel 
brands. One possible explanation for the lack of resistance to celebrity paired brands in Study 
1 was that without persuasive messages or taglines there may not have been a recognition of 
advertising and therefore acknowledgement of a persuasion attempt was not triggered. Study 
2 addressed this concern and included accompanying taglines as indicators that the brands 
were advertising campaigns. As before, after initially rating celebrities, non-celebrities and 
novel brands, young adults rated the brands before completing the IAT. Finally, they were 
asked to choose their favourite three brands. Findings replicated those of Study 1, with young 
adults once again showing both an explicit and implicit preference for brands paired with 
celebrities they had a high liking for.  
 Study 3, again carried out with young adults (n = 72), moved from using novel brands 
to instead using brands that were known to the participants without being market leaders in 
their field. Prior to taking part in the experimental procedure each participant also completed 
an advertising literacy questionnaire - a short version of Rozendaal, Opree et al’s (2016) 
Attitudinal Literary Scale for Children (ALS-c) which was adapted for use with the sample of 
young adults. The scale consisted of two subcomponents looking at conceptual and 
attitudinal advertising literacy. The assumption of Studies 1 and 2 was that as experienced 
consumers of advertising, young adults would have a fully developed conceptual 
understanding of advertising and therefore that they would also be reasonably sceptical about 
advertising. This was tested in Study 3. As before, findings showed that young adults had 
both an explicit and implicit preference for brands that had been paired with well-liked 
celebrities. The 14-item Conceptual Literacy subscale was found to be unreliable, probably 
reflecting the adaptations made to the original scale to facilitate its use with adults. Because 
of this, the data from this subscale was omitted from analysis. The six-item Attitudinal 
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Literacy subscale, however, reached an acceptable reliability level and was included in the 
analysis. There was a significant negative correlation between attitudinal advertising literacy 
and both celebrity-paired explicit brand score and implicit brand preference score. 
 In the previous three studies the expectation was to see resistance in young adults’ 
explicit responses. This failure to see resistance in explicit responses led to the implicit 
measure being left out of this study. Study 4 omitted the IAT from the method, focusing 
solely on examining why young adults were failing to show evidence of resisting the 
celebrity effect in their explicit judgments. Furthermore, this study moved away from using 
well-liked celebrities and became much more representative of our real-life advertising 
experiences where we experience brands presented with a range of celebrities which are 
known but not necessarily well-liked. Study 4 was a four-part questionnaire-based study. The 
first and fourth sections tested young adults’ (n = 86) scepticism pre- and post- presentation 
of brands using a scale adapted from Obermiller and Spangenberg’s (1998) Advertising 
Scepticism (SKEP) Scale. The second section of the questionnaire presented a sequence of 
images of brand logos presented on the type of backdrop boards often seen in media 
interviews or photographs. For half of the sample, a well-known celebrity was standing in 
front of the board, and the other half presented the backdrop without a celebrity. Participants 
were required to rate each brand presented. Brands and celebrities were counterbalanced 
across participants so that each brand was presented alone and with a celebrity. In the third 
section of the questionnaire participants were required to choose their favourite three brands. 
In contrast to the findings from Studies 1 to 3, findings showed that young adults had an 
explicit preference for brands presented alone rather than brands presented with a known 
celebrity. Furthermore, participants who scored higher on the scepticism scale before and 
after brand presentation had lower explicit preferences for brands presented with celebrities. 
 Study 4 demonstrated that celebrity liking and scepticism to advertising could be what 
drives explicit advertising preferences in young adults. Study 5 built upon this study and 
utilised the same methods with children aged eight to 14 years (n = 271) to examine 
developmental trends in explicit advertising judgments. Across the overall sample, results 
showed a higher preference for brands presented alone than presented with a celebrity, even 
in the youngest age groups. Furthermore, regardless of how the brands were presented, 
preference for brands decreased with age. Generally, brand preference was lower in the two 
older age groups (12-years and 14-years). Alongside this, scepticism increased with age, with 
the eight-year-olds being less sceptical than the older children. Even though the eight-year-
olds were less sceptical than the older age groups in the sample, they still had an explicit 
preference for brands presented alone. 
Study 6 maintained the stimuli presentation of advertising boards, to examine whether 
the results of Studies 1 to 3 were due to the method of the simple pairing presentation of 
celebrities and brands, or the effects of well-liked celebrities. The IAT method was also 
reintroduced to examine the celebrity effect in children’s implicit judgments. In this study, 
children aged eight- to 14-years (n = 207) were presented with the advertising boards alone 
or with either well-liked celebrities (piloted and matched to their age) or known celebrities. 
Children were tested over a three-week period. In week one, they were presented with a 
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printed questionnaire which tested independently their initial brand liking; initial celebrity 
liking; and initial scepticism – a scale which was developed for this study to incorporate both 
accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism. In week two, they were presented with brands 
presented either alone or with a celebrity (either well-liked or known) where they were asked 
to rate each brand and choose their favourite three. An IAT measure similar to that used in 
Studies 1 to 3 was also included to test implicit responses. In week three, scepticism and 
brand ratings were once again tested.  
Age differences were found across both celebrity conditions (well-liked and known). 
In the well-liked celebrity group, only the 14-year-old children showed resistance to the 
celebrity effect, and they had an explicit preference for brands presented alone. In contrast, in 
the known celebrity group, there was a significant explicit preference for celebrity brands 
over brand alone for the 14-year-olds. Eight-year-olds, 10-year-olds and 12-year-olds showed 
no significant difference in explicit preference for brands presented alone or with celebrity 
brands (well-liked or known). Younger children (eight- to 10-year-olds) had an implicit 
preference for brands presented with a known celebrity, whereas 14-year-olds had a 
significant implicit preference for brands presented alone. The implicit findings of the 14-
year-olds matched their explicit preferences. 
 For the older children, an increase in scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-
based) was related to lower explicit preferences for brands presented with well-liked 
celebrities only, highlighting that the negative influence of scepticism was only seen when a 
celebrity was present. For the younger children, the opposite was true, and those with higher 
scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) had lower explicit preference for brands 
presented alone. For the young children in the known celebrity group, affect-based scepticism 
was related to lower explicit brand alone preference. For both the younger children (aged 
eight- to 10-years) and older children (aged 12- to 14-years) very high celebrity liking was 
directly related to higher explicit celebrity brand preference. This relationship seemed to 
occur independent of scepticism. 
 
2.5 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is organised chronologically with each chapter outlining the six empirical studies. 
Firstly, Chapters 3 and 4 examine the impact of well-liked celebrities and neutrally rated non-
celebrities upon the brand preferences of young adults and a small sample of children. In 
Chapter 5 the scepticism scale was introduced to assess advertising literacy in young adults in 
relation to explicit preference, implicit brand preference, and brand choice. Chapters 6 and 7 
shifted focus slightly and examines the results of explicit preferences, brand choice, and 
scepticism when children and young adults were shown brands presented alone or paired 
with a known (rather than specifically ‘well-liked’) celebrity. Chapter 8 offers a reanalysis of 
the scepticism scale used in Studies 3 to 5, where general scepticism was split into accuracy-
based and affect-based scepticism - as a result further analyses and explorations of the 
findings are offered. Chapter 9 discusses the final empirical study looking specifically at how 
well-liked and known celebrities influence children’s explicit and implicit brand preference, 
brand choice and how this relates to advertising scepticism. Chapter 10 models the findings 
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of Study 6 and, finally, Chapter 11 completes the thesis with an overall discussion of the 
findings from all six studies, and includes an examination of the strengths and weaknesses, 
implications, and conclusions of this research. Recommendations for future work are also 
suggested. 
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3 Study 1 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The focus of the current chapter is to outline the first study conducted as part of this thesis. 
As discussed in section 1.2, traditional psychological theories such as Piaget and Theory of 
Mind predict that children’s cognitive resources and their perspective taking abilities are not 
at adult level. More specifically, it has been proposed that their advertising knowledge could 
be more limited than that of adults. Therefore, it can be suggested that children should be less 
likely to show resistance in their explicit, propositional responses to ads, and therefore, when 
presented with celebrity-paired brands, they may not show resistance to the celebrity effect. 
Young adults, on the other hand, should recognise a persuasion attempt and resist the effects 
of pairing in their explicit responses. Some evidence for this can be found in research looking 
at product placement which, at least notionally, involves covert advertising. Gibson, Redker 
and Zimmerman (2014) found that for brands presented covertly in a popular TV show, when 
participants recalled seeing the brand they tended to report positive explicit brand attitudes. 
However, when participants were primed to expect persuasion to occur those who recalled 
the brand reported more negative explicit brand attitudes. These researchers explain their 
results in terms of propositional reasoning engaged in by participants who were alerted to the 
manipulation attempt and which led them to provide more negative responses. Recognition of 
persuasion attempt involves propositional reasoning, and children are less likely to show this. 
However, because much of modern advertising aims at triggering an affective 
response, this study was also interested in implicit responses. This study takes a dual-process 
approach to try to understand the explicit and implicit processes involved in ad responses, 
and to investigate how children and young adults respond to advertising. Forehand & Perkins 
(2005) demonstrated that upon recognising a celebrity endorser, young adults resisted the 
celebrity effect by altering their explicit attitude to the brand against the persuasive intention 
of the advertiser. In Study 1 participants were presented with brands paired with celebrities 
they had already identified as being well-liked in order to explore the effect of such pairing 
on their explicit brand judgments. Forehand and Perkins also found that the effect of the ads 
was not resisted in their adults’ implicit responses. Other research (e.g. Yoo, 2008) has also 
shown that incidental exposure to ads can lead to favourable implicit responses to brands in 
adults. Therefore, an additional aim of Study 1 was to examine implicit responses in a group 
of young adults and children, to add to the somewhat limited research within this field. 
Although young adults can seemingly control their explicit propositional responses to 
advertising, automatic associational responses may be more difficult to control and therefore 
it was expected that they would still show an implicit preference for brands paired with 
celebrities. Assuming children do not have an adultlike understanding of persuasion in ads, 
this proposal would also suggest that children should find implicit responses difficult to 
control and therefore children should also show an implicit preference for advertised brands.  
As discussed in section 1.4.2, no research to date has considered the effect of 
celebrity advertising on both children’s explicit and implicit responses to advertising on their 
advertising judgements. Furthermore, as discussed in section 1.2, advertising research which 
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has previously taken a developmental approach has largely used Piagetian theory or taken a 
Theory of Mind perspective to explain how and when children understand the persuasive 
intent of advertising on an explicit, conscious level. This study, and the thesis more widely, 
aims to further build upon these theories by examining the developmental nature of 
children’s explicit understanding of celebrity advertising but, importantly a further purpose 
was to explore the development of children’s implicit responses to celebrity advertising in 
order to begin to construct a dual-processing model of the development of advertising 
understanding.  
The literature most relevant to this study can be found in sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5, 
which explores research which has taken a dual-processing approach to social cognition. For 
example, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2011) APE model distinguishes between implicit 
and explicit processing, suggesting that implicit evaluations are memory associations or “gut 
feelings”, whilst explicit responses require propositional processing. In using well-liked 
celebrity endorsers in this study, it was expected that positive feelings towards the celebrity 
would transfer automatically to the associated brand (Forehand & Perkins, 2005; Till & 
Shimp, 1998) in implicit judgments, leading young adults and children to demonstrate an 
implicit preference for celebrity paired brands. However, conscious reflection about celebrity 
advertising can impact upon young adults’ self-reported judgments leading to resistance to 
the advertised brand (Forehand & Perkins, 2005). Rozendaal, Lapierre et al.  (2011) call this 
the “cognitive defence” view of how children and adults resist the effect of ads. In line with 
the work of Piaget and Theory of Mind, younger children are unlikely to have developed the 
cognitive skills necessary to engage in this “stop and think” approach and, therefore, this 
study could expect to see different explicit and implicit preferences in young adults, but not 
in young children. Young adults are likely to recognise the manipulation attempt and guard 
against it in their explicit, propositional processing whereas children may lack the skills or 
cognitive resources to do so. For both age groups, however, automatic associational 
responses are more difficult to control and defending against the persuasion attempt is 
unlikely. 
Currently, the proposed predictions are based on the idea that young adults, but not 
children, can recognise ads and consciously process a persuasion attempt via conscious 
propositional process which impacts on their explicit but not implicit responses. Rozendaal, 
Buijs et al. (2016) suggest that recognizing a persuasion attempt triggers negative affective 
response which impacts on attitude and scepticism, triggering explicit resistance. This would 
mean that for young adults we could see evidence of resistance in both their explicit and 
implicit responses. If children also recognise a manipulation attempt, then they might also 
hold negative feelings which might transfer to their brand judgments. Rozendaal, Buijzen et 
al. (2011) suggest that children as young as eight-years of age should recognise an attempt 
using celebrities, which would mean resistance in both their implicit and explicit preferences 
could emerge. However, children’s propositional processing abilities are considered to 
be limited due to their underdeveloped cognitive abilities and, therefore, if they do not 
recognise the attempt then it would be expected that no resistance in either explicit or implicit 
preferences would be shown.  
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In Study 1, young adults and children were presented with images of well-liked 
celebrities or neutrally-rated non-celebrities paired with neutrally-rated brands. Novel brand 
logos created by the experimenter were presented so that participants’ judgments could not 
be influenced by any pre-conceived attitudes to brands. A simple pairing procedure without 
any overt endorsement was utilised to ensure that participants had a good chance of 
recognising the irrelevance of the celebrity to their brand evaluation and potentially recognise 
the pairing procedure as an attempt to manipulate their brand judgment. The aim, therefore, 
was to set up conditions where resistance to the celebrity effect was likely to occur. 
Participants’ explicit and implicit preferences for the brands were recorded along with their 
justifications for their explicit judgments. Their brand choice was also recorded. A key 
interest here was whether simply pairing well-liked celebrities with novel brands would 
trigger explicit and implicit preferences for celebrity-paired brands or whether adult 
participants would show resistance to the effects of celebrity.  
Based on the existing literature, it was hypothesized that because of the greater ad 
knowledge or larger amount of cognitive resources available to them, young adults would 
recognise the persuasion attempt of the celebrity and therefore show no explicit preference 
for brands paired with celebrities. Whilst Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) predicted that 
children as young as eight-years recognise the tactics involved in celebrity advertising, the 
wider body of developmental literature suggests that children aged 10-years-old would not be 
able to resist the celebrity effect in their explicit judgements because of processing 
limitations and, therefore, if they don’t recognise the attempt then it would be expected that 
no resistance in either explicit or implicit preferences would be shown. It was therefore 
predicted that children would be unable to alter their explicit or implicit judgments and thus 
preference for celebrity brands would be shown in both their explicit and implicit 
preferences.  
In relation to implicit judgments there were two alternative predictions for the young 
adult sample. Firstly, based on the literature (such as Forehand & Perkins, 2005) which 
suggests that dual processes occur separately, it could be predicted that, because their 
affective associational responses to the celebrity pairing could be more difficult to control, 
young adults would have an implicit preference for brands paired with well-liked celebrities. 
Alternatively, based on the literature (such as Rozendaal, Buijs et al. 2016) which suggests 
that dual processes interact, it could be predicted that recognition of manipulation and 
persuasion in ad presentation, negative propositional processes should trigger negative 
associational implicit preferences also. 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
70 young adults (55 female) from a UK University took part in this study in return for credit 
towards research participation requirements for their course award. The mean age of the 
overall young adult sample was 19.44 years (SD = 3.44). 21 Year Six children (11 female) 
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from a school in England also participated in this study. The mean age of the overall 
children’s sample was 10.38 years (SD = 0.49). 
 
3.2.2 Materials 
Novel brand logos were used in Study 1. The fifteen coloured logos were designed by the 
researcher and measured 3” x 3” (see Appendix 3.1). Head and shoulder images of 10 
celebrities and 10 non-celebrities measuring 3” x 3” were also presented at Stage 1 of the 
Study. The celebrity images were selected on the basis of being those which were most 
popular with a small pilot sample of teenagers (n=17) and young children (n=12) and non-
celebrity images were then matched in terms of age, gender and facial expression. All tasks 
were presented on PC using a custom-built computer program. The program consisted of five 
stages:  
Stage 1 - Initial explicit brand/celebrity/non-celebrity evaluation. Participants were 
presented with 10 celebrity faces (varied by age group tested) and 10 non-celebrity faces. For 
each one, presented individually in the centre of the screen, participants were asked whether 
they recognised the face which required a “Yes” or “No” response, followed with the 
question “how much do you like this person?” A scale of 1 = dislike to 9 = like was used. 
Participants were then shown a series of brands, again presented individually, and for each 
one were asked to say whether they recognised the brand “Yes or “No” and how much they 
liked it (1 = dislike to 9 = like). Overall, 15 novel brands were shown, alongside 10 real 
brands to ensure that the stimuli used looked more believable to the participants. Following 
these initial evaluations, for each individual the computer selected the four celebrities they 
had liked the best (i.e. score 9, 8, 7) and four non-celebrities they had rated most neutrally (5, 
then 4, 6) to be paired alongside the eight novel brands that were most neutrally rated (5, then 
4, 6). For each participant, the four celebrities and four non-celebrities were then randomly 
paired with the eight novel brands for the remainder of the experiment.  
At the end of Stage 1 each participant had provided the following data: 
 
a) Explicit Celebrity Evaluation score (1-9) for each of the celebrities  
b) Explicit Non-Celebrity Evaluation score (1-9) for each of the non-celebrities 
c) Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation score (1-9) for each of the novel brands. 
 
Stage 2 - Presentation of selected brands paired with celebrity/non-celebrity images. 
Each of the four celebrity (well-liked) and four non-celebrity (neutrally-rated) images 
selected at Stage 1 were then presented on-screen paired with the image of a neutrally rated 
novel brand – eight pairs in total. These pairings were presented side-by-side in the centre of 
the screen, with the rating scale depicted underneath the celebrity/non-celebrity and brand 
pairings. An example of the screen setup for this stage of the study can be seen in Appendix 
3.2. Participants were told that they would be shown four celebrity brands and four non-
celebrity brands, and they simply had to rate how much they liked the brand, on a scale of 1 = 
dislike to 9 = like. This was the Explicit Paired Brand Evaluation score (d). The Explicit 
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Paired Brand Evaluation score could then be compared with their Explicit Initial Brand 
Evaluation score before pairing (c) to produce an Explicit Brand Preference Change score (e). 
At the end of Stage 2 each participant had provided data for: 
d) Explicit Paired Brand Evaluation score (1-9) for each of the novel brands. 
e) Explicit Brand Preference Change score for each of the brands. 
 
Stage 3 – post-pairing Explicit Brand Evaluation justification. Participants saw all the 
brand/person pairings and their mean celebrity and non-celebrity brand evaluation scores and 
asked why they responded in this way. The researcher wrote down the responses given. 
 
Stage 4 - Implicit Brand Evaluations. The celebrity/non-celebrity images were omitted for 
Stage 4 which now just looked at brands. The computer program automatically selected the 
eight brands seen by each individual categorised into those that had been paired with a 
celebrity (celebrity brand) or a non-celebrity (non-celebrity brand). These two categories 
were used in the IAT which also utilised two further categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ words 
(‘Attributes’) – for example, happy, nice, sad, nasty, which were selected from standard 
attribute words used in typical IATs. For the brand IATs the celebrity or non-celebrity brands 
were paired with pleasant or unpleasant terms on each response key. The procedure for the 
IAT test was developed by Greenwald et al. (2003) and Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji (2005). 
The assumption behind the test is that individuals will respond more quickly in identifying 
categories when presented with concepts they already associate together (‘prefer’) compared 
with those they do not associate. 
 The first two parts of the brand IAT were practice trials. The first reinforced 
participants’ recognition of the good and bad attribute words. Participants used the ‘Z’ and 
‘M’ keys on the keyboard and were instructed to press ‘M’ (R response) when they saw a bad 
word, and ‘Z’ (L response) when they saw a good word. Each word was presented twice to 
confirm that participants could discriminate between good and bad words [16 trials]. An 
incorrect response was highlighted using a red cross appearing on the screen, and participants 
were instructed that if a red cross appeared they must respond correctly to continue with the 
trial. Participants’ ability to discriminate between celebrity and non-celebrity brands was then 
tested. In the image discrimination task, the four celebrity brands and four non-celebrity 
brands selected for that participant were shown one by one. As before, participants used the 
‘Z’ and ‘M’ keys on the keyboard and were instructed to press the ‘M’ key when they saw a 
brand that had been previously paired with a celebrity, and ‘Z’ when a non-celebrity brand 
was shown. Each brand remained on screen until participants registered a response and each 
brand was presented three times to confirm that participants could correctly discriminate 
between celebrity and non-celebrity paired brands [24 trials].  
 Next, the brand IATs were run to assess the strength of association between 
celebrity and non-celebrity brands and good and bad attributes. Participants were again 
required to press one of the two response keys (M or Z) and received instructions at each 
stage upon when to make a right or left response. In the first test trials celebrity paired brands 
were paired with good attributes (non-celebrity paired brands with bad attributes). The key 
orientation was switched followed by further practice trials and then the final test trial asked 
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participants to respond to non-celebrity paired brands and good attributes (celebrity paired 
brands with bad attributes). 
 Upon completion of the test trials, the computer program automatically generated a 
D-score for each participant using the D-algorithm following the recommendations of 
Greenwald, et al. (2003) positive D scores represent faster times for the celebrity brand/good 
pairing and an implicit preference for celebrity brands. 
At the end of Stage 4 the participant had provided: 
 
f) Implicit Brand Evaluation (D-) score.  
 
 
Stage 5 - Explicit Brand Choice. All eight brands were presented on the screen and 
participants were asked to rank in order the top three brands in terms of which they would 
prefer to buy. At the end of Stage 5 each participant had provided: 
g) Brand Choice score. 
 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from the Keele University ethics committee (see Appendix 3.3). 
Following the development of materials, participants were recruited using the School of 
Psychology Research Participation System (see Appendix 3.4) so that young adult students 
could sign up to gain course credit. Headteachers of schools in Staffordshire and Shropshire 
were sent a letter which thoroughly detailed the research requirements and the importance of 
the research. Headteachers who expressed an interest in allowing participation from children 
at their school were subsequently visited to discuss the research further. Agreement to 
participate was received from one school. Because the study was not considered to be of a 
nature which would be likely to cause upset with young children, the university’s ethical 
panel deemed it suitable for a parental opt-out method to be employed. A letter was sent 
home to parents/guardians of all children eligible to participate which detailed the research 
aims (see Appendix 3.5). The letter gave details of the researcher’s contact details as well as 
that of the supervisors in case anyone wished to discuss the research further. Parental letters 
were sent out by the school two weeks prior to data collection. Any forms returned to the 
schools were obtained by the researcher and it was ensured by the class teacher that children 
who had returned an opt-out form did not participate. 
 Data collection took place individually in a research room for the young adult sample 
and in an individual study room at the school for children. Young adults were given an 
information sheet to read (see Appendix 3.6) which provided detailed information about the 
study and what they would be required to do. Young adults who were happy to continue after 
reading the information sheet signed a consent form to indicate this (see Appendix 3.7). 
Children were given the instructions verbally and reminded that, although a letter had been 
sent home, participation in the study was voluntary and they could return to the classroom if 
they wished. Verbal consent was given by children who were happy to take part.  
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 All experimental instructions were given via the computer programme and so young 
adults were left alone to complete each stage whilst the researcher sat quietly in the corner of 
the room. When participants reached Stage 3 (post-pairing explicit evaluation justification) 
they were instructed to call over the researcher so that they could write down their verbal 
responses. After completing this evaluation they were once again left alone to complete the 
remainder of the study. Upon completion participants were thanked for their participation and 
were given the opportunity to ask questions. Young adults were given a debrief form to read 
and take away (see Appendix 3.8). Children completed the same procedure as the young 
adult sample although the researcher sat with them and gave instructions at each stage. Upon 
completion a verbal debrief was given (see Appendix 3.9) before they were thanked for their 
participation and returned to the classroom. 
 
3.3 Results – young adults 
 
Explicit preferences  
The mean initial preference scores or selected items across the whole young adult sample are 
shown in Table 3.1 below. This table highlights that whilst both the Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation score and the Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation score both received average ratings 
showing no particular like or dislike, the Explicit Celebrity Evaluation score shows a higher 
preference for the celebrities used in the study. 
 
Table 3.1 Study 1: Young adult (n = 70) mean and SD initial Explicit Preference Ratings 
prior to pairing for selected celebrities, non-celebrities and novel brands (Min 1 – Max 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explicit Paired Brand Preference score and Explicit Brand Preference change score are 
shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 Mean SD 
Explicit Celebrity Evaluation 
Preference 
 
7.71 1.30 
Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation Preference 
 
5.00 .12 
Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation 
Preference 
4.99 .49 
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Table 3.2 Study 1: Young adult mean (SD) post-pairing Explicit Brand Preference score 
(Min 1 – Max 9) and Explicit Brand Preference change score for brands paired with 
celebrities and non-celebrities (n = 70).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Explicit Brand Preference scores and Explicit Brand Preference Change score did 
not reveal a strong explicit preference for either set of brands, there was a significant explicit 
preference for celebrity paired brands over non-celebrity brands: t(69) = 5.059, p < .001, d = 
.27. Comparison of mean preference change for the brands before and after pairing with 
either celebrities or non-celebrities showed that preference for brands was significantly 
higher after pairing with celebrities (t[69] = 3.81, p < .001, d = .18) but significantly lower 
after pairing with non-celebrities (t[69] = 2.56, p = .013, d = .09). These results were in 
contrast to the expectation that young adults would guard against the influence of celebrity in 
their explicit post-pairing judgments. 
 
Explicit brand choices 
Participants selected their three favourite brands from the eight selected from their initial 
ratings to be paired with celebrities and non-celebrities. One young adult did not take part in 
the brand choice task. Looking at first choices only; out of the remaining 69 participants, 
90% of young adults chose a celebrity brand as their first choice and 10% chose a non-
celebrity brand.  
Looking at the first three choices; celebrity brands were scored positively, and non-
celebrity brands scored negatively with three points awarded to the first-choice brand, two 
points for second choice and one point for the third choice. For example, where a celebrity 
brand was first choice (+3) and then non-celebrity brands second (-2) and third (-1) choice 
the total score awarded was 0 (+3-2-1=0), representing no overall choice between celebrity 
and non-celebrity brands. Using this system, it was possible for participants to produce eight 
combinations of choices with possible scores of 6, 4, 2, 0, 0, -2, -4 or -6. There was an overall 
preference to choose celebrity brands: (M = 4, SD = 2.97) one sample t(68) = 11.186, p < 
.001. 
 
 Explicit Brand 
Preference 
score 
 Explicit Brand 
Preference change 
score 
Brands paired with liked 
celebrities 
5.48 (.95)  
 
+.49 (1.08) 
Brands paired with neutral 
non-celebrities 
4.76 (.59)  - .23 (.74) 
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Justifications for explicit brand judgments 
Justifications given by young adults were recorded and fell into five categories independently 
agreed by the researcher and verified by a second researcher: (‘celebrity influence’, 
‘unfamiliar brands’, ‘visual appearance of brand’, ‘don’t know’, ‘no answer’). 52% of the 
young adults stated that their explicit brand preference was due to celebrity influence, with 
40% claiming a judgment couldn’t be made as the brands were unknown. 
 
Implicit brand preferences 
The IAT produces a single score (referred to as D). The magnitude of the score indicates the 
degree of preference (.35 = medium effect size; .60 = large effect size; Rudman, 2011). As 
expected the results showed that young adult participants displayed a large implicit 
preference for the celebrity brands (D = .77): one sample t(68) = 11.326, p < .001. 
 
3.4 Results – children 
 
Explicit preferences 
The mean initial preference ratings for selected items across the sample of children are shown 
in Table 3.3 below. This table highlights that whilst both the Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation score and the Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation score both received average ratings 
showing no particular like or dislike, the Explicit Celebrity Evaluation score shows a higher 
preference for the celebrities used in the study. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Study 1: 10-year-olds (n = 21) mean and SD initial Explicit Preference Ratings 
prior to pairing for selected celebrities, non-celebrities and novel brands (Min 1 – Max 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean SD 
Explicit Celebrity Evaluation 
Preference  
 
8.00 1.20 
Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation Preference 
 
4.79 .46 
Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation 
Preference 
4.88 .50 
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Explicit Paired Brand Preference score and Explicit Brand Preference change score are 
shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Study 1: Mean (SD) post-pairing Explicit Paired Brand Preference scores (Min 1 – 
Max 9) and Explicit Brand Preference change scores for brands paired with celebrities and 
non-celebrities (n = 21).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explicit preference ratings for novel brands were compared after pairing with celebrities and 
non-celebrities. A paired samples t-test showed that for the 10-year-olds there was a 
significant explicit preference for celebrity paired brands over brands paired with non-
celebrities: t(20) = 6.971, p < .001, d = 1.91. Mean preference change for novel brands before 
and after pairing with either celebrities or non-celebrities was compared using two t-tests. For 
the 10-year-olds, preference for novel brands was significantly higher after pairing with 
celebrities (t[20] = 9.062, p < .001, d = 2.34) but there was no difference in preference for the 
novel brands after pairing with non-celebrities (t[20] = 1.570, p > .05). 
 
Explicit brand choices 
Participants selected their three favourite brands from the eight selected from their initial 
ratings to be paired with celebrities and non-celebrities. Four children did not take part in the 
brand choice task. Looking at first choices only; out of the remaining 17 participants, 82% of 
children chose a celebrity brand as their first choice and 18% chose a non-celebrity brand.  
Looking at the first three choices, using the scoring system applied with the young 
adult group (see above), celebrity brands were scored positively, non-celebrity brands scored 
negatively and a total score of 0 represented no overall choice between celebrity and non-
celebrity brands. In the children’s group there was an overall preference to choose celebrity 
brands: (M = 3.53, SD = 3.20) one sample t(16) = 4.542, p < .001. 
 
 Explicit Paired 
Brand 
Preference 
score 
 Explicit Brand 
Preference change 
score 
Brands paired with liked 
celebrities 
6.66 (.96)  
 
+1.78 (.89) 
Brands paired with neutral 
non-celebrities 
5.05 (.71)  +.17 (.50) 
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Justifications for explicit brand judgments 
The same five categories of response emerged as in the young adult group in justification of 
brand judgments (‘celebrity influence’, ‘unfamiliar brands’, ‘visual appearance of brand’, 
‘don’t know’, ‘no answer’). The majority of children (76%) stated that their explicit brand 
preference was due to celebrity influence, with four stating they chose the brand due to 
colour or some other visual appearance. One child did not answer. 
 
Implicit brand preferences 
As expected the results showed that participants displayed a large implicit preference for the 
celebrity brands (D = .50): one sample t(17) = 7.125, p < .001. 
 
3.5 Comparison of young adults’ and children’s explicit preference change 
Further analysis of change scores comparing young adults and children was carried out using 
a 2 (age group) x 2 (brand type) ANOVA with age as the between group variable and brand 
type as the repeated measure. There was a significant main effect of age, with a greater 
change in preference scores following pairing seen amongst the 10-year-olds (M = .97, SE = 
.15) than the young adults (M = .13, SE = .08): F(1,89) = 25.576, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. There 
was also a significant main effect of brand type, with preference scores increasing for brands 
paired with celebrities (M = 1.14, SE = .13) but reducing slightly for those paired with non-
celebrities (M = -.03, SE = .09): F(1,89) = 65.001, p <.001, ηp2 = .42. However, these main 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction: F(1,89) = 9.509, p = .003, ηp2 = .10. These 
results show that pairing with celebrities increased positive responses to the brands more 
amongst the children than the young adults, whereas pairing with non-celebrities led to a less 
positive response to the brands amongst young adults but made no difference to children’s 
responses. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
This study has shown that simple pairing of well-liked celebrities with novel brand logos can 
influence explicit and implicit preferences for brands and brand choices in both young adults 
and children. Results showed that both young adults and children had an explicit preference 
demonstrating preference for brands paired with well-liked celebrities over non-celebrities. 
The same was shown for both young adults and children in their implicit preferences, with 
brands paired with well-liked celebrities being preferred to brands paired with non-
celebrities. 
Based on the previous work of Forehand and Perkins (2005) it was predicted that 
young adults would show explicit resistance to celebrity brands, yet no implicit resistance. 
This was in contrast to the view of Rozendaal, Bujis et al. (2016) who would predict that 
recognizing a persuasion attempt triggers negative affective response which impacts on 
attitude and scepticism, triggering explicit resistance. Therefore, for young adults we could 
55 
 
have expected to see evidence of resistance in both their explicit and implicit responses. 
Whilst the results of the implicit preferences are in line with those of Forehand and Perkins, 
the results of the young adults in Study 1 have failed to provide support for either of these 
findings in relation to their explicit preference. The sample of young adults and children 
failed to show resistance to the celebrity effect, showing an explicit preference for brands 
paired with celebrities.  
Although previous research has shown that celebrity endorsement is one of the 
earliest advertising tactics that children understand (Rozendaal, Buijzen, et al., 2011), based 
upon the theoretical work of Piaget and the more recent work on Theory of Mind it was 
expected that children aged 10-years-old would not resist the celebrity effect in their explicit 
judgements because of processing limitations. Therefore, the results here for the children’s 
sample are not surprising and suggest that, regardless of whether they understand celebrity 
endorsement, they may not be able to resist it. However, it was predicted that young adult 
participants would be able to guard against the effects of celebrity in their explicit preference 
judgments, and possibly in their brand choices, as they should realise that the celebrity 
images had no bearing on their evaluation of the brand and that the pairing had taken place in 
an attempt to manipulate their judgments. This was not the case, however. Therefore, the 
responses seen in Forehand and Perkins’ (2005) participants when presented with audio 
advertising were not replicated here with visually presented materials.  
Several factors could be important here. First, simple pairing of celebrity images and 
brands with no endorsement of the brand was intended to help participants to recognise that 
the celebrity was not really relevant to evaluating the brand. Also, novel brands were used to 
eliminate the possibility that participants already came to the study with prior feelings and 
beliefs about the brands. In fact, when brands are seen for the first time it could be that 
simple pairing with well-liked celebrities has a positive associational influence upon 
evaluative judgments of the brand because there is no other meaningful cue upon which to 
base the brand judgment. Furthermore, Heath (2012) has suggested that in order for cognitive 
defences against advertising to be engaged adults need to be able to recognise that they are 
being subjected to an attempt to persuade them. It may be that in Study 1, which used novel 
brands and simply paired them with celebrity images without any overt endorsement, 
participants did not feel that they were being subjected to advertising and therefore this did 
not trigger resistance to the celebrity-paired brands.  
Interestingly, analysis of explicit responses demonstrated that pairing celebrities with 
novel brands increased positive responses to the brands more amongst the children than the 
young adults. On the other hand, pairing with non-celebrities led to a less positive response to 
the brands amongst young adults but made no difference to children’s responses. This is 
somewhat unsurprising if we consider theory from the PKM (Friedstad & Wright, 1994) and 
Theory of Mind research which suggests that as age develops so too does the cognitive 
ability to understand the persuasive intent which lies behind advertiser messages. Whilst the 
young adults in this study also had an explicit preference for the brands paired with well-
liked celebrities, results from this analysis do support the notion that celebrity advertising 
affects children more so than young adults.  
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It was expected that, because adults found it difficult to resist implicit preferences, so 
too would children, with children also displaying an implicit preference for brands paired 
with celebrities. With children’s propositional processing abilities being considered to 
be limited due to their underdeveloped cognitive abilities, it was predicted that if they did not 
recognise the manipulation attempt of the celebrity then no resistance in either explicit or 
implicit preferences would be shown. This is what the results of the study demonstrated – 
children had both explicit and implicit preferences for brands paired with celebrities. This 
was in contrast to the prediction that because eight-year-olds understand about celebrity 
advertising they may also recognise a manipulation attempt, consequently holding negative 
feelings which might transfer to their brand judgments (Rozendaal, Buijzen, et al., 2011). 
This leads to the suggestion that whilst children could understand celebrity endorsement, they 
may not be developed in their knowledge of how to use this in their responses to ads. 
In relation to the implicit results of the young adult sample two alternative predictions 
were offered. Following on from the research carried out by Forehand and Perkins (2005) it 
was expected here that young adults would find it difficult to protect themselves from the 
effects of celebrity influence in their implicit responses. The results were in line with this 
assumption. Rozendaal, Bujis, et al. (2016) suggested that recognizing a persuasion attempt 
triggers negative affective response which impacts on attitude and scepticism, triggering 
explicit resistance. This meant that for young adults we could have seen evidence of 
resistance in both their explicit and implicit responses. This was not shown in this study – 
instead it was found that explicit and implicit processes aligned.  
Although the young adults didn’t behave as expected in their explicit responses, the 
evidence from the implicit responses of both the children and adults suggests a clear effect of 
celebrity on implicit preferences. This reinforces the question of to what extent simply 
increasing conceptual (or propositional) knowledge of advertising has on protecting young 
adults from the effect of advertising. This result highlights that efforts to increase knowledge 
of persuasive intent in children may be, to some extent, not as purposeful as some believe but 
rather understanding what may influence our implicit judgments may be a more useful 
consideration help children to resist ads because the celebrity effect also impacts on their 
implicit responses. It could, however, also be possible that no-one felt manipulated and 
therefore propositional processing did not lead to a conclusion that manipulation was 
occurring. This requires further investigation. Nevertheless, taken at face value the results of 
this study have supported the limited findings in implicit research to date. But failure to find 
resistance in the adults exposes the need to explore this further. 
In conclusion, the results of this study have supported the hypothesis that children 
would not resist the effects of celebrities in their explicit judgments and demonstrates that 
pairing celebrities with brands influence the overall implicit preferences of both young adults 
and children. However, this study has not provided support for the prediction that young 
adults would recognise the celebrity as an attempt to persuade, and no resistance was shown 
in their explicit judgments. Finding evidence of understanding in adults’ explicit judgments 
was a key aim of this study, and results in support of this assumption would have provided 
further support for theoretical perspectives such as Piaget, Theory of Mind and the PKM that 
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adults have a sophisticated understanding of advertising, including its persuasive intent. With 
this in mind, the focus of the next study shifts, to examine further why the young adults in 
this study did not recognise celebrity pairing as a persuasion attempt in order to then be able 
to go on to examine the developmental progress of advertising understanding. 
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4 Study 2 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The results of Study 1 were unexpected, particularly in relation to the explicit preferences of 
young adults who, alongside children, failed to resist the celebrity effect. Exploring this 
effect in young adults is important in understanding the effect of celebrity advertising, and 
therefore Study 2 focuses solely on exploring further the celebrity effect in young adults. In 
Study 1, participants may not have demonstrated resistance to the celebrity effect because 
they did not feel that they were in an advertising situation. Study 2 builds upon the findings 
of Study 1 and attempts to address this concern by adding an advertising slogan when 
presenting the images and brands. Laran, Dalton and Andrade (2010) have described how 
consumer behaviour is often swayed by marketing tactics such as slogans, which often exert 
subtle, automatic persuasion (Shapiro, 1999). Furthermore, research suggests that consumers 
can more easily recognize how slogans are meant to influence their behaviour and this may 
increase the possibility that they will consciously attempt to correct (or resist) any unwanted 
bias encountered when presented with advertisements (Williams, Fitzsimons & Block, 2004). 
In line with this, Friestad and Wright (1994) have proposed that when consumers understand 
how a stimulus such as a slogan is intended to influence their behaviour, they are more likely 
to perceive it as a persuasion tactic. If this is the case, then by adding marketing slogans 
when presenting the celebrity/non-celebrity images paired with brands, it is more likely that 
resistance to the celebrity effect will be shown in young adults’ explicit judgments.  
In Study 2, young adults were again presented with images of well-liked celebrities or 
neutrally-rated non-celebrities paired with neutrally-rated brands with persuasive taglines.  
As in Study 1, the novel brand logos created by the experimenter were presented so that 
participants’ judgments could not be influenced by any pre-conceived attitudes to brands and 
there was no overt endorsement. The simple pairing procedure was again utilised to ensure 
that participants had a good chance of recognising the irrelevance of the celebrity to their 
brand evaluation and potentially recognise an attempt to manipulate their brand judgment. 
Advertising taglines were created to include with each brand so that the participants had the 
opportunity to recognise that a persuasion attempt was being made. The aim, therefore, was 
to set up conditions where resistance to the celebrity effect was likely to occur and the 
participants were more likely to recognise an attempt to persuade them. Participants’ explicit 
and implicit preference for the brands was recorded along with their justifications for their 
explicit judgments. Their brand choice was also recorded. A key interest here was whether 
simply pairing well-liked celebrities with novel brands, when a persuasive message is more 
obvious, would trigger explicit and implicit preferences for celebrity-paired brands or 
whether adult participants would show resistance to the effects of celebrity.  
It was hypothesized that, with the taglines included, adults would recognise the 
persuasion attempt behind use of the celebrity and feel more manipulation than in Study 1. If 
this was the case, then it would be expected that young adults should show resistance to the 
celebrity paired brands and demonstrate no explicit preference for brands paired with 
celebrities, therefore demonstrating a negative change in preference for celebrity brands. In 
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relation to implicit judgments, it was predicted that in line with the results of Study 1, an 
implicit preference for brands paired with well-liked celebrities would still occur. This fits 
with literature suggesting that affective associational responses to the celebrity pairing is 
difficult to control. When asked to choose their favourite three brands, it was hypothesized 
that young adults may recognise the persuasion attempt of the celebrity and therefore resist 
the brands previously paired with celebrities to again show a non-celebrity brand preference.  
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
59 young adults (45 female) from a UK University, with a mean age of 19.59 (SD = 2.12) 
took part in this study in return for credit towards research participation requirements for 
their course award. Because 28 of these participants took part in Study 1 the data was also re-
analysed with their data removed to leave a sample of 31 participants (25 female) with a 
mean age of 19.94 years (SD = 2.64). Both sets of analyses will be presented here. 
 
4.2.2 Materials 
Novel brand logos were also used in Study 2. Fifteen new coloured logos were designed by 
the author and measured 3” x 3” (see Appendix 4.1). The remainder of the materials were the 
same as those used in Study 1, except that when the celebrities/non-celebrities were 
presented, paired with the brands in Stage 2, a one-sentence advertising slogan (e.g. 
“Modern. Stylish. Classic. BRAVURA!”, see Appendix 4.2) was also included running 
below the celebrity and brand images. All slogans were presented in Arial font, size 12. As 
before, the celebrity images were selected on the basis of being those which were most 
popular with a small pilot sample of young adults, and non-celebrity images were then 
matched in terms of age and facial expression. All tasks were presented on PC using the 
custom-built computer program used in Study 1. The program operated in exactly the same 
way as in Study 1, except that the celebrity/ non-celebrity brand pairings at Stage 2 also 
included the advertising taglines described above. 
 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from the Keele University ethics committee (see Appendix 3.3). 
Following the development of materials participants were recruited – this involved 
advertising the study on the School of Psychology Research Participation System (see 
Appendix 3.4) so that young adult students could sign up to gain course credit. Data 
collection took place individually in a research room, where participants were given an 
information sheet to read (see Appendix 3.6) which provided detailed information about the 
study and what they would be required to do. If, after reading the information sheet, young 
adults were happy to continue, they signed a consent form (see Appendix 3.7). All 
instructions were given on the computer programme and the experimental procedure 
followed was exactly the same as for Study 1. Upon completion participants were thanked for 
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their participation and were given the opportunity to ask questions, they were then given a 
debrief form to read and take away (see Appendix 3.8).  
 
4.3 Results 
 
Explicit preferences  
The mean initial preference ratings for selected items across the whole sample are shown in 
Table 4.1 below. This table highlights that whilst both the Explicit Non-Celebrity Evaluation 
score and the Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation score both received average ratings showing 
no particular like or dislike, the Explicit Celebrity Evaluation score shows a higher 
preference for the celebrities used in the study. 
 
Table 4.1 Study 2: Young adult (n = 59) mean and SD initial Explicit Preference Ratings 
prior to pairing for selected celebrities, non-celebrities and novel brands (Min 1 – Max 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explicit Paired Brand Preference score and Explicit Brand Preference change score are 
shown in Table 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean SD 
Explicit Celebrity Evaluation 
score 
 
7.75 1.13 
Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation score 
 
5.02 .14 
Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation 
score 
4.81 .58 
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Table 4.2 Study 2: Mean (SD) post-pairing Explicit Brand Preference score (Min 1 – Max 9) 
for brands paired with celebrities and non-celebrities (n = 59).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These means are very similar to those reported in Study 1 for young adults. A comparison of 
explicit preference ratings for novel brands after pairing with celebrities and non-celebrities 
was conducted for the full sample of young adults in Study 2 (n = 59). Results showed that, 
as in Study 1, although there was not a strong positive response for either set of pairings, 
there was a significant explicit preference for celebrity paired brands t(58) = 4.629, p < .001, 
d = .88.  
Because some of the participants in this study also took part in Study 1, even though a 
new set of brands were used here, a check was made to ensure there were no significant 
differences in the mean Explicit Brand Preference scores and mean Explicit Brand Preference 
Change scores across the two groups. Analysis showed that there were no significant 
differences for Explicit Brand Preference scores or mean Explicit Brand Preference Change 
scores across those who had participated in Study 1 and 2 compared to those taking part in 
the study for the first time (p > .05).  
 
Brand choices 
As in Study 1, participants selected their three favourite brands from the eight selected from 
their initial ratings to be paired with celebrities and non-celebrities. The scoring method used 
in Study 1 was also used in this study. Of the 59 participants taking part in this study, looking 
at first choices only, 64% of young adults chose a celebrity brand as their first choice and 
35% of young adults chose a non-celebrity brand. There was no difference in responses of 
participants who took part in both Study 1 and 2 and those who took part in Study 2 only. 
 
 
 
 Explicit Brand 
Preference score 
Explicit 
Brand 
Preference 
change score 
 
Brands paired with liked 
celebrities 
5.46 (.98) +2.29 (1.18)  
 
Brands paired with neutral non-
celebrities 
4.72 (.68) +.30 (.71) 
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Explicit judgment evaluation 
As in Study 1, the frequency of codings for the justifications given by young adults were 
recorded, organised into the same five categories (‘celebrity influence’, ‘unfamiliar brands’, 
‘visual appearance of brand’, ‘don’t know’, ‘no answer’). The majority of young adults in 
Study 1 stated that their explicit brand preference was due to celebrity influence, whereas in 
Study 2 (regardless of previous participation) young adults tended to state that no judgement 
could be made as the brands were unknown. There was no difference in responses of 
participants who took part in both Study 1 and 2 and those who took part in Study 2 only. 
 
Implicit preferences 
The D score for the total young adult sample in Study 2 was 0.79 (SD = .72) showing that the 
participants held a large implicit preference for the celebrity brands one sample t(58) = 8.322, 
p < .001. As shown in their Explicit Brand Preference score, there was no significant 
difference in D score between the young adults who had also taken part in Study 1 (0.91) and 
those who had not previously taken part (0.68) p = .229. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
In Study 2, there was still a strong implicit preference for brands paired with celebrities but, 
despite adding advertising slogans beneath the celebrity/non-celebrity brand pairings, 
participants’ explicit responses showed no evidence of resistance to the celebrity effect. 
Friestad and Wright (1994) suggested that when consumers understand how a stimulus such 
as taglines is intended to influence their behaviour, they are more likely to perceive it as a 
persuasion tactic which effects their explicit judgments. However, there was no evidence of 
this demonstrated in the findings of this study. Because this is the second time that this 
finding has emerged, it should be considered that the participants could have considered this 
as an advertising attempt, but their strong liking of the celebrities overrode resistance to a 
persuasion attempt. When there are strong positive feelings towards celebrities it is possible 
that manipulation attempts are overlooked meaning that conscious, propositional reasoning 
about them is not carried out and explicit responses are strongly influenced by a ‘gut feeling’ 
about the celebrity. Alternatively, it could be that the general effect of associating well-liked 
celebrities with brands is to create positive explicit and implicit evaluations of the brand (as, 
presumably, is assumed by those employing celebrity endorsement as a marketing strategy).  
Across both Study 1 and Study 2 resistance to the celebrity effect has not been found. 
Previous research had suggested that resistance might be seen in explicit responses to brands, 
where participants were able to consciously reflect upon the presence of the celebrity image 
as an attempt to manipulate their brand judgment. In Forehand and Perkins’ (2005) study, 
participants were played audio recordings of celebrity voiceovers in radio ads and it was the 
brand evaluations of the participants who recognised the celebrity which tended to become 
less positive. Recognition of the ‘hidden’ celebrities in the radio ads could have triggered a 
sense of being manipulated in these participants which then led to resistance. In contrast, in 
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the study reported here the identity of the celebrities was known and for each participant the 
celebrities paired with brands were those that they had identified as being well-liked. In 
Studies 1 and 2, therefore, there was no hidden manipulation for participants to detect and 
visual presentation of the liked celebrity alongside a brand was enough to bring about more 
positive evaluations of the brand.  
It could be because that, in spite of the introduction of the slogans, participants still 
did not feel that they were being subjected to a persuasion attempt. Perhaps the novel brands 
created for these studies combined with the experimental situation gave rise to an experience 
that was not sufficiently lifelike to encourage participants to feel that they were being 
manipulated and therefore demonstrate resistance. In order to address this issue, in Study 3 
novel brands were replaced with real brand logos.             
Whilst there was once little research which has looked at the effect of modality in 
advertisements (Bryce & Olney, 2000) this is becoming an area of interest to advertisers, and 
therefore the difference in advertising stimuli across the studies reported here and that of 
Forehand and Perkins (2005) must be considered as an explanation for the contrasting results. 
In a recent study looking at the effect of presentation modality in TV ads for prescription 
drugs, Wogalter, Shaver, and Kalsher (2014) found that TV ads using both visual and 
auditory presentation produced the highest level of later recall and recognition. When 
separated into visual only and auditory only, the visual only ad produced better performance. 
This may go some way to explaining why the current studies reported in this thesis (which 
used visual stimuli) are different to those of Forehand and Perkins who used an auditory 
advertising method. The fact that visual stimuli has been shown to influence recall and 
recognition (Wogalter et al., 2014) could mean that the young adults in Studies 1 and 2 had 
more likelihood of the celebrity ads being remembered, more so than the young adults in 
Forehand and Perkins’ study. This could have affected the preferences and choices made.  
Another possible contributory factor is that being able to utilise cognitive defences 
really depends upon individuals being in possession of advertising literacy skills. For the first 
two studies, the assumption was that in samples of young adults advertising literacy skills 
should be at adult-like levels and, therefore, it was expected that participants would use these 
skills to protect themselves against any unwanted effects of advertising. Previous literature 
has suggested that advertising scepticism is an important offshoot of advertising literacy. For 
example, Rozendaal, Lapierre, et al. (2011) suggested that the development of advertising 
scepticism – which some researchers have treated as an affective response to ads – may be 
important in helping children combat the negative effects of advertising. However, 
researchers also argue that having a critical or sceptical attitude towards advertising (i.e. 
attitudinal advertising literacy) may be a more important determinant of how individuals 
respond to advertising. Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998) suggested that scepticism can be 
an important factor in ad effectiveness on its own, providing evidence that advertising 
scepticism is related to less positive responses to advertising amongst adults. Study 3 
attempts to measure participants’ advertising literacy via a short advertising literacy scale 
prior to responding to the brands. The main interest here was to see whether any differences 
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in advertising literacy skills were evident in the sample and, if so, whether this impacted on 
participants’ brand preferences.  
In conclusion, across Study 1 and Study 2 both explicit and implicit preferences in 
young adults were the same and, in these samples, young adults demonstrated preferences for 
novel brands paired with well-liked celebrities over and above brands paired with non-
celebrities rated neutrally. Again, whilst evidence for dual-processing models is provided in 
the limited literature which has examined both explicit and implicit responses to advertising 
(e.g. Büttner et al., 2014), differences in explicit and implicit preferences would provide 
some evidence of separate processes, which the two studies reported thus far have failed to 
offer.   
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5 Study 3 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of Study 3 was to extend the work of Study 1 and Study 2 by incorporating a 
measure of advertising literacy. The main aim of the study was to explore further why young 
adults in the previous studies demonstrated explicit preferences for novel brands paired with 
well-liked celebrities, over and above non-celebrities. In Study 1 and Study 2, the responses 
of the young adults and children did not conform to the expectations based on previous work. 
It had been expected that young adults would, at least in their explicit judgments, recognise 
the persuasion attempt of the celebrities and show resistance to this manipulation by showing 
preference for non-celebrity brands. This was not found in this study and is therefore 
inconsistent with the previous work of Forehand and Perkins (2005). Whilst Rozendaal, 
Bujis, et al. (2016) predicted that a negative affective response to manipulation may reflect in 
young adults and children’s implicit preferences, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 did not 
echo this. Instead, these studies demonstrated an implicit preference for celebrity paired 
brands, providing support for the assumption that implicit preferences are difficult to 
overcome, even in young adults who are assumed to have a high level of advertising literacy. 
This study aims to examine the effects of advertising literacy and scepticism to advertising. 
The most relevant literature to this chapter can be found in section 1.3. 
Typically, advertising literacy has been seen by researchers to include several 
components: the ability to recognise advertisements, an awareness of the source of 
advertisements; understanding both the selling intent and persuasive intent behind advertising 
(Rozendaal, Lapierre et al., 2011). Acquiring this kind of knowledge about advertising during 
childhood has been viewed as an important step in developing the ability to cope with any 
unwanted or harmful effects of advertising (Kunkel, 2010). Opree and Rozendaal (2015) 
have referred to this knowledge set as conceptual advertising literacy (i.e. knowledge about 
how advertising works). However, these researchers also argue that having a critical or 
sceptical attitude towards advertising (i.e. attitudinal advertising literacy) may be a more 
important determinant of how individuals respond to advertising. Work by Obermiller and 
Spangenberg (1998) and Obermiller, Spangenberg & MacLachen (2005), for example, has 
provided some evidence that advertising scepticism is related to less positive responses to 
advertising amongst adults. Furthermore, in work with eight- and 12-year-olds Rozendaal, 
Lapierre, et al. (2011) found no relationship between conceptual advertising knowledge and 
children’s ability to utilise strategies to defend themselves against advertising, but high 
scores for attitudinal advertising literacy (i.e. representing a more negative orientation 
towards ads) were related to greater likelihood of engaging resistance strategies when faced 
with advertising. In Study 3, the short version of Rozendaal, Opree and Buijzen’s (2016) 
Attitudinal Literary Scale for Children (ALS-c) was adapted for use with a sample of young 
adults. The scale consisted of two subcomponents looking at conceptual advertising literacy 
(ad knowledge) and attitudinal advertising literacy (subjective orientation towards ads). 
The methods of this study were the same as in Study 1 and Study 2, except that 
instead of using novel brands, existing brands were presented which were selected on the 
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basis that they were likely to be familiar to participants without being market leaders in their 
field. No brand slogans were used in this study as they made no difference in Study 2 and it 
was considered that slogans for existing brands, if available, would not be easy to present in a 
consistent format. Prior to taking part in the experimental procedure, each participant 
completed the adapted advertising literacy questionnaire. As experienced consumers of 
advertising, it was expected that young adult participants would have an adult-like conceptual 
understanding and therefore the assumption that they would also be reasonably sceptical 
about advertising was tested. In line with findings from Forehand and Perkins (2005), it was 
hypothesised that young adults would recognise the persuasion attempt behind the use of the 
celebrity and use this manipulation attempt to offer resistance to the celebrity paired brands 
to demonstrate no explicit preference for brands paired with celebrities. However, an implicit 
preference for brands paired with well-liked celebrities was expected to be seen. In terms of 
advertising literacy, it was expected that scores would be at ceiling for both Conceptual and 
Attitudinal literacy. 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
72 young adults (59 female) from a UK University with a mean age of 19.37 years (SD = 
6.09) participated in return for course credit.  
 
5.2.2 Materials 
In addition to the adapted Attitudinal Literary Scale (aALS), all materials were the same as 
those used in Study 1 and Study 2 except that the celebrities/non-celebrities were presented 
paired with real brands (see Appendix 5.1) with no accompanying advertising slogan. 
Participants completed all tasks on PC, with the aALS scale containing a total of 20 items 
(Rozendaal, Opree et al. 2016) loaded onto an online survey platform and the remainder of 
the study was carried out on the specially designed computer programme used in Study 1 and 
Study 2. 
 
Conceptual Advertising Literacy 
Several items were omitted from the Conceptual Literacy Subscale as they were considered 
to be unsuitable for presentation to young adults. For example, some questions asked about 
requesting parents to purchase products - “are commercials on television there to make you 
ask your parents to buy the advertised products?” or using pocket money to buy products - 
“are commercials on television there to make you buy the advertised products out of your 
allowance?”. This left 14 items, for which the wording was altered, to make them more 
appropriate to adults. For example, items referring to asking parents to buy a product, or 
using pocket money to buy a product were altered. The remaining items tested five 
components of advertising understanding with a series of questions (the full questionnaire 
can be seen in Appendix 5.2): 
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1.Recognition of advertising (items 1, 2, 3) e.g. “Please watch this video – is it an 
advertisement?” Participants could respond – Yes, Definitely / Yes, I think so / No, I don’t 
think so / No, definitely not. 
2.Recognition of the source of advertising (item 5) e.g. “Advertisements cost money. Who 
do you think pays to make ads?” A series of options were given (e.g. the people that make the 
products in the ad / the people in the ad / the TV network that carries the ad) and participants 
could choose one response. 
3.Perception of intended audience (items 6, 7, 8) e.g. “Please look at the following ad. Who 
do you think is the intended audience of this ad? Please be as precise as possible.” This 
required a written response.  
4.Understanding persuasive intent (items 9, 10, 11) e.g. “Are advertisements there to make 
you [want/think positively/feel positively] about the advertised products?” Participants could 
respond – Yes, Definitely / Yes, I think so / No, I don’t think so / No, definitely not. 
5.Understanding persuasive tactics (items 4, 12, 13, 14) e.g. “The following statements 
describe five possible reasons why celebrities are used in advertisements. Please rank the 
statements in order of importance (with 1 being the most important).” Responses included 
(but weren’t limited to) to make you buy the advertised product / to help people to learn 
about the products / to get people to believe what the ad says. 
 
Attitudinal Advertising Literacy 
For the Attitudinal Literacy Subscale three items were removed which were considered to be 
too repetitive for adults (e.g. ‘how often do you think that television advertisements are 
truthful?’ and ‘how often do you think television advertisements tell the truth?’) but retained 
the remaining six items and the wording used in the original questionnaire. All of the items in 
this scale were answered on a scale containing the responses Never / Sometimes / Often / 
Very Often. These items tested: 
Understanding of advertising bias (item 15) e.g. “How often do you think that what you see 
in advertisements is like things are in reality?” 
Scepticism towards advertising (items 16, 17) e.g. “How often do you think advertisements 
are truthful?” 
Disliking of advertising (items 18, 19, 20) e.g. “How often do you think advertisements are 
boring/stupid/irritating?” 
 
The original scoring system of Rozendaal, Opree et al. (2016) was used for all items 
(see Appendix 5.3) to produce a single conceptual literacy score (high scores representing 
high conceptual literacy) and a single attitudinal literacy score (high scores representing high 
scepticism). Once the scale had been completed, participants completed the explicit and 
implicit brand evaluation and brand choice tasks in five stages, exactly as carried out in 
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Studies 1 and 2 using the specially designed computer program. The only difference in Study 
3 was that real brands were presented with no taglines. 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from the Keele University ethics committee (see Appendix 5.4). 
Following the development of materials participants were recruited – this involved 
advertising the study on the School of Psychology Research Participation System (see 
Appendix 5.5) so that young adult students could sign up to gain course credit. Data 
collection took place individually in a research room, where participants were given an 
information sheet to read (see Appendix 5.6) which provided detailed information about the 
study and what they would be required to do. If, after reading the information sheet, young 
adults were happy to continue, they signed a consent form (see Appendix 3.7). All 
instructions were given on the computer programme. After the Attitudinal Literacy Scale was 
completed on an online survey platform, the experimental procedure followed was exactly 
the same as for Study 1 and Study 2. Upon completion participants were thanked for their 
participation and were given the opportunity to ask questions, they were then given a debrief 
form to read and take away (see Appendix 3.8).  
 
5.3 Results 
 
Explicit preferences 
Four participants were omitted from the analysis as they did not complete the Advertising 
Literacy Scale. The mean initial preference ratings for selected items across the whole sample 
are shown in Table 7. This table highlights that whilst both the Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation score and the Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation score both received average ratings 
showing no particular like or dislike, the Explicit Celebrity Evaluation score shows a higher 
preference for the celebrities used in the study. 
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Table 5.1 Study 3: Young adult (n = 68) mean and SD initial Explicit Preference Ratings 
prior to pairing for selected celebrities, non-celebrities and novel brands (Min 1 – Max 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explicit Paired Brand Preference score and Explicit Brand Preference Change score are 
shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Study 3: Mean (SD) post-pairing Explicit Brand Preference score (Min 1 – Max 9) 
for brands paired with celebrities and non-celebrities (n = 68).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explicit preference ratings for real brands were compared after pairing with celebrities and 
non-celebrities. A paired samples t-test showed that, again, there was not a strong positive 
response for either set of pairings but there was a significant explicit preference for celebrity 
paired brands: t(67) = 3.834, p < .001, d = .19. 
Mean brand preference change was assessed using two t-tests which compared mean 
preference scores for real brands before and after pairing with celebrities, and before and 
after pairing with non-celebrities. Preference for real brands was significantly higher after 
pairing with celebrities (t[67] = 4.288, p < .001, d =.22) but there was no significant 
difference in preference after pairing with non-celebrities (t[67] = 1.133, p = .261). Even for 
 Mean SD 
Explicit Celebrity Evaluation 
score  
 
8.04 1.08 
Explicit Non-Celebrity 
Evaluation score  
 
4.97 .13 
Explicit Initial Brand Evaluation 
score  
5.12 .49 
 Explicit Brand 
Preference score 
Explicit 
Brand 
Preference 
change score 
 
Brands paired with liked 
celebrities 
5.62 (1.05) +.50 (.96)  
Brands paired with neutral non-
celebrities 
5.04 (.68) - .08 (.56)  
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real brands, therefore, no resistance to the celebrity effect was seen in the explicit brand 
preferences of the young adults.  
 
Brand choices 
Looking at first choices only, 69% of young adults chose a celebrity brand as their first 
choice and 25 % of young adults chose a non-celebrity brand. Scoring followed the same 
method as in Study 1 and 2. Looking at the first three choices; the mean brand choice score 
was 1.40 (SD = 3.13) one sample t(67) = 3.665, p < .001, representing a preference to choose 
celebrity brands. 
 
Brand preference evaluation 
As in Study 1 and 2, the frequency of codings for the justifications given by young adults 
were recorded, using the same five categories as Study 1 and 2: (‘celebrity influence’, 
‘unfamiliar brands’, ‘visual appearance of brand’, ‘don’t know’, ‘no answer’). 51% of young 
adults stated that their explicit brand preference was due to celebrity influence – a similar 
finding to Study 1 where celebrity influence was rated as the main reason for brand selection.  
 
Implicit preferences  
In terms of implicit responses, once again we saw the expected strong implicit preference for 
the celebrity-paired brands (D = 0.74) one sample t(67) = 8.362, p < .001. This is a finding 
consistent with Study 1 (D = 0.77) and Study 2 (D = 0.79). 
 
Advertising literacy 
In analysing responses to the adapted Advertising Literacy Scale, mean scores for each 
component of the aALS are shown in Table 9. As expected, mean scores for each of the 
components was relatively high suggesting a good level of advertising literacy amongst the 
young adult participants. 
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Table 5.3 Study 3: Young adult (n = 68) mean Conceptual and Advertising Literacy scores 
by component. 
 
 
The procedure used by Rozendaal, Opree et al. (2016) was adopted by using the standardised 
mean item scores to run the reliability analysis for each subscale. For the 14 items comprising 
the adapted version of the Conceptual Literacy Subscale Cronbach’s Alpha (.37) was poor, 
probably reflecting the changes made to the original scale to facilitate its use with adults. 
Because of the poor reliability, the data generated by this subscale was omitted from further 
analysis. For the six-item Attitudinal Advertising Literacy Subscale, however, Cronbach’s 
Alpha (.67) reached an acceptable level (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  
The mean attitudinal literacy score for the sample was 2.91 but scores ranged from 
1.83 to 3.83, so there was some individual variation in the level of scepticism shown by 
participants. To assess whether there was any relationship between participants’ general 
attitude to advertising and their explicit and implicit preference for celebrity-paired brands, 
participants’ mean attitudinal literacy scores were correlated with their responses to each of 
the five measures: Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference score, Non-Celebrity-Paired 
Explicit Brand Preference score, Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference change score, 
Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference change score, Implicit Preference score and 
Attitudinal Advertising Literacy score. The results of the correlation are shown in Table 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Mean Score (SD) 
Conceptual Advertising Literacy 2.99 (.17) 
     Recognition of Advertising (3 items: Min 1 – Max 4) 3.50 (.37) 
     Recognition of Advertising’s Source (1 item: Min 0 – Max 1) .91 (.29) 
     Perception of Intended Audience (3 items: Min 0 – Max 2) 1.77 (.34) 
     Understanding Persuasive Intent (3 items: Min 1 – Max 4) 3.65 (.38) 
     Understanding Persuasive Tactics (4 items: Min 1 –Max 4) 3.55 (.30) 
  
Attitudinal Advertising Literacy 2.91 (.41) 
     Understanding Advertising’s Bias (1 item: Min 1 – Max 4)  3.06 (.49) 
     Scepticism towards Advertising (3 items: Min 1 – Max 4) 2.95 (.47) 
     Disliking Advertising (3 items: Min 1 – Max 4) 2.82 (.59) 
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Table 5.4 Study 3: Correlations between Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference score, 
Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference score, Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand 
Preference change score, Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference change score, 
Implicit Preference score and Attitudinal Advertising Literacy score (n = 68). 
** Significant at p < .01 
  * Significant at p < .05 
 
There was no correlation between Attitudinal Advertising Literacy score and Non-Celebrity-
Paired Explicit Brand Preference score or Celebrity and Non-Celebrity Explicit Brand change 
scores. However, there was a significant negative correlation between Attitudinal Advertising 
Literacy and both Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand preference score and Implicit Brand 
Preference score. Participants who scored higher on the Attitudinal Literacy Subscale 
(indicating higher scepticism about ads) tended to have lower explicit celebrity brand 
preferences (r = -.262, p < 0.05) and lower implicit brand preference for celebrity brands (r = 
-.241, p < 0.05). 
 To explore the relationship between scepticism only and brand attitudes/choice, 
assessing understanding of bias and general liking of advertising were omitted for the next 
analysis. The results of the correlation between Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference 
score, Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference score, Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Celebrity-Paired Explicit 
Brand Preference score 
 
- 
 
 
    
2. Non-Celebrity-Paired 
Explicit Brand Preference 
score 
 
.014 
 
- 
 
 
   
3. Celebrity-Paired Explicit 
Brand Preference change 
score 
 
.885** 
 
- .280* 
 
- 
 
 
  
4. Non-Celebrity-Paired 
Explicit Brand Preference 
change score 
 
- .333** 
 
.706** 
 
- .278* 
 
- 
 
 
 
5. Implicit Preference score        .074 .030 - .091 - .257 -  
6. Attitudinal Advertising 
Literacy score 
 
- .262* 
 
-  .038 
 
- .208 
 
.086 
 
- .241* 
 
- 
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Preference change score, Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference change score, 
Implicit Preference score and Scepticism can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 5.5 Study 3: Correlations between Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference score, 
Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference score, Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand 
Preference change score, Non-Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand Preference change score, 
Implicit Preference score and Scepticism score (n = 68). 
** Significant at p < .01 
  * Significant at p < .05 
 
Correlations using the Scepticism measure only (rather than overall Attitudinal Ad Liking 
score) also generated a negative correlation between Celebrity-Paired Explicit Brand 
Preference score and Scepticism (r = -.236, p = .05). However, the correlation seen between 
Attitudinal Ad Liking and Implicit Brand Preference was no longer present (r = -.009, p > 
.05). These results indicate that overall attitudinal ad literacy is related to both explicit 
(propositional) and implicit (associational) brand preference, yet scepticism more specifically 
is only related to explicit, propositional brand preference. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Celebrity-Paired Explicit 
Brand Preference score 
 
- 
 
 
    
2. Non-Celebrity-Paired 
Explicit Brand Preference 
score 
 
.014 
 
- 
 
 
   
3. Celebrity-Paired Explicit 
Brand Preference change 
score 
 
.885** 
 
- .280* 
 
- 
 
 
  
4. Non-Celebrity-Paired 
Explicit Brand Preference 
change score 
 
- .333** 
 
.706** 
 
- .278* 
 
- 
 
 
 
5. Implicit Preference score        .074 .030 - .091 - .257 -  
6. Scepticism score -.236* -.017 -.189 .095 -.009 - 
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5.4 Discussion 
As in Studies 1 and 2, despite presenting participants with real brands, the findings of this 
study again failed to see young adults resisting the influence of well-liked celebrities in their 
explicit and implicit brand evaluations and their overt brand choices. General attitude to 
advertising was a little lower overall than might have been expected from a sample of young 
adults, but there was some indication that the relationship between attitudinal advertising 
literacy and resistance to advertising previously seen in children’s explicit responses 
(Rozendaal, Lapierre et al., 2011) was also present in the explicit responses of young adults 
to existing brands when they were paired with well-liked celebrities. Furthermore, there was 
evidence to suggest that, in this sample, higher attitudinal advertising literacy was also 
related to less positive explicit and implicit responses to the brands. This may be the first 
time that such a link has been identified between attitudinal advertising literacy and implicit 
responses to brands, and further reinforces the view that attitudinal advertising literacy may 
be an important factor in moderating the effects of advertising. When looking at the 
scepticism component of the attitudinal scale alone, the relationship between scepticism and 
implicit responses failed to emerge, yet increased scepticism remained negatively related to 
explicit preference for celebrity paired brands.  
The three studies presented so far have provided new insights into the effect of well-
liked celebrities on brand preferences, by demonstrating that both explicit and implicit 
judgments are influenced by the pairing of well-liked celebrities and brands. Based upon 
previous research (e.g. Forehand & Perkins, 2005), it was assumed at the outset that, where 
individuals possess a strong liking for celebrities’, resistance might be seen in explicit 
responses to brands where participants were able to consciously reflect upon the presence of 
the celebrity image as an attempt to manipulate their brand judgment. In all three studies, 
however, simple pairing with a well-liked celebrity was enough to bias participants’ brand 
evaluations (both explicit and implicit), and their brand choices towards brands paired with a 
celebrity that they liked. In their recent review of research on celebrity endorsement, 
Bergkvist and Zhou (2016) point to mixed findings from studies looking into the effects of 
well-liked celebrities, with both positive, neutral and even negative effects being reported 
from the limited range of studies carried out. However, the results from the studies presented 
here is clear: for both novel and existing brands, in the absence of any overt endorsement, 
simple pairing of a well-liked celebrity with a brand led to more positive explicit evaluations 
of the brand and greater likelihood of brand choice. Furthermore, brand evaluations became 
more positive after pairing with a liked celebrity. For similarly rated brands, those paired 
with celebrities were preferred to those paired with non-celebrities; and even for novel brands 
that they had previously rated neutrally, an overwhelming number of participants chose 
celebrity-paired brands as their favourite brand. In all three studies there was also an implicit 
preference for the celebrity-paired brands which supports the findings of Forehand and 
Perkins’ (2005) view that the implicit effects of celebrity advertising are difficult to 
overcome.  
These studies did not provide evidence of the resistance to the celebrity effect, which 
was apparent in the explicit responses of participants in Forehand and Perkins’ (2005) study. 
In their study participants were played audio recordings of celebrity voiceovers in real radio 
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ads and it was the brand evaluations of the participants who recognised the celebrity which 
tended to become less positive. It is possible that in Forehand and Perkins’ study, the fact that 
the identity of the celebrity was disguised could have triggered a sense of being manipulated 
in these participants which then led to resistance. In contrast to Forehand and Perkins, in the 
studies reported here the visual presentation of celebrities paired with brands meant that the 
identity of the celebrity was immediately apparent to participants. Importantly, for each 
participant the celebrities paired with brands were also those that they had identified as being 
well-liked.  
Rozendaal, Bujis et al. (2016) claimed that negative emotions stemming from 
recognition of manipulation might lead to resistance. In this study, however, there was no 
hidden manipulation for participants to detect and visual presentation of the liked celebrity 
alongside a brand was enough to bring about more positive evaluations of the brand. It could 
be that the general effect of associating well-liked celebrities with brands is to create positive 
explicit and implicit evaluations of the brand (as, presumably, is assumed by those employing 
celebrity endorsement as a marketing strategy). An exception to this could be where 
consumers feel directly that they are being manipulated in some way, which then sets in 
motion a resistance response. Some evidence for this can be found in research looking at 
product placement which, at least notionally, involves covert advertising. Gibson et al. (2014) 
found that for brands presented covertly in a popular TV show, when participants recalled 
seeing the brand they tended to report positive explicit brand attitudes. However, when 
participants were primed to expect persuasion to occur, those who recalled the brand reported 
more negative explicit brand attitudes. These researchers explain their results in terms of the 
propositional reasoning engaged in by participants who were alerted to the manipulation 
attempt which led them to provide more negative responses. 
While recognising a manipulation attempt and consciously reflecting upon it may be 
one route to resisting the celebrity effect which is dependent upon aspects of the specific 
context in which the ad is presented, the results from Study 3 also suggest an alternative, 
attitudinal, basis for resistance. The relationship identified between higher attitudinal 
advertising literacy and lower explicit brand preferences has been seen previously in research 
assessing the relationship between ad literacy and explicit responses to advertising in both 
children (Rozendaal, Opree et al., 2016) and adults (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998; 
Obermiller et al., 2005). One explanation for this would be that increased advertising literacy 
leads to defensive reasoning when individuals are exposed to advertising. This is supported 
by the finding that, for individuals demonstrating high advertising scepticism, advertising 
with greater informational content is less persuasive than advertising based on an emotional 
appeal (Obermiller et al., 2005). Notably, however, in Study 3 a similar relationship between 
attitude to ads and implicit responses to the brands paired with well-liked celebrities was 
identified; higher attitudinal advertising literacy was related to lower implicit preference for 
the celebrity brands. This suggests that there is also a relationship between advertising 
literacy and individuals’ affective responses to advertising. Interestingly, this finding does 
not remain when looking at scepticism more specifically – the significant correlation found 
between attitudinal ad literacy and implicit scores did not remain, suggesting that whilst 
overall attitude to ads is related to both explicit (propositional) and implicit (associational) 
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brand preference, scepticism more specifically is only related to explicit, propositional brand 
preference. Moving forward, looking at general attitudinal advertising literacy and scepticism 
as separate entities would be beneficial. This is something which is returned to later in the 
thesis.  
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) proposed that the (positive or negative) valence 
of implicit associations previously stored in memory influence the affective responses to a 
specific target item. If the overall affective response felt by an individual towards advertising 
is negative, then this ‘gut reaction’ to advertising will determine their implicit responses and 
could influence their explicit propositional judgments. An exception to this could occur, for 
example, where feelings of scepticism are overriden by strong positive feelings initiated by 
powerful emotional content included in an ad (Obermiller et al., 2005). More research is 
needed to investigate the relationship between advertising scepticism and explicit and 
implicit responses to advertising and to examine the relationship between propositional and 
affective responses to advertising in different advertising contexts. 
It could be possible that adults don’t attend to or even explicitly recognise 
advertisements as much as initially thought, since technological advances of advertising 
mean that we are increasingly surrounded by advertising in a wide variety of contexts. If we 
are constantly surrounded by advertising, with some of it being unattended, is it plausible that 
we can always be on guard against any unwanted effects? Heath (2012) suggested that when 
consumers are able to critically evaluate advertisements their ability to consciously reflect 
can actually alert them to recognise manipulation, thus affecting their explicit brand 
preferences. Furthermore, he proposed that “switching off” to advertising could actually be a 
key route to persuasion as cognitive defences are lowered and the implicit effects of 
advertising are difficult, or even impossible, to overcome. However, the findings of Study 3 
oppose this view and is the first research to the author’s knowledge to demonstrate that 
implicit defences against the celebrity effect can be maintained which could suggest that 
attitudinal advertising literacy may be able to help. These novel findings provide a clear 
direction for future work into advertising literacy and are relevant, for example, to school-
based advertising literacy initiatives which often focus on developing children’s conceptual 
understanding of advertising, whereas these results suggest the importance of emphasising 
attitudinal literacy. 
In conclusion, the results of the three studies reported so far have clearly 
demonstrated that pairing well-liked celebrities with brands can have a robust positive effect 
upon both explicit and implicit brand evaluations. There was little evidence to suggest that 
young adults consciously resisted the effects of celebrity pairing in their explicit judgments, 
however there was evidence indicating that a high level of attitudinal advertising literacy and 
scepticism acts upon the explicit effects of celebrity on brand judgments, but that attitudinal 
advertising literacy also moderates implicit effects. Study 4 explores further why no 
resistance to the celebrity effect – even in explicit judgments - has been found so far. In the 
discussion of Study 2 it was suggested that using well-liked celebrities might be leading to 
any scepticism being overridden by liking to the celebrity, even in participants explicit brand 
judgments. Therefore, a new method to increase the feeling of manipulation (a more realistic 
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ad situation) and a situation where the positive attitudes to celebrity is reduced (by using 
‘known’ rather than liked celebrities) was devised for Study 4. 
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6 Study 4 
 
6.1 Introduction 
One aim of Study 4 was to further explore the role of scepticism in young adults’ brand 
preferences. The literature most relevant to this chapter can be seen in section 1.3, where an 
examination of research into scepticism is offered. Literature suggests that having high levels 
of advertising literacy (or media literacy) is one way in which prevention of negative 
advertising effects can be used to protect consumers from the explicit effects of advertising 
campaigns (Büttner et al., 2014). Furthermore, literature concerning celebrity advertising is 
presented in section 1.4 which discusses the considered benefits for advertisers when 
celebrities are used in their advertising campaigns. Another aim of Study 4 was to examine 
the effect of celebrity advertising when the celebrity is known but not necessarily well-liked. 
Studies 1 to 3 have shown that the effect of well-liked celebrities is difficult to overcome 
(both explicitly and implicitly) even when participants demonstrate a relatively high level of 
scepticism towards advertising. However, only presenting participants with well-liked 
celebrities is not representative of how we, as consumers, typically experience advertising 
campaigns – for the most part we experience adverts which contain celebrities that we know 
but may have no particular liking for. Therefore, Study 4 moves away from using well-liked 
celebrities and instead utilises celebrities which participants should recognise but may not 
necessarily rate highly.  
Studies 1 to 3 have consistently shown that young adults, when presented with brands 
with well-liked celebrities, have an explicit and implicit preference for these brands over and 
above brands presented with non-celebrities. It had been expected that young adults would 
show resistance to the effects of celebrity in their explicit judgments and consequently have a 
preference for brands paired with non-celebrities. This was not found in any of the previous 
studies, which led to the conclusion that how the brands were presented failed to trigger the 
feeling of manipulation from which resistance would likely have arisen. The implicit effect 
consistently matched that of previous research (e.g. Forehand & Perkins, 2005), and therefore 
this study moves towards examining the explicit effect only. The IAT method was 
consequently not used in this study. Study 3 found that when there was a positive affective 
response (e.g. to a well-liked celebrity), even though attitudinal advertising literacy was high, 
brand choice, explicit and implicit responses were more negative. However, when correlating 
scepticism more specifically, rather than advertising literacy, there was no relationship with 
implicit responses and only the negative relationship with explicit responses remained. This 
highlights the importance of examining scepticism and explicit preferences in more depth.  
Studies 1 to 3 failed to find resistance to celebrity advertising in explicit judgments, in 
both children and young adults, even though dual process models based on Forehand and 
Perkins (2005) predict that explicit and implicit responses could be different. This could have 
been because of how the brands were paired which consequently failed to make participants 
feel manipulated. Therefore, Study 4 included a new format of pairing to represent a typical 
advertising scenario. Ten different brand logos, that were created in a format typically 
presented on advertising boards used as a backdrop for celebrity interviews, and photographs 
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of these brands, were shown to participants either with or without a celebrity. A measure of 
scepticism only (rather than attitudinal ad literacy) was included in this study, to extend the 
findings of Study 3, which found that scepticism to advertising was only correlated with 
explicit preference for celebrity brands, yet not implicit preference. Scepticism towards ads 
was measured both before and after testing to explore whether baseline scepticism to 
advertising matches that of scepticism directly after being presented with an advertising 
campaign. It seems plausible that scepticism to ads could increase upon presentation of 
adverts, and therefore both pre- and post-testing was conducted. 
Young adults were presented with printed questionnaires which measured advertising 
scepticism both pre- and post- brand testing, as well as explicit preference for brands 
presented either alone or with known celebrities. The brands selected were common brands, 
familiar to UK students, yet not market leaders within their field. Participants’ explicit 
preferences for the brands were recorded along with their justifications for their explicit 
judgments. Their brand choice was also recorded. A key interest here was whether simply 
pairing known celebrities with brands, in the format often seen on TV and other media, 
would trigger explicit preferences for celebrity-paired brands or whether adult participants 
would show resistance to the effects of celebrity. It was hypothesized that brands presented 
with celebrities, in a more realistic advertising scenario, would trigger feelings of 
manipulation in the young adults and thus resistance to celebrity paired brands would be 
shown. It was further predicted that high levels of scepticism to advertising would be related 
to lower explicit celebrity brand preference. 
 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
86 young adults (72 female) from a UK University with a mean age of 19.55 years (SD = 
4.40) took part in this study in return for credit towards research participation requirements 
for their course award. The data for two participants was removed as they failed to complete 
both (pre- and post-test) Scepticism scales, meaning a total sample of 84 participants (70 
female) were included in the final analysis. 
 
6.2.2 Materials 
All participants were presented with a printed questionnaire which contained four sections. 
The first and fourth sections tested young adults’ scepticism pre- and post- presentation of 
brands using a scale adapted from Obermiller and Spangenberg’s (1998) Advertising 
Scepticism (SKEP) Scale. The SKEP scale is a nine-item scale (α=.85) designed to measure 
general scepticism towards advertising with the items tapping into consumer opinions about 
the aims, honesty, truthfulness and accuracy of advertising. This scale was adapted to make 
the language and terminology more appropriate for young adults – for example, “advertising 
is a reliable source of information about the quality and performance of products” was 
replaced with “I can rely on the information given in adverts”. One item was removed 
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(“advertising is a truth well told”) as it was considered to be an ambiguous statement. The 
scepticism scale therefore consisted of eight statements (see Appendix 6.1) which tested 
scepticism towards advertising and were all responded to on a four-point scale: 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree. The decision to remove the “neither 
agree nor disagree” response was taken as studies show that the inclusion of a neutral or “no 
opinion” option significantly increases the number of people stating they have no opinion 
when they actually do (Bishop, 1987). Single mean scepticism scores before and after testing 
(high scores representing high scepticism) were calculated for each participant.  
 The second section of the questionnaire presented participants with 10 images of 
brands presented on advertising boards typically used as a backdrop for celebrity interviews 
and photographs (see Appendix 6.2). The brands selected were common brands, familiar to 
UK students, yet not market leaders within their field. For each participant, five of the images 
were presented as brands on ad boards only, and in the other five the ad boards were 
presented with a known celebrity in front of them. The order of presentation was 
counterbalanced, so that each brand was at some point presented alone and with each of the 
five celebrities. Unlike Studies 1 to 3, the celebrities selected were not measured as being 
“well-liked” but instead were selected on the basis that they were likely to be known. Each 
coloured image (brand alone or brand with celebrity) was presented separately on a page and 
measured 3.5” x 2” and preceded a question “How much do you like this brand?” (Explicit 
Brand Preference) to which participants could respond on a scale from “0 - Not at All” to “10 
- Very much”. The third section of the questionnaire presented all 10 brand images on a page 
and asked participants to choose their favourite three brands and to give the reasons for their 
selections (Brand Choice). 
 
6.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from the university ethics committee (see Appendix 6.3). 
Following the development of materials, participants were recruited – this involved 
advertising the study on the university’s Research Participation System (see Appendix 6.4) so 
that young adult students could sign up to gain course credit. Data collection took place in a 
large research room in groups of eight to 10 people. The room was large enough to allow 
only one participant to be sat on each row of four to ensure that participants were working 
independently. Participants were each given an information sheet to read (see Appendix 6.5) 
which detailed information of the study and what they would be required to do. If, after 
reading the information sheet, young adults were happy to continue, they signed a consent 
form (see Appendix 3.7) and were given the printed questionnaire to complete. Participants 
were asked to remain silent and in their seats until everybody had completed their 
questionnaires, to ensure no disruption. The researcher stood at the back of the room to 
prevent any late comers entering the room and disrupting the other participants. Upon 
completion, participants were thanked for their participation and were given the opportunity 
to ask questions, they were then given a debrief form to read and take away (see Appendix 
6.6).  
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6.3 Results 
 
Brand preferences  
Results showed that these young adults had a significantly higher explicit preference for 
brands presented alone (M = 5.19, SD = 1.09) than brands presented with a celebrity (M = 
4.69, SD = 1.32), t(84) = 3.33, p = .001, d = 0.41. This suggests that experiencing a brand 
paired with a known rather than a well-liked celebrity in a more true-to-life presentation led 
participants to resist the celebrity effect. 
 
Brand choice 
Participants were asked to select their three favourite brands from the 10 previously shown to 
them. Looking at first choices only, 56% of young adults selected a brand that they had seen 
previously presented alone in the ad presentation part of the study. In order to produce a 
Celebrity Brand Choice score, a score of one was given for each of the three favourite brands 
selected that had been presented with a celebrity, and a score of zero for chosen brands that 
had been presented alone. When looking at the three favourite brands selected by 
participants, the average Celebrity Brand Choice score (with three being the max) was 1.38 
(SD =.74). A single sample t-test demonstrated that this score was not significantly different 
to what would be expected by chance t(83) = -1.469, p > .05. 
 
Scepticism  
In analysing responses to the adapted Scepticism Scale the items were used to run the 
reliability analysis for each presentation of the scale, both before and after presenting the 
brands. For the eight items comprising the Scepticism Scale the Cronbach’s Alpha (.76 
before, .80 after) reached an acceptable level (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Mean scepticism 
scores were calculated and t-test analysis showed that there was no significant difference 
between scepticism scores before (M = 2.51, SD = .33) and after (M = 2.53, SD = .35) 
testing, t(84) = 1.24, p >. 05, d = 0.06. To assess whether there was any relationship between 
responses to the scepticism scales and explicit brand preferences, participants’ mean 
Scepticism Before and Scepticism After scores were correlated with their responses to each 
of the brand preference measures: Brand Choice, Brand Alone preference and Celebrity 
Brand preference. The results of the correlation are shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Study 4: Correlations between Brand Alone Preference, Celebrity Brand 
Preference, Brand Choice, Scepticism Before and Scepticism After (n = 84). 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4.  5. 
1. Brand Alone Preference -     
2. Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
.374** -    
3. Brand Choice -.187 .291** -   
4. Scepticism Before 
testing 
-.085 -.221* -.020 -  
5. Scepticism After testing -.058 -.248* -.021 .841** - 
** Significant at p < .01 
  * Significant at p < .05 
 
Correlational analysis showed a significant strong positive correlation between Scepticism 
Before and Scepticism After testing (r = .841, p < .001) which was to be expected. There was 
also a significant, positive correlation between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Explicit 
Celebrity Brand Preference (r = .374, p < .001). More importantly, there were significant 
negative correlations between preference for Explicit Celebrity Brands and Scepticism 
Before (r = -.221, p < .05) and Scepticism After (r = -.248, p < .05) testing, highlighting that 
participants who scored higher on the scepticism scale before and after brand presentation 
had lower explicit preferences for brands presented with celebrities. Interestingly there was 
no significant correlation between scepticism scores and brand preference scores when 
brands were presented alone. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
In Study 4, the strong celebrity effect that had consistently been seen across three previous 
studies was not seen when the brands were paired with ‘known’ rather than well-liked 
celebrities. This could indicate that in Study 4 for the first time young adults were 
demonstrating resistance to the celebrity effect. Despite this, even for known celebrities, an 
effect of scepticism similar to that seen in Study 3 occurred. Regardless of the fact that brand 
alone was preferred overall, within the sample the participants who scored higher for 
scepticism were also more likely to score celebrity brands lower. Higher scepticism (both 
before and after testing) was associated with lower preference for brands paired with known 
celebrities but the same relationship was not found for brands presented alone. In Study 3 the 
association was present when celebrities were paired with brands but not when there was a 
non-celebrity presented with the brand. Taken together these findings suggest that the 
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presence of the celebrity was important in influencing the responses of individuals with 
higher levels of ad scepticism. This result is entirely in line with the correlational result in 
Study 3 which highlighted that higher scepticism was related with lower celebrity brand 
scores.   
Research suggests that the presence of a celebrity endorser in advertisements can 
overshadow (or “eclipse”) the brand (Ilicic & Webster, 2014). Where this happens, and the 
consumer has a strong attachment to the celebrity, then their positive attitudes to the celebrity 
transfer onto the brand, enhancing their brand attitude - so eclipsing leads to a particular 
result when the celebrity is well-liked. This is a finding which could explain the findings that 
have been replicated in Studies 1 to 3 when each experiment was tailored to use only 
celebrities that were well liked to the participant. However, in Study 4 the research moved 
away from using celebrities that the participants had already rated as being well-liked, to 
present all young adults with the same celebrities, and the eclipsing effect disappeared. 
Across all of the studies reported thus far, the findings support the findings of Ilicic and 
Webster (2014) which suggest that a positive affective response to celebrities can override 
individuals’ cognitive defences regardless of whether they are aware of the persuasive intent 
of using celebrities in the ads to create a positive response to brands.  
In Studies 1 to 3 it was found that the simple pairing of a brand with a well-liked 
celebrity was enough to bias participants’ brand evaluations (both explicit and implicit) and 
brand choices in favour of brands paired with a celebrity that they liked. Study 4 moved away 
from presenting participants only with celebrities for whom they have a strong liking as, in 
reality, we are not only exposed to adverts that contain celebrities we like. It was expected 
that the presence of a celebrity with the brand would trigger cognitive defences within 
individuals which would enable them to guard against the intended persuasive nature of the 
celebrity figure. These results are therefore in line with this prediction and also fit with the 
suggestion that celebrities in ads do trigger cognitive defences in young adults, but when the 
celebrities are well-liked these defences are overridden.  
Two things need to be considered when discussing this finding. Firstly, it may be that 
the young adults here were searching for a reason to reject the brand when it was paired with 
a celebrity. Kunda (1990) found that individuals often search for a reason to reject the claims 
of advertisements, with those not wanting to believe the claim (i.e. those with high levels of 
scepticism) calling upon beliefs that can be used to question the nature of the advert. 
Friedstad and Wright (1994) highlight the importance of recognising the intended persuasive 
tactic within an advert. It may be that the ‘tactic’ of including a celebrity in an ad should 
make it easier to recognise an ad event but, even so, positive feelings for a celebrity may 
neutralise the recognition of manipulation and overrides defences. If the intended tactic is not 
immediately evident then one is less likely to trigger scepticism and could unknowingly 
welcome a persuasion attempt, which may offer an explanation as to why the young adults in 
this study preferred brands that were presented alone. It’s important to note, however, that 
young adults did show lower preferences when presented with celebrities, but overall brand 
preference in this study was not high (five out of 10). It may not be so much that they were 
defending themselves against the effect of celebrity pairings, but more to do with them 
missing the tactic of brands presented alone which explains why a) brands presented alone 
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were preferred more than celebrity paired brands and, b) why the negative relationship 
between scepticism and brands is only found when brands are paired with celebrities.  
Previous research (e.g. Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., 2011) has shown that the ability to 
recognise the intended tactics of advertisements varies by age, with eight-year-olds 
recognising some tactics of an advert much less accurately than older children and adults. 
The presentation of brands in this study depicted a more accurate representation of how ads 
are typically presented in everyday life. Therefore, it is more likely to have triggered 
recognition of being manipulated which enabled resistance to the celebrity paired brands. 
Therefore, in terms of triggering resistance, the change in procedure in this study seems to 
have worked. The current research explored the effects of celebrity advertising as it seems to 
be one tactic that children understand reasonably well. Due to the findings from Rozendaal, 
Buijzen et al.’s study (2011) where even eight-year-olds were able to identify the intentions 
of ads using celebrity endorsement, Hudders et al. (2016) stated that celebrity endorsement is 
not a tactic to which children are vulnerable. If eight-year-olds understand about celebrity 
endorsers, then we would expect to see them prefer brands presented alone, over and above 
brands presented with a known celebrity. This does not fit with previous assumptions about 
children’s vulnerability to ads derived from the work of Piaget (see section 1.2.1). Based on 
this earlier work it would be questionable whether ad literacy in young children is sufficiently 
developed to trigger scepticism. It is important, therefore, to explore whether the scepticism 
findings from Study 4 are as seen in a child sample, more specifically whether an association 
between high scepticism and low celebrity paired brand preference is observed. A finding 
matching that of the young adult sample would suggest that both children and adults are 
processing these ads in a similar way which, seems unlikely given the earlier research. 
Examining this was one of the aims of Study 5. 
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7 Study 5 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the results from the young adults in Study 4, to explore whether the 
same findings are evident in children aged eight- to 14-years. Earlier studies reported in this 
thesis (Studies 1 to 3) consistently highlighted that young adults have both an explicit and 
implicit preference for brands paired with celebrities for whom they have a strong liking – 
any attempt to use advertising literacy skills to defend against the celebrity influence seems 
to be overridden by their response to celebrities they like. In contrast, Study 4 found that 
when the celebrity is known as opposed to well-liked (which is more representative of 
everyday advertising), this effect disappears in young adults, with participants demonstrating 
an explicit preference for brands presented alone, as opposed to brands presented with known 
celebrities. Study 4 also demonstrated that young adults who scored higher on the scepticism 
scale before and after brand presentation had lower explicit preferences for brands presented 
with celebrities. Interestingly there was no significant correlation between scepticism scores 
and brand preference scores when brands were presented alone. This suggests that young 
adults with higher levels of scepticism can utilise advertising literacy skills to defend 
themselves against the persuasive intent of a celebrity paired brands when a known celebrity 
is featured (as opposed to a well-liked celebrity) and that the presence of a celebrity appears 
to trigger a negative response in those with higher ad scepticism.  
The results from Study 1, which included a small group of 10-year-olds, suggested 
that children of this age also have an explicit preference for brands paired with well-liked 
celebrities over brands paired with non-celebrities. As with the adults, this could be explained 
in terms of their cognitive defences being overridden by a strong liking for the celebrities. On 
the other hand, it could be that advertising literacy skills are associated with cognitive 
development which occurs during later childhood, and it is not until the age of around 12- to 
14-years that children respond to the celebrity effect in the same way as young adults. 
Therefore, an alternative account of the responses of the 10–year-olds in Study 1 would be 
that concerns about being manipulated by the celebrity were not overridden by their liking for 
the celebrities. It could be that they simply did not recognize the manipulation attempt 
because children of this age are easily persuaded by this form of advertising, highlighting a 
lack of advertising literacy. 
As described earlier in the thesis, the literature around advertising literacy has 
traditionally relied strongly upon Piaget’s stage theory of cognitive development which 
describes how children become increasingly able to reason about the world, from 
coordinating ‘simple’ motor skills in infancy to utilising higher-level reflective judgments in 
adulthood. Based upon this account of development, it has been suggested that with age most 
children will develop cognitive reasoning skills that will allow them to understand the nature 
of advertising and guard against any unwanted influence. For example, according to Piaget 
(1932) younger children are not good at picking up ambiguities, they are less able to deal 
with complexity, and they are not good at taking the perspective of another person. Friedstad 
and Wright’s (1994) Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) suggests that, compared with 
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older children and adults, younger children will find it difficult to appreciate the information 
contained in advertising and to recognise that advertisers present information from the 
perspective of their clients in seeking to persuade the recipient and influence their behaviour. 
From this perspective, therefore, it is not until children reach adolescence (12-years and 
onwards) that children would be fully able to understand persuasive intent inherent to 
advertising, and grasp that there are complexities and ambiguities in messages displayed 
through media.   
          More recent research has suggested children younger than 12-years do have some 
understanding of how advertising works. Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) conducted research 
into children’s understanding of advertising by asking them to match the intended effect of 
the advertisement with different tactics that advertisers chose to employ. They suggest that 
the age at which children in the Netherlands reach an adult level of understanding of 
advertising varies by tactic, with even eight-year-olds in their sample understanding the 
intention of celebrity endorsement being to get them to like the product. If the tactic of 
celebrity endorsement is an easy tactic for children to recognise, then it may be that children, 
like adults, can defend themselves against the intended manipulation of the celebrity paired 
brands. 
Whilst Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) report that eight-year-olds have a good 
understanding of celebrity endorsement, the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friedstad & 
Wright, 1994) indicates that it is likely that the younger age groups (aged eight and 10-years) 
may not yet have the cognitive skills and knowledge of advertising to defend themselves 
against celebrity advertising. In other words, they may recognise advertisers’ intentions but 
still not defend themselves in their explicit responses to ads. One of the aims of Study 5, 
therefore, was to explore children’s levels of scepticism to advertising and to examine 
whether any relationships between scepticism and explicit preferences emerge. Considering 
the developmental work of Piaget alongside the work of Friedstad and Wright and the PKM, 
we would expect to find the younger children to be less sceptical of advertising than the older 
age groups when presented with brands paired with known (as opposed to well-liked) 
celebrities. This might lead eight-year-olds to prefer celebrity brands more than older 
children, with this preference also being evident in their final brand choice.  
 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
271 children took part in this study, although only 216 children (102 female) were included 
in the subsequent analysis. Any child who failed to complete all tasks in full was left out of 
the analysis. In order to be able to specify clear age groups only children whose age fell into 
one of the following age categories were included in the study: eight-year-olds (seven years 8 
months to 9:4); 10-year-olds (9:8 to 11:4); 12-year-olds (11:8 to 13:4); 14-year-olds (13:8 to 
15:4). The final sample consisted of 45 children (28 female) in the eight-year-old group 
(mean age = 7.97, SD = .45), 76 children (46 female) aged 10-years-old (mean age = 10.18, 
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SD = .61), 42 children (16 female) aged 12-years-old (mean age = 11.92, SD = .34), and 53 
children (23 female) aged 14-years-old (mean age = 13.98, SD = .25). 
 
7.2.2 Materials 
All children were presented with the same printed questionnaire as used in Study 4. As before 
it contained four sections. The first and fourth sections tested children’s advertising 
scepticism pre- and post- presentation of brands using a scale adapted from Obermiller and 
Spangenberg’s (1998) Advertising Scepticism Scale. The readability score of this scale was 
improved (before = 12-years-old, after = eight-years-old, Flesch–Kincaid readability test) to 
make the scale more appropriate for the younger of our age groups. As in Study 4 the scale 
consisted of eight statements (see Appendix 6.1) which tested scepticism towards advertising 
on a 4-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree. Single 
mean scepticism scores (high scores representing high scepticism) were calculated for each 
child before and after testing.  
 The second section of the questionnaire presented participants with 10 different 
brands (see Appendix 6.2) that had been created to look like images of brands presented on 
advertising boards, typically used as a backdrop for celebrity interviews and photographs. 
The brands selected were common brands familiar to UK children, yet not market leaders 
within their field. The brands used were the same as those used in Study 4 with the young 
adults. For each participant five of the images presented the brands on ad boards only and the 
other five were presented with a known celebrity in front of them. The order of presentation 
was counterbalanced, so that each brand was at some point presented alone and with each of 
the five celebrities. As in Study 4, the celebrities used were known, rather than well-liked, 
and representative of celebrities that might be seen endorsing products. Each coloured image 
(brand alone or brand with celebrity) was presented separately on a page and measured 3.5” x 
2” and preceded a question “How much do you like this brand?” to which participants could 
respond on a scale from “0 - Not at All” to “10 - Very much”. The third section of the 
questionnaire presented all 10 brand images on a page and asked participants to choose their 
favourite three brands and to give the reasons for their selections. 
 
7.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from the university ethics committee (see Appendix 7.1). 
Following the development of materials participants were recruited. Headteachers of schools 
in Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire were sent a letter which thoroughly detailed the research 
requirements and the importance of the research (see Appendix 7.2). Headteachers who 
expressed an interest in allowing participation from children at their school were 
subsequently visited to discuss the research further. Agreement to participate was received 
from two schools, and a thank you gift of £50 book voucher was given to each of these 
participating schools. Because the study was not considered to be of a nature which would be 
likely to cause upset with young children, the university’s ethical panel deemed it suitable for 
a Headteacher to consent on behalf of parents. However, a letter was sent home to 
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parents/guardians of all children eligible to participate which detailed the research aims (see 
Appendix 7.3). The letter gave contact details of the researcher, as well as that of the 
researcher’s supervisors in case they wanted to discuss the research further 
 Data collection took place in children’s classrooms, on a whole class basis. Children 
were given the instructions verbally and reminded that although a letter had been sent home 
participation in the study was voluntary and they could be given an alternative activity to do 
if they wished. Children who had been opted out by the parents, or those who said they didn’t 
wish to take part in the study were given the task of designing a new poster advert for 
children’s toothpaste. Consent was assumed upon completion of the questionnaires. To 
ensure that all children understood each question, the researcher read each question aloud, 
along with the response options and gave time for the children to make their selections. 
Generally, each child worked through the questionnaire at the same time as the researcher. 
Upon completion a verbal debrief was given (see Appendix 7.4) and they were thanked for 
their participation. 
 
7.3 Results 
 
Brand preference  
Explicit Celebrity Brand score and Explicit Brand Alone score by age group are shown in 
Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Study 5: Means (SD) of Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Explicit Brand 
Alone Preference by age group (Min 0 – Max 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To examine the effects of age and brand presentation type a 4 (age) x 2 (presentation) mixed 
ANOVA was run with age as the between subject’s variable and presentation type as the 
repeated measure. This showed a significant main effect of presentation type with higher 
preference for brands presented alone (M = 5.34) than presented with a celebrity (M = 4.90); 
 Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference 
eight-year-olds (n=45) 5.53 (1.99) 6.08 (1.67) 
10-year-olds (n=76) 5.27 (1.79) 5.50 (1.82) 
12-year-olds (n=42) 4.54 (1.79) 4.81 (1.72) 
14-year-olds (n=53) 4.09 (1.96) 4.88 (1.81) 
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F(1,212) = 7.09, p = .008, ηp2 = 0.03. There was also a significant main effect of age. 
Regardless of how the brands were presented, preference for brands decreased with age, 
F(3,212) = 10.46, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13.  There was no significant interaction between brand 
preference and age. Literature suggests that as children get older their understanding of 
advertising and its intent increases (see detail of the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friedstad 
& Wright, 1994) and the findings of other studies discussed in section 1.2) and therefore the 
sample was split into younger (eight- and 10-year-olds) and older (12- and 14-year-olds) 
children. Post hoc t-tests found that brand preference was lower in the two older age groups 
(12-year-olds and 14-year-olds, M = 4.57, p = .01) compared to the younger age groups 
(eight-year-olds and 10-year-olds, M = 5.54, p > .05) suggesting that older children may be 
less susceptible to advertising which would fit with previous literature, the Piagetian account 
of development and the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friedstad & Wright, 1994). 
 
Scepticism  
Although this is the first time this scale has been used, there were no differences between age 
groups in children who completed the scale. In analysing responses to the adapted Scepticism 
Scale the item scores were used to run the reliability analysis pre- and post-testing. For the 
eight items comprising the version of the Scepticism Scale adapted for use with children, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha (.74 before, .80 after) reached an acceptable level (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994). Scepticism Before and Scepticism After scores by age group are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Study 5: Means (SD) of Scepticism Before and Scepticism After brand 
presentation (Min 1 – Max 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To examine advertising Scepticism Before and Scepticism After presentation by age a 4 (age) 
x 2 (presentation time: pre- vs. post-) mixed ANOVA was run with age as the between 
subjects variable and presentation time as the repeated measure. Findings showed a 
significant main effect of presentation time with scepticism scores higher after testing (M = 
2.43) than before testing (M = 2.39), F(1,212) = 4.29, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.02. There was also a 
significant main effect of age F(3, 212) = 5.24, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.07 with eight-year-olds (M 
= 2.20) being less sceptical than the 10-year-olds (M = 2.45), 14-year-olds (M = 2.47) and 
12-year-olds (M = 2.50): (all p < .001). However, there was no significant interaction 
between presentation time and age. 
 Scepticism Before Scepticism After 
eight-year-olds (n=45) 2.19 (.43) 2.20 (.55) 
10-year-olds (n=76) 2.43 (.35) 2.48 (.40) 
12-year-olds (n=42) 2.46 (.50) 2.53 (.57) 
14-year-olds (n=53) 2.47 (.32) 2.47 (.36) 
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Brand choice 
Children were also asked to select their three favourite brands from the 10 previously shown 
and a score of one was given for each of the brands selected that had been presented with a 
celebrity (with the maximum score of 3 representing a strong choice of celebrity brands). For 
the overall sample, looking at first choices only, 59% of children selected a brand that had 
been previously presented alone in the ad presentation part of the study, again highlighting 
that the celebrity effect was being resisted. Similarly, when looking at the three favourite 
brands selected the average brand select score was 1.34 (SD = .92). A single sample t-test 
showed that this score was significantly lower than what would be expected by chance: 
t(194) = 2.376, p < .01, and therefore that across the overall sample there was a tendency to 
choose brands that had been presented alone rather than with a celebrity. A one-way 
ANOVA showed that there was no difference in brand choice scores by age group (p = .798) 
nor when comparing younger (eight- and 10-year-olds) and older (12- and 14-year-olds) 
participants (p = .394). 
 
Correlating scepticism 
To assess whether there was any relationship between participants’ Scepticism Before and 
Scepticism After and their explicit preference for brands participants’ mean scepticism scores 
were correlated with Explicit Brand Alone Preference, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference 
and Brand Choice. These results can be seen in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Study 5: Correlations between Explicit Brand Alone Preference, Explicit Celebrity 
Brand Preference, Brand Choice, Scepticism Before and Scepticism After (n = 216). 
** Significant at p < .01 
* Significant at p < .05 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Explicit Brand 
Alone Preference 
-     
2. Explicit 
Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
.139* -    
3. Brand Choice -.507** .386** -   
4. Scepticism 
Before 
-.127 -.226** -.53 -  
5. Scepticism 
After 
-.110 -.221** -.101 .842** - 
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When looking at the overall correlations with all of the age groups included there was a 
significant strong correlation between Scepticism Before and Scepticism After testing (r = 
.842, p < .001) which was to be expected. There was also a significant, positive correlation 
between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference (r = .139, 
p < .05). Importantly, as was found with the young adult sample in Study 4, for the eight- to 
14-year-olds here there were no significant correlations between Scepticism (Before or After) 
scores and Explicit Brand Alone Preference but there was a significant negative correlation 
between preference for Explicit Celebrity Brands and Scepticism scores both Before (r = -
.226, p = .001) and After testing (r = -.221, p = .001).This showed that children who scored 
higher on the scepticism scale had lower preference for brands presented with celebrities. 
Furthermore, as seen in Study 4, although there was a significant association between 
Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Brand Choice (p <.001) there was no relationship 
between Brand Choice and Scepticism.  
Further correlations were carried out to look at the results for individual age groups 
based on the previous finding that children aged 12-years and older demonstrated a lower 
overall preference for brands than children in the younger age groups. As expected, for each 
of the age groups there was a significant, positive correlation between Scepticism Before and 
After testing: eight-year-olds (r = .758, p < .001); 10-year-olds (r = .824, p < .001); 12-year-
olds (r = .905, p < .001) and the 14-year-olds (r = .846, p < .001). Also, in all age groups 
Explicit Brand Alone Preference was negatively associated with Brand Choice (all p < .05). 
However, there were some age-related differences. For the two older age groups (12-year-
olds and 14-year-olds) there were significant, positive correlations between Explicit Brand 
Alone Preference and Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference (12-year-olds: r = .465, p = .002; 
14-year-olds: r = .304, p = .02) showing that, for these children, liking for brands was 
consistent across presentation types (with or without a celebrity). In contrast, for the eight-
year-olds there was a significant negative correlation present (r = -.292, p = .05) suggesting 
that, for the youngest children, those who liked one type of presentation tended to dislike the 
other.  
For the two older age groups (12-years and 14-years) analysed together, a positive 
relationship (r = .364, p < .001) between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Explicit 
Celebrity Brand Preference remained, indicating that there could be a shift around the age of 
12-years in how children treat brands paired with celebrities. Correlational tables for both 12- 
to 14-year olds (Table 7.4), and eight- to 10-year olds (Table 7.5) can be seen below. 
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Table 7.4 Study 5: Correlations between Explicit Brand Alone Preference, Explicit Celebrity 
Brand Preference, Brand Choice, Scepticism Before and Scepticism After for children aged 
12- and 14-years (n = 95). 
 
** Significant at p < .01 
* Significant at p < .05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Explicit 
Brand Alone 
Preference 
-     
2. Explicit 
Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
.364** -    
3. Brand Choice -.507** .249* -   
4. Scepticism 
Before 
-.004 -.244* -.160 -  
5. Scepticism 
After 
-.003 -.223* -.165 .883** - 
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Table 7.5 Study 5: Correlations between Explicit Brand Alone Preference, Explicit Celebrity 
Brand Preference, Brand Choice, Scepticism Before and Scepticism After for children aged 
eight- and 10-years (n = 121).  
 
** Significant at p < .01 
* Significant at p < .05 
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 both show a positive relationship between Scepticism Before and After 
testing, as expected. Table 7.4 also shows negative relationships between Explicit Celebrity 
Brand Preference and both Scepticism Before and Scepticism After testing for the older 
children (aged 12- to 14-years), but these results disappear in the younger age groups (aged 
eight- to 10-years). This supports the fact that maybe eight- to 10-year-olds have scepticism 
but are unable to use it. The correlations of the older children offer support for this finding. 
 
7.4 Discussion 
In line with the results of Study 4 carried out with young adults, the findings of the current 
study have shown that amongst a sample of children aged eight to 14-years, brands presented 
alone are preferred to brands paired with a known celebrity. When analysed individually, all 
age groups had a preference for brands presented alone and chose a brand presented alone. 
These findings appear to show evidence of resistance in all age groups, which would support 
the claims of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) that children as young as eight-years of age 
have a good understanding of celebrity advertising. When considering the work of Friedstad 
and Wright (1994) and the Persuasion Knowledge Model, it would be reasonable to expect 
eight-year-olds to rate brands presented alone and celebrity paired brands equally, or to prefer 
celebrity brands more. As discussed in section 1.2, work from Piaget, Theory of Mind and 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Explicit 
Brand Alone 
Preference 
-     
2. Explicit 
Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
-.144 -    
3. Brand Choice -.511** .549** -   
4. Scepticism 
Before 
-.164 -.151 .007 -  
5. Scepticism 
After 
-.145 -.176 -.071 .807** - 
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the Persuasion Knowledge Model suggests that the cognitive abilities of eight-year-olds may 
be limited, which could impede their ability to understand the intentions of advertisers and 
therefore mean that their capacity to resist ads is limited. However, the results presented here 
suggest resistance did occur in the younger age groups. 
On the other hand, the results of this study also showed that preference for brands 
(regardless of how they were presented – with/without a celebrity) overall decreases with 
age, with further analyses showing brand preference to be lower in the two older age groups 
(12-year-olds and 14-year-olds) compared to the younger age groups (eight-year-olds and 10-
year-olds). This finding is to be expected and would be predicted by the Persuasion 
Knowledge Model (Friedstad & Wright, 1994) and the findings of other studies (see section 
1.2) – as children get older their understanding of advertising and its intent increases. It 
seems plausible to suggest that as understanding of advertising increases so too do levels of 
scepticism and this is what was found here as the eight-year-olds were less sceptical about 
advertising than older children. Again, this would fit with Piaget and the Persuasion 
Knowledge Model (Friedstad & Wright, 1994). Furthermore, for older children scepticism 
was negatively related to celebrity brand preference, yet for younger children this was not the 
case.  
The general levels of scepticism increased with age, but this highlights the fact that, 
although scepticism was lower in the eight-year-old group, they preferred brands presented 
alone just like older children. In the older age groups, when the celebrity was present, higher 
scepticism was associated with lower brand preference. So, this could mean that, similar to 
the young adults in Study 4, scepticism influences the explicit celebrity brand preferences of 
the 12- and 14-year-olds. This would demonstrate how high ad scepticism can be involved in 
the resistance of the celebrity effect. In contrast, despite preferring brands presented alone, 
younger children’s judgments appeared to involve different underlying processes. The 10-
year-olds seemed to be equally as sceptical as the older children according to their scepticism 
scores, but their judgments showed no relationship between scepticism and brand preference. 
This is indicative of the fact that they may not apply their scepticism in the same way as older 
children. The eight-year-olds were not as sceptical as the older children yet also demonstrated 
a preference for brand alone suggesting that rather than being rooted in scepticism, their 
brand responses had an alternate basis. One possibility is suggested by the research findings 
of Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) who claimed that the recognition of being manipulated 
would trigger unpleasant associations which lead to negative feelings towards ads. It is also 
possible that whilst the eight-year-olds didn’t have levels of scepticism as high as the older 
children, they could have had enough scepticism to trigger a preference against the celebrity 
brands. A measure of affect-based scepticism was incorporated into Study 6, to explore 
whether affective responses in children are related to brand preference and brand choice. 
As in Study 4 with young adults, in the 12- to 14-year-olds (but not for the younger 
children), there was a negative relationship between scepticism and brand preference that was 
only seen when the celebrity was present. This suggests that the celebrity may have triggered 
scepticism in these older participants which affected their brand preferences. Further 
evidence that the younger and older children are responding differently lies in the 
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relationship between their brand alone and celebrity brand preference scores. For the two 
older age groups (12-years and 14-years) there is a positive relationship between brand alone 
scores and celebrity paired brand scores suggesting that if they like brands presented alone 
they tend to also like brands with celebrities, so the older children seem to be responding in 
terms of a general approach to advertising. For the younger age groups no similar 
relationships emerged. This indicates that it could be around the age of 12-years when 
advertising is better understood by children and that older children tend to have a more stable 
attitude to brands. This shift is better indicated by the lower brand preference for 12-year-
olds (and 14-year-olds) than 10-year-olds (and eight-year-olds). This fits with previous 
literature which suggests that by the age of 12-years of age children understand the intentions 
of advertising on an adult level have a more adult-like approach to ads. 
Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) claimed that children as young as eight-years-old 
recognise the intended effect of celebrity advertising. The results seen here, whereby younger 
children matched the older children in preferring brands presented alone over celebrity 
brands, at first sight, offer support for this claim. However, having understanding of the 
intent behind celebrity advertising and being able to act upon it may not go hand in hand. It 
could be that eight-year-olds are able to recognise persuasive intent but don’t know how to 
apply that knowledge and, although they act like older children and also prefer brands 
presented alone, they may have very different reasons for holding this preference. Therefore, 
whilst findings presented in this study support the work of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., and 
children of all ages did appear to recognise the intention of the celebrity, some of the findings 
are better suited to being explained by the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friedstad & 
Wright, 1994). For example, overall brand preference decreased with an increase in age, and 
older children were more sceptical than younger children, findings which further support the 
notion of the PKM. This suggests that in general, older children are better able to reflect upon 
their own thinking and the thoughts of others. This corresponds with their ability to 
understand more about the purpose and intent of advertising. In sum, these findings can be 
explained by drawing upon the findings of both Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., and that of the 
PKM. Although basic brand preferences and choices were the same across age groups, the 
underlying processes which underpin these judgments may have been different. 
 The main model of advertising that has been drawn upon extensively throughout this 
thesis has been the Persuasion Knowledge Model, dated 1994 (Friedstad & Wright). Over the 
last 25 years the advertising market has grown substantially, with many more advertising 
techniques forming part of our daily lives - for example, there has been a recent surge in 
electronic advertising with Internet ads often being personally tailored to our browsing 
habits. Advertising methods are now ubiquitous meaning adults’ and children’s defences may 
have evolved, or people may not attend to all advertising. Additionally, the nature of 
television advertising has changed, and people are now able to skip ads or watch ad-free 
programmes via newly developed apps. These are factors that the PKM model may not be 
able to accommodate. This will be explored in the general discussion (see section 11). 
In conclusion, the results of this study showed that overall explicit preference for 
brands (regardless of how they were presented – with/without a celebrity) decreases with age, 
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with further analyses showing brand preference to be lower in the two older age groups (12-
year-olds and 14-year-olds) compared to the younger age groups (eight-year-olds and 10-
year-olds). Scepticism could be important in influencing explicit brand judgments in children 
aged 12- and 14-years but not younger children, providing support for the notion that it could 
be around the age of 12-years when children are better able to engage in propositional 
reasoning about advertising.  
It is important to recognise that this study only looked at children’s explicit responses, 
which only addresses half of the main aims of this thesis. The small sample of children tested 
in Study 1 indicated that children would also have an implicit preference for celebrity brands 
(at least when paired with well-liked celebrities). To examine this with a much larger sample 
of children of varying ages, the implicit measure was reintroduced in Study 6 to examine the 
effects of celebrity on implicit, as well as explicit preferences. Results from the small sample 
of children in Study 1 suggest that children are likely to find the implicit preference difficult 
to overcome. However, the suggestion of Rozendaal, Bujis et al. (2016) should be 
acknowledged, and thus it could also be found that the negative feelings encountered by the 
recognised manipulation attempt may trigger resistance in implicit preferences also. Due to 
underdeveloped cognitive abilities however, this may not occur in the younger age groups.  
The main analysis discussed so far throughout this thesis has focused on brand 
preferences (both explicit and implicit), when brand choice may also offer an insight into the 
influence that scepticism and celebrity pairings have on our choice decisions. Studies 3, 4 and 
5 all used different advertising literacy scales, and each of these individual scales tapped into 
different aspects of ad literacy - for example, understanding bias, disliking of ads, and 
truthfulness of ads. Chapter 8 therefore offers reanalysis of Studies 3, 4 and 5 to further 
explore the relationships between scepticism, brand preferences and brand choice. Study 6 
builds upon these findings to investigate scepticism, brand preferences (explicit and implicit) 
and brand choices of eight- to 14-year-old children. 
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8 Reanalysis of Studies 3, 4 and 5 
 
The findings from Study 5 showed that scepticism may impact differently upon the responses 
of younger and older children and it isn’t clear from the results what caused younger children 
to prefer brands presented alone to celebrity paired brands. Also, because Studies 3, 4 and 5, 
used different scepticism scales from each other, further analyses were conducted of each 
study to look in more detail at the relationship between scepticism to advertising, brand 
preferences and final brand choice. Much of the previous analysis throughout this thesis has 
focused on participants’ preferences for brands (both explicit and implicit) whereas brand 
choice may tell us a lot about the influence that scepticism and celebrity pairings has on our 
choice decisions. Study 3 utilised an adapted version of the Attitudinal Advertising Literacy 
Subscale (aALS) which is one component of the Attitudinal Literacy Scale for children 
(Rozendaal, Opree et al., 2016). The aALS consisted of six items which tested understanding 
of advertising bias (one item), scepticism towards advertising (two items) and disliking of 
advertising (three items). The scepticism scale used in Studies 4 and 5 was based upon 
Obermiller and Spangenberg’s (1998) scale which looked at belief in the accuracy and 
truthfulness of ads. 
 
8.1 Study 3 Reanalysed 
For the purposes of reanalysis, the aALS was broken down into subscales. Because the two 
items from the aALS testing scepticism focused upon the truthfulness of advertising these 
were treated as an ‘accuracy-based’ scale (i.e. similar to Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) 
and the three items testing disliking of advertising were treated as an ‘affect-based’ scale. 
The single item question looking at bias (“how often do you think that what you see in 
advertisements is like things are in reality?”) was omitted for the reanalysis as this item did 
not fit with explaining either accuracy-based or affect-based scepticism. 
 When all six items were analysed (original analysis for Study 3) it was found that 
young adults with higher levels of attitudinal advertising literacy had lower explicit celebrity 
brand preference and lower implicit preference. When looking solely at the two items which 
tapped into measuring scepticism more directly, results showed that higher scepticism was 
related to lower explicit celebrity brand preference only – there was no relationship between 
scepticism and implicit preference. Reanalysis of the results of Study 3 using the two 
subscales for accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism provides interesting results (see 
Table 8.1). This showed there was a negative, significant correlation between accuracy-based 
scepticism and celebrity paired explicit brand preference (r = -.287, p = .017). Young adults 
scoring higher on the accuracy-based scepticism scale had a lower explicit preference for 
celebrity paired brands. There was no significant correlation between affect-based scepticism 
and explicit brand alone preferences, indicating that, at least in adults, it is their accuracy-
based scepticism which counteracts the celebrity effect in their explicit responses. However, 
for implicit brand preference the opposite was true. There was a significant, negative 
correlation between affect-based scepticism and implicit preference scores (r = -.247, p = 
.04). Young adults who had higher affect-based scepticism had lower implicit preference for 
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brands paired with celebrities. On the other hand, there was no significant correlation 
between implicit preference and accuracy-based scepticism. All of the correlations can be 
seen in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1 Table of correlations for Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Non-
Celebrity Brand Preference, Implicit Preference, Affect-Based Scepticism, Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism and Brand Choice for Study 3. 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
To examine whether scepticism (both Accuracy-Based Scepticism and Affect-Based 
Scepticism) and brand preferences (Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Non-Celebrity 
Brand Preference) are significant predictors of final Brand Choice, a regression analysis was 
conducted including Brand Choice as the DV and Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand Preference 
and Implicit Preference as the five IVs. Using the enter method it was found that the five IVs 
explain a significant amount of the variance in the final brand choice F(5, 61) = 2.65, p = 
.031, R2 = .17, R2Adjusted = .11. The analysis showed that scepticism (both Accuracy-Based 
and Affect-Based) and Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand Preference did not significantly predict 
final Brand Choice however Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Implicit Preference 
were significant predictors. The results can be seen in Table 8.2. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
- - - - -  
2. Explicit 
Non-Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
 
.014 
- - - -  
3. Implicit 
Preference 
.074 .030 - - -  
4. Affect-Based 
Scepticism 
-.131 -.034 -.247* - -  
5. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
 
-.287* 
 
-.028 
 
-.146 
 
.305* 
-  
6. Brand choice .301** -.136 .238* -.042 .022  
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Table 8.2 Regression analysis. Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based Scepticism, 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand Preference and Implicit 
Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score for Study 3. 
 
 Beta T Sig. 
Accuracy-Based Scepticism  .144 1.136 .261 
Affect-Based Scepticism .012 .094 .926 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference .328 2.705 .009 
Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand Preference -.142 -1.225 .225 
Implicit Preference   .241 2.007 .049 
 
 
The regression results show that both Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Implicit 
Celebrity Brand Preference were significant positive predictors of Brand Choice, indicating 
that the more positive the explicit and implicit preference, the more likely celebrity 
brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite brands. Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand 
preference was included in the regression to check whether low preference for non-celebrity 
brands predicts low celebrity brand choice – it did not. Following presentation of these 
pairings, Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand scores were not related to general advertising 
scepticism scores (Accuracy-Based nor Affect-Based). For celebrity brand pairings, higher 
Accuracy-Based Scepticism was related to lower Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, and 
higher Affect-Based Scepticism was related to Implicit Preference for celebrity brands. But, 
although scepticism was related to preferences, scepticism did not have a direct effect upon 
Brand Choice. On the other hand, both Explicit and Implicit Celebrity Brand Preference were 
related to Brand Choice.  
All of the above findings suggest that for adults, it is accuracy-based scepticism 
which is related to explicit brand preferences rather than affect-based scepticism. However, 
the opposite appears true in terms of implicit preferences where affect-based scepticism is 
related to counteracting the celebrity effect. These results have been depicted in a new model 
of celebrity advertising (Figure 8.1 below). Although we see these relationships between 
scepticism and preference in underlying responses to celebrity brands in Study 3 celebrity 
brands were still preferred and chosen over brands paired with non-celebrities. However, the 
important factor may be that in Study 3 brands were paired with celebrities selected as being 
extremely well-liked by each participant. 
For the models presented in Figures 8.1 to 8.5, it has been assumed that accuracy-
based scepticism occurs at a propositional level. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) 
describe propositional processes as being validated by conscious thought and logic, meaning 
that high level of cognitive resource is needed. On the other hand, it has been assumed that 
affect-based scepticism occurs at an associational level and is based upon the activation of 
simple associations in memory. Model 8.1 takes account of the participants likely response to 
the ad event (celebrity brand pairing) then tracks through participant responses at both the 
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propositional/explicit and associational/implicit level, showing relationships between 
scepticism and preference and the predictions of brand choice. In terms of Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen’s APE model (2011), it could be that recognising a well-liked celebrity gives 
rise to propositional processing in participants which generates positive thoughts about the 
celebrity which have previously been consciously articulated, thus overriding any general 
concerns about the accuracy of advertising. At an associational level, liking of a specific 
celebrity could also produce a strong positive affective response which overrides a general 
dislike of ads. Therefore, although those participants with higher accuracy-based and affect-
based scepticism towards ads tended to demonstrate lower explicit preference for celebrity-
paired brands overall, celebrity paired brands were still preferred and chosen by the young 
adults.  
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8.2 Study 4 Reanalysed 
In Study 4, the scepticism scale adapted from Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998) was used 
which tested accuracy-based scepticism only. Also, participants only provided their explicit 
responses to brands. The celebrities in this study were not explicitly well-liked as they were 
in Study 3, instead they were celebrities that should have been known to the young adults. 
This was considered to be more representative of typical advertising exposure. Further 
regression analysis was conducted for Study 4, including Brand Choice as the DV and 
Scepticism Before, Scepticism After, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Explicit Brand 
Alone Preference as the 4 IVs. Using the enter method it was found that the four IVs explain 
a significant amount of the variance in the final Brand Choice F(4,79) = 4.65, p = .002, R2 = 
.44, R2Adjusted = .15. The analysis showed that Scepticism Before and Scepticism After did not 
significantly predict final Brand Choice, however Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference was a 
positive predictor and Explicit Brand Alone Preference was a negative predictor of Celebrity 
Brand Choice. The results can be seen in Table 8.3. 
 
Table 8.3 Regression analysis. Scepticism Before, Scepticism After, Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Explicit Brand Alone Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score for 
Study 5. 
 
 Beta T Sig. 
Scepticism Before -.034 -.179 .859 
Scepticism After .095 .504 .616 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference .437 3.883 .000 
Explicit Brand Alone Preference -.347 -3.175 .002 
 
 
The regression results show a negative significant relationship between Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference and Brand Choice score, indicating that the higher the brands presented alone 
were rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite 
brands. In comparison, a positive significant correlation between Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Brand Choice score was found, indicating that as the celebrity brands 
preference increased, so too did the likelihood of these brands being selected as favourites. 
Regardless of the fact that brands presented alone were preferred overall, within the sample 
the participants who scored higher for accuracy-based scepticism were also more likely to 
score celebrity brands lower. The initial correlations of Study 3, which showed that higher 
levels of scepticism were related to explicit celebrity brand choice, are in line with this. 
Furthermore, the regression with Brand Choice as the DV shows that Celebrity Brand 
Preference positively predicts Brand Choice. So, scepticism correlates negatively with brand 
preference and brand preference positively predicts brand choice. These findings can be 
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depicted in an advertising model of young adults’ responses to neutral celebrity advertising 
(see Figure 8.2). 
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8.3 Study 5 Reanalysed 
As in Study 4, only accuracy-based scepticism and explicit preferences were measured in 
Study 5 which investigated accuracy-based scepticism and brand preferences in children. The 
celebrities in this study were not explicitly well-liked as they were in Study 3, instead they 
were celebrities that should have been known to the children. This matched the method of 
Study 4 and was considered to be more representative of typical advertising exposure. As 
reported in the results section of Study 5 (see Table 7.3, page 90) correlational analysis 
showed that for the eight- to 14-year-olds there was a significant negative correlation 
between Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Accuracy-Based Scepticism scores Before 
(r = -.226, p = .001) and After testing (r = -.221, p = .001), showing that children who scored 
higher on the scepticism scale had lower preference for brands presented with celebrities. 
This matched the young adult sample of Study 4. Furthermore, as was also seen with the 
young adult sample, there were no significant correlations between scepticism scores and 
brands presented alone.  
 A regression analysis including Brand Choice as the DV and Scepticism Before, 
Scepticism After, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Alone Preference as the 4 
IVs was also conducted for Study 5. Again, using the enter method it was found that the four 
IVs explain a significant amount of the variance in the final Brand Choice F(4, 190) = 39.23, 
p < .001, R2 = .67, R2Adjusted = .45. The analysis shows that Scepticism Before and Scepticism 
After did not significantly predict final Brand Choice however, as in Study 4, Explicit 
Celebrity Brand Preference and Explicit Brand Alone Preference were significant predictors. 
The results can be seen in Table 8.4. 
 
Table 8.4 Regression analysis. Scepticism Before, Scepticism After, Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Brand Alone Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score for Study 5. 
 
 Beta T Sig. 
Scepticism Before .087 .851 .396 
Scepticism After -.149 -1.457 .147 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference .422 7.669 .000 
Explicit Brand Alone Preference -.550 -10.146 .000 
 
The regression results show a negative significant finding between Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference and Brand Choice score, indicating that the higher the brands presented alone 
were rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite 
brands. In comparison, a positive significant correlation between Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Brand Choice score was found, indicating that as the celebrity brands 
preference increased, so too did the likelihood of these brands being selected as favourites.  
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It is interesting to look at the regression analyses when broken down into two age groups - 
older children (aged 12- to 14-years) and younger children (aged eight- to 10-years). These 
results can be seen in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. For the older children a regression analysis 
including Brand Choice as the DV and Scepticism Before, Scepticism After, Explicit 
Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Alone Preference as the 4 IVs was also conducted for 
Study 5. Again, using the enter method it was found that the four IVs explain a significant 
amount of the variance in the final Brand Choice F(4, 85) = 18.79, p < .001, R2 = .48, 
R2Adjusted = .46. The analysis shows that Scepticism Before and Scepticism After did not 
significantly predict final Brand Choice however, as in Study 4, Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Explicit Brand Alone Preference were significant predictors.  
 
 
Table 8.5 Regression analysis. Scepticism Before, Scepticism After, Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Brand Alone Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score for older 
children (aged 12- to 14-years) in Study 5. 
 
 Beta T Sig. 
Scepticism Before .006 .035 .972 
Scepticism After -.056 -.330 .742 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference .496 5.584 .000 
Explicit Brand Alone Preference -.690 -7.955 .000 
 
The regression results show that Explicit Brand Alone Preference was a negative predictor of 
Brand Choice score, indicating that the higher the brands presented alone were rated, the less 
likely celebrity brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite brands. In 
comparison, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference predicted a high Brand Choice score. Again, 
when taken into consideration with the correlational results presented in Table 7.4 (see page 
92) these results allow for a model of neutral celebrity advertising to be created based on 12- 
to 14-year-old children’s responses to celebrity advertising (see Figure 8.4). 
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Regression results for the younger children (aged eight- to 10-years) can be seen below. A 
regression analysis including Brand Choice as the DV and Scepticism Before, Scepticism 
After, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Alone Preference as the 4 IVs was also 
conducted for Study 5. Again, using the enter method it was found that the four IVs explain a 
significant amount of the variance in the final Brand Choice F(4, 108) = 22.15, p < .001, R2 = 
.46, R2Adjusted = .44. The analysis shows that scepticism before and scepticism after did not 
significantly predict final brand choice however, as in Study 4, celebrity brand preference 
and brand alone preference were significant predictors. Results can be seen in Table 8.6. 
 
Table 8.6 Regression analysis. Scepticism Before, Scepticism After, Explicit Celebrity Brand 
Preference and Brand Alone Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score for younger 
children (aged eight- to 10-years) in Study 5. 
 
 Beta T Sig. 
Scepticism Before .130 1.029 .306 
Scepticism After -.172 -1.349 .180 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference .435 5.725 .000 
Explicit Brand Alone Preference -.407 -5.345 .000 
 
The regression results show that Explicit Brand Alone Preference was a negative predictor of 
Brand Choice score, indicating that the higher the brands presented alone were rated, the less 
likely celebrity brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite brands. In 
comparison, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference predicted high Brand Choice score. When 
taken into consideration with the correlational results presented in Table 7.5 (see page 93) 
these results lend themselves to providing support for the model presented in Figure 8.3 (see 
page 106), although looking solely at the younger age group allows us to tease apart the 
effect of both accuracy-based scepticism before and after (see Figure 8.5).  
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In relation to the results of Study 5 presented in this thesis, the eight-year-olds were less 
sceptical (accuracy-based) than the other age groups, yet just like the older children they 
preferred brands presented alone. Hudders et al. (2016) in their work with children found that 
children requested advertised brands more after playing an advergame rather than seeing a 
TV commercial, and that these effects seem to be mediated by affective but not cognitive 
advertising literacy. In addition, their results highlighted that cognitive (e.g. accuracy-based) 
advertising literacy only seems to reduce advertising influence when the affective advertising 
literacy is high. As reported by Hudders et al., when affective advertising literacy is low, 
cognitive advertising literacy appears to have a positive influence on children's purchase 
requests, so it could be that children in the younger age groups (aged eight- to 10-years) have 
high levels of affective scepticism which has gone unmeasured in Study 5 yet could be 
important. It may not be the accuracy-based scepticism score which has affected brand 
choice, but rather an unmeasured affect-based scepticism level (e.g. pre-existing feelings for 
the given brand and/or celebrity) that has affected the brand presented alone 
preference. Given the findings of the further analyses conducted, future research should 
consider affective responses to specific advertising events as an important predictor of 
attitudes and brand choice which overrides general ad scepticism. This is the basis of the next 
study. 
It could be possible that, when faced with an ad event involving known celebrities for 
adults, a high level of accuracy-based scepticism is the driver of the ability to defend against 
the explicit effects of celebrity-based advertising, yet for younger children whose conceptual 
advertising knowledge may be more limited, high levels of affect-based scepticism is 
necessary. It may be that in Study 5, children aged eight-years had enough accuracy-based 
scepticism (as suggested by the PKM) to recognise advertising attempts, but high levels of 
accuracy-based scepticism may be linked to better conceptual understanding of ads. For 
eight-year-olds who may have lower levels of conceptual understanding, resistance to ads 
may depend upon affect-based scepticism. In Study 5, therefore, it may have been affect-
based scepticism rather than accuracy-based scepticism which may have led the eight-year-
olds to favour brands presented alone, over and above brands presented with a celebrity.   
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9 Study 6 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this final study was to bring together the methods and results of the previous five 
studies to examine the effect of both well-liked and known celebrities on explicit and implicit 
brand preferences and brand choice in children aged eight- to 14-years of age. Additionally, it 
aimed to explore the role of both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism, to examine 
whether having a high level of scepticism can aid in resisting the celebrity effect. As reported 
in Studies 1 to 3, results failed to see samples of young adults resisting the effect of well-
liked celebrities in their implicit, but more surprisingly in their explicit brand judgments. This 
was an unexpected finding, as previous literature suggests that at the age of around 12-years, 
children and adults are savvy to the intent of advertising and should be able to recognise its 
persuasive and manipulative intent. Coupled with Rozendaal, Buijzen et al.’s (2011) finding 
that celebrity endorsement is one of the earliest advertisers’ tactics that children understand, 
it was surprising to see young adults explicitly preferring brands presented with well-liked 
celebrities. Although accuracy-based scepticism scores were negatively correlated with 
explicit celebrity brand preference in Study 3, additional analysis showed that scepticism 
(both accuracy-based and affect-based) did not significantly predict final brand choice. 
 Study 4 was the first time that young adults demonstrated resistance to the celebrity 
effect, showing an explicit preference for brands presented alone as opposed to brands paired 
with a known celebrity. This finding was replicated in Study 5 with children aged eight- to 
14-years of age. Where participants showed high levels of scepticism (Study 3) some 
resistance to the celebrity effect did appear to be triggered in brand preferences but not 
enough to detract from an overall preference for celebrity-paired brands across the sample.  
 Studies 1 to 3 focused upon responses to brands paired with well-liked celebrities in a 
fairly artificial situation – celebrities and brands were simply paired, and in these studies no 
resistance to the effects of well-liked celebrities was seen in the responses of the young 
adults. However, the presentation format in those studies may have impeded young adults’ 
ability to recognise that they were being advertised to and therefore they may not have felt 
like they were in a realistic advertising situation. If this was the case then participants will not 
have felt manipulated and, as such, there was unlikely to have been any negative feelings to 
transfer to their brand preferences (as predicted by Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016), suggesting 
that a strong liking for celebrities in Studies 1 to 3 influenced brand judgments and overrode 
advertising defences. Studies 4 and 5 looked at known celebrities (not necessarily well-liked) 
and also presented them with brands in a typical advertising format. This appeared to trigger 
resistance. Study 6 built on these results to look at the effects of both well-liked and known 
celebrities using the ad format from Studies 4 and 5, investigating how children between the 
ages of eight- and 14-years responded to brands paired with well-liked and known celebrities 
presented in a typical ad format. 
 Both explicit and implicit responses to brands paired with celebrities were examined 
in Studies 1 to 3, showing a consistent effect of implicit preference, with young adults having 
an automatic response to favour brands paired with well-liked celebrities. Because this effect 
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was consistently replicated and due to the fact that the expected resistance was not seen in 
explicit judgments, Studies 4 and 5 did not examine implicit preferences. Whilst the small 
sample of children in Study 1 indicated that children would also have an implicit preference 
for celebrity brands (at least when paired with well-liked celebrities), the implicit measure 
was reintroduced in Study 6 to examine the effects of celebrity on implicit, as well as explicit 
preferences.  
 Studies 3, 4 and 5 looked at the relationship between scepticism and responses to 
celebrity-paired brands, although each study used a different measure of scepticism. Findings 
from Studies 3, 4, and 5 showed that accuracy-based scepticism is associated negatively with 
celebrity brand preferences, with the results of Study 5 further demonstrating that the 
relationship between accuracy-based scepticism and explicit preference may occur differently 
dependent upon age. In Study 6, separate measures of accuracy-based and affect-based 
scepticism were used to assess children’s scepticism and explore how these different aspects 
of scepticism relate to their brand responses. 
 One of the aims of Study 6 was to explore the effect of both well-liked and known 
celebrities in a realistic advertising format. In Studies 4 and 5, with a more typical advertising 
format, resistance appeared for the first time (although the brands were paired with known 
rather than well-liked celebrities). Based on predictions derived from the cognitive defence 
view (see section 1.2) in a situation where the celebrity is well-liked it could be that older 
children possess the cognitive resources to resist the effects of well-liked celebrities in their 
explicit brand preferences and choices, whereas younger children do not. Alternatively, if 
children’s resistance to advertising is overridden by liking of celebrities then children should 
show an explicit preference for celebrity paired brands and also choose them as their 
favourite brand. When paired with known rather than well-liked celebrities this preference is 
likely to disappear.  
 Based on the cognitive developmental literature and also the work on Advertising 
Literacy along with the results of studies reported thus far in the thesis, it was predicted that 
in Study 6 older children would have higher levels of scepticism than the younger children.  
It was further expected that even though older children will have higher scepticism, when 
presented with well-liked celebrities this scepticism will be overridden and children in the 
well-liked celebrity group would show an explicit preference for brands paired with well-
liked celebrities. It was expected that children in the known celebrity group would use their 
scepticism to defend against the celebrity, thus showing a preference for brands presented 
alone. This finding was expected to be particularly prominent in the older children (aged 12- 
and 14-years). 
         In terms of implicit responses, based solely on the results of the small sample of 
children in Study 1, it might be expected that all age groups in both the well-liked and known 
celebrity conditions in Study 6 will show an implicit preference for celebrity paired brands. 
Furthermore, the cognitive defence view, which proposes that resistance appears due to 
explicit propositional processing, and findings such as those of Forehand and Perkins (2005), 
also offer support for this prediction and suggest implicit associations may be difficult to 
overcome. However, the simple pairing of celebrities and brands in Studies 1 to 3 may not 
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have triggered feelings of being manipulated and based on the literature (such as Rozendaal, 
Buijs et al., 2016) which suggests that dual processes interact, it could be predicted that 
associational implicit preferences could be triggered in Study 6 if recognition of manipulation 
and persuasion occurs. It is possible that this might be found in the older children only, where 
a more sophisticated understanding of celebrity advertising is present, although it could be  
that this occurs even in the youngest children if they are able to recognise the intentions 
behind celebrity advertising, as Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., (2011) suggest.   
        It may also be the case that how explicit and implicit processes interact occurs 
differently dependent on whether participants are presented with brands paired with well-
liked celebrities or with celebrities for whom they have no strong feelings overall. It would 
not be too surprising, for example, if strong affective responses triggered by well-liked 
celebrities impact upon implicit associational responses to the brands – and these effects may 
occur differently in children of different ages. In Study 5, younger children, with lower levels 
of accuracy-based scepticism, were just as likely to prefer brands presented alone as the 14-
year-olds. One possible explanation for this is that, as suggested by Rozendaal, Buijs et al. 
(2016), their responses to the brands were driven by an affective response - ‘gut-feeling’ –
which in turn impacted upon their explicit brand preferences. This opens up the possibility 
that younger children’s brand responses were generated by different underlying processes 
than those of the older children. This possibility was explored further in Study 6. 
 In Study 6 a measure of affect-based scepticism was introduced in order to assess the 
relationship between children’s explicit and implicit responses to celebrity brands and their 
general liking or disliking of advertising. Previously in the literature, rather than examine 
children’s general liking or disliking of ads, there has been a tendency to measure children’s 
attitude to ads, sometimes including a component of liking or disliking as one of several 
measures (see the Attitudinal Ad Literacy Scale; Rozendaal, Opree et al., 2016), or to assess 
their affective response towards a particular advertising format (e.g. TV advertising) or even 
an specific advertising event such as an online advergame (Hudders, Cauberghe & Panic, 
2016). In Study 6, general affect-based ad scepticism was measured as a separate item. Based 
on the notion that affect–based scepticism involves simple associational processing (or ‘gut-
feelings’) and in the absence of any previous research with such a measure, it was unknown 
whether age differences in affect-based scepticism would be present in this sample. However, 
Study 5 highlighted that children in the younger age groups (e.g. aged eight-years) 
demonstrated an explicit preference for brands presented alone, just like the older children. 
This led to the suggestion that for eight-year-olds resistance to ads may depend upon affect-
based scepticism - it may have been a general ‘gut-level’ dislike of ads that led the eight-
year-olds to favour brands presented alone over and above brands presented with a celebrity 
rather than accuracy-based scepticism. If so, it could be that eight-year-olds demonstrate 
similar levels of affect-based scepticism to 14-year-olds. 
 To summarise, across all of the previous five studies results have suggested that when 
the celebrity advertising a brand is considered to be well-liked, any defence triggered by high 
levels of scepticism is overridden and both an explicit and implicit preference is shown for 
celebrity brands. However, when the celebrity is only known and there is no particular high 
liking, the celebrity effect disappears. 
115 
 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Participants 
207 children (mean age = 11.24, SD = 2.13) took part in this study, although only 174 
children (92 male) were included in the final analysis. This study ran over three consecutive 
weeks and any child who was absent for one or more of the sessions was left out of the 
analysis. In order to be able to specify clear age groups only children whose age fell into one 
of the following age categories was included in the study: eight-year-olds (7 years 8 months 
to 9:4); 10-year-olds (9:8 to 11:4); 12-year-olds (11:8 to 13:4); and 14-year-olds (13:8 to 
15:4) and therefore any child not within these ranges was also excluded. Children in each age 
group were allocated to one of two conditions – approximately half being presented with 
well-liked celebrities and brands alone, and the remaining being presented with known 
celebrities and brands alone.  
 From the remaining sample 46 children (27 male; 22 “well-liked” condition) were 
in the eight-year-old group  (mean age = 8.36, SD = .44), 38 children (20 male; 19 “well-
liked” condition) aged 10-years-old (mean age = 10.53, SD = .47), 44 children (21 male; 22 
“well-liked” condition) aged 12-years-old (mean age = 12.05, SD = .15) and 46 children (24 
male; 20 “well liked” condition”) aged 14-years-old (mean age = 13.93, SD = .33). Overall 
83 children participated in the well-liked celebrity condition and 91 in the known celebrity 
condition. 
 
9.2.2 Materials 
Children were tested over three consecutive weeks, and at each time point were presented 
with printed questionnaires. In week two, during the implicit testing stage, participants were 
also presented with an online IAT test on laptop computers. 
 Unlike Studies 1 to 3, where a larger selection of celebrities were rated and chosen 
to tailor individual preference, children in this study were all presented with the same 
(piloted) celebrities. This was due to the large sample of children that were to be tested. It 
was important for this study that children were tested on the same day each consecutive week 
and the only way to ensure that this could happen was to test explicit preferences via paper 
and pen method in a classroom. It was unfeasible to individually measure celebrity 
preference in this study. Therefore, to determine the celebrities to be used in the study a pilot 
study including children aged eight- to 14-years of age was conducted to indicate which 
celebrities’ children in each age group have a high liking for. This measure was included to 
check that those in the well-liked celebrity group did in fact have a higher liking for the 
celebrities presented to them than the children in the known celebrity group. A single mean 
score (high score representing high celebrity liking) was generated for each child. 
 In Week 1 children were presented with a questionnaire containing three sections. 
The first section tested children’s conceptual advertising literacy prior to presentation of the 
brands using the six-item Accuracy-Based Advertising Scepticism Scale adapted from 
Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998), (see Appendix 9.1) and also used in Study 5. Two 
questions were removed for Study 6 to avoid repetition of questions (e.g. “most adverts tell 
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the truth” and “adverts are usually truthful”) and to make the questionnaire shorter. The 
readability of this scale was improved (before = 16-years-old, after = eight-years-old, Flesch-
Kincaid readability test) to make the scale more appropriate for the younger age groups. The 
scale consisted of six questions which tested scepticism towards advertising with responses 
occurring on a four-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly 
agree. As in Studies 4 and 5 the “neither agree nor disagree” response was removed to reduce 
the number of people stating they have no opinion when they actually do (Bishop, 1987).  
 A five-item scale testing children’s affect-based scepticism was developed for this 
study (see Appendix 9.2), with items taken from scales used by Hudders et al. (2016) and 
Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) combined to compile a measure of affect-based scepticism. 
The scale consisted of five statements, with the readability suitable for children aged seven-
years-old (Flesch-Kincaid readability test). Two of these items negatively worded to prevent 
a response set where participants respond favourably or unfavourably to all items (Marsh, 
Barnes, Cairnes, & Tidman, 1984). These two items (“I think adverts are boring” and “I think 
adverts are stupid”) were reverse coded before analysis, and responses occurred on a four-
point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree. Again the 
“neither agree nor disagree” response was removed. A mean accuracy-based scepticism score 
and mean affect-based scepticism score was calculated for each participant (high score 
representing high scepticism in each of the scales).  
 The second section of the questionnaire presented children were presented with four 
celebrities - either four that were considered to be “well-liked” or four that should be known 
to children without particularly being considered liked or disliked and were asked to respond 
on a scale of one to nine to indicate how much they liked (maximum score of nine) or 
disliked (minimum score of one) each presented celebrity (see Appendix 9.3).  
 The last section in this questionnaire presented children with eight printed images 
of backdrop boards containing brand logos for brands that they should have knowledge of but 
no particularly strong liking. These brands were consistent with the brands used in earlier 
studies reported in this thesis. Children were asked to rate each brand on how much they 
liked (maximum score = nine) or disliked (minimum score = one) each brand, and an overall 
mean brand score was calculated. Therefore Week 1 served to test children’s initial 
preference for brands prior to these being paired with celebrities and also gave an indication 
of their baseline scepticism – both accuracy-based and affect-based. 
 In Week 2 children were again presented with a questionnaire and also took part in 
an IAT on a laptop computer. There were four different versions of the questionnaire each 
with a series of images of backdrop boards containing brand logos, half of which had the 
image of a celebrity superimposed. Each child was presented with only one of these 
questionnaires. Two of the questionnaires contained well-liked celebrities and two contained 
known celebrities that children had seen in week one. For each questionnaire type (well-liked 
and known) the celebrity and brand pairings were counterbalanced so that if Child A saw the 
four celebrities paired with Aquafresh, Lacoste, Subway and Puma, then Child B saw the 
four celebrities with the other four brands (Heinz, Nivea, Motorola, Chanel). Children saw 
each of the celebrities they had previously seen in week one.  Each image (either brand alone 
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or brand with celebrity) was presented separately on one page and measured 3.5” x 2” and 
preceded a question “How much do you like this brand?” to which participants could respond 
on a scale from “1 - Not at All” to “9 - Very much”. For each of the eight brand images 
children were also presented with the affect-based scepticism scale so that scepticism for 
each of the individual brands and celebrity paired brands could be recorded. The scale 
consisted of five statements, with two of these items negatively worded and reverse coded 
before analysis (“I think adverts are boring” and “I think adverts are stupid”). Responses 
were made on a four-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly 
agree. Again the “neither agree nor disagree” response was removed. The second section of 
the questionnaire presented all eight brand logos on a page and asked participants to choose 
their favourite three brands and to give the reasons for their selections.  
 Children were then asked to complete the IAT and they did this individually on a 
laptop provided by the researcher. Children were presented items from four categories: i) 
images of their four ‘celebrity brands’, ii) their four ‘brands presented alone’, iii) five 
‘positive’ attributes (e.g. happy, nice) and iv) five ‘negative’ attributes (e.g. sad, nasty). They 
were instructed to use the ‘E’ and ‘I’ keys to categorize each item quickly while making as 
few errors as possible. The IAT ran in five stages with two initial familiarisation trials 
(images and attributes) followed by the first set of test trials where the concept categories 
‘celebrity brands’ and ‘good’ were combined on the ‘E’ key and ‘brand alone’ and ‘bad’ 
were combined on the ‘I’ key. The concept category pairings were then reversed on the two 
keys for a further familiarisation trial and following this the second set of test trials ran with 
this reversed key orientation. As suggested by Cvencek et al. (2011) and Greenwald, Nosek, 
and Banaji (2003) to reduce the need for children to sustain their attention for a long period 
of time, the standard IAT length of trials was reduced by 20% for use with younger 
participants. Therefore, the three practice trials contained 16 items and the two test trials 
(celebrity brands and positive / celebrity brands and negative) contained 32 trials. The order 
of presentation was counterbalanced so that half of the children responded to celebrity brands 
/ positive attributes and brand alone / negative attributes first, whereas half of the children 
responded to celebrity brand / negative and brand alone / positive first. The calculation of 
IAT scores using the D-algorithm also followed the recommendations of Greenwald et al. 
(2003) Positive D scores indicated an implicit preference for celebrity brands.  
 In Week 3 children were presented a questionnaire with the eight brand logos that 
they had seen in the previous two weeks and were asked to indicate for each one how much 
they liked the brand from 1 = not at all, to 9 = very much. An overall mean brand rating for 
each child at post-test was calculated. Children were then presented with the conceptual 
scepticism scale from week one and the affect-based scepticism scale previously seen in 
week one and week two so that a measure of these two types of scepticism could be 
identified at post-test.  
 
9.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from the university ethics committee (see Appendix 9.4). 
Following the development of materials participants were recruited. Headteachers of schools 
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in Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire were sent a letter which thoroughly detailed the research 
requirements and the importance of the research (see Appendix 9.5). Headteachers who 
expressed an interest in allowing participation from children at their school were 
subsequently visited to discuss the research further. Agreement to participate was received 
from three schools, with one school agreeing testing of children aged eight-years and 10-
years. A £50 book voucher was given as a thank you to each participating year group.  
Because the study was not considered to be of a nature which would be likely to cause 
upset with young children, the university’s ethical panel deemed it suitable for a parental opt-
out method to be employed. A letter was sent home to parents/guardians of all children 
eligible to participate which detailed the research aims (see Appendix 9.6). The letter gave 
contact details of the researcher as well as that of the researcher’s supervisors if anyone 
wished to discuss the research further. Letters were sent out by the school two weeks prior to 
data collection. Any forms returned to the schools were obtained by the researcher and it was 
ensured by the class teacher that children who had returned an opt-out form did not 
participate.  
 In Week 1 and Week 3 data collection took place in children’s classrooms on a whole 
class basis. Children were given the instructions verbally and reminded that although a letter 
had been sent home, participation in the study was voluntary and they could be given an 
alternative activity to do if they wished. Children who had been opted out by the parents, or 
those who said they didn’t wish to take part in the study were asked to carry on with their 
reading books. Consent was assumed upon completion of the questionnaires. To ensure that 
children in the youngest age group (aged eight-years-old) understood each question, the 
researcher read each question aloud, along with the response options and gave time for the 
children to make their selections. Generally, each child worked through the questionnaire at 
the same time as the researcher. Upon completion at the end of each week a verbal debrief 
was given (see Appendix 9.7) and the children were thanked for their participation. 
 In Week 2 children in the younger age groups (aged eight- and 10-years) were tested 
in a quiet room adjoining their classroom in groups of six. Children in the older age groups 
were given individual allocated times to arrive for participation. In each instance children sat 
around a large table and were firstly given the questionnaire to complete – this was read 
aloud for the younger children. Once all questionnaires had been completed each child was 
given a laptop and were given instructions for the IAT part of the study. Children completed 
both tasks in silence and there was no evidence of group testing being problematic or 
distracting. Once the IAT had been completed by all children they were verbally debriefed 
and thanked for their participation.  
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9.3 Results 
 
Initial celebrity liking (Week 1) 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that the celebrities used in the “well-liked” 
group were rated significantly higher than the celebrities used in the “known” group. The 
means (SD) for each age group can be seen in Table 9.1. 
 
Table 9.1 Study 6: Initial mean preference (SD) for Well-Liked Celebrity and Known 
Celebrity by age. 
Age group Well-Liked Celebrity Known Celebrity 
eight-years (n=46) 6.52 (1.77)  5.60 (1.78) 
10-years (n=38) 6.91 (1.51) 4.08 (2.20) 
12-years (n=44) 6.02 (2.62) 3.84 (1.50) 
14-years (n=46) 4.92 (1.73) 2.74 (1.70) 
Whole sample 6.09 (2.07)  4.00 (2.05) 
 
When looking at individual age groups 10-year-olds (p < .001), 12-year-olds (p = .001) and 
14-year-olds (p < .001) had a significantly higher preference for well-liked celebrities. 
Although the difference in preference for well-liked and known celebrities in the eight-year-
old group was not significant, preference scores were in the same direction as for the older 
groups. For the overall sample, analysis showed that there was a significant difference in 
preference between the well-liked and known celebrities, with the celebrities presented in the 
well-liked condition having a higher rating score (M = 6.09, SD = 2.07) than those in the 
known celebrity condition (M = 4.00, SD = 2.05), t(169) = 6.62,  p < .001, d = 1.01. 
The scores of the 14-year-olds are lower than those of children in the lower age 
groups for both the well-liked and known celebrities. Although a pilot study revealed that the 
four celebrities were considered to be well-liked by children of this age, the sample of 14-
year-olds participating in this study was culturally diverse which could explain why some of 
the children rated the celebrities quite neutrally or towards the lower end of the rating scale. 
Whilst there is a significant difference between the well-liked celebrity liking score and the 
known celebrity liking score, when looking at the means of the other age groups it could be 
suggested that the 14-year-olds displayed some level of dislike for the known celebrities and 
had no particular liking for the well-liked celebrities. 
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Immediate explicit brand preference (Week 2) 
Immediate explicit brand preference for brands paired with well-liked and known celebrities 
and brands presented alone for each age group are shown in Table 9.2.  
 
Table 9.2 Study 6: Mean (SD) immediate Explicit Brand Preference for brands presented 
with a celebrity and brands presented alone for each age group (Week 2). 
 
 
To examine the effects of age and brand presentation type a 4 (age) x 2 (presentation – 
celebrity brands vs brand alone) x 2 (celebrity group – well-liked vs known) mixed ANOVA 
was run with age and celebrity group as between subjects variables and presentation type as 
the repeated measure. This showed no significant main effects of presentation type, celebrity 
group or age. There was, however, a significant interaction between age group, celebrity 
group and presentation type (F(3,166) = 11.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .172). Further exploratory t-
test analyses were conducted with Bonferroni correction applied to correct for the eight 
comparisons. Therefore p < .006 is used as the threshold of significance. Results found that 
eight-year-olds, 10-year-olds and 12-year-olds showed no significant difference in 
preference for brands presented alone or with well-liked celebrity brands and no preference 
between brand alone and known celebrity brands. For the 14-year-olds in the well-liked 
celebrity group there was a significant preference for brands alone (M = 6.05) over celebrity 
brands (M = 4.63): t(26) = 3.36, p < .001, d = .88. In contrast, in the known celebrity group 
there was a significant preference for celebrity brands (M = 6.14) over brand alone (M = 
4.82): t(26) = -5.79, p = < .001, d = 1.01. Interestingly, the results of the 14-year-olds in the 
well-liked celebrity group seem to show resistance to the celebrity effect – something which 
was expected of the young adults in Studies 1 to 3. Reasons for this will be explored further 
in the discussion.  
 
 Well-Liked Celebrities Known Celebrities 
 Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
Explicit 
Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
P Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference  
Explicit 
Brand Alone 
Preference 
p 
eight-years 
(n=46) 
6.16 (2.28) 5.20 (2.02) .142 5.19 (1.67) 5.92 (1.88) .068 
10-years 
(n=38) 
6.12 (1.60) 6.00 (1.69) .816 5.61 (1.88) 5.36 (1.70) .654 
12-years 
(n=44) 
6.51 (1.45) 5.57 (1.45) .018 5.09 (1.70) 5.75 (.98) .118 
14-years 
(n=46) 
4.63 (1.42) 6.05 (1.77) .003 6.14 (1.24) 4.82 (1.37) <.001 
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Immediate implicit brand preference (Week 2) 
The IAT produces a single score (referred to as D). The magnitude of the score indicates the 
degree of preference (.15 = small effect size; .35 = medium effect size; .60 = large effect size; 
Rudman, 2011) with positive D-scores representing an implicit preference for celebrity 
brands and a negative D-score representing a preference for brands alone. Immediate Implicit 
Brand preference scores are shown in Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3 Study 6: Immediate Implicit Brand Preference for each age group in the Well-
Liked Celebrity and Known Celebrity conditions. Positive scores represent preference for 
celebrity brands.  
 
The above table shows the calculated D score for each of the age groups in each of the two 
experimental conditions. Calculation of the IAT scores using the D-algorithm also followed 
the recommendations of Greenwald, et al. (2003) where positive D scores indicate an implicit 
preference for celebrity brands and negative scores indicate a preference for brands presented 
alone. The D score results of the 14-year-olds are both negative which suggests that this age 
group have resistance to both types of celebrity (well-liked and known). 
A fully between subjects 4 (age) x 2 celebrity group (well-liked vs known) ANOVA 
explored children’s immediate implicit brand responses. This showed a significant main 
effect of age (F(3,163) = 7.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .12) with the 14-year-olds overall showing a 
higher implicit preference for brands presented alone than children in the younger groups (all 
p < .05). There was no significant effect of celebrity group, but there was a significant 
interaction between celebrity group and age F(3,163) = 3.03, p = .031, ηp2 = .05. Post hoc 
tests for the well-liked celebrity group were conducted with Bonferroni applied to correct for 
the four age groups being compared. Therefore p < .01 is used as the benchmark for 
statistical significance. Results show a significant effect of age F(3,75) = 3.75, p = .015, with 
12-year-olds (M = .19, SD = .34) and 14-year-olds (M = -.26, SD = 62) being statistically 
different (p = .007). Further post hoc tests for the known celebrity condition (again, with p < 
.01 used as the benchmark for statistical significance) were conducted. Results show a 
significant effect of age F(3,87) = 6.61, p < .001, with 14-year-olds (M = -.35, SD = .73) 
being statistically different to both eight-year-olds (M = .24, SD = .38, p = .002) and the 10-
year-olds (M = .26, SD = .53, p = .002). This shows that the 14-year-olds are responding 
 
Age group 
Well-Liked 
Celebrity 
Known Celebrity  Overall Implicit 
Preference 
eight-years (n=46) -.033 (.37) .244 (.39) .119 (.40) 
10-years (n=38) -.010 (.30) .259 (.53) .128 (.45) 
12-years (n=44) .196 (.34) -.071 (.42) .060 (.40) 
14-years (n=46) -.257 (.62) -.351 (.72) -.310 (.68) 
Whole sample -.023 (.46)  -.007 (.59) -.015 (.53) 
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differently to the younger age groups and differently to the young adults in Studies 1 to 3. 
Furthermore, the implicit response of the 14-year-olds is not like their explicit response in 
Week 2, which provides evidence for a dual-process approach. 
Based on these findings the overall results were used to run a one sample t-test, 
excluding the 14-year-olds to explore whether the responses of this age group are carrying 
the preferences of the overall sample. Results of the children aged eight- to 12-years showed 
the mean implicit score (.100) to be significantly higher than the baseline score of 0, 
demonstrating that children aged 12-years and younger had a significant implicit preference 
for celebrity paired brands t(118) = 2.64, p = .009. Analysis of the 14-year-old sample found 
a significant implicit preference for brands presented alone, with the implicit score (-.310) 
being significantly lower than the baseline score of 0, t(45) = -3.10, p = .003. 
 
Brand choice (Week 2) 
Initially participants’ brand choices were analysed by looking at their first choices only. Of 
the 174 participants, 53% chose a celebrity paired brand as their first choice and 44% chose a 
non-celebrity brand. Four children did not complete the brand choice questions. When broken 
down into well-liked and known celebrities, of the 83 who saw liked celebrities (one child 
did not respond), 50% chose a celebrity brand as their first choice, and from the 91 who were 
presented with known celebrities (three children did not respond) 57% also chose a celebrity 
brand as their first choice. Analysis was also conducted on the overall choice score generated 
from the three favourite brands selected. For each of the celebrity brands selected a score of 1 
was given and therefore children could score between 0 (all three selections were previously 
brand alone) to 3 (all three selections were previously a celebrity brand). When looking at the 
three favourite brands selected across the overall sample, the average brand select score (with 
three being the max) was 1.58 (SD = .83). There was no significant preference for celebrity 
brands as a whole. Looking across the two different groups (well-liked vs. known) there were 
also no significant main effects of celebrity pairing on brand choice for any of the individual 
age groups in either condition. The Brand Choice score for each age group can be seen in 
Table 9.4. 
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Table 9.4 Study 6: Mean (SD) Brand Choice scores. High scores represent preference for a 
celebrity brand. 
 
There was no significant preference for celebrity brands as a whole. Looking across the two 
different groups (well-liked vs known) there were also no significant main effects of celebrity 
group for any of the individual age groups.   
 
Delayed explicit brand preference (Week 3) 
To examine whether explicit preferences from Week 2 remained in Week 3, a 2 (celebrity 
group – well-liked vs known) x 2 (presentation type – celebrity vs brand alone) x 4 (age 
group) ANOVA was conducted. The means (SD) can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 9.5 Study 6: Mean (SD) delayed Explicit Brand Preference for brands presented with a 
celebrity and brands presented alone for each age group (Week 3). 
 
 
 Overall Well-Liked 
Celebrity  
Known Celebrity 
eight-years (n=46) 1.54 (.67) 1.67 (.73) 1.41 (.59) 
10-years (n=38) 1.64 (.93) 1.63 (.95) 1.68 (.95) 
12-years (n=44) 1.67 (.87) 1.77 (.88) 1.57 (.87) 
14-years (n=46) 1.48 (.86) 1.15 (.88) 1.73 (.78) 
 Well-Liked Celebrities Known Celebrities 
 Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference  
Explicit 
Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
p Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference  
Explicit 
Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
P 
eight-years 
(n=46) 
5.80 (1.74) 5.52 (1.85) .491 4.90 (1.61) 5.55 (2.09) .163 
10-years 
(n=38) 
6.42 (1.32) 5.58 (1.98) .120 5.87 (1.83) 5.42 (1.68) .417 
12-years 
(n=44) 
6.59 (2.05) 5.46 (1.86) .092 5.46 (1.71) 5.69 (1.36) .651 
14-years 
(n=46) 
4.97 (1.73) 5.95 (1.92) .044 5.97 (1.24) 5.62 (1.45) .210 
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As in Week 2, results only showed a significant interaction between presentation type, age 
group and celebrity group F(3,154) = 3.30, p = .02, ηp2 = .06. As before there was no main 
effect of celebrity group and no main effect of age.  
Further exploratory t-test analyses with the Bonferroni adjustment applied to correct 
for the eight comparisons (p < .006) found that, as before eight-year-olds, 10-year-olds and 
12-year-olds showed no significant difference in preference between brand alone and well-
liked celebrity brands and no significant difference between brand alone and known celebrity 
brands. For the 14-year-olds the immediate preference seen in Week 2 disappeared and, at 
Week 3, they showed no difference in preference in either the well-liked or known celebrity 
condition. It appears as though any resistance to the well-liked celebrities in Week 2 had been 
lost one week later in the older age group - any immediate celebrity effect disappeared. 
 
Scepticism  
Two scepticism scales were presented in Study 6; a six-item accuracy-based scepticism scale 
and a five-item affect-based scepticism scale. Participants responded to the scales twice, once 
before testing (Week 1) and once after testing (Week 3). A reliability analysis was carried out 
on the scales pre- and post-testing using Cronbach’s Alpha. The reliability of the accuracy-
based scale reached an acceptable level before (Alpha = .698) and after testing (Alpha = 
.651). The five-item scale comprising the affect-based scale also reached an acceptable level 
(Alpha = .758 before; Alpha = .800 after) (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Pre- and post-test 
Accuracy-Based and Affect-Based Scepticism means (SD) by age group are shown in Table 
9.6. 
 
Table 9.6 Study 6: Mean (SD) Accuracy-Based Scepticism and Affect-Based Scepticism 
scores pre- and post- brand presentation by age group. High scores represent high scepticism. 
 
To examine accuracy-based scepticism before and after presentation a 4 (age) x 2 (test time) 
mixed ANOVA was run with age as the between subjects variable and (test time) (pre- vs. 
post-study) as the repeated measure. Findings showed no main effect of test time, with 
accuracy-based scepticism scores being identical (M = 2.34) both before and after the study. 
 Pre-test Post-test 
 Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism 
Affect-Based 
Scepticism 
Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism 
Affect-Based 
Scepticism 
eight-years (n=46) 2.36 (.47) 2.62 (.82) 2.33 (.64) 2.64 (.85) 
10-years (n=38) 2.37 (.32) 2.44 (.49) 2.33 (.33) 2.47 (.54) 
12-years (n=44) 2.25 (.40) 2.48 (.51) 2.21 (.28) 2.57 (.57) 
14-years (n=46) 2.39 (.38) 3.05 (.52) 2.47 (.32) 3.00 (.53) 
Whole sample 2.34 (.40) 2.65 (.66) 2.34 (.44) 2.67 (.67) 
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There was also no main effect of age and no significant interaction between accuracy-based 
scepticism and age. 
To examine affect-based scepticism before and after presentation a 4 (age) x 2 (test 
time) mixed ANOVA was run with age as the between subjects variable and test time (pre- 
vs. post-study) as the repeated measure. Findings showed no main effect of test time, with 
affect-based scepticism scores being almost identical both before (M = 2.65) and after (M = 
2.67) the study and there was no significant interaction between affect-based scepticism and 
age. However, there was a significant main effect of age F(3,158) = 9.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, 
with 14-year-olds displaying a higher level of affect-based scepticism (M = 3.03) than the 
other age groups (all p < .005).  
 
Correlational and regression analyses 
Because there was no significant difference in scepticism (accuracy-based or affect-based) 
pre- to post-testing, each scale was collapsed to create one overall Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism score and one overall Affect-Based Scepticism score for the correlational and 
regression analyses. Analyses were conducted separately for both the Well-Liked Celebrity 
group and the Known Celebrity group. 
 
1. Well-Liked Celebrity group 
Correlation analyses were conducted on the overall sample (n = 83) with Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism, Affect-Based Scepticism, Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference, Brand Alone 
Preference, Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice as variables. 
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Table 9.7 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference, Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice for the Well-Liked Celebrity group. 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
Correlational results showed a positive relationship (r = .503, p < .001) between Accuracy-
Based and Affect-Based Scepticism, which was to be expected - higher accuracy-based 
scepticism was associated with higher affect-based scepticism. Both Explicit Well-Liked 
Celebrity Brand Preference (r = -.297, p = .005) and Explicit Brand Alone Preference (r = -
.287, p = .006) had a negative relationship with Accuracy-Based Scepticism showing that 
higher accuracy-based scepticism is related to lower well-liked celebrity explicit preference 
and brand alone explicit preference. This matches the results of the young adult sample in 
Study 3 where higher accuracy-based scepticism was related to lower celebrity brand 
preference. Similarly, both Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference (r = -.339, p = 
.001) and Explicit Brand Alone Preference (r = -.247, p = .016) had a negative relationship 
with Affect-Based Scepticism, again showing that higher affect-based scepticism was related 
to lower well-liked celebrity explicit preference and brand alone explicit preference. These 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-      
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.503** -     
3. Well-Liked 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
-.297** -.339** -    
4. Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
-.287** -.247* .113 -   
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
-.098 -.109 .200* .053 -  
6. Brand 
Choice 
-.016 -.132 .435** -.423** .141 - 
127 
 
results show that both types of scepticism (accuracy-based and affect-based) are related to 
brand responses more generally - regardless of whether a celebrity is present.  
In terms of Brand Choice score, there was a negative relationship (r = -.423, p < .001) 
between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Brand Choice score indicating that the higher 
the brands presented alone were rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen 
within the top three favourite brands. In contrast a positive relationship (r = .435, p < .001) 
between Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Choice was found 
indicating that as the celebrity brands preference increased, so too did the likelihood of these 
brands being selected as favourites. This also matched the results of the young adult sample 
in Study 3. Interestingly there was also a positive relationship (r = .200, p = .043) between 
Implicit Preference and Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference demonstrating that 
explicit preference for well-liked celebrity brands is related to implicit preference also. 
To examine the factors predicting brand choice in the well-liked celebrity group a 
regression analysis for the well-liked celebrity group including Brand Choice as the DV and 
Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based Scepticism, Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand 
Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Implicit Brand score as the 5 IVs was 
conducted. The results can be seen in Table 9.8. 
 
Table 9.8 Study 6: Regression analysis. Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference and Implicit Brand Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the enter method it was found that the five IVs explain a significant amount of the 
variance in the final brand choice F(5,74) = 10.37, p < .001, R2 = .43, R2Adjusted = .39. The 
analysis shows that both Accuracy-Based Scepticism and Affective-Based Scepticism and 
Implicit Brand Preference did not significantly predict final Brand Choice, however Explicit 
Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference and Explicit Brand Alone Preference were significant 
predictors.  
 
 Beta T Sig. 
Accuracy-Based Scepticism .041 .376 .708 
Affect-Based Scepticism -.115 -1.052 .297 
Well-Liked Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
.450 4.534 .001 
Brand Alone Preference -.494 -5.165 .001 
Implicit Brand Preference .069 .739 .463 
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2. Known Celebrity group 
Correlation analyses were conducted on the overall sample (n = 91) with Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism, Affect-Based Scepticism, Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit 
Brand Alone Preference, Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice as variables. 
 
Table 9.9 Study 6: Correlational table with Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference, 
Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice for the Known Celebrity group. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-      
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.444** -     
3. Known 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
-.065 .102 -    
4. Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
-.080 -.215* .153 -   
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
-.065 -.022 -.106 -.013 -  
6. Brand 
Choice 
-.062 .055 .338** -.409** .012 - 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
Correlational results show that, as expected and consistent with previously reported studies, 
high levels of Affect-Based Scepticism are related with higher levels of Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism (r = .444, p < .001). In the known celebrity group Affect-Based Scepticism was 
negatively related to Explicit Brand Alone Preference (r = -.215, p = .023) highlighting that 
higher levels of affect-based scepticism are related with lower explicit brand alone 
preference. This is a different finding to the well-liked celebrity group where the negative 
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influence of scepticism was seen across all brand preferences (both celebrity brands and 
brand alone). In the well-liked celebrity group both accuracy-based and affect-based 
scepticism were negatively correlated with both explicit celebrity brand preference and 
explicit brand alone preference. The findings of the known celebrity subgroup seem to 
suggest that a known celebrity overrides scepticism. 
In terms of Brand Choice score, there was a negative relationship (r = -.409, p < .001) 
between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Brand Choice score indicating that the higher 
the brands presented alone were rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen 
within the top three favourite brands. In contrast a positive relationship (r = .338, p = .001) 
between Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Choice was found indicating that as 
the celebrity brands preference increased, so too did the likelihood of these brands being 
selected as favourites. Again, this is a finding showing to be consistent throughout these 
studies.  
To examine whether Accuracy-Based Scepticism and Affect-Based Scepticism and 
Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference and Explicit Brand Alone Preference in the 
known celebrity group predicts brand choice a regression analysis for the known celebrity 
group including Brand Choice as the DV and Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference 
and Implicit Brand Preference as the 5 IVs was conducted. The results can be seen in Table 
9.10. 
 
Table 9.10 Study 6. Regression analysis. Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference 
and Implicit Brand Preference as predictors of Brand Choice score. 
 Beta T Sig. 
Accuracy-Based Scepticism -.037 -.364 .716 
Affect-Based Scepticism -.077 -.730 .468 
Known Celebrity Brand 
Preference 
.424 4.514 .001 
Brand Alone Preference -.493 -5.221 .001 
Implicit Brand Preference .047 .513 .610 
 
Using the enter method it was found that the five IVs explain a significant amount of the 
variance in the final Brand Choice F(5,85) = 8.38, p < .001, R2 = .34, R2Adjusted = .30. The 
analysis shows that both Accuracy-Based Scepticism and Affective-Based Scepticism and 
Implicit Brand Preference did not significantly predict final Brand Choice, however Explicit 
Known Celebrity Brand Preference and Explicit Brand Alone Preference were significant 
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predictors, and so despite the different pattern of correlations the significant predictors are the 
same as the well-liked group. 
 
 
9.4 Discussion 
In contrast to the results of Study 5 where children had an explicit preference for brands 
presented alone over brands presented with a known celebrity, Study 6 found that children 
aged eight-, 10- and 12-years showed no significant difference in explicit preference for 
brands presented alone or with known celebrity brands. This finding was also found in the 
well-liked celebrity group and children aged eight- to 12-years had no preference for either 
set of brands. The 14-year-olds in both groups, however, discriminated in their brand 
judgments dependent upon whether or not they were presented with celebrities. For the 14-
year-olds in the well-liked celebrity group there was a significant explicit preference for 
brands presented alone over brands paired with a well-liked celebrity, and in the known 
celebrity group there was a significant explicit preference for celebrity paired brands over 
brands presented alone. Interestingly, the 14-year-olds in the well-liked celebrity group 
seemed to show resistance in their immediate responses to the celebrity effect – something 
which was expected of the young adults in Studies 1 to 3.  
 Evidence of the celebrity effect being maintained in explicit preferences was not 
shown, however, with the 14-year-olds showing no significant difference between brands 
presented alone or with a celebrity when tested again one week later. This suggests that 
whilst older children can recognise the manipulation attempt of the well-liked celebrity, and 
trigger explicit resistance to this, later testing of the brand does not seem affected. It could be 
possible that after a lengthy delay, disassociations between the brand and liked celebrity are 
made when the celebrity is not later presented with the brand which could have implications 
for the overall effectiveness of advertisements. However, it is important to consider that 
pairing of the celebrities with brands occurred only once throughout this study. In real life, 
ads which include celebrities are repeated with the intention of strengthening the association 
between celebrity and brand. Future research should explore whether this leads to scepticism 
being overridden or whether resistance in those with higher scepticism is being strengthened. 
Conclusions cannot be drawn for either suggestion within the results of the current study.  
 In relation to the well-liked celebrity subgroup, explicit brand preference and implicit 
preference results showed that, overall, children with lower explicit celebrity preference were 
more likely to have lower implicit preference for well-liked celebrity paired brands also. As 
predicted by Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016), this finding supports the notion that dual 
processes interact and that associational implicit preferences could be triggered if recognition 
of manipulation and persuasion occurs. It was further predicted that this might be found in 
the older children only, where a more sophisticated understanding of celebrity advertising is 
present. Subsequent analysis (discussed in the following chapter) shows this relationship only 
exists in the older children’s group. 
 In Study 3 implicit scores of young adults were negatively correlated with affect-
based scepticism, suggesting that those with higher levels of affect-based scepticism had 
131 
 
lower implicit preference for well-liked celebrity brands – a finding which has not been 
replicated in the current study. However, this study has found that higher levels of affect-
based scepticism was related to lower explicit celebrity paired brand preference, suggesting 
that affect-based scepticism could go some way to explaining how adults are able to 
consciously defend against the celebrity effects. According to Greenwald and Banaji (1995) 
implicit cognitions are derived from past experiences, with Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
(2011) distinguishing between implicit and explicit processing by proposing that implicit 
evaluations are based upon the activation of simple associations in memory which result in 
positive or negative affective responses - “gut reactions”. Explicit evaluations, on the other 
hand, are based upon propositional processes and involve the validation of information 
through the application of conscious thought and logic, meaning that a high level of cognitive 
resource may be needed.  
 As Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) propose, it seems likely that the celebrity effect in 
advertising results mainly from the triggering of implicit, associative evaluations. 
Recognising manipulation triggers negative feelings which then impact on attitude and 
scepticism, so a negative implicit response is then picked up on in explicit responses. This 
didn’t seem to happen in the sample of young adults in Study 3 as no relationship between 
affect-based scepticism and explicit responses was found, yet higher levels of affect-based 
scepticism in the children in Study 6 was related to lower explicit celebrity paired brand 
preference. In Study 6, children were asked to make prior evaluations of the celebrities and 
brands (one week before the explicit and implicit preference testing), and it could be argued 
that this may have encouraged engagement with propositional evaluations. At the time of 
testing, recognition of manipulation could have triggered feelings which impacted on 
attitudes and scepticism against the celebrity, which then transferred to children’s explicit 
preferences. If this is the case then this has implications for the way in which advertising 
operates and, if Heath’s (2012) view is correct, it may be that to some degree the success of 
celebrity endorsement rests upon not encouraging consumers to engage in explicit 
propositional evaluation of advertisements where celebrity endorsement occurs. In line with 
the cognitive defence view, the relationship between affect-based scepticism and explicit 
celebrity brand preference should only be seen in the older children who are able to recognise 
the manipulation attempt. This is a finding which emerges in the following chapter. 
 A further suggestion to explain the difference across findings from the young adults 
of Study 3 and the children of Study 6 could be that having conscious awareness of our own 
level of affect-based scepticism may be a determinant of whether resistance to the celebrity 
effect is possible. This is explained in further detail later in the discussion. Alternatively, it 
could be possible that resistance to the celebrity effect occurs in either explicit preferences or 
implicit preferences, but not both.  
Taking into account the responses of eight- to 14-year-old children, correlational 
results from the well-liked celebrity group showed some similarities to results previously 
seen with young adults. Higher accuracy-based scepticism was associated with higher affect-
based scepticism which was to be expected. Those with higher accuracy-based scepticism 
tended to rate well-liked celebrity brands and brands presented alone lower, a finding that 
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matches the results of the young adult sample in Study 3 where higher accuracy-based 
scepticism was related to lower explicit celebrity brand preference. Similarly, results showed 
that higher affect-based scepticism was related to lower well-liked explicit celebrity 
preference and explicit brand alone preference, again flagging the importance of scepticism 
(both accuracy-based and affect-based) in triggering resistance to brands. In the overall 
sample of children in the known celebrity group results showed that higher levels of affect-
based scepticism was related to lower explicit brand alone preference. Whilst this specific 
finding matches the results of the well-liked celebrity group, in the well-liked celebrity group 
the negative influence of scepticism was seen across all brand preferences (celebrity and 
brand alone). For the known celebrity subgroup, scepticism was not related to explicit 
celebrity brand preference, suggesting that the influence of known celebrities may have 
overridden scepticism.  
In terms of final brand choice selections, regression analyses found that both well-
liked explicit celebrity brand preference and explicit brand alone preference were significant 
predictors of overall brand choice. This finding was also conclusive in the correlations which 
found that as well-liked celebrity brands preference increased, so too did the likelihood of 
these brands being selected as favourites. This again matched the results of the young adult 
sample in Study 3. There was also a negative relationship between explicit brand alone 
preference and brand choice score indicating that the higher the brands presented alone were 
rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite brands. 
Furthermore, and in additional support of the results of Study 3, results found that the higher 
the brands presented alone were rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen 
within the top three favourite brands. In terms of brand choice score results of the known 
celebrity group, results indicate that the higher the brands presented alone were rated, the less 
likely celebrity brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite brands. This was 
supported in the regression results which found that known celebrity brand and brand alone 
scores were significant predictors of brand choice. As the celebrity brands preference 
increased, so too did the likelihood of these brands being selected as favourites. Again, this is 
a finding showing to be consistent throughout all of the studies. 
The following chapter explores these effects by age group and offers new models of 
responses to celebrity advertising. 
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10 Modelling the findings of Study 6 
 
To explore the developmental nature of the effect celebrity advertising and scepticism have 
on explicit and implicit brand preference and overall brand choice, further correlational 
analyses were conducted by age group - for younger children (aged eight- to 10-years) and 
older children (aged 12- to 14-years) for both the well-liked and known celebrity conditions. 
The findings have been depicted in new models of responses to celebrity advertising. 
 
10.1 Well-Liked Celebrity group by age 
Overall correlational results for the whole sample of the well-liked celebrity group (see Table 
9.7, page 126) indicated a positive relationship (r = .200, p = .043) between Implicit Brand 
Preference and Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference demonstrating that higher explicit 
preference for well-liked celebrity brands was also related to higher implicit preference. The 
14-year-old children in the well-liked celebrity group had a significant explicit preference for 
brands alone over celebrity brands, so to explore whether the older age group were carrying 
the responses of the whole sample, further correlations by age group were conducted. The 
sample was divided into an older age group (children aged 12- to 14-years) and a younger 
group (children aged eight- to 10-years) to examine further the relationships between all of 
the variables included in the correlational analysis for Study 6. Looking back at literature in 
section 1.1, it is assumed that children aged 12-years and over have a sophisticated 
understanding of advertising, and therefore the children aged 12-years in this sample were 
included in the “older” children group. Results for the older children can be seen in Table 
10.1 and Figure 10.1.  
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Table 10.1 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference, Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice for the 12- to 14-year-olds in the 
Well-Liked Celebrity group. 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-      
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.545** -     
3. Well-Liked 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
-.420** -.543** -    
4. Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
-.237 .008 .159 -   
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
-.199 -.225 .318* .011 -  
6. Brand 
Choice 
-.122 -.333* .532** -.384* .224 - 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
When looking at the correlations of the older age group (aged 12- to 14-years-old) a positive 
(r = .545, p < .001) relationship between Accuracy-Based and Affect-Based Scepticism was 
found again, as expected. Negative relationships between Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference 
and both Accuracy-Based Scepticism (r = -.420, p = .006) and Affect-Based Scepticism (r = -
.543, p < .001) have been found, demonstrating that children with increased scepticism (both 
accuracy-based and affect-based) have lower explicit preferences for brands paired with well-
liked celebrities. However, the significant relationships between both Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism and Affect-Based Scepticism and Brand Alone Preference seen in the overall 
group disappeared. For the older children, the negative influence of scepticism was only seen 
when a celebrity was present.  
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In terms of Brand Choice score, there was a negative relationship (r = -.384, p = .012) 
between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and Brand Choice score indicating that the higher 
the brands presented alone were rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to be chosen 
within the top three favourite brands. In contrast a positive relationship (r = .532, p < .001) 
between Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Choice was found indicating that as 
the celebrity brands preference increased, so too did the likelihood of these brands being 
selected as favourites. This also matched the results of the young adult sample in Study 3. 
Additionally, there was a negative relationship between Affect-Based Scepticism and Brand 
Choice (r = -.333, p = .031) which fits with the finding that the 14-year-olds had higher 
affective scepticism than younger children. 
There was a positive relationship between Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and 
Implicit Brand Preference (r = .318, p = .043) highlighting that children with lower explicit 
celebrity preference were more likely to have lower implicit preference for well-liked 
celebrity paired brands also. This correlational relationship makes sense when we consider 
the previous finding that 14-year-olds had an implicit preference for brands presented alone 
rather than brands presented with a celebrity. These correlational results can be seen depicted 
in Figure 10.1. 
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Figure 10.1 highlights some key findings of the older children’s responses to celebrity 
advertising when the celebrity was considered to be well-liked. In comparison to the 
correlational results of the overall sample where scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-
based) was negatively related to both explicit celebrity brand preference and explicit brand 
alone preference, the older children only showed a negative relationship between scepticism 
and explicit celebrity brand preference. This suggests that for older children scepticism is 
only effective when a celebrity is present, contradicting developmental literature which 
suggests that children aged 12-years and older should be at a cognitive ability to recognise 
and defend against advertising more generally. It could be argued here that older children do 
not recognise brands without celebrities to be a cause for concern. It is possible that because 
of the nature and presence of everyday advertising children of this age could have become 
accustomed to it and don’t attempt to raise the defences every time they encounter it. When a 
celebrity appears with a brand that is notable because this alerts them to the manipulation 
attempt.  
 It was concluded in Study 3 that, at least in adults, it is their propositional reasoning 
about ads involved in accuracy-based scepticism which counteracts the celebrity effect in an 
explicit way. Results from Study 6 show that older children in the well-liked celebrity 
condition with higher affect-based scepticism were less likely to choose a celebrity brand as 
one of their final brand choices, which shows that gut-feeling affective responses are driving 
the judgments of older children. It could be that a high level of affect-based scepticism is also 
necessary for resistance to the celebrity effect to be effective. Throughout the analyses of 
Study 6, both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism have had the same relationship(s) 
with the other variables being analysed. For example, if accuracy-based scepticism was 
related to explicit celebrity brand preference, then the same relationship was also found for 
affect-based scepticism. Furthermore, both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism have 
continually been positively related to each other. This suggests that explicit preferences are 
largely guided by both conscious thoughts (scepticism) concerning advertising, as well as our 
“gut feelings” (affect-based scepticism). The only exception to this that has been seen thus 
far in the thesis is the relationship between affect-based scepticism and brand choice. For the 
well-liked celebrity group of Study 6, older children with higher levels of affect-based 
scepticism tended to choose celebrity brands less in their final brand choice - the same 
relationship did not emerge with accuracy-based scepticism. This finding is in contrast to 
what we may expect from considering the celebrity eclipsing literature. Ilicic and Webster 
(2014) found that where the presence of a celebrity becomes the focal point of the advert, 
strong celebrity attachment (affective responses) enhances brand attitude. We may therefore 
have expected the liking of the celebrity to show in their brand choices. However, whilst 
findings of Goldsmith et al. (2000) have shown that endorser credibility influences both 
attitude towards the brand and purchase intention, La Ferle and Choi (2005) argue that this 
only occurs when a celebrity is considered to be a credible endorser for the brand being 
endorsed. It could therefore be argued that the older children in this sample did not consider 
the celebrity and brand to “fit” which may have altered their brand preferences. 
 Celebrity endorsement has been seen to operate best under conditions of low 
involvement because a risk to its effectiveness occurs when the targeted audience is 
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encouraged to consciously reflect upon the intentions behind the ad under conditions of high 
involvement / high elaboration likelihood. Heath (2012) has argued that when the potential 
for conscious cognitive elaboration of advertising material is high, consumers are much more 
likely to process that material critically and therefore advertising may be less effective. For 
example, when presented with celebrity endorsement, consumers engaging in conscious 
reflection might become more alert to the possibility that their feelings are being manipulated 
by the use of a celebrity, recognise the irrelevance of the celebrity to an objective evaluation 
of the product and resist the intentions of the advertiser. It could therefore be argued that 
proportional processes had been activated and the intentions of the celebrity and the ad 
triggered associational processes which led to negative affective associations. This would fit 
with the findings suggesting that the use of celebrities is more effective under conditions of 
low involvement (e.g., Choi et al, 2005) and further offers support for the suggestion that 
where an ad contains no product information to process, we may rely on our affective 
attitude. Explicit preferences and brand selections may therefore alter if a general dislike for 
ads is held, and therefore this sample of children may have lowered celebrity brand selections 
because they hold a general negative affective response towards celebrity ads. Furthermore, 
whilst young adults may hold a positive feeling towards a particular celebrity, it could be that 
they have a strong dislike for this celebrity being used in advertisements. According to the 
cognitive defence view, older children can engage in a “stop and think” process, and it could 
be that recognition of a well-liked celebrity being used as a manipulation attempt increases 
affective scepticism. This fits with the finding that 14-year-olds had higher levels of affect-
based scepticism than the other age groups, which suggests that their general dislike for ads 
was related to their brand selections. 
 Results of the correlational analysis for the younger children (aged eight- to 10-year-
olds) can be seen in Table 10.2.  
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Table 10.2 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Well-Liked Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference, Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice for the eight- to 10-year-olds in the 
Well-Liked Celebrity group. 
 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
 
When looking at the correlations of the younger age group (aged eight- to 10-years-old) a 
positive (r = .510, p = .001) relationship between Accuracy-Based Scepticism and Affect-
Based Scepticism was found, as expected. Negative relationships between both Accuracy-
Based (r = -.442, p = .004) and Explicit Brand Alone Preference, and Affect-Based (r = -
.548, p < .001) and Explicit Brand Alone Preference were shown, demonstrating that those 
with higher scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) have lower preference for 
brands presented alone. This is a very different finding to the older children where higher 
scepticism (accuracy-based and affect-based) was related to lower explicit preference for 
celebrity brands only. For the younger children, therefore, their level of general ad scepticism 
was only related to how they responded to brands when the brand had not been paired with a 
celebrity. It could be that for the younger children the presence of a celebrity dampened the 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-      
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.510** -     
3. Well-Liked 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
-.260 -.138 -    
4. Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
-.442** -.548** .083 -   
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
.057 .066 .028 .131 -  
6. Brand 
Choice 
.068 .021 .364* -.426** -.056 - 
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effect of general ad scepticism due to celebrity eclipsing - it may be that where the presence 
of a celebrity became the focal point of the advert, strong celebrity attachment limited 
scepticism to be activated. This is in contrast to the older children where the presence of a 
celebrity may have heightened general ad scepticism.  
Lastly, in terms of Brand Choice, correlations demonstrated a positive relationship (r 
= .364, p = .021) between Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Choice yet a 
negative relationship (r = -.426, p = .006) between Explicit Brand Alone Preference and 
Brand Choice, demonstrating a higher preference for celebrity paired brands related to higher 
likelihood of selecting a celebrity brand as one of their three favourites. These correlational 
results can be seen depicted in Figure 10.2. 
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Unlike the older children there was no relationship between well-liked celebrity explicit 
brand preference and implicit preference in the sample of younger children. Whilst 
Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) suggest that both explicit and implicit responses interact, with 
recognition of manipulation triggering feelings impacting on attitudes and scepticism, 
cognitive developmental theories such as Piaget and Theory of Mind suggest that processing 
of advertisers’ intention is limited in younger children. According to the cognitive defence 
stance, even if young children can process the intent adherent to advertising, they still have to 
connect up other responses to apply it in their defence. This connective process doesn’t seem 
to occur in the same way in younger children, which explains why we find fewer 
correlational relationships in comparison to the older children. It is therefore not surprising 
that this relationship did not occur here - with an inability to consciously process the intent of 
the celebrity effect, there is no opportunity for the effects of manipulation to transfer to the 
implicit preferences.  
 Comparing the correlational results of the older children and younger children 
highlights some important findings. Table 9.7 (page 126) shows that in the overall sample of 
children in the well-liked celebrity subgroup, both accuracy-based scepticism and affect-
based scepticism were negatively correlated with both explicit celebrity brand preference and 
explicit brand alone preference. As seen in Table 10.1 (page 134), the results of the older 
children show a negative relationship between scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-
based) and explicit celebrity brand preference only. In contrast, Table 10.2 (page 139) shows 
the opposite relationship for the younger children and both accuracy-based scepticism and 
affect-based scepticism were negatively related with explicit brand alone preference only.  
Whilst it could be argued that for the younger children the celebrity overrides scepticism, this 
seems unlikely, especially when older children had higher levels of scepticism. The 
correlational results of the young children here offer some support for the eight-year-olds in 
Study 5, who also had lower accuracy-based scepticism than the other age groups (which 
would be expected based on developmental literature) yet also had an explicit preference for 
brands presented alone.  
 Whilst the results of the overall sample indicate that scepticism does seem to offer a 
defence against brands, at least in brand preferences, it seems to operate in a different way in 
the younger and older groups when well-liked celebrities are involved. Despite this, neither 
accuracy-based nor affect-based scepticism were negative predictors of brand choice. Even 
though the correlational results show different patterns emerging for younger and older 
children, this is a consistent finding across the whole sample that neither accuracy-based nor 
affect-based scepticism predicts final brand choice. Whilst scepticism did not predict final 
brand choice, for the older children the correlational results did show a negative relationship 
between affect-based scepticism and brand choice suggesting that where affect-based 
scepticism was higher celebrity brands were chosen less frequently. Where an ad contains no 
product information to process, we may rely more on our affective attitude, and explicit 
preferences and brand selections may alter if a general dislike for ads is held. This is more 
likely where an ad contains no product information to process and reliance on affective 
attitudes are more prominent. Older children may have lowered celebrity brand selections 
because they hold a general negative affective response towards celebrity ads. This fits with 
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the finding that 14-year-olds had higher levels of affect-based scepticism than the other age 
groups, which suggests that their general dislike for ads was related to their brand selections. 
It could be that a high level of affect-based scepticism is also necessary for resistance to the 
celebrity effect to be effective. 
 
 
10.2 Known Celebrity group by age 
As with the well-liked celebrity group, correlations were re-run separating the sample into 
older children (aged 12- to 14-years) and younger children (aged eight- to 10-years). Results 
for the older children can be seen in Table 10.3. 
 
Table 10.3 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference, 
Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice for the 12- to 14-year-olds in the Known 
Celebrity group. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-      
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.382** -     
3. Known 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
-.140 .074 -    
4. Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
-.003 -.236 .182 -   
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
-.241 .039 -.156 -.044 -  
6. Brand 
Choice 
-.119 -.039 .251 -.251 .083 - 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
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The only significant correlation present in the older age group demonstrates the relationship 
between Accuracy-Based and Affect-Based Scepticism (r = .382, p = .007). This is a 
consistent finding and is to be expected. This can be seen depicted in Figure 10.3. Whilst not 
quite significant, the correlations between Brand Choice and Explicit Preferences are in the 
expected direction showing a non-significant positive association between explicit known 
celebrity preference and celebrity brand choice, and a non-significant negative association 
between explicit brand alone preference and celebrity brand choice.
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Figure 10.3 highlights the lack of correlations between scepticism (accuracy- and affect-
based), explicit celebrity brand preference, brand alone preference, and implicit brand score 
when the celebrities were simply known rather than well-liked. The correlations seen in the 
older children in the well-liked condition were not replicated here when brands were paired 
with known celebrities. Firstly, when the celebrity was well-liked, negative relationships 
emerged between scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) and explicit celebrity 
(well-liked) brand preference, yet not explicit brand alone preference. This was a finding 
which also matched the results of the young adults in Study 3 who were also presented with 
well-liked celebrities. On the other hand, the results from the known celebrity group in Study 
6 show that scepticism is not related to explicit celebrity brand preference nor explicit brand 
alone preference, meaning that the negative effect of scepticism did not emerge - even when 
a celebrity was present. This suggests that, for older children, the negative effect of 
scepticism is only shown when a celebrity is present, providing the celebrity is considered to 
be well liked. When discussing the results of the older children in the well-liked group it was 
alluded to the fact that older children may be immune to celebrity advertising, and it is only 
when they have an emotional response to the celebrity that scepticism is triggered.  
 The results presented here show that high levels of accuracy-based scepticism were 
also not correlated with explicit preferences - neither for celebrity brands nor brands alone. 
Whilst it was concluded in Study 3 that, at least in adults, it is their propositional reasoning 
about ads involved in accuracy-based scepticism which counteracts the celebrity effect in an 
explicit way, a discussion of the earlier results in Study 6 argued that a high level of affect-
based scepticism could also be necessary for resistance to the celebrity effect to be effective. 
It could be suggested that the 14-year-olds responses are driven differently to those of the 
young adults in Study 3, with older children being driven more by affective feelings more 
than older participants. 
 When looking back at the results of the previous studies using known celebrities, both 
Study 4 (young adults, known celebrities) and Study 5 (older children, known celebrities) 
support the findings of the older children in Study 6 - there were no correlations present 
between scepticism and explicit brand alone preference, again adding support for the notion 
that the effects of scepticism are only seen when a celebrity is present. However, in Study 4 
scepticism (generally) was negatively correlated with explicit celebrity brand preference, as 
was accuracy-based scepticism more specifically. This was a finding which also emerged in 
Study 5 - older children with a higher level of scepticism had lower explicit preferences for 
brands presented with celebrities. In both of these studies brands were presented with known 
celebrities and this celebrity was enough to trigger a negative relationship between scepticism 
and explicit celebrity brand preference, so we may have expected the same relationship to 
emerge in the known celebrity group of Study 6 - which we did not. Scepticism was only 
negatively related to explicit celebrity brand preference in the well-liked celebrity condition. 
This suggests that for older children, their “gut feeling” response to advertising is not 
triggered to the same extent when a known celebrity is presented with the brand. It could be 
possible to suggest that celebrities for whom they have no particular liking trigger little (or 
no) feelings of manipulation, meaning there is no response to transfer to explicit responses 
(Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016).  
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 It is possible that the same relationships from Studies 4 and 5 concerning scepticism 
and explicit celebrity brand preference did not emerge in Study 6 because of the introduction 
of the affect-based scepticism scale. The results from Studies 4 and 5 discussed above refer to 
scepticism quite broadly, and don’t encompass the importance of affect-based scepticism. As 
examined in the discussion of Study 6, it could be that having conscious awareness of our 
own level of affect-based scepticism may be a determinant of whether resistance to the 
celebrity effect is possible. 
 An alternative explanation as to why scepticism was related to explicit celebrity brand 
preference in Studies 4 and 5 yet not in the known condition of Study 6, is that risk to ad 
effectiveness occurs where the targeted audience is encouraged to consciously reflect upon 
the intentions behind the ad under conditions of high involvement. Heath (2012) has argued 
that when the potential for conscious cognitive elaboration of advertising material is high, 
consumers are much more likely to process that material critically and therefore advertising 
may be less effective. This may have been the case when the celebrities were known yet not 
particularly well-liked. It is possible that conscious thinking about the celebrity occurred and 
that the individual had to retrieve from memory where/when they have seen them previously. 
It is likely that this level of thought is much more likely to occur when the celebrity is known 
rather than when they are well liked - usually when presented with a celebrity we like we can 
recall who they are with minimal effort and thus little cognitive evaluation is needed.  
 The celebrities used in this study were selected on the basis that they should be 
known by the participants, yet they may not have any particular liking or disliking of them. 
Table 9.1 highlights that for the older children, the mean “liking” score for the known 
celebrities was 3.29 out of 9.00, which suggests that these celebrities may have actually been 
disliked. Till and Shimp (1998) found that whilst positive feelings towards a celebrity 
transfers to the brand (even under conditions of low effort), any future negative information 
of the celebrity lowers brand evaluations. This may have happened here. Further research 
into the effect of celebrity disliking on children’s and young adult’s brand preferences would 
drive this research forward. 
 Results for the younger children sample (eight-year-olds to 10-year-olds) can be seen 
in Table 10.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
 
Table 10.4 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Known Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference, 
Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice for the eight- to 10-year-olds in the Known 
Celebrity group. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-      
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.524** -     
3. Known 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
.030 .111 -    
4. Brand 
Alone 
Preference 
-.094 -.146 .236 -   
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
.056 .073 .039 -.123 -  
6. Brand 
Choice 
.017 .119 .438** -.555** .024 - 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
Results for the eight- to 10-year-old group showed a significant positive correlation between 
Affect-Based Scepticism and Accuracy-Based Scepticism (r = .524, p < .001). The only other 
significant correlations for this age group in the known celebrity group were for Explicit 
Celebrity Brand Preference and Brand Choice (r = .438, p = .004) and Explicit Brand Alone 
Preference and Brand Choice (r = -.555, p <.001). Consistent with the other studies, these 
scores indicate that the higher the brands presented alone were rated, the less likely celebrity 
brands were to be chosen within the top three favourite brands. In contrast as the celebrity 
brands preference increased, so too did the likelihood of these brands being selected as 
favourites. Unlike Study 5 there was no negative correlation between explicit preference for 
celebrity paired brands and brands presented alone. These correlational results can be seen 
depicted in Figure 10.4. 
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The correlations seen in the younger children in the well-liked condition are not present here. 
In the well-liked celebrity condition, it was found that those with higher scepticism (both 
accuracy-based and affect-based) had lower explicit preference for brands presented alone. 
This finding did not emerge when the celebrity was simply known but not particularly well-
liked, which tells us something about young children’s thinking. In an advertising situation 
where a well-liked celebrity was present, young children’s scepticism was negatively related 
to explicit brand choice, and so, whilst there was no relationship with explicit celebrity 
preferences, scepticism was triggered. This was not found when a known celebrity was used. 
No correlations emerged from this sample, demonstrating that the way in which young 
children think about the celebrity may have an effect on their explicit preferences. In this 
instance, when a known celebrity is presented it seems as though scepticism isn’t triggered. 
This finding supports the results of Study 5. In the sample of young children in Study 5 
(where known celebrities were used), scepticism was not related to explicit brand 
preferences. 
 
10.3  “High” vs “Low” celebrity liking 
Although the celebrities in the well-liked condition were initially rated significantly higher 
(indicating higher liking) than the known celebrities, there were individual differences and 
variation of scores in each group. Consequently, for each group the sample was split at the 
median to produce a “higher liking” and “lower liking” group. Results of Study 6 showed 
that for older children, the negative effect of scepticism is only shown when a celebrity is 
present, providing the celebrity is considered to be well liked. This suggested that older 
children may be immune to celebrities advertising brands, and it is only when they have an 
emotional response to the celebrity that scepticism is triggered. This was examined further by 
exploring the responses of children who had a very high celebrity liking in comparison to 
those with a lower level of celebrity liking. Correlational analyses were conducted to explore 
whether Celebrity Liking was related to Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Brand Alone Preference, Implicit 
Brand Preference and Brand Choice. 
 
10.3.1 Well-Liked Celebrity condition 
Across the sample of 83 children who participated in the well-liked celebrity condition, the 
median “liking” score for the celebrities was 6.00 out of 9.00. Participants were therefore 
allocated to one of two groups - those children who had a mean “liking” score lower than 
6.00, and those who had a mean score of celebrity liking higher than 6.00.  
Correlational analysis was conducted for each sub-group to explore whether Celebrity 
Liking was related to any of the variables previously measured. Looking at the “lower liking” 
group as a whole (n = 38) there were no correlations between Celebrity Liking and any of the 
other factors. In the “higher liking” (n = 45) group as a whole, higher Celebrity Liking was 
related to lower Affect-Based Scepticism (r = -.366, p = .013) and higher Explicit Celebrity 
Brand Preference (r = .421, p = .004) suggesting favourable responses to the presented 
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celebrity lowered “gut feeling” affect-based scepticism and increased explicit preference for 
celebrity brands. Because significant relationships occurred for the high liking group these 
responses were explored further by looking at the responses of the older and younger children 
separately. However, these analyses need to be treated with caution as the number of children 
in each age group was relatively small. 
 
Older Children  
In the sample of older children (aged 12- to 14-years) in the well-liked celebrity condition (n 
= 18), the median “liking” score was 5.25 out of 9.00 and therefore the data was split into 
high and low liking accordingly. Results of the correlational analysis can be seen in Table 
10.5. 
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Table 10.5 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Brand Alone Preference, Implicit Brand 
Preference, Brand Choice and Celebrity Liking (High) for the 12- to 14-year-olds in the 
Well-Liked Celebrity group. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-       
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.575** -      
3. Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference  
-.527** -.673** -     
4. Explicit 
Brand Alone 
Preference 
-.281 -.170 -.003 -    
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
-.171 .032 .012 .026 -   
6. Brand 
Choice 
-.128 -.318 .620** -.448* .126 -  
7. High 
Celebrity 
Liking 
-.616** -.569** .448* .307 -.064 .149 - 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
Higher Celebrity Liking was found to be negatively correlated to both Accuracy-Based 
Scepticism (r = -.616, p = .001) and Affect-Based Scepticism (r = -.569, p = .004) showing 
that the more sceptical older children were about advertising, the less they liked the 
celebrities. High Celebrity Liking was also positively correlated with Explicit Celebrity 
Brand Preference (r = .448, p = .028) showing that the higher celebrities were rated as being 
well-liked, the higher the preference for celebrity brands. However, further correlational 
analysis showed lower levels of Accuracy-Based (r = -.527, p = .008) and Affect-Based (r = -
.673, p = <.001) Scepticism were related to a higher preference for Explicit Celebrity Brands. 
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In sum, having a higher initial liking for the celebrities was related to lower accuracy-based 
and affect-based scepticism which in turn was related to higher explicit preference for 
celebrity paired brands. This could suggest that scepticism was overridden. These findings 
fail to match the explicit brand preferences of the 14-year-olds who showed an explicit 
preference for brands presented alone. Whilst interpretations of these results need to be 
explored with caution due to the small sample size, it could be that the explicit brand alone 
preference was being carried by the children of this age who had a lower liking for the 
celebrities.  
 Alternatively, this finding can be said to offer further support for the earlier argument 
that where an ad contains no product information to process, reliance on affective attitude 
becomes important. Explicit preferences and brand selections may therefore alter if a general 
dislike for ads is held, and therefore this sample of children may have lowered celebrity 
brand selections because they hold a general negative affective response towards celebrity 
ads. Whilst older children may hold a positive feeling towards a particular celebrity, it could 
be that they have a strong dislike for said celebrity being used in advertisements. According 
to the cognitive defence view, older children can engage in a “stop and think” process, and it 
could be that in this instance recognition of a celebrity that is particularly favourable being 
used as a manipulation attempt increases affective scepticism. 
 Lastly, Explicit Celebrity Brand preference was positively correlated with overall 
Brand Choice (r = .620, p < .001) whilst Explicit Brand Alone preference was negatively 
correlated with overall Brand Choice (r = -.448, p = .028) highlighting that an increased 
explicit celebrity brand preference is related to a higher likelihood of a celebrity brand being 
selected in final brand choice, whilst those with a higher preference for brands presented 
alone are less likely to select a celebrity brand in their final choice.  
 There were no significant correlations to report from the older children with lower 
celebrity liking. The absence of correlations offer support for the suggestion that older 
children may be immune to celebrity advertising, and it is only when they have an emotional 
response to the celebrity that scepticism is triggered. The children in this sample had lower 
liking to the presented celebrities and, as such, they may have been resistant to the celebrity 
effect. Furthermore, it was argued that when the celebrity was considered to be highly liked, 
older children may have a strong dislike for said celebrity being used in advertisements. This 
may not have been a concern for the children when the celebrity wasn’t rated as highly liked.  
  Figure 10.5 incorporates high celebrity liking into the model of older children’s 
responses to well-liked celebrity advertising.  
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Younger Children  
For the younger children (aged eight- to 10-years) in the well-liked celebrity condition (n = 
21), the median “liking” score was 6.75 out of 9.00 and therefore the data was split into high 
and low liking accordingly. Results of the correlational analysis can be seen in Table 10.6. 
 
 
Table 10.6 Study 6: Correlational table showing Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Brand Alone Preference, Implicit Brand 
Preference, Brand Choice and Celebrity Liking (High) for the eight- to 10-year-olds in the 
Well-Liked Celebrity group. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Accuracy-
Based 
Scepticism 
-       
2. Affect-
Based 
Scepticism 
.398 -      
3. Explicit 
Celebrity 
Brand 
Preference 
.031 -.164 -     
4. Explicit 
Brand Alone 
Preference 
-.389 -.289 .135 -    
5. Implicit 
Brand 
Preference 
-.185 -.381 .299 .149 -   
6. Brand 
Choice 
.475* .008 .180 -.520* .239 -  
7. High 
Celebrity 
Liking 
.061 -.028 .663** -.123 .156 .122 - 
** significant at p < .01 
* significant at p < .05 
 
A positive correlation (r = .663, p = .001) was found between high Celebrity Liking and 
Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference in the younger children’s group, showing that when a 
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celebrity is particularly well liked by young children they are more likely to show an explicit 
preference for brands paired with celebrities - regardless of their level of scepticism. Brand 
Choice and Explicit Brand Alone Preference were negatively correlated (r = -.520, p = .016) 
showing that the higher brands presented alone are rated, the less likely a celebrity brand is to 
be selected in their final brand choice. Brand Choice was further correlated with Accuracy-
Based Scepticism (r = .475, p = .029) in this sample, showing that those with higher levels of 
accuracy-based scepticism were more likely to choose a celebrity brand in their final choice. 
In the findings reported here, celebrity liking was not related to an increase of scepticism, 
suggesting that contrary to the findings of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) younger children 
may not fully understand the use and intent of using celebrities in ads. This fits with the idea 
that even if children of this age are sceptical about ads this seems to operate independently of 
their other judgments (i.e. not related to preference responses). In this instance they may have 
a high liking for the celebrities, which is connected to their explicit brand preference 
judgments, but it could be that they are not applying scepticism. Generally, in the younger 
group (Table 10.2) when well-liked celebrities were presented, their scepticism impacted on 
brand alone preference judgments (unlike the older children whose celebrity brand preference 
judgements were impacted). Although the correlations are not significant here (likely due to a 
small sample size), there is a trace of this relationship present.  
 The key difference with the older group for this analysis is that high celebrity liking is 
not related to low scepticism. Again, this can be explained using the celebrity eclipsing 
literature. As previously discussed, it could be that for the younger children the presence of a 
well-liked celebrity dampened the effect of general ad scepticism due to celebrity eclipsing - 
it may be that where the presence of a celebrity became the focal point of the advert, strong 
celebrity attachment limited scepticism to be activated. Interestingly, there were no 
significant correlations to report from the younger children with lower celebrity liking which 
suggests that for celebrity eclipsing to be effective, the celebrity needs to be well-liked. This 
may only be the case for younger children who have lower cognitive processing of ads in 
general and who may rely on superficial cues (for example celebrity endorsement) as the 
basis for their preferences. Figure 10.6 incorporates high celebrity liking into the model of 
younger children’s responses to well-liked celebrity advertising.
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10.3.2 Examining the effect of high celebrity liking in Study 3 
The results of Study 6 highlighted important findings surrounding the effect of “high” liking 
of well-liked celebrities, showing that for both younger and older children, having a high 
liking for a celebrity was directly related to an increased likelihood of an explicit preference 
for celebrity paired brands, even though the 14-year-olds in the well-liked condition in Study 
6 had an explicit preference for brands presented alone. As discussed in Chapter 8, the scale 
used to test scepticism in young adults in Study 3 was divided into two subscales - three 
items which tested accuracy-based scepticism, and three items which tested affect-based 
scepticism. Using these two scales allows for the testing of the relationship between 
scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) and high celebrity liking in the sample of 
young adults. In the older group of children in the well-liked celebrity group of Study 6 there 
was a negative association between scepticism and explicit brand preference, but despite this 
finding there was also a direct relationship between high celebrity liking and celebrity brand 
liking. It was suggested that this could mean that scepticism was possibly overridden. This is 
something which was explored further with the young adults of Study 3.  
 Correlational analyses were conducted to examine whether celebrity liking was 
related to any of the variables previously measured – Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-
Based Scepticism, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Explicit Non-Celebrity Brand 
Preference, Implicit Brand Preference and Brand Choice. Due to the method used in Study 3 
young adults were only presented with celebrities they had previously rated as being very 
well liked (mean = 8.04 out of 9.00) in an earlier stage of the study. Therefore, the initial 
celebrity ratings provided by all of the sample was used and there was no need for a median 
split. The initial results of Study 3 (see Table 5.5, page 73) showed that young adults scoring 
higher on the accuracy-based (but not affect-based) scepticism scale had a lower explicit 
preference for celebrity paired brands. This is in contrast to the older children of Study 6 
where increased affect-based scepticism was negatively related to explicit celebrity brand 
preference. Additional results from the “high liking” analysis of the sample of young adults 
in Study 3 showed that, as with the older children, high Celebrity Liking was positively 
related to Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference (r = .396, p = .001). For both young adults 
(Study 3) and 14-year-olds (Study 6) there is a direct positive relationship between liking 
celebrities and liking brands paired with celebrities, but across the whole sample the adults 
showed no explicit resistance but the 14-year-olds did.  
 However, this leaves the question as to why the older children in Study 6 who would 
be assumed (according to developmental literature) to have a similar level of understanding 
to the young adults, did not respond in the same way to young adults. There are two credible 
explanations. Firstly, as discussed earlier in the thesis, it is possible to suggest that young 
adults didn’t feel “advertised to” in Study 3, and therefore scepticism wasn’t triggered. 
Secondly, for the young adults there was a relationship between accuracy-based scepticism 
and explicit brand preferences, whereas for the 14-year-olds there was an additional 
relationship between affect-based scepticism and explicit brand preferences. This could 
indicate that affect-based scepticism may be important when responding to a celebrity for 
whom individuals have a strong preference for, which adds further support for the discussion 
throughout this thesis that affect-based scepticism may be important for older children. 
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10.3.3 Known Celebrity Condition 
Across the sample of 88 children who participated in the known celebrity condition, the 
median “liking” score for the celebrities rated was 3.65 out of 9.00. The data was therefore 
split into two groups - those children who had a mean “liking” score lower than 3.65, and 
those who had a mean score of celebrity liking higher than 3.65.  
 Correlational analysis was conducted to see whether celebrity liking was related to 
any of the variables previously measured – Accuracy-Based Scepticism, Affect-Based 
Scepticism, Explicit Celebrity Brand Preference, Brand Alone Preference, Implicit Brand 
Preference and Brand Choice. There were no significant correlations between celebrity liking 
and any of the other factors in the lower liking condition (n = 47) nor in the higher liking 
condition (n = 41). This was also true when the sample was further separated into older (12- 
to 14-year-olds) and younger (eight- to 10-year-olds) children. 
 
10.4 Discussion 
Modelling the results of the children’s responses to celebrity advertising in Study 6 
highlighted some important differences between the older and younger children. Taking the 
well-liked group first, looking at the results of the older age group (aged 12- to 14-years-old), 
results demonstrated that children with increased scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-
based) had lower explicit preferences for brands paired with well-liked celebrities only. The 
previous finding from the overall sample, which highlighted a negative relationship between 
scepticism and brand alone preference, was lost, suggesting that, for older children, 
scepticism is only effective when a celebrity is present. This contradicts developmental 
literature suggesting that children aged 12-years and older should have a developed cognitive 
ability to recognise and defend against advertising more generally. It could be argued that 
older children do not recognise brands without celebrities to be a cause for concern due to the 
fact that advertising is a common occurrence in their everyday lives. Furthermore, the 
correlational results showing that both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism were 
negatively correlated with explicit celebrity brand preference only, could explain why 14-
year-old children in this study preferred brand alone over and above well-liked celebrity 
brands. This is a response which was expected, but not seen, in the young adults of Studies 1 
to 3, which also looked at the effects of well-liked celebrities. It could be that high levels of 
both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism are needed for explicit resistance to be 
possible.  
 The results of the older children in Study 6 flag some important differences when 
comparing to the younger children. Whilst the results of the older children highlighted 
relationships between scepticism and explicit celebrity brands, looking solely at the results of 
the children aged eight- to 10-years in the well-liked celebrity group, relationships showed 
that those with higher scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) had lower explicit 
preference for brands presented alone. Both of these results fit with the explicit preferences 
of the younger age groups who had an explicit preference for brands paired with well-liked 
celebrities rather than brands presented alone, suggesting that accuracy-based and affect-
based scepticism only appear to be effective on the explicit brand alone preferences in 
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children of this age. It could be that for the younger children, the presence of a celebrity 
dampened the effect of general ad scepticism due to celebrity eclipsing - it may be that where 
the presence of a celebrity became the focal point of the advert, strong celebrity attachment 
limited activation of scepticism. These results are in contrast to the older children, where 
scepticism was related to celebrity brands only. For older children in the sample, the presence 
of a celebrity may have heightened general ad scepticism. Given that the older children had 
higher levels of scepticism, it seems unlikely to infer that the celebrity effect was overridden 
in the younger sample. Instead, it could be argued that older children may have lowered 
celebrity brand selections because they hold a general negative affective response towards 
celebrity ads, highlighting that a high level of affect-based scepticism may be necessary for 
resistance to the celebrity effect to be effective. 
 Continuing to explore the well-liked celebrity condition, the correlational results of 
the young adults in Study 3 match those of the older children in the well-liked condition of 
Study 6, finding that accuracy-based scepticism was negatively related to explicit preference 
for celebrity brand preference score. However, there was no correlation between affect-based 
scepticism and celebrity paired explicit brand alone score in Study 3 - a finding which did 
emerge in the older children of Study 6. Furthermore, the results of the overall sample of 
children in the well-liked condition of Study 6 showed that affect-based scepticism was 
negatively related to explicit brand preference (celebrity brand and brand alone), which 
suggests that the more realistic ad situation in Study 6 might have triggered “gut-feeling” 
responses to influence the explicit judgments, and it occurred in those with high scepticism 
for all brands (not just celebrity brands). This could offer support for the fact that the two 
types of scepticism work together. Whilst the results of the overall (well-liked) sample of 
Study 6 indicated that scepticism does seem to offer a defence against brands, at least in 
brand preferences, it seems to operate in a different way in the younger and older groups 
when well-liked celebrities are involved. It was concluded in Study 3 that, at least in adults, it 
is their propositional reasoning about ads involved in accuracy-based scepticism which 
counteracts the celebrity effect in an explicit way, but it could be that a high level of affect-
based scepticism is also necessary for resistance to the celebrity effect to be effective.  
 The correlations seen in the older children in the well-liked condition were not 
replicated when brands were paired with known celebrities, which suggests that, for older 
children, the negative effect of scepticism is only shown when a well-liked celebrity is 
present. When discussing the results of the older children in the well-liked group, it was 
alluded to the fact that older children may be immune to celebrity advertising, and it is only 
when they have an emotional response to the celebrity that scepticism is triggered. The lack 
of correlation in the known celebrity group offers further support for this suggestion, and it 
could be possible to suggest that celebrities for whom they have no particular liking trigger 
little (or no) feelings of manipulation in older children, meaning there is no response to 
transfer to explicit responses (Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016). It has also been suggested 
earlier in this thesis that having conscious awareness of our own level of affect-based 
scepticism may be a determinant of whether resistance to the celebrity effect is possible. 
Heath’s model (2012) was also considered to be important, and it could be that when the 
celebrity was only known, and not necessarily liked, that children were encouraged to 
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consciously reflect upon the intentions behind the ad under conditions of high involvement. 
According to Heath, advertising may be less effective if consumers are encouraged to process 
advertising material critically.  
 Looking at the results of the younger children in the known celebrity group also 
shows that previous correlations seen in the well-liked condition are not present here. The 
correlations between higher scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) and lower 
explicit preference for brands presented alone did not emerge when the celebrity was simply 
known but not particularly well-liked. This tells us something about young children’s 
thinking and the way in which they think about the celebrity. When a celebrity was known it 
seems as though scepticism was not triggered, yet in an advertising situation where a well-
liked celebrity was present, young children’s scepticism was negatively related to explicit 
brand choice, and so, whilst there was no relationship with explicit celebrity preferences, 
scepticism was triggered.  
Study 6 also correlated initial celebrity liking with explicit brand preference (celebrity 
and brand alone), implicit preference, scepticism (accuracy-based and affect-based) and 
brand choice. For the older children (12- to 14-years) it was found that those with particularly 
high liking for well-liked celebrities had lower levels of both accuracy-based and affect-
based scepticism, with lower scepticism correlating with an increased explicit celebrity brand 
preference. Furthermore, high initial celebrity liking was positively correlated with explicit 
celebrity brand preference, indicating that having a high liking for a celebrity increases the 
likelihood of a celebrity brand being preferred when making explicit judgments. Importantly, 
there was a direct correlation between high celebrity liking (in the well-liked celebrity group) 
and explicit celebrity brand preference, which could suggest that scepticism may operate 
independently of brand judgments. This might lead us to expect an explicit celebrity brand 
preference, which did not occur, at least not in the 14-year-olds in the well-liked group. The 
findings of the 14-year-olds in this sample instead showed an explicit preference for brands 
presented alone. One explanation for this contrasting finding could be that in the initial 
analysis of explicit preferences and brand choice the overall sample of 14-year-olds in the 
well-liked condition (n = 20) were included, which contained some children who fell below 
the median split, therefore representing lower liking for the celebrities. This could have 
impacted on the results. Not all of these 20 children fell into the “high liking” group in the 
well-liked celebrity condition, and therefore the sample was considered to be too small to run 
further exploratory t-tests of explicit and/or implicit preference. A recommendation for future 
research would be to explore this further to examine whether those with a particular high 
liking to well-liked celebrities are more likely to have an explicit preference towards 
celebrity brands.  
Matching the results of the older children, for the younger children in the sample, high 
liking for a well-liked celebrity was directly correlated with explicit celebrity brand 
preference, again, seemingly independent of scepticism scores. It could be that younger 
children do not recognise celebrities as being an attempt to persuade as Rozendaal, Buijzen et 
al. (2011) suggested, and therefore attempts to defend against such ads may not be made. 
However, unlike the older children, high celebrity liking was not related to low scepticism in 
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the younger children. This could be explained using the celebrity eclipsing literature. As 
previously discussed, it may be that for the younger children the presence of a well-liked 
celebrity dampened the effect of general ad scepticism due to celebrity eclipsing (Ilicic & 
Webster, 2014). Where the presence of a celebrity became the focal point of the advert, 
strong celebrity attachment could have limited scepticism to be activated.  
 When looking at celebrity liking in the known celebrity group, it may have been 
expected that a replication of the results seen in the well-liked celebrity group would be 
shown - those that rated celebrities more favourably (in the higher boundary of the median 
split) would show a reduction in scepticism, with lower scepticism being correlated with 
higher explicit celebrity brand preference. However, even those who rated the known 
celebrities highly (and therefore fell above the median split threshold) showed no relationship 
between celebrity liking and any of the other variables. For older children, the negative effect 
of scepticism was only shown when a celebrity is present, providing the celebrity was 
considered to be well liked. When discussing the results of the older children in the well-
liked group it was alluded to that older children may be immune to celebrity advertising, and 
it is only when they have an emotional response to the celebrity that scepticism is triggered.  
However, consideration of the median split values must also be mentioned here. In the 
overall sample, those in the well-liked celebrity group were considered to have high celebrity 
liking if their score fell above the threshold of 6.00, whereas the cut off for those in the 
known celebrity group was only 3.67. Therefore, whilst the celebrities in the known 
condition were rated as being highly liked (within that condition), the extent of this liking 
was far from matching that of those considered highly liked in the well-liked celebrity group. 
This could be important and suggests that high celebrity liking is only likely to be related to a 
lower level of scepticism when the celebrities are extremely well-liked (for example, the 
upper half of those in the well-liked celebrity condition). 
This suggestion is supported by the results of the young adults in Studies 1 to 3, where 
there was a consistent explicit preference for celebrity paired brands. The computer 
programme in the earlier studies ensured that each participant was shown brands paired with 
a celebrity they had a very high liking for and, although it was expected that young adults 
would recognise the manipulation attempt and therefore utilise cognitive defences against 
them, the young adults consistently demonstrated an explicit preference for celebrity brands. 
It is likely that the model presented on page 154 (Figure 10.5) is relevant to the young adults 
here - very high celebrity liking was related to lower scepticism, which in turn was related to 
having a higher explicit liking for celebrity brands. However, there is an important 
consideration to raise here. The presentation format in Studies 1 to 3 used celebrity and brand 
pairing, whereas Studies 4 to 6 used a more realistic advertising board format commonly seen 
during celebrity interviews. So, it must still be considered that the young adults, whilst 
having a very high liking for the celebrities in the earlier studies did not feel “advertised to” 
and, as a result, scepticism was possibly not triggered. It would also be plausible to infer that, 
as with the children in Study 6, a high liking for celebrities could operate independently of 
scepticism and be directly related to an increase in celebrity paired brands.  
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Based on the developmental literature discussed throughout this thesis (see section 1.2), 
it would be reasonable to suggest that children aged 12- to 14-years, but not eight- to 10-
year-olds, would be cognitively in line with their young adult counterparts and therefore act 
in a way in line with the results of Studies 1 to 3. Following this assumption, and based on 
the model presented (Figure 10.5, page 154) which shows that in the older children very high 
celebrity liking was related to lower scepticism, and lower scepticism was related to higher 
explicit celebrity brand preference, it may have been expected that, like the young adults in 
Studies 1 to 3, older children in the well-liked celebrity condition may also explicitly prefer 
celebrity brands - which they did not. There are two points here which could explain the 
disparity between the older children in the well-liked celebrity group of Study 6 and the 
young adult sample in Study 3.  
 Firstly, these findings could suggest that, like John (1999) proposed, the older 
children in this sample are not at an adult-like level of understanding in relation to celebrity 
advertising and therefore scepticism has not been utilised to guard against this. This would 
offer an explanation as to why the older children here are acting differently to the young 
adults in Studies 1 to 3. However, this does not fit with the general developmental literature, 
nor the findings of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) who found that celebrity advertising is 
the first understood advertising tactic by even young children. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
this is a credible explanation. The initial hypothesis for Study 6 predicted that with the 
inclusion of a more realistic advertising presentation format, older children should be able to 
recognise persuasion and manipulation attempts, which in turn would lead them to explicitly 
prefer brands presented alone - which they did - at least in the sample of children presented 
with well-liked celebrities. However, it is difficult to explain this finding based on the current 
model and the conclusion that very high celebrity liking is related to lower scepticism, which 
should lead to higher explicit celebrity brand preference. Whilst it was concluded in Study 3 
that at least in adults, it is their propositional reasoning about ads involved in accuracy-based 
scepticism which counteracts the celebrity effect in an explicit way, it could be argued that a 
high level of affect-based scepticism could also be necessary for resistance to the celebrity 
effect to be effective. It could be suggested that the 14-year-olds responses are driven 
differently to those of the young adults in Study 3, with older children being driven more by 
affective feelings more than older participants. 
Secondly, a further explanation as to why the 14-year-olds’ explicit preferences were in 
favour of brands presented alone (in the well-liked celebrity group), and therefore were in 
line with the expected explicit preferences of the young adults in Studies 1 to 3, could be 
attributed to the affect-based scepticism scale. In Studies 1 and 2 scepticism wasn’t 
measured, and whilst it is likely that these young adults held a level of affect-based 
scepticism towards advertising, the fact that they weren’t being asked about their views on 
scepticism in a standalone scale could have been detrimental to their ability (or inability) to 
resist the celebrity effect. Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model (2011) suggests that 
recognising an advertising campaign triggers propositional processing of the ad event where 
conceptual knowledge is activated, so the ad event is reflected upon. In sum, it could be 
argued that being made to reflect on their “gut feeling” and affect-based scepticism triggered 
conscious reflection of propositional conceptual ad understanding in the older children, 
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which then allowed resistance to the ad to be made on the basis of conceptual understanding. 
This explanation also goes some way to explaining why younger children had no preference 
for celebrity brands nor brands presented alone. With an underdeveloped ability to 
consciously reflect on the intent characteristic of celebrity advertising, scepticism may not 
have taken effect. This will be explored further in the general discussion. Although 
awareness of affect-based scepticism has not been measured in this study, a tentative 
suggestion of the results based on the findings of the studies reported in this thesis, have been 
included into the advertising model (see Figure 10.7, page 165).
165 
 
 
166 
 
 It is important to highlight here that affect-based scepticism is considered to be an 
associational process that taps into our “gut feelings”, and therefore it needs to be questioned 
whether children reflecting consciously on their affect-based scepticism actually truly 
represents this measure, or whether once brought into conscious thinking it better represents a 
propositional process. Rozendaal, Buijs et al’s (2016) research suggested that being warned 
about manipulative intent in an ad arouses individuals to the fact that they are being 
manipulated – a feeling which tends to be unpleasant and considered unfair. Consequently, 
attitudinal advertising literacy is activated which triggers negative and sceptical feelings 
towards ads. However, as well as considering affect-based, associational processing being 
brought into line with conceptual, propositional processing, it must also be considered that 
the opposite relationship may also represent the findings of this study. A counter argument 
may suggest that propositional processing was activated when considering the intentions of 
the ad, which then triggered associational processes linking recognition of a persuasion 
attempt which gave rise to negative affective associations. With this in mind, it would not be 
surprising to find that 14-year-olds in this study had an implicit preference for brands 
presented alone when considering the view of Rozendaal, Buijs et al. that conscious feelings 
of manipulation can manifest in implicit, associational processes also. 
The results of the 14-year-old sample in this study also found that when tested one 
week later the previously significant preference for brands presented alone (in the well-liked 
celebrity condition) was lost, and there was no explicit difference between celebrity paired 
brands and brands presented alone. Whilst the scepticism scales were given to children again 
at this time of testing, children were not asked to rate the celebrities previously seen, nor was 
there any visual inclusion of the celebrities previously used. Therefore, in the absence of a 
highly rated celebrity, reliance on scepticism may have become more important and, with no 
celebrity to override scepticism levels, children may have instead relied more on their “gut 
feelings” which emerged from completing the affect-based scepticism scale. This could 
suggest that a high celebrity liking can operate separately to scepticism, but only when the 
celebrity is present and/or at the forefront of judgements. This wasn’t examined in this study 
but would be an important factor to consider moving forward. It would be interesting to 
explore whether a reminder of the celebrities used, or a scale as a check of celebrity liking 
continued to override scepticism at a later time of testing maintains brand preference. This 
could have implications for the overall success of advertising campaigns - whilst TV ads, 
internet ads and billboards generally consistently show the celebrity and brand advertised 
together, individuals purchasing habits tend to rely solely on judging brands and products 
independent of celebrity images.  
In conclusion, the results of this study have shown that for older children presented 
with well-liked celebrities, explicit preferences for brands presented alone were preferred 
over and above brands paired with celebrities. Furthermore, when these celebrities are 
considered to be “highly liked”, scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) was 
lower, with lower levels of scepticism being related to a higher explicit preference for 
celebrity paired brands. Very high celebrity liking was also related to an increased explicit 
preference for celebrity paired brand - a finding apparent in both younger and older children. 
However, resistance against the celebrity has been shown for the 14-year-olds in the well-
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liked celebrity sample, and reasons for this have been discussed in relation to the findings of 
young adults in Studies 1 to 3. The same findings were not shown for the younger children, 
which calls into question whether recognition of the tactic behind celebrity advertising is 
understood by this age group, or whether the link between associational affect-based 
scepticism triggering propositional accuracy-based scepticism is linked as easily. 
Furthermore, the children in the known celebrity group showed no relationship between 
celebrity liking and scepticism. This will be explored further in the general discussion. 
In relation to implicit preference, a positive relationship between well-liked explicit 
celebrity brand preference and implicit preference was found, demonstrating that as explicit 
celebrity preference increases so too does implicit preference. As predicted by Forehand and 
Perkins (2005), the implicit effect seems difficult to overcome. However, the 14-year-olds in 
the known celebrity group deviated from this finding and provided evidence of a dual-
process approach. This sample of children showed an implicit preference for brands 
presented alone yet an explicit preference for celebrity brands. Overall, these results can be 
applied to both the findings of previous studies reported in this thesis, and literature 
discussing developmental trends in understanding. Making reference to some of the key 
literature and theories discussed in the literature review, the general discussion will bring 
together the six studies and provide interpretations of the main findings in accordance to the 
new proposed model of celebrity advertising. Furthermore, recommendations for future 
research will be discussed. 
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11 General Discussion 
 
This chapter will bring together the findings of each of the six studies reported in this thesis 
and discuss how these can be used to inform our knowledge of children’s and adults’ 
understanding of celebrity advertising. In particular, this chapter will review the initial aims 
of the thesis and give a summary of its main findings, before discussing these in relation to 
key developmental literature. Strengths and limitations of this thesis will be addressed, before 
a discussion of the implications of the main findings and suggestions for future research. The 
unique contributions of this thesis are also explored. 
 
11.1 Reviewing thesis aims 
The research for this thesis was carried out due to the lack of developmental research 
exploring the nature of celebrity advertising and the effect it has on children’s implicit and 
explicit brand judgments. One of the initial aims of this thesis was to examine the 
developmental trends of children’s and young adults’ advertising understanding by 
examining the case of celebrity advertising. Previous research and influential theories in this 
area have suggested that adults, but not children, have comprehensive knowledge of 
advertising intent. Theories of cognitive development (e.g. Piaget, Theory of Mind) and 
models such as the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) which extended this work, suggest 
that children over 12-years (but not younger children) and adults understand persuasive intent 
inherent to advertising, and would predict that young adults would have no difficulty in 
defending against the celebrity effect, at least in their explicit judgments.  
 In line with this view, research such as that carried out by Forehand and Perkins 
(2005) found that when celebrities were identified in an ad, young adults would alter their 
explicit preferences against that of the celebrity (although resistance was not apparent in their 
implicit judgments). The traditional view of children’s development would predict that for 
younger children (aged eight- and 10-years), due to limitations in their cognitive skills, their 
explicit preferences would be in favour of brands presented with a liked celebrity. More 
recently, this has been called into question by the work of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) 
who suggested that even children as young as eight-years of age understood the tactic of 
celebrity advertising. If so, then even children of this age could show resistance to celebrity 
influence.  
 Because children’s implicit responses have not been extensively investigated 
previously, it was recognised that this research was needed, and it was acknowledged that a 
dual-process model may be required. In terms of implicit preferences, two alternative 
hypotheses were investigated. Forehand and Perkins (2005) suggested that dual processes 
occur separately and associational responses to celebrity pairings could be difficult to control. 
If so, then regardless of explicit brand preferences, both young adults and children could have 
an implicit preference for celebrity brands. For the young adult sample, this was in contrast to 
the prediction based on literature such as Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) which suggested that 
dual processes interact. Due to assumed lack of advertising knowledge, it was considered 
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unlikely that this interaction would occur in young children, and they would still show an 
implicit preference for brands presented with celebrities although, again, the claim by 
Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) that even eight-year-olds understand celebrity advertising 
meant this was an open question. 
 Research suggests that conceptual advertising literacy may not be helpful in guarding 
against the celebrity effect (Rozendaal, Opree, et al., 2016), but attitudinal literacy might. A 
negative disposition towards ads might be useful. Hudders et al. (2017) claimed that not only 
do children have a limited dispositional advertising literacy (e.g. knowledge of advertising 
and its intent) but they also have difficulty applying such knowledge (situational advertising 
literacy). With this in mind, scepticism was also studied. As discussed in section 1.2, 
previous research suggests that a dual-process model may be needed to explain explicit and 
implicit advertising judgments, so an additional aim of this thesis was to begin to develop a 
new model of advertising response which incorporates the effects of ad scepticism in a novel 
way. 
 
11.2 Summary of findings 
A table summarising the main hypotheses and findings for each study can be seen in 
Appendix 11.1 (page 309). 
 The results from the younger children in Study 1 were in line with the hypotheses that 
they would not be able to defend themselves against the celebrity effect, and children showed 
both an explicit and implicit preference for novel brands paired with celebrities that they 
liked, as opposed to novel brands paired with neutrally rated non-celebrities. Whilst these 
findings supported the cognitive defence viewpoint, the view of Rozendaal, Buijs et al. 
(2016) was not supported and any negative feelings of manipulation (if this occurred) did not 
transfer to explicit judgements. However, the sample of young adults in both Studies 1 and 2 
also showed an explicit and implicit preference to novel brands paired with liked celebrities. 
This was unexpected as it had been assumed that recognising the celebrity would allow 
young adults to recognise the manipulation attempt and guard against the celebrity brands in 
their explicit judgments. Whilst both the explicit and implicit responses were in line, there is 
no real evidence for an interaction between the two. On the other hand, there was also no 
evidence of resistance, which is against initial predictions. This led to the suggestion that the 
presented ad situation was not giving rise to feelings of manipulation. To explore this finding 
further, Study 3 tested young adults only, using real brands in place of novel brands, and the 
same findings emerged - young adults demonstrated both explicit and implicit preference for 
real brands paired with liked celebrities as opposed to neutrally rated non-celebrities.  
 Study 3 also saw the introduction of a measure of advertising literacy, in an attempt to 
explore why young adults consistently preferred celebrity paired brands. There was some 
evidence to suggest that attitudinal advertising literacy was related to explicit and implicit 
brand judgments. In Studies 1 to 3 there was little evidence to suggest that young adults 
consciously resisted the effects of celebrity pairing in their explicit judgments. However, 
whilst general attitude to advertising was more negative than might have been expected from 
170 
 
a sample of adults, there was evidence in Study 3 to indicate that a high level of attitudinal 
advertising literacy and scepticism acts upon the explicit effects of celebrity on brand 
judgments, but that attitudinal advertising literacy also moderates implicit effects. Additional 
analysis showed that those scoring higher on the accuracy-based scepticism scale had a lower 
explicit preference for celebrity brands, although accuracy-based scepticism was not related 
to implicit preference. In contrast, higher levels of affect-based scepticism was related to 
lower implicit preference for brands paired with celebrities. Explicit celebrity brand 
preference and implicit celebrity brand preference were also significant positive predictors of 
brand choice. It was suggested that using well-liked celebrities might have led to any 
scepticism being overridden by liking to the celebrity, even in young adults’ explicit brand 
judgments.  
 Study 4, therefore, introduced a more realistic advertising situation, in an attempt to 
increase the feeling of manipulation in young adults, and also introduced a more typical 
situation where a range of celebrities was presented. Therefore, celebrities that were likely to 
be known but not necessarily well liked were used. The implicit measure was removed, and, 
in this study, brands were presented with a celebrity or alone rather than with a non-celebrity. 
A measure of accuracy-based scepticism, though different to the one used in Study 3, was 
also retained. Whilst higher scepticism was again correlated with lower explicit brand 
preference (as in Study 3), the consistent celebrity effect disappeared, and in Study 4 young 
adults held an explicit preference for brands presented alone, rather than with a celebrity. 
Young adults who scored higher on the scepticism scale before and after brand presentation 
had lower explicit preferences for brands presented with celebrities. However, there was no 
significant correlation between scepticism scores and brand preference scores when brands 
were presented alone. This suggested that, for young adults with high scepticism, the 
presence of the celebrity could have triggered resistance in their brand judgments. Explicit 
celebrity brand preference was a positive predictor of brand choice, whereas explicit brand 
alone preference was a negative predictor of celebrity brand choice. 
 With resistance being demonstrated by the young adults in Study 4, Study 5 used the 
same advertising format and explored whether the same findings emerged in children aged 
eight- to 14-years of age. In line with the results of the young adults, all children in this study 
had an explicit preference for brands presented alone, with even the eight-year-olds showing 
resistance to celebrity advertising - a result which would be expected according to Rozendaal, 
Buijzen et al. (2011). In the overall sample of children, a negative correlation emerged 
between preference for explicit celebrity brands and scepticism, yet there was no significant 
correlation between scepticism and explicit brand alone preference. It seemed that the pairing 
of celebrity and brand could have triggered resistance in those with high scepticism. 
However, the eight-year-olds demonstrated lower accuracy-based scepticism than the other 
age groups, raising questions about whether scepticism was the reason for their resistance.  
 Explicit brand preference was lower in the two older age groups (12- to 14-years) 
compared to the younger age groups (eight- to 10-years) suggesting that older children may 
be generally less susceptible to advertising. Also, for the sample of older children, a positive 
relationship between explicit brand alone preference and explicit celebrity brand preference 
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was found - a relationship which did not emerge in the younger age groups. This suggests 
that the older children seem to be responding in terms of a general approach to advertising, 
which indicates that it could be around the age of 12-years when advertising is better 
understood by children, and that older children tend to have a more stable attitude to brands. 
This shift is better indicated by the lower brand preference for 12-year-olds (and 14-year-
olds) than 10-year-olds (and eight-year-olds), which fits with previous literature suggesting 
that by the age of 12-years of age children understand the intentions of advertising on an 
adult level have a more adult-like approach to ads. Furthermore, for the older children, a 
negative relationship between explicit celebrity brand preference and both scepticism before 
and scepticism after testing also emerged. These correlational findings were not found in the 
younger children, supporting the idea that maybe eight- to 10-year-olds do possess some 
degree of scepticism but may be unable to use it.  
 Study 6 brought together the findings of the previous studies to examine the effects of 
both well-liked and known celebrities on explicit and implicit brand preferences. Accuracy-
based and affect-based scepticism scales were used, and the more realistic advertising stimuli 
was retained. In this study, age differences were found across both celebrity conditions (well-
liked and known). In the well-liked celebrity group, only the 14-year-old children showed 
resistance to the celebrity effect, having an explicit preference for brands presented alone. In 
contrast, no resistance was shown by the 14-year-olds in the known celebrity group where 
there was a significant explicit preference for celebrity brands over brand alone. Eight-year-
olds, 10-year-olds and 12-year-olds showed no significant difference in explicit preference 
for brands presented alone or celebrity brands in either the well-liked or known celebrity 
group. Across the sample, in some age groups, children held different explicit and implicit 
brand preferences. For example, eight- to 10-year-olds in the known celebrity group had no 
explicit preference (for celebrity brands or brands alone) but they had an implicit preference 
for celebrity brands. These differences between explicit and implicit responses would provide 
support for Forehand and Perkins’ (2005) assumption that dual processes occur separately 
and that implicit effects are difficult to overcome. On the other hand, the results of the 14-
year-olds showed that this age group have resistance to both types of celebrity (well-liked 
and known) in their implicit preferences, yet an explicit preference for celebrity brands paired 
with a known celebrity. Resistance in implicit, but not explicit, preferences would support the 
notion of a dual process model, but not necessarily the one proposed by Forehand and 
Perkins (2005). The idea that both implicit and explicit processes are involved in the 
processing of advertising has been supported but does not support Forehand and Perkins’ 
(2005) contention that resistance is more likely to be seen in explicit rather than implicit 
responses.  
 Correlational results from the well-liked celebrity condition showed that, for the older 
children, higher scepticism (both accuracy-based and affect-based) was related to lower 
explicit preferences for brands presented with well-liked celebrities only, highlighting that 
the negative influence of scepticism on brand judgments was only seen when a celebrity was 
present. For the younger children, the opposite was true, and those with higher scepticism 
(both accuracy-based and affect-based) had lower explicit preference for brands presented 
alone. The pattern of correlations from Study 6 show that it is only in the older children for 
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the well-liked celebrity condition that there is some coherence between their accuracy-based 
and affect-based scepticism, brand preferences and brand choice. This suggests that, for this 
age group, cognitive links are being made between these factors, which ultimately influence 
judgments. These correlations do not appear for the younger children, which supports 
developmental literature that they may not be making cognitive connections between their 
different responses in the same, sophisticated way as their older counterparts.  
 In the known celebrity group, affect-based scepticism was related to lower explicit 
brand alone preference, but only in the sample of younger children. Consistent with the 
results from the well-liked celebrity condition, the older children in the known celebrity 
group showed no relationship between scepticism and explicit brand alone preference, again 
showing that, for the older children, the negative influence of scepticism is only seen when a 
celebrity is present. The lack of correlation between scepticism (accuracy-based and affect-
based) and lower explicit preferences for brands presented with known celebrities add 
support to the fact that the celebrity may need to be well-liked (rather than known) for 
scepticism to be triggered and impact upon brand judgments. 
 
11.3 Considering the developmental literature 
One of the aims of this thesis was to assess whether, and at what age, children and young 
adults demonstrate resistance to the effects of pairing celebrities with brands. Research in the 
area of children’s cognitive development (which is discussed in detail in section 1.2) tends to 
agree that as children get older their reasoning abilities develop and becomes more 
sophisticated. Friedstad and Wright’s (1994) PKM model suggests that compared with older 
children, younger children find it difficult to appreciate the information contained in 
advertising and to recognise that advertisers present information from the perspective of their 
own biased interests. Throughout this thesis, six studies have explored both explicit and 
implicit responses to celebrity brands and brand choices. Furthermore, an examination of 
whether scepticism is linked to resistance to the celebrity effect was included. Each of these 
three main features will be discussed in relation to the original aims of the research. 
 
11.3.1 Explicit preferences and brand choice 
This thesis, by using both novel and real brands with young adults, has highlighted that 
pairing a well-liked celebrity with brands can have a positive effect in favour of the brand 
even if it is unknown or has not been advertised previously. This is an encouraging finding 
for advertisers. The brands in Studies 1 and 2 had not previously been seen by young adults, 
yet they were preferred when they were paired with a well-liked celebrity, which was also 
replicated in Study 3 with real brands. Furthermore, brand evaluations became more positive 
after pairing with a liked celebrity. For similarly rated brands, those paired with celebrities 
were preferred to those paired with non-celebrities, and even for novel brands that had 
previously been rated neutrally, an overwhelming number of young adults chose celebrity-
paired brands as their favourite brand choice. 
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 For the young adults, the general body of literature was consistent - adults should be 
able to guard against the effects of celebrity as they should realise that the celebrity images 
had no bearing on their evaluation of the brand. According to Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016), 
young adults should be able to recognise a manipulation attempt which should trigger 
negative feelings which impacts on their attitudes. This should then be picked up in young 
adults’ explicit brand preference. However, this was not the case, and young adults seemed 
unable to resist the celebrity effect, demonstrating an explicit preference for brands paired 
with well-liked celebrities. One explanation as to why young adults’ responses did not offer 
support for the hypothesis could be explained through celebrity eclipsing. One of the main 
findings of Ilicic and Webster’s (2014) research was that high eclipsing (where the celebrity, 
rather than the brand, is the focal point of the ad) in consumers with strong celebrity 
attachment, enhances brand attitude, regardless of whether they perceive the celebrity and 
brand to either match or mismatch. In contrast to the findings of Forehand and Perkins 
(2005), therefore, these findings suggest that where there is a strong preference for a celebrity 
(as in Studies 1 to 3), this can lead individuals to be more positive in their reasoning about 
the associated brand, even when they are aware of the persuasive intent of using celebrities in 
the ads. This could also be an explanation for the children’s responses, which led to the study 
of known celebrities in later studies of the thesis.   
 As explored in the discussion of Study 1 (section 3.6), further suggestions were 
offered as to why the young adults may have failed to resist the celebrity effect. Firstly, 
simple pairing of stimuli (brands and head and shoulder photos) was used to help participants 
to recognise that the celebrity was not really relevant to evaluating the brand logo. It was also 
used to examine where the boundary between associative processing and propositional 
processing lies. However, the absence of a clear endorsement by the celebrity may have 
meant that the simple pairing procedure had a positive influence upon evaluative judgments 
of the brand, because where fake brands are being seen for the first time, there is no other 
meaningful cue upon which to base this judgment. Heath (2012) suggested that in order for 
cognitive defences against advertising to be engaged, adults need to be able to recognise that 
they are being subjected to an attempt to persuade them. Failing to recognise an advertising 
attempt is likely to show a lack of resistance, as young adults possibly failed to feel like they 
were being manipulated. This was addressed in Study 2 where persuasive taglines were 
included. 
 Laran et al. (2010) described how consumer behaviour is often swayed by marketing 
tactics such as slogans, with research suggesting that consumers can more easily recognize 
how slogans are meant to influence their behaviour. It was therefore expected that including 
taglines in Study 2 would increase the possibility that young adults would consciously 
attempt to resist any unwanted bias encountered when presented with advertisements 
(Williams et al., 2004). However, even when an advertising tagline was included, young 
adults demonstrated an explicit preference for brands paired with a celebrity. Friedstad and 
Wright (1994) suggested that when consumers understand how a stimulus such as taglines is 
intended to influence their behaviour, they are more likely to perceive it as a persuasion 
tactic. However, there was no evidence of this demonstrated in the findings of Study 2, which 
could be because that despite the introduction of the slogans, participants still did not feel that 
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they were being subjected to a persuasion attempt. Perhaps the novel brands created for these 
studies, combined with the experimental situation, gave rise to an experience that was not 
sufficiently lifelike to encourage participants to feel that they were being manipulated and 
therefore demonstrate resistance. In order to address this issue, in Study 3 novel brands were 
replaced with real brand logos, yet young adults still held an explicit preference for celebrity 
paired brands.  
 Literature which has looked at the celebrity “match” to the brand has tended to 
suggest that strong celebrity attachment enhances brand attitude, regardless of whether they 
perceive the celebrity and brand to match or mismatch (Ilicic & Webster, 2014). Although 
Mishra (2015) found that the believability of an ad was significantly higher when presented 
with a congruent celebrity, the findings from Studies 1 to 3 suggest that this congruence is 
not necessary for brand liking to occur when people have a strong liking for the celebrity. In 
Studies 1 and 2 the brands were novel brands, unknown to the young adults, and therefore 
there was no opportunity for reflection upon whether the celebrity was congruent with the 
brand being presented. Furthermore, the brands were presented as a logo format, and 
therefore young adults would have very little information as to what the brand represented - 
for example, sportswear, food, fashion. However, brands paired with well-liked celebrities 
were liked as opposed to neutrally rated, as they could have been. Studies 1 and 2 could have 
shown no difference across celebrity brand or non-celebrity brand ratings, however these 
studies showed a significant preference for brands paired with well-liked celebrities. This 
shows that young adults did not seem to mind that they had no knowledge of the brands that 
were paired with the celebrities they liked, and highlights that the well-liked celebrity played 
a big part in explicit brand judgements. 
 According to Kang and Herr (2006), factors associated with a celebrity are more 
likely to lead to positive brand evaluations where consumers’ motivation to process 
information is low. Because it is likely that in Studies 1 and 2 there was little (or no) 
recognition of manipulation, motivation to process the information may have been high. It is 
plausible that when presented with unknown brands with celebrities that young adults, who 
are cognitively developed, will be motivated to try and make sense of the situation. Kang and 
Herr suggested that where motivation to process information is high, and consumers cannot 
see a relevant link between celebrity and brand (as may have been the case for the young 
adults in these studies), they may overcorrect against the perceived source of bias leading to 
negative brand evaluations. This would offer an alternative explanation as to why young 
adults had an explicit preference for celebrity paired brands - it could be that negative 
feelings towards the unknown brand were shown, and the liking for the celebrity overrode 
their preferences leading to a celebrity brand preference. This would also fit with the 
correlational results which showed celebrity liking and explicit celebrity brand preference to 
be directly related. Heath (2012) has also argued that when the potential for conscious 
cognitive elaboration of advertising material is high, consumers are much more likely to 
process material critically and therefore advertising may be less effective. Overall, this would 
fit with findings suggesting that the use of celebrities is more effective under conditions of 
low involvement, where consumers have little interest or motivation to engage in deep 
175 
 
processing of ad information, and this highlights the key role of implicit (as opposed to 
explicit) evaluations in influencing consumers’ responses to celebrity endorsement.   
Tavassoli and Lee (2003) highlighted the importance of modality in advertising, 
suggesting that elements such as jingles, music (auditory) and images, logos (visual) can 
have an unintended negative effect by interfering with our processing mechanisms. In 
particular they found that in English ads, auditory elements can interfere more with cognitive 
responding than visual elements. This could offer one explanation as to why initial results 
reported in this thesis saw young adults act in a way different to those in the study of 
Forehand and Perkins (2005). Wogalter et al. (2014) found that TV ads using both visual and 
auditory presentation produced the highest level of later recall and recognition. However, 
when separated into visual only and auditory only, the visual only ad produced better 
performance. This may go some way to explaining why the young adults in Studies 1 and 2 
had more likelihood of the celebrity ads being remembered more so than the young adults in 
Forehand and Perkins’ study. This could have affected the preferences and choices made. 
 As previously discussed, one consideration to explain the findings of the first three 
studies was that young adults did not feel that they were being advertised to, and therefore 
they felt no need to offer resistance to the celebrity effect. Consequently, Study 4 introduced 
a presentation method which was more representative of modern day advertising. This 
change in method saw young adults in Study 4 hold an explicit preference for brands 
presented alone rather than brands presented with a celebrity. For the first-time young adults 
were demonstrating resistance to the celebrity effect. The presentation of brands in Study 4 
depicted a more accurate representation of how ads are typically presented in everyday life, 
and therefore, it is more likely to have triggered recognition of being manipulated which 
enabled resistance to the celebrity paired brands. Therefore, in terms of triggering resistance, 
the change in procedure in this study seems to have worked although the presentation 
remained to be visual only. 
The eclipsing effect that is seen when celebrities are well-liked is lost when the 
celebrities are simply known (Ilicic & Webster, 2014). As consumers, we are not only 
exposed to adverts that contain celebrities we like, and therefore it was expected that the 
presence of a celebrity with the brand would trigger cognitive defences within individuals 
which would enable them to guard against the intended persuasive nature of the celebrity 
figure. The results of Study 4 are therefore in line with this prediction, and also fit with the 
suggestion that celebrities in ads do trigger cognitive defences in young adults, but when the 
celebrities are well-liked these defences are overridden. Friedstad and Wright (1994) 
highlight the importance of recognising the intended persuasive tactic within an advert. It 
may be that the ‘tactic’ of including a celebrity in an ad should make it easier to recognise an 
ad event but, even so, positive feelings for a celebrity may neutralise the recognition of 
manipulation and overrides defences. 
 The explicit preference results of Study 4 were replicated in Study 5 with children 
aged eight- to 14-years of age, with children in all age groups having an explicit preference 
for brands presented alone over brands paired with a known celebrity. As predicted by the 
PKM (Friedstad & Wright, 1994), Study 5 showed that brand preference decreased with age, 
with overall brand preference being lower in the older children. However, in Study 6, the 14-
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year-olds in both groups (well-liked and known) discriminated in their brand judgments 
dependent upon whether or not they were presented with celebrities. For the 14-year-olds in 
the known celebrity group, there was a significant explicit preference for celebrity paired 
brands over brands presented alone. This is a response which was expected, but not seen, in 
the young adults in Studies 1 to 3. John (1999), extending upon Piaget’s (1932) cognitive 
development theory, stated that even 14-year-olds do not respond like adults in terms of their 
advertising understanding, yet offered no explanation as to why. Whilst more research would 
be beneficial, to explore these differences further, the importance of triggering scepticism 
may be one tentative explanation as to why 14-year-olds and young adults may respond 
differently. 
When discussing the results of the older children, it has previously been suggested 
that they may not resist advertising’s effects, and it is only when they have an emotional 
response to the celebrity that scepticism is triggered. Therefore, an alternative explanation as 
to the difference in responses across young adults and older children could be that older 
children need an emotional response to the celebrity to be able to trigger resistance. However, 
it is unlikely that this suggestion alone truly captures why older children and young adults 
may be different in their thinking. Livingstone and Helsper (2006), in their work on media 
literacy, suggested that different processes of persuasion operate at different ages, with older 
children being persuaded by high quality arguments. This may provide an insight into why 
older children and even young adults’ explicit preferences were in favour of the celebrity 
brand in some of the studies reported throughout this thesis. In Studies 1 to 3 it was argued 
that the young adults did not feel advertised to, and therefore the effects of well-liked 
celebrities were met with no resistance in either explicit or implicit judgments. Therefore, 
there was unlikely to have been any negative feelings to transfer to their brand preferences 
(as predicted by Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016), suggesting that a strong liking for celebrities 
in Studies 1 to 3 influenced brand judgments and overrode advertising defences. However, 
according to Heath (2012), it may be that to some degree the success of celebrity 
endorsement rests upon not encouraging consumers to engage in explicit propositional 
evaluation of advertisements. So, although we would expect older children and young adults 
to be more persuaded by a quality argument, they were still affected by the presence of a 
celebrity (Studies 1 to 3, well-liked; Study 5, known) unless something triggered scepticism.  
 The known celebrities used in Studies 5 and 6 were selected on the basis that they 
should be known by the participants, yet they may not have any particular liking or disliking 
of them. As discussed previously, the 14-year-olds’ mean “liking” score for the known 
celebrities was low, meaning that these celebrities may have actually been disliked. Till and 
Shimp (1998) found that whilst positive feelings towards a celebrity transfer to the brand 
(even under conditions of low effort), any future negative information of the celebrity lowers 
brand evaluations. This may have happened here, particularly in Study 6 where children were 
tested over a three-week period. It is possible that children will have been exposed to these 
celebrities in different contexts during the testing period, and, consequently, brand 
evaluations could have been influenced and altered. Future studies may benefit from 
exploring the effect of repeated exposure of celebrities on preferences.  
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 In comparison to the known celebrity group in Study 6 (and the young adults in 
Studies 1 to 3), the 14-year-olds in the well-liked celebrity group seemed to show resistance 
in their immediate responses to the celebrity effect – something which was expected of the 
young adults in Studies 1 to 3. Whilst scepticism is addressed at length later in the discussion, 
it seems logical to infer here that it was only when the 14-year-olds responded to well-liked 
celebrity brands that scepticism was triggered – so liking did not override scepticism in this 
case, instead, those who had high levels of scepticism tended to be lower in celebrity brand 
preference. Figure 10.7 (page 165) offered a model which suggested that it is possible that 
being triggered to think of the advertiser’s intent of using a highly liked celebrity altered the 
preferences of the older children in Study 6, whilst being protected of this recognition in 
Study 3 allowed young adults to follow their “gut feelings” in favour of the well-liked 
celebrity.  
 The finding that 14-year-olds in the well-liked celebrity group of Study 6 had a 
significant preference for brands alone over celebrity brands does not match the expectations 
of the literature concerning celebrity eclipsing. Ads are considered to be most effective when 
processed under conditions of low involvement (Choi et al., 2005) which suggests that where 
an ad contains no product information to process, we may rely on our affective attitude. 
Explicit preferences and brand selections may therefore alter if a general dislike for ads is 
held, which suggests that this sample of children may have lowered celebrity brand selections 
because they hold a general negative affective response towards celebrity ads quite generally. 
According to the cognitive defence stance, even if young children can process the intent 
adherent to advertising, they still have to connect up other responses to apply it in their 
defence. This connective process does not seem to occur in the same way in younger 
children, which can help to explain why younger children showed no preference for either set 
of brand pairings. 
 For the 14-year-old children, the immediate preference seen in Week 2 disappeared 
and, at Week 3, they showed no difference in preference in either the well-liked or known 
celebrity condition. It appears as though any resistance to the well-liked celebrities in Week 2 
had been lost one week later in the older age group - any immediate celebrity effect 
disappeared. It is worthwhile considering that some of the celebrities may also be associated 
with their own advertising campaigns, or involved with celebrity endorsement for other 
companies, which could have led children to consider the “fit” of the celebrity with the 
brand, in comparison to the brands they usually advertise or endorse. Whilst there is some 
disparity concerning the importance of celebrity “fit” (e.g. Ilicic & Webster, 2014; Mishra, 
2015), being aware of this during the time of testing may also have altered children’s 
perceptions of the celebrity being used in this study. Further research into the effect of 
celebrity disliking on children’s and young adult’s brand preferences would drive this 
research forward. Furthermore, Büttner et al. (2014) criticised many previous studies for 
examining explicit and implicit preferences at time of testing, rather than at time of 
consumption which is more representative of typical advertising which largely occurs some 
time before purchasing. As Büttner et al. noted, it is likely that attitudes and preferences alter 
during the gap between ad exposure and intention to buy. The results from Study 6 offer 
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support for this claim as the 14-year-olds initial explicit preference was not shown one week 
later.  
  This thesis explored the effects of celebrity advertising as it seems to be one tactic 
that children understand reasonably well (Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., 2011). Due to the 
findings from Rozendaal, Buijzen et al.’s study (2011) where even eight-year-olds were able 
to identify the intentions of ads using celebrity endorsement, Hudders et al. (2016) stated that 
celebrity endorsement is not a tactic to which children are vulnerable. If eight-year-olds 
understand about celebrity endorsers, then it seemed logical to expect them not to hold a 
preference for celebrity paired brands, and that active resistance might be demonstrated by 
preferring brands presented alone. Showing no preference for celebrity brands could be 
construed as not being influenced by the celebrity. However, this assumption did not fit with 
previous work concerning children’s vulnerability to ads which derived from the cognitive 
defence literature (see section 1.2). Study 1 demonstrated that simple pairing of well-liked 
celebrities with novel brand logos can influence young children’s explicit preferences for 
brands and the brand choices they make. Based on developmental literature which suggests 
younger children have limited cognitive defences, it was not surprising to find that children 
in this study held an explicit preference for brands paired with celebrities that they like, 
although this finding did call into question whether young children do understand celebrity 
endorsement as a tactic.  
 The advertising format presented in Study 4 saw young adults defend against the 
celebrity effect in their explicit preferences - this was the first time throughout the studies in 
this thesis that this result was found. Therefore, Study 5 adopted the same method to explore 
whether the same findings emerged in a sample of children aged eight- to 14-years-old. 
Children in all age groups had an explicit preference for brands presented alone rather than 
brands presented with a celebrity, which appears to show evidence of resistance in all age 
groups, offering support for the claims of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) that children as 
young as eight-years of age have a good understanding of celebrity advertising. When 
considering the work of Friedstad and Wright (1994) and the Persuasion Knowledge Model, 
it would be reasonable to expect eight-year-olds to rate brands presented alone and celebrity 
paired brands equally, or to prefer celebrity brands more. As discussed in section 1.2, the 
cognitive defence view suggests that the cognitive abilities of eight-year-olds may be limited, 
which could impede their ability to understand the intentions of advertisers and therefore 
mean that their capacity to resist ads is restricted. However, the results presented here suggest 
resistance did occur in the younger age groups as there was no explicit preference for 
celebrity brands, as we may have expected. On the other hand, the results did offer support 
for the developmental literature as brand preference decreased as children got older, 
highlighting that 14-year-olds preferred brands less than younger children. This may be 
evidence of a more coherent general response to advertising that is increasingly less positive 
with age.  
 One of the two conditions in Study 6 also used known celebrities. In contrast to the 
results of Study 5, this condition of Study 6 found that children aged eight-, 10- and 12-years 
showed no significant difference in explicit preference for brands presented alone or with 
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known celebrity brands. Based on the PKM (Friedstad and Wright, 1994), this is a response 
that could have been expected, and provides some evidence for the fact that younger children 
may not be resisting celebrity brands and perhaps don’t understand the intent behind celebrity 
advertising, as Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) predict. The cognitive defence view (see 
section 1.2) suggests that the cognitive abilities of eight-year-olds may be limited, which 
could impede their capacity to resist ads. Following the findings of Study 5, in relation to the 
eclipsing literature, the young children of Study 6 have offered some support for the 
assumption that the celebrity eclipsing effect is lost when celebrities are known rather than 
well-liked. Whilst there was no significant difference between explicit preferences for brands 
presented alone or brands presented with a celebrity, if the celebrity was seen to be the focal 
point of the ad, we may have expected celebrity brands to be favoured. 
 As discussed in section 1.2.2, McAlister and Cornwell (2009) tested preschool 
children’s Theory of Mind to explore whether it was related to understanding of persuasion 
knowledge of print advertisements. Research has criticised the work of McAlister and 
Cornwell for not measuring persuasive intent (Lapierre, 2013), although the researchers did 
conclude that those children with better developed Theory of Mind were more likely to 
understand brand campaigns and brand awareness. Methodologically, the research of 
McAlister and Cornwell is similar to that presented in Studies 4 to 6, by using print ads rather 
than televised content, and it can infer similar findings. Whilst neither persuasive intent nor 
Theory of Mind were directly tested throughout the research presented here, the studies 
reported in this thesis have included measures of scepticism (which will be explored later in 
the discussion) and liking towards ads containing celebrities, which could be indicative of 
understanding the nature of advertising. The findings in this thesis, by incorporating 
measures of scepticism, offer some support for the conclusions of McAlister and Cornwell 
(2009). It has been suggested throughout the thesis that young children may have awareness 
of celebrity advertising, yet they haven’t fully developed the cognitive skills necessary to 
apply a defence. 
Livingstone and Helsper (2006) argued that the evidence on children’s responses to 
advertising does not support the widely held belief that younger children are more influenced 
by advertising (even though older children may be more “media literate”), but rather different 
processes of persuasion operate at different ages. For example, Livingstone and Helsper 
claimed that younger children would be more inclined to be persuaded by advertising 
containing celebrities, whereas older children are more likely to be persuaded more by ads 
that contain high quality arguments. The findings of Studies 5 and 6 appear to disagree with 
this view. Whilst scepticism was shown to increase with age, and therefore is supportive of 
the general development literature on cognitive development (e.g. Piaget, Theory of Mind), 
in Study 5, younger children matched the explicit preferences of the older children and 
showed an explicit preference for brands presented alone. In Study 6, the younger children 
did not show a preference for celebrity brands in their explicit judgments when, in 
accordance with the developmental literature and the findings of Livingstone and Helsper, we 
may have expected them to be more persuaded and succumbing to the celebrity effect by 
showing a preference for the celebrity paired brands. In sum, the younger children in Studies 
5 and 6 were less influenced by the presence of the celebrity than Livingstone and Helsper’s 
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argument about superficial cues would predict, and also less than the traditional account 
would propose.  
In terms of final brand choice, explicit celebrity brand preference was consistently a 
positive predictor of final brand choice. This is a finding which emerged from the samples of 
young adults in Studies 3 and 4, and the samples of children in Studies 5 and 6 (in both the 
well-liked and known celebrity group). In Studies 4, 5 and 6, brand alone preference was a 
negative predictor of final brand choice, yet in Study 3 where brands were paired with non-
celebrities than alone, this relationship did not emerge - non-celebrity brand preference did 
not predict celebrity brand choice. This finding highlights the importance of the celebrity. In 
terms of Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model (2011), it could be suggested that at an 
associational level, recognition of a celebrity could also produce an affective response which 
non-celebrities do not generate. Again, the effects of scepticism and preferences will be 
explored further later in the discussion but are worthwhile mentioning here in relation to 
explicit preferences and brand choice. 
 
11.3.2 Implicit preferences and brand choice 
In Studies 1 to 3 young adults consistently demonstrated an implicit preference for celebrity 
brands. These results matched the predictions of Forehand and Perkins (2005) who suggested 
that because affective associational responses to the celebrity pairing could be more difficult 
to control, young adults would have an implicit preference for brands paired with well-liked 
celebrities. Furthermore, the reanalysis of Study 3 highlighted that implicit celebrity brand 
preference was a significant positive predictor of brand choice. Although these implicit 
results were consistent with young adults across all three studies, the results need to be 
treated with caution. It has been widely discussed throughout this thesis that a lack of 
resistance against celebrity brands in the earlier studies could have been due to young adults 
not feeling like they were being advertised to. Consequently, we must consider that, had 
negative feelings of manipulation been present, negative emotions stemming from 
recognition of manipulation might have led to resistance (Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016). 
Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) suggested that recognizing a persuasion attempt triggers 
negative affective response which impacts on attitude and scepticism, triggering explicit 
resistance. This would mean that for young adults we could have seen evidence of resistance 
in both their explicit and implicit responses. Adults’ implicit responses were not tested in 
later studies, where the focus turned to children, and therefore the focus of this section lies in 
examining the implicit preferences of older and younger children. 
 Following the cognitive defence theory, it was expected that if children also recognise 
a manipulation attempt, then they might also hold negative feelings which might transfer to 
their brand judgments. It was suggested that this would likely only occur in older children 
(over the age of 12-years) whose cognitive abilities are presumed to be at ceiling. The results 
of the young children in Study 1 supported this view, and children held an implicit preference 
for brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. With children’s propositional processing 
abilities being considered to be limited due to their underdeveloped cognitive abilities, this 
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finding falls in line with the prediction that if they did not recognise the manipulation attempt 
of the celebrity, then no implicit resistance would be shown in their preferences.  
Implicit responses were also measured in children aged eight- to 14-years in Study 6. 
Analysis showed that younger children had a significant implicit preference for celebrity 
brands. Matching the implicit results of the young children in Study 1, these results are in 
contrast to the prediction that because eight-year-olds understand about celebrity advertising 
they may also recognise a manipulation attempt, consequently holding negative feelings 
which might transfer to their brand judgments (Rozendaal, Buijzen, et al., 2011). As with 
Study 1, the younger children’s implicit preferences were in favour of celebrity brands. In 
contrast, older children had a significant implicit preference for brands presented alone, 
which was the only time in the studies reported throughout this thesis where resistance to the 
celebrity effect was shown in implicit preferences.  
Whilst implicit responses will be discussed in more depth in section 11.3.4 where 
dual processing models are examined, it is important to note here that for the older children 
in the known celebrity group, this implicit preference for brands alone was in contrast to their 
explicit preferences, where celebrity paired brands were preferred. Rozendaal, Buijs et al. 
(2016), suggest that recognizing a persuasion attempt triggers negative affective response 
which impacts on attitude and scepticism, triggering explicit resistance, which, for the older 
children, is not supported. However, in relation to the well-liked celebrity subgroup, explicit 
brand preference and implicit preference results aligned in the older children and showed 
that, overall, children with lower explicit celebrity preference were more likely to have lower 
implicit preference for well-liked celebrity paired brands also. As predicted by Rozendaal, 
Buijs et al. (2016), this finding supports the notion that dual processes interact and that 
associational implicit preferences could be triggered if recognition of manipulation and 
persuasion occurs. This will be explored further in section 11.3.4 which discusses the 
operation of dual processes. 
 
11.3.3 Advertising scepticism, preference and brand choice 
Examining the importance of scepticism on children’s and young adults explicit and implicit 
preferences was an important aim of this research. A lot of research has seen advertising 
literacy as being the key which enables children to protect themselves against advertising. 
Three aspects of advertising literacy had been proposed previously but attempts to measure it 
have been criticised (see Kunkel, 2001) and have focused entirely on explicit knowledge and 
skills. An earlier attempt to measure it in this thesis (see Study 3) based on the work of 
Rozendaal, Opree et al. (2016) also failed. Therefore, the later three studies reported in this 
thesis (Studies 4 to 6) introduced scales to measure advertising scepticism more specifically. 
 It has already been discussed that the young adults in earlier studies were unlikely to 
have felt manipulated, which offers an explanation as to why they preferred celebrity brands 
both explicitly and implicitly. Despite this, results of Study 3 showed an effect of general 
scepticism on both their explicit and implicit responses. Further analysis of Study 3 divided 
the scales into accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism, and results highlighted that those 
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with higher accuracy-based scepticism showed lower explicit preference. There was no 
significant correlation between affect-based scepticism and explicit brand alone preferences, 
indicating that, at least in adults, it is their accuracy-based scepticism which counteracts the 
celebrity effect in their explicit responses. This was also highlighted in the analysis of “high” 
vs “low” liking of celebrities. Whilst high celebrity liking was positively correlated with 
explicit celebrity brand preference (matching the older children of Study 6), for young adults’ 
explicit preference was for well-liked celebrity brands. It was suggested that, for the older 
children where affect-based scepticism was also correlated with explicit celebrity preference, 
this aided resistance in the older children. This highlights the importance of affect-based 
scepticism when responding to celebrities for whom a high liking is shown. In Study 3 those 
with higher affect-based scepticism showed lower implicit preference. These results provide 
a compelling argument that in the absence of negative gut feelings about a manipulation 
attempt, an effect of pre-existing general scepticism (accuracy-based and affect-based) is 
seen. 
The results of Study 3 have shown that pre-existing general scepticism can affect 
responses to brands. Whilst Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) proposed that the celebrity effect 
in advertising results mainly from the triggering of implicit, associative evaluations, this did 
not seem to happen in the sample of young adults in Study 3, as no relationship between 
affect-based scepticism and explicit responses was found. The processes uncovered in Study 
6 were different, and they were also varied in the different age groups, as a connection 
between affect-based scepticism and lower explicit responses in the older children was found 
in the well-liked group of Study 6 that was not present in adults or younger children. Only 
older children in the well-liked group of Study 6 showed a negative relationship between 
scepticism and explicit celebrity brand preference which suggests that, for older children, 
scepticism is only effective when a liked celebrity is present. This could indicate that, 
because of high exposure to advertising situations, older children do not feel the need to raise 
defences each time an ad is seen, yet when a well-liked celebrity is present they become 
alerted to an attempt of manipulation. It could be that the presence of a well-liked celebrity 
encourages individuals to consider the ad situation, which enables them to think critically 
about the intent of using a celebrity as a manipulation attempt.  
According to Heath’s (2012) view, advertising works best under conditions of low 
involvement, yet the results of the older children in Study 6 offer support for the notion that 
recognising the manipulation attempt and considering the intention acts as a defence. As 
Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) proposed, the recognition of manipulation triggers negative 
feelings which impact on attitudes and scepticism, which are picked up on in explicit 
preferences. The relationship between high celebrity liking and explicit celebrity brand 
preference was positive for the young adults in Study 3, which may offer an explanation as to 
why young adults in this study preferred brands paired with celebrities. This result could pose 
an argument that celebrity liking could be directly related to brand preferences, regardless of 
whether a manipulation attempt was recognised. However, unlike the sample of older 
children in Study 6, there was no relationship between high celebrity liking and scepticism 
for the young adults, which offers support for the notion that they did not feel like they were 
being advertised to in earlier studies, and therefore scepticism was not triggered.  
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 As explored in the discussion of Study 6 (see section 9.4), the scepticism scale used in 
Study 3 was only retrospectively separated into accuracy-based items and affect-based 
scepticism and the affect-based scepticism questions did not form a standalone scale. 
Therefore, the affect-based scepticism questions would not have been as identifiable to the 
young adults as they were to the children and, as such, would likely to have been consciously 
processed or reflected on less – young adults would have likely engaged in “gut feeling” 
associational processing. In Study 6, children were asked to complete two separate, distinct 
scepticism scales, and it was found that when the well-liked celebrity was highly liked this 
was associated with a decrease in affect-based scepticism, which in turn was related to a 
higher preference for celebrity brands. Whilst 14-year-olds in the well-liked group in this 
sample had an explicit preference for brands presented alone and therefore deviated from the 
predictions of the model, it could be proposed that being asked to reflect on their affect-based 
scepticism made these children more aware of the persuasive intent of the celebrity in the 
advertisement, which actually brought their affect-based scepticism in line with their 
conceptual understanding. This possibly triggered an explicit defence against the celebrity 
brand.   
 As suggested in the reanalysis of Study 3 (see section 8.1), it could be that the liking 
of a specific celebrity could produce a strong positive affective response based upon 
associational processes, which leads to a positive “gut feeling” which overrides scepticism or 
conceptual awareness of the nature of celebrity advertising, but this may only have occurred 
in the studies involving young adults where the adults did not feel particularly manipulated 
and reflection upon affect-based scepticism did not occur. In sum, it could be that being made 
consciously aware of one’s own affect-based scepticism (as in Study 6) could have enabled 
recognition of the persuasive intent of the celebrity and encouraged the 14-year-olds with a 
high level of affect-based scepticism to put up resistance in their explicit judgments. This 
may not have been possible in the young adults of Study 3, which could explain why an 
explicit preference for brands presented with a well-liked celebrity was shown. One 
explanation to clarify the differences in findings across older children and young adults may 
be that being presented with a well-liked celebrity, and having to consciously think about 
scepticism, could work together. However, future research (as discussed in section 11.6) to 
validate this assumption is needed.  
 In Study 5, despite preferring brands presented alone in their explicit preferences, 
younger children’s judgments appeared to involve different underlying processes to those of 
older children. Whilst older children held a relationship between accuracy-based scepticism 
and explicit celebrity brand preference, for younger children this pattern did not emerge. The 
correlational findings from the overall sample of children in the known celebrity condition of 
Study 6 were minimal, as were correlational results of older and younger children. However, 
the absence of significant relationships between scepticism and other responses could tell us 
a lot about children’s thinking. In line with the results of Study 4 (young adults) and Study 5 
(children), there were no relationships in Study 6 between scepticism and explicit brand alone 
preference in the overall sample. This provides support for the fact that the effects of 
scepticism are only seen for children when a celebrity is present. This could offer support for 
the work of Heath (2012) who suggests that advertising works best under conditions where 
conscious cognitive elaboration of advertising is low, and could explain why 14-year-olds 
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had an explicit preference for brands presented with a known celebrity. When faced with an 
ad event involving known celebrities for adults and older children, a high level of accuracy-
based scepticism could be the driver of the ability to defend against the explicit effects of 
celebrity-based advertising, yet for younger children whose conceptual advertising 
knowledge may be more limited, high levels of affect-based scepticism may be necessary. As 
predicted by Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011), it could be that eight-year-olds are able to 
recognise persuasive intent, but it may be that they don’t know what to do with the 
knowledge, and therefore, although they act like older children and also prefer brands 
presented alone, they may have very different reasons for holding this preference.   
 When looking at the well-liked subgroup of Study 6, higher affect-based scepticism 
was related with lower explicit celebrity brand preference in the older children, yet for the 
younger children, it was related to lower explicit preference for brands presented alone. For 
the younger children, their level of general ad scepticism was only related to how they 
responded to brands when the brand had not been paired with a celebrity. It could be that for 
the younger children the presence of a celebrity dampened the effect of general ad 
scepticism, possibly due to celebrity eclipsing (Ilicic & Webster, 2014), and where the 
presence of a celebrity became the focal point of the advert, strong celebrity attachment 
limited scepticism to be activated. This is in contrast to the older children where the presence 
of a celebrity may have heightened general ad scepticism.  
 The current research explored the effects of celebrity advertising as it seemed to be 
one tactic that children understand reasonably well (Rozendaal, Buijzen et al., 2011). 
However, for the young children low celebrity liking was not related to higher scepticism 
(accuracy-based nor affect-based), suggesting that contrary to the findings of Rozendaal, 
Buijzen et al. (2011) and Hudders et al. (2016), younger children may not fully understand 
the use and intent of using celebrities in ads. This fits with the idea that, even if children of 
this age are sceptical about ads, this seems to operate independently of their other judgments 
(i.e. not related to preference responses). In this instance, they may have a high liking for the 
celebrities, which is connected to their explicit brand preference judgments, but it could be 
that they are not applying scepticism. This fits with previous assumptions about children’s 
vulnerability to ads derived from the work of Piaget (see section 1.2.1). Based on this earlier 
work, it would be questionable whether ad literacy in young children is sufficiently 
developed to trigger scepticism. However, the results presented in Studies 5 and 6, suggest 
that young children’s general advertising scepticism is just as well developed as older 
children’s but they may not apply it in the same way, or as effectively. 
 The results of the well-liked condition of Study 6 suggest that scepticism does seem 
to offer a defence against brands, at least in brand preferences, but it seems to operate in a 
different way in the younger and older groups. Despite this, when looking at the regression 
analyses, neither accuracy-based nor affect-based scepticism were negative predictors of 
brand choice - a finding which was consistent across the whole sample. Whilst scepticism did 
not predict final brand choice, for the older children the correlational results did show a 
negative relationship between affect-based scepticism and final brand choice, suggesting that 
where affect-based scepticism was higher, celebrity brands were chosen less frequently. 
Where an ad contains no product information to process, we may rely more on our affective 
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attitude, and explicit preferences and brand selections may alter if a general dislike for ads is 
held. This is more likely where an ad contains no product information to process and reliance 
on affective attitudes are more prominent. Older children may have lowered celebrity brand 
selections because they hold a general negative affective response towards celebrity ads, 
which fits with the finding that 14-year-olds had higher levels of affect-based scepticism than 
the other age groups. This suggests that their general dislike for ads was related to their brand 
selections, which could indicate that a high level of affect-based scepticism is also necessary 
for resistance to the celebrity effect to be effective. 
Hudders et al. (2017) suggested that whilst young children do have limited knowledge 
of advertising and the intent surrounding it (which they called ‘dispositional literacy’), they 
have difficulty applying such knowledge (‘situational advertising literacy’). Support for this 
finding has been given when looking at the correlational analysis of highly liked celebrities 
and scepticism in Study 6, which showed that, unlike the results of the older children, very 
high celebrity liking was not related to low scepticism in younger children. This contradicts 
the findings of Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) which suggest that younger children 
understand the use and intent of using celebrities in ads. This fits with the idea that even if 
children of this age are sceptical about ads this seems to operate independently of their other 
judgments (i.e. not related to preference responses) and that they are not applying scepticism. 
As previously discussed, it could be that for the younger children the presence of a well-liked 
celebrity dampened the effect of general ad scepticism due to celebrity eclipsing. There were 
no significant correlations to report from the younger children with lower celebrity liking 
which suggests that, for celebrity eclipsing to be effective, the celebrity needs to be well-
liked, although this may only be the case for younger children who have lower cognitive 
processing of ads in general and may rely on superficial cues (for example celebrity 
endorsement) as the basis for their preferences. 
 
 
11.3.4 A dual process account of advertising 
As the findings from this thesis emerged, so too did the need for new dual-processing models 
of celebrity advertising to be created. The main model of advertising that has been drawn 
upon extensively throughout this thesis has been the Persuasion Knowledge Model, dated 
1994 (Friedstad & Wright). Over the last 25 years the advertising market has grown 
substantially, and advertising methods now vary greatly. Therefore, peoples’ defences may 
have evolved and it could be that not all advertising is attended to. This is a factor that the 
PKM model may not be able to accommodate. Whilst the PKM is useful in explaining 
research findings in relation to some of the older, more typical advertising formats, it is 
questionable whether the model is fit for purpose when considering more recent advertising 
formats or adverts where celebrities are present. As discussed throughout this thesis, a more 
recent model of advertising was needed, and, as such, various dual-processing models of 
celebrity advertising were created as new findings emerged. However, it is likely that future 
models would need to be adapted to focus on differing advertising techniques.  
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Evidence of explicit and implicit preferences operating independently was found in 
the reanalysis of the young adults in Study 3. Throughout Studies 1 to 3, irrespective of 
explicit preferences to celebrity brands, the results of the young adults (Studies 1 to 3) 
remained consistent and an implicit preference for celebrity presented brands was shown. 
From the research carried out by Forehand and Perkins (2005) it was expected that young 
adults would find it difficult to protect themselves from the effects of celebrity influence in 
their implicit responses, and the results were in line with this assumption. In contrast, 
Rozendaal, Bujis, et al. (2016) suggested that recognizing a persuasion attempt triggers 
negative affective response which impacts on attitude and scepticism, triggering explicit 
resistance. This meant that for young adults we could have seen evidence of resistance in 
both their explicit and implicit responses. But this was not shown throughout Studies 1 to 3 
and instead it was found that explicit and implicit processes aligned positively.  
 Of course, there has been lengthy discussion concerning whether the stimuli 
represented a true to life advertising situation and whether this enabled any initial 
manipulation to occur. Consequently, we must consider that, had negative feelings of 
manipulation been present, negative emotions stemming from recognition of manipulation 
might have led to resistance (Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016). Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) 
suggested that recognizing a persuasion attempt triggers negative affective response which 
impacts on attitude and scepticism, triggering explicit resistance. This would mean that for 
young adults we could have seen evidence of resistance in both their explicit and implicit 
responses. It could also be possible that adults don’t attend to, or even explicitly recognise 
advertisements as much as initially thought, since technological advances and the ubiquity of 
advertising mean that we are increasingly surrounded by advertising in a wide variety of 
guises. If we are constantly surrounded by advertising, with some of it being unattended, is it 
plausible that we can always be on guard against any unwanted effects? Heath (2012) 
suggested that when consumers are able to critically evaluate advertisements, their ability to 
consciously reflect can actually alert them to recognise manipulation, thus affecting their 
explicit brand preferences. Furthermore, he proposed that “switching off” to advertising 
could actually be a key route to persuasion as cognitive defences are lowered and the implicit 
effects of advertising are difficult, or even impossible, to overcome.  
 When looking at the reanalysis results of Study 3, where scepticism (accuracy-based 
and affect-based) was correlated with explicit preferences, implicit preferences and brand 
choice, evidence of dual-processing emerged, and a new model of celebrity advertising was 
proposed (see Figure 8.1, page 101). Correlational results demonstrated that, for adults, it was 
accuracy-based scepticism which was related to explicit brand preferences rather than affect-
based scepticism. As discussed throughout, Study 4 utilised a more realistic advertising 
situation and moved from using well-liked celebrities to celebrities simply known to young 
adults, and therefore direct comparisons of young adults in Study 3 and Study 4 should be 
treated with caution. However, it is important to highlight that a high level of accuracy-based 
scepticism was negatively related to explicit celebrity brand preference in this study also. 
This is therefore a finding which emerged when young adults were presented with both well-
liked and known celebrities and is shown in both models (see Figure 8.1, page 101 and 
Figure 8.2, page 104) of celebrity advertising (both well-liked and known). Furthermore, 
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regression analyses showed that celebrity brand preference positively predicted brand choice 
in both Studies 3 and 4. So, scepticism correlated negatively with explicit brand preference, 
and brand preference positively predicted brand choice, yet explicit brand preferences in 
Studies 3 and 4 were different. In Study 3, the association was present when celebrities were 
paired with brands but not when there was a non-celebrity presented with the brand. Taken 
together these findings suggest that the presence of the celebrity was important in influencing 
the explicit responses of individuals with higher levels of ad scepticism.  
 In contrast to the results showing a relationship between accuracy-based scepticism 
and explicit celebrity preferences, in Study 3, high affect-based scepticism was associated 
with less positive implicit celebrity brand attitudes. The is an important finding as it is the 
first time, to my knowledge, that such a link has been identified between general affect-based 
scepticism and implicit brand responses. The pattern of relationships uncovered here fits with 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2011) dual process account of cognition and suggests that 
accuracy-based scepticism is based upon explicit propositional processes (involving 
reflection upon the truth status and accuracy of advertising claims) whereas affect-based 
scepticism is based upon associational processes which connect more strongly with implicit 
attitudes Figure 8.1 (see page 101) attempts to depict this process. This was not a finding 
which emerged in Study 6, however, which highlights important differences between young 
adults and children.  
 Study 6 re-introduced the implicit measure, to explore both the explicit and implicit 
preferences of children. In the overall sample, implicit preference results showed that 14-
year-olds had higher implicit preference for brands presented alone, which was in contrast to 
their explicit responses where known celebrity paired brands were preferred. Furthermore, 
there was a correlation between explicit celebrity brand preference and implicit preference. In 
the overall sample of children, those with lower explicit celebrity preference were more 
likely to have lower implicit preference for well-liked celebrity paired brands also. As 
predicted by Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016), this finding supports the notion that dual 
processes interact and that associational implicit preferences could be triggered if recognition 
of manipulation and persuasion occurs. Further analysis by age group showed this to be 
representative of the older children only. This was depicted in a new model of well-liked 
celebrity advertising for older children, which suggests that both explicit and implicit 
responses interact (see Figure 10.1, page 136). For the younger children there was no 
relationship between well-liked celebrity explicit brand preference and implicit preference. 
Cognitive developmental theories suggest that processing of advertisers’ intention is limited 
in younger children and, according to the cognitive defence stance, even if young children 
can process the intent adherent to advertising, they still have to connect up other responses to 
apply it in their defence. This connective process doesn’t seem to occur in the same way in 
younger children. With an inability to consciously process the intent of the celebrity effect, 
there is no opportunity for the effects of manipulation to transfer to the implicit preferences. 
 As Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) proposed, it seems likely that the celebrity effect in 
advertising results mainly from the triggering of implicit, associative evaluations. 
Recognising manipulation triggers negative feelings which then impact on attitude and 
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scepticism, so a negative implicit response is then picked up on in explicit responses. This 
did not seem to happen in the sample of young adults in Study 3 as no relationship between 
affect-based scepticism and explicit responses was found. However, higher levels of affect-
based scepticism present in the older children (in the well-liked condition) of Study 6 was 
related to lower explicit celebrity paired brand preference. In Study 6, children were asked to 
make prior evaluations of the celebrities and brands (one week before the explicit and 
implicit preference testing), which may have encouraged engagement with propositional 
evaluations. At the time of testing recognition of manipulation could have triggered feelings 
which impacted on attitudes and scepticism against the celebrity, which then transferred to 
children’s explicit preferences. If this is the case then this has implications for the way in 
which advertising operates and, if Heath’s (2012) view is correct, it may be that to some 
degree the success of celebrity endorsement rests upon not encouraging consumers to engage 
in explicit propositional evaluation of advertisements where celebrity endorsement occurs. In 
line with the cognitive defence view, the relationship between affect-based scepticism and 
explicit celebrity brand preference was only be seen in the older children, who are considered 
able to recognise the manipulation attempt.  
 Whilst Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) suggest that both explicit and implicit responses 
interact, with recognition of manipulation triggering feelings impacting on attitudes and 
scepticism, cognitive developmental theories suggest that processing of advertisers’ intention 
is limited in younger children. This offers an explanation as to why the correlation between 
explicit preferences and implicit preference present in older children was absent in younger 
children. According to the cognitive defence stance, even if young children can process the 
intent adherent to advertising, they still have to apply it in their defence. This process doesn’t 
seem to occur in the same way in younger children, which explains why fewer correlational 
relationships emerge in comparison to the older children. With an inability to consciously 
process the intent of the celebrity effect, there is no opportunity for the effects of 
manipulation to transfer to the implicit preferences. Model 10.2 (see page 141) shows the 
limited correlations which emerged from the younger children in the well-liked celebrity 
group. 
 For both the older and younger children in the known celebrity condition of Study 6, 
all correlations highlighted in the well-liked condition were not replicated when brands were 
paired with known celebrities. For older children the negative effect of scepticism was only 
shown when a well-liked celebrity was present, which could suggest that older children may 
be immune to celebrity advertising, and it is only when they have an emotional response to 
the celebrity that scepticism is triggered. In an advertising situation where a well-liked 
celebrity was present, young children’s scepticism was negatively related to explicit brand 
choice, and so, whilst there was no relationship with explicit celebrity preferences, scepticism 
was triggered. This was not found when a known celebrity was used. For both older and 
younger children, accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism were positively correlated, 
which could suggest that implicit and explicit processes may interact. 
 In conclusion, the studies presented throughout this thesis have provided 
overwhelming support for new dual-processing models of celebrity advertising to be created. 
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As has been demonstrated, findings from children and young adults suggest that a “one size 
fits all” model cannot explain explicit and implicit processes. Whilst there has been evidence 
to suggest that explicit and implicit responses may operate independently in young adults (in 
support of the research of Forehand and Perkins, 2005), findings provided from older 
children suggest that both explicit and implicit responses may interact in this age group, with 
recognition of manipulation triggering feelings impacting on attitudes and scepticism 
(Rozendaal, Buijs et al., 2016). In support of cognitive developmental theories, it has been 
suggested that processing of advertisers’ intention is limited in younger children. With an 
inability to consciously process the intent of the celebrity effect, there is no opportunity for 
the effects of manipulation to transfer to the implicit preferences - a relationship which 
emerges in older children. 
 Whilst the models created as part of this thesis are relevant for celebrity advertising, 
they may not be appropriate for research in explaining alternative advertising techniques. 
Future research would be useful in exploring the processes involved in these varying 
advertising techniques and would provide a more solid foundation for the growth of 
advertising research. Furthermore, the models that have been proposed throughout this thesis 
may not take into account individual differences - for example, exposure time to electronic 
media and televisions, parental control, and personal liking of celebrities may also play an 
integral role. It could be that not all of the children tested regularly engaged with the 
opportunity to be “advertised to” - some may actively choose to fast forward through ads, 
whilst others may enjoy watching them as part of their TV viewing. Whilst once we were 
unable to avoid ads, it is increasingly possible to avoid some advertising material - for 
example online streaming and Netflix, which may not be accounted for in these models. 
 
11.4 Strengths and limitations 
As the strengths and limitations pertaining to each study have been discussed in the 
individual empirical chapters, here the strengths and limitations of the research as a whole 
have been addressed.  
 A particular strength of this thesis was that it incorporated an implicit measure to 
explore both explicit and implicit responses in children. As highlighted in the literature 
review (see section 1.2.5), there is very limited research which has included an implicit 
measure to explore preferences, and this is particularly lacking in children. This was 
surprising considering research has highlighted the vulnerability of young children. 
Exploring both explicit and implicit preferences, and how they interact, is a unique 
contribution of this research and has allowed for a deeper understanding of how celebrity 
advertising is processed both explicitly and implicitly. Furthermore, a scale of accuracy-
based scepticism and a scale for affect-based scepticism was created to examine whether 
levels of scepticism can offer resistance to celebrity advertising. Again, this offers a unique 
contribution to the existing literature - particularly when considering the affect-based 
scepticism measure. Very few studies have successfully attempted to explore affective 
responses, and those that had, used short 2 or 3 item scales. The affective-based scale created 
here, whilst needing further validation, showed to be a reliable scale, and it is hoped that this 
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is used in future research. In sum, a fundamental strength of this thesis is that it has attempted 
to look at the underlying relationships between different types of general advertising 
scepticism and both explicit and implicit responses to brands and how these different 
responses impact upon brand choice. Doing this has allowed for the exploration of underlying 
cognitive processes in a way that has not been done previously. More work is required in this 
area, but this thesis has provided an important platform for which further work can expand. 
This research demonstrates the complexity of responses and how sensitive responses to 
advertising are under different conditions, and this points to the need for caution in using a 
“one size fits all” account of how children respond to advertising.  
 A further strength of this thesis was the number of participants recruited for each of 
the studies. All six studies had large sample sizes and in the latter two studies where children 
of different ages were studied, sample sizes were large in each of the individual age groups. 
In the limited literature which does incorporate an implicit measure, sample sizes tend to be 
small due to the requirements of individual testing. Being able to collect IAT data from over 
200 children is a considerable strength of this thesis and adds significantly to the advertising 
field of research.  
 Findings from each of the studies reported in this thesis complement each other and 
allowed for further exploration of celebrity advertising. Whilst conducting six empirical 
studies was not part of the initial trajectory of the PhD, the findings which emerged from the 
samples of young adults allowed for a deeper exploration of the effect of celebrity 
advertising, which in itself adds knowledge to the advertising literature. Exploring further the 
lack of resistance to the celebrity effect in young adults strengthened the later studies with 
children which, overall, has enabled a more comprehensive thesis to be written. Study 6 was 
not just useful for contextualising the findings of the thesis as a whole, but also provided 
many novel findings which has pushed the importance of this research area forward. 
 As discussed throughout this thesis, the methods and scales used in each of the studies 
differed. Whilst there were appropriate reasons for these changes as the focus of the thesis 
progressed, it is difficult to infer any comparative conclusions. A limitation of the later 
studies (Studies 4, 5 and 6) was that the celebrities weren’t chosen by each individual 
participant. Where the participants in Studies 1 to 3 rated a wide range of celebrities with 
their top four being selected for use in the experimental trials, for the later studies all children 
rated the same celebrities and these same celebrities were used throughout the study. 
Although pilot studies were conducted with children and adults of appropriate ages, and the 
celebrities were chosen on this basis, these later studies could not take into account individual 
differences in celebrity liking and, for some children, this meant that they were being tested 
with celebrities that whilst most others considered “well-liked” they had either a dislike or no 
particular liking/disliking for. For the later studies, when testing of children was of 
paramount importance, it was not practical or possible in the timeframe given to allow for 
children to be tested completely independently - for a large sample size to be achieved the 
initial liking of celebrities and brands alongside initial scepticism levels needed to be tested 
on a whole class basis so to reduce disruption in the class, and also to allow for a large 
sample size. The nature of this research caused some inconvenience to the schools, which 
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meant that school recruitment was difficult. The number of visits to the school for pre- and 
post-testing meant visiting classes over three consecutive weeks, and during the IAT testing 
the researcher remained in the school over one or two days testing children for 30 minutes in 
small groups.  
 A further limitation of this research could surround the brands that were used in the 
later studies. Whilst all of the brands were selected on the basis of them being known to the 
participants but not market leaders in their field, the brands being rated and selected were all 
for different products from different markets – for example, beauty, food and sport. Whilst 
this ensured limited bias, for example to those with no interest in sport, beauty, and so on, it 
could be that judging brands from different markets is difficult for younger children as 
comparisons are being made across categories that children don’t consider to be comparable 
or congruent. Research shows that until a certain age, children can be fixed in their thinking, 
so it could be that comparing food brands with sporting brands and being asked to choose 
between them may be cognitively demanding, especially for the younger children within the 
studies. Furthermore, it could be possible that the “fit” of the celebrities used was clearer for 
the participants to identify for some of the brands yet not others which could have impacted 
upon their preferences. Research by Ilicic and Webster (2014) suggested that making a 
celebrity with whom consumers have a strong attachment the focal point of the ad can lead 
the celebrity to overshadow the brand and enhance brand attitude. Ilicic and Webster (2014) 
claim this occurs regardless of whether they perceive the celebrity and brand to match or 
mismatch (Ilicic & Webster, 2014). In contrast, however, Mishra (2015) found that the 
believability of an ad was significantly higher when presented with a congruent celebrity 
which, if true, would have likely had some bearing on the results presented in this thesis. 
One of the criticisms of the work of Rozendaal, Bujis et al. (2016), raised in section 
1.3, was that the research was conducted at one single time point in a school environment, 
which may not be considered to be representative of a typical advertising situation where 
consumers are exposed to ads in different environments at many different times. Whilst 
Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) found that forewarning about ads was beneficial to children, 
the effects of this in the long term remain unclear. This is also a limitation of the studies 
reported in this thesis. Although Study 6 was conducted with the same children over three 
consecutive weeks, testing for brand liking at a much later time point would be beneficial to 
this research also, in an attempt to resolve this experimental limitation and explore how brand 
liking and brand choice relates to actual purchases and/or purchasing preferences. Many 
advertised products that consumers are exposed to are often only seen when shopping in 
supermarkets, and therefore there is an assumed link between responses to advertising and 
purchase behaviour. As with many of the previous studies discussed which have explored 
attitudes to brands and brand liking, the studies presented in this thesis did not measure actual 
consumption behaviour, but rather brand choice was considered to be a proxy for behaviour. 
A limitation of this it that it cannot be assumed that purchase intentions and purchase 
behaviours necessarily match.  
Lastly, it must be considered that the brands used in the first few studies were novel 
brands, created by the researcher to explore the effect of well-liked celebrities on responses 
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to brands that the participants had no prior knowledge of. It should therefore be recognised 
that the brands presented may actually be viewed by participants as images or logos, rather 
than representing a wider “brand”. First, simple pairing of celebrity images and brands with 
no endorsement of the brand was intended to help participants to recognise that the celebrity 
was not really relevant to brand evaluation. Also, novel brands were used to eliminate the 
possibility that participants already came to the study with prior feelings and beliefs about the 
brands.  
Previous research has been carried out which uses logos as “brands” to examine the 
success of novel brands when they first appear in a highly saturated advertising market. 
Reimann, Castaño, Zaichkowsky and Bechara (2012) acknowledged that consumers’ 
responses to new brands on the market are not well understood, and as such their 
neurophysiological work explored novel versus familiar brands to investigate why some 
novel brands become popular with consumers. In this research participants were presented 
with logos for 20 novel brands and 20 self-selected familiar brands, and were asked to rate all 
40 on a scale of -1 “negative”, 0 “neutral”, and 1 “positive”. Reimann et al. (2012) found no 
significant difference in ratings, with both the novel and familiar brands being rated as 
“neutral”, leading them to conclude that differences in affect are more likely to stem from 
incidental affect (such as mood) rather than any differences in internal representation of the 
different types of brand under consideration (integral affect). This led to their conclusion that 
novel brand logos trigger a “lure of reward” (pp. 756) in the same way as familiar brand 
logos.   
In fact, when brands are seen for the first time it could be that simple pairing with well-
liked celebrities has a positive associational influence upon evaluative judgments of the brand 
because there is no other meaningful cue upon which to base the brand judgment. In their 
discussion of the APE model of Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011), Smith et al. (2012) also 
discuss how positive associations could form on the basis of learned propositions stored in 
episodic memory. However, the results presented in Studies 1 to 3 of this thesis suggest that 
because novel brands were shown which had no prior meaning to the participants this could 
not be the case, but rather associations were a result of co-occurrence with the positive 
stimuli. Taken with the results of Reimann et al. (2012), it seems likely that such associations 
were formed in my studies by participants who regarded the stimuli as brands.  
 
11.5 Implications 
Whilst previous research into the effect of celebrity advertising on children’s explicit and 
implicit preferences is limited, the little body of research which has started to address 
advertising understanding in children largely agrees that younger children are more 
vulnerable to advertising because they are not as cognitively developed as older children. In 
an attempt to make younger children more informed of advertising and its manipulative 
effects, media literacy and advertising literacy has been recommended. However, this thesis 
has provided considerable evidence to suggest that this may not be as effective as first 
thought. By looking at both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism, alongside both 
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explicit and implicit preferences, this thesis has shown that the celebrity effect is not 
straightforward.  
Research by Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) suggested that recognition of manipulation 
triggers negative feelings which activates scepticism, affecting our propositional and 
associational processing, and findings which have emerged from this thesis have offered 
support for a dual-processing model of celebrity advertising. The effects of implicit 
associations and affect-based scepticism demonstrated by the findings in this thesis, go some 
way to demonstrating that that an ability to recognise ads, and understand their nature and 
persuasive intent, may not be enough to immunise children against the effects of ads. 
Coupled with literature suggesting that modern advertising techniques such as advergames 
and web advertising are more difficult for children to recognise, and the fact that advertising 
is now more ubiquitous than before, findings presented in this thesis suggest that maybe 
media literacy training would be more effective if it focused on developing scepticism 
towards ads both in terms of its accuracy, but also in terms of developing a healthy dislike of 
ads. As Forehand and Perkins (2005) suggested, implicit effects of celebrity associations with 
brands are difficult to overcome, and this is problematic. 
 An important finding to emerge from Study 6, was that in both the younger children 
(aged eight- to 10-years) and older children (aged 12- to 14-years), very high celebrity liking 
was directly related to an increased likelihood of explicit celebrity brand preference. 
Importantly, this relationship appeared to occur independent of scepticism. This was also a 
finding which arose from the results of the young adults in Study 3 and adds an important 
contribution not only to the fairly limited research which has looked at the celebrity effect in 
children, but also to the developmental literature which suggests that as full cognitive 
development has likely been reached, young adults should be able to resist the celebrity 
effect. This has implications for the way in which advertising may choose to include 
celebrities in their campaigns. Hudders et al. (2017) suggested that whilst children do have 
limited knowledge of advertising and the intent surrounding it (which they called 
‘dispositional literacy’) they also have difficulty applying such knowledge (‘situational 
advertising literacy’). The results presented in this thesis offer some support for this view. 
This could have implications for the way in which the main conclusions of this thesis are 
considered, as it could be argued that these findings are only applicable to advertisements 
where celebrity placement or endorsement feature. However, for the most part this is true – 
for example the use of celebrities in ads is considered to be the easiest tactic for children to 
understand, and consequently this was one of the reasons for examining the developmental 
differences in celebrity advertising.  
 The results reported throughout this thesis have made clear links to celebrity 
advertising, and no assumptions that these results would apply to other advertising situations 
and ads without celebrities have been made. Examination of different advertising techniques 
would be recommended and beneficial to push literature into this area forward. Furthermore, 
closer examination of the cognitive processes underlying children’s responses and how they 
develop would be beneficial. The findings reported in this thesis showed greater coherence 
between scepticism and preferences in older children only, particularly when well-liked 
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celebrities were involved. This suggests that, for younger children, cognitive links are not 
being made between these factors, which ultimately influence judgments, which also holds 
implications for the way in which advertising to younger children occurs.  
Throughout this thesis children and young adults have been exposed to celebrity 
advertising with a range of different celebrities included – some of which were considered to 
be well-liked, some which were known but not necessarily well-liked and, for the adult 
samples in the earlier studies, celebrities selected by each participant as being very well liked. 
For both children and young adults, it was found that having a very high level of liking to the 
celebrity was related to explicit celebrity brand preference directly - seemingly independent 
of scepticism. However, for older children, the more sceptical they were about advertising, 
the less they liked the celebrity brands, which, for the 14-year-olds at least, could explain 
why explicit preference for brands alone was shown. These findings can be said to offer 
further support for the earlier argument that where an ad contains no product information to 
process, reliance on affective attitude becomes important. There were no significant 
correlations to report from the older children with lower celebrity liking, offering support for 
the suggestion that it is only when they have an emotional response to the celebrity that 
scepticism is triggered. This is further supported by the finding that 14-year-olds had an 
explicit celebrity brand preference in the known celebrity group only - presumably when 
there was only a limited affective response. These findings highlight how current ad literacy 
training is likely to be more effective when children are encouraged to reflect on their 
feelings towards advertising campaigns. Whilst current advertising programmes highlight the 
importance of increasing advertising literacy and conceptual understanding of advertising 
intent, the research proposed in this thesis suggests that our affective responses may be more 
important in influencing our preference than our advertising knowledge.  
  
11.6 Future research 
Although the findings of this thesis have provided a considerable contribution to knowledge, 
there is still scope for various directions in which to extend the research, which are outlined 
here. The discussion of suggestions for future research partly stems from the limitations and 
implications that have been outlined here. As discussed in section 1.2, research into the effect 
of advertising on children of varying ages is limited - particularly in relation to implicit 
judgements and the effect increased scepticism may have on providing a protective barrier. 
Results from Study 6 highlighted that it was only the older children, for the well-liked 
celebrity condition, that coherence between accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism, 
brand preferences and brand choice occurred. This led to the suggestion that, for this age 
group, cognitive links are being made between these factors, which ultimately influence 
judgments. These are correlations which are missing from the younger children, which 
supports developmental literature that they’re not making cognitive connections in the same 
way as older children. These findings are important and add to the literature surrounding 
cognitive processes underlying children’s responses and how they develop. Future research 
here is important and is recommended to explore further the cognitive processes which 
underlie children’s responses and how they develop.  
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 Although the implicit responses of young adults were tested in Studies 1 to 3, it has 
been argued in this thesis that, due to the presentation of the brands, young adults may not 
have felt like they were being advertised to. This is likely to have resulted in the explicit 
preference for celebrity paired brands and could also offer an explanation as to why the 
implicit preferences were always in favour of celebrity brands. Whilst it was predicted from 
the work of Forehand and Perkins (2005) that implicit preferences would be in line with the 
celebrity paired brands, research by Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) suggested that, actually, 
implicit preferences could align with explicit preferences. Based on this assumption, it could 
have been that with a more realistic advertising method both explicit and implicit responses 
showed resistance to celebrity brands. However, adults’ implicit responses were not tested in 
later studies, as the focus of the thesis turned to examining the preferences of children, and 
Study 6 focused on using the IAT method with children only. Future research would benefit 
from using a more realistic advertising method with adults whilst also incorporating a 
measure of implicit responses. 
 Whilst this thesis has explored the effect of celebrity advertising, considered by 
Rozendaal, Buijzen et al. (2011) to be the tactic first understood by young children (and thus 
deemed suitable for the age ranges of the children in the studies), there are many advertising 
techniques which remain unexplored yet children (and adults) are increasingly exposed to. 
For example, only a limited amount of research has looked at children’s understanding of 
advergames (e.g. Hudders et al., 2016; Hudders et al., 2017) yet with the increase in 
popularity of smartphones, and the rise of children using iPads, computers and other 
handheld devices, this line of research is important. Future research should particularly look 
to incorporate a measure of implicit testing into these studies as this thesis has provided 
findings to add to only a limited collection of literature.  
 Additionally, one avenue of research may explore the types of advertisements 
typically viewed by children in comparison to adults. Whilst there will undoubtedly be some 
overlap in the advertisements that both children and adults are exposed to, there will also be 
many instances where ad exposure is different. For example, it is likely that personalised 
pop-up ads on the internet are tailored differently, and that due to varied interests (in TV 
viewing, magazine viewing etc.) children and adults are actually exposed to very different 
ads, each with very different intentions. It could be, for example, that adults are typically 
exposed to a larger volume of higher premium ads for products such as holidays and cars, 
that by their very nature require much more conscious reflection than the typical “everyday” 
products. This may explain why, for brands considered to be fairly low range (as presented in 
the studies in this thesis), young adults were more inclined to follow their “gut feelings” in 
favour of the well-liked celebrities. Further analysis of Study 3 showed that young adults 
scoring higher on the accuracy-based scepticism scale had a lower explicit preference for 
celebrity paired brands, indicating that, at least in adults, it is their accuracy-based scepticism 
which counteracts the celebrity effect in their explicit responses. This could be because they 
are more exposed to ads which require a high level of conscious thought. Exploring 
responses to higher-range brands aimed at adults, would offer an insightful contribution to 
the findings discussed throughout this thesis, and could shed some further insight into why 
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14-year-olds and adults could be different in their advertising understanding, as John (1999) 
proposed.  
 Alongside further research into the developmental trends of the effects of alternative 
advertising tactics, future research would also benefit from exploring the effect of scepticism 
on these tactics. Whilst the research reported in this thesis has shown that high celebrity 
liking can override scepticism, celebrity advertising only accounts for a small proportion of 
the adverts that consumers are now exposed to. It has generally been found in the studies 
reported throughout this thesis that a negative “gut feeling” towards advertising and a high 
level of general scepticism can aid both children and adults in defending against the 
manipulative intent of celebrity advertising. Research which examines the effect of 
scepticism on other advertising techniques would fruitfully add to the literature, and it would 
be encouraged that both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism measures are retained. 
 Future research should also look at validating the scale adapted for use with children 
in Studies 5 and 6. The scales from which the author’s own scale was created were designed 
for research in America (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) and the Netherlands (Rozendaal, 
Opree et al., 2016) although the adapted scales retained high reliability when used with 
children in the United Kingdom, even when the scale was adapted to ensure the reading age 
was made appropriate for the younger children in the sample. Whilst there was no evidence 
of the younger children having difficulty with the questions in the scales, and completion rate 
of the scales for the eight-year-olds remained as high as that of the other ages, the scales 
would benefit from further testing and validation. Whilst it was assumed throughout the 
reporting of the findings that the younger children displayed lower levels of scepticism than 
their older counterparts due to reduced cognitive development, it should not be dismissed that 
the lower levels was instead due to lack of understanding. More testing of the scale would 
hopefully allow for the scale to be validated, to provide future research in the area to test both 
accuracy-based and, importantly affect-based (for which a scale is currently lacking) to be 
used in a wider spectrum of research.  
 Whilst it is recommended that future research attempts to validate the scales created 
to test for scepticism in children, it would also be of benefit to test the scales on a sample of 
young adults. Study 6 provided important findings in relation to high celebrity liking, 
scepticism and explicit brand preference to highlight that when a celebrity was particularly 
well-liked, explicit preference for a celebrity paired brand increased - seemingly independent 
of scepticism. Reanalysis of the scale used with young adults in Study 3 also highlighted the 
same finding - high celebrity liking was related to high explicit preference for celebrity 
brands. However, the explicit preferences of the young adults (Study 3) and those of the older 
children (Study 6) were different, and young adults showed a preference for celebrity brands, 
whilst older children still showed some resistance and instead had an explicit preference for 
brands presented alone. Although the young adults in Study 3 completed a scale of 
scepticism, this was retrospectively divided into accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism 
and each scale only consisted of three items, whereas the older children were presented with 
scales of six items (accuracy-based) and five items (affect-based). It has been suggested 
throughout this thesis that, for older children, affect-based scepticism may have been 
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important, so re-running the method of Study 6 with young adults, including the full 
scepticism scales, would be beneficial and would allow for more direct comparisons between 
younger adults and older children. An alternative suggestion as to why older children and 
young adults had different explicit preferences was because the presentation method in Study 
3 was considered to be less true to modern advertising, which could have affected young 
adults’ scepticism. Again, running the method of Study 6 with young adults would allow for 
a closer comparison of the results across young children, older children and young adults.  
 The studies in this thesis have focussed solely on the effect of well-liked celebrities in 
comparison to either a non-celebrity, a known celebrity, or no celebrity at all. What these 
studies have not addressed is the potential effect that disliked celebrities may have on brand 
preferences. As highlighted earlier in this discussion, it is possible that some of the celebrities 
in the known celebrity condition may actually have been considered disliked, which could 
have lowered brand evaluations in a way not measured or accounted for in this study. 
Considering the literature of Till and Shimp (1998) which suggests that negative information 
of the celebrity lowers brand evaluations, it would be beneficial to address this in future 
research. The last three studies reported in this thesis used an advertising format which 
replicated a typical advertising scenario, and known celebrities were used to again mimic a 
true to life advertising event where we see celebrities (to whom we may have no particular 
liking) advertising products. This thesis also investigated liked celebrities. However, there are 
many advertising campaigns which are considered to be generally disliked because of the 
associated celebrity/figure, that remain highly popular brands. Investigating the effect of 
disliked celebrities, therefore, would add an interesting strand to this body of research. 
Furthermore, future work might usefully vary the extent to which the celebrity is clearly 
involved in a persuasion attempt in order to investigate whether and how feelings of being 
manipulated influence consumers’ brand judgments and whether strong liking for celebrities 
can override such feelings.  
Lastly, it would be of benefit to develop a less experimental method. Büttner et al. 
(2014) have criticised research into advertising preferences, claiming that testing children 
experimentally may not accurately represent the purchasing intentions at times of 
consumption. Studies which would require children and young adults to engage in some sort 
of purchasing assessment would add a valuable contribution to the advertising literature and 
would better reflect a more true to life advertising scenario. 
 
11.7 Unique contribution to knowledge 
There is a substantial lack of literature which has explored the developmental nature of 
celebrity advertising and the effect it has on children’s implicit and explicit brand judgments. 
In itself, this thesis offers valuable research findings from which future research can extend 
the field. To date, there is no research which has examined how accuracy-based and affect-
based scepticism are related to explicit and implicit attitudes to brands and brand choice, and 
this is the first research to my knowledge to demonstrate that implicit defences against the 
celebrity effect can be maintained where there is a high level of scepticism about advertising. 
Furthermore, this research has shown that both young adults and children can hold different 
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explicit and implicit preferences towards celebrity advertising, suggesting that a dual-process 
model of celebrity advertising is needed. This thesis has proposed new models of celebrity 
advertising which each offer an insightful and unique contribution to the limited literature in 
this field. As has been discussed earlier in the discussion, findings from children and young 
adults suggest that one model alone cannot explain both explicit and implicit processes in 
different age groups. Whilst there has been evidence to suggest that explicit and implicit 
responses may operate independently, findings have also suggested that both explicit and 
implicit responses may interact, and therefore several models of celebrity advertising have 
been developed and discussed, as appropriate. 
 
11.8 Conclusion  
To conclude, this thesis brings together six studies which examined the effect of celebrity 
advertising on children’s and young adults’ explicit and implicit preferences and brand 
choice. Research in this area is particularly limited, especially concerning the testing of 
young children’s implicit preferences. Furthermore, it has examined the effectiveness of two 
differing types of scepticism (accuracy-based and affect-based) through scales adapted 
specifically for this research, to explore whether being sceptical of advertisers’ intent can act 
as a protective buffer of resistance. Following developmental literature and theory, this thesis 
has addressed existing literature to observe whether increasing age (and therefore increasing 
cognitive ability) aids in consumers ability to resist the celebrity effect. Previous literature 
has suggested that advertising literacy children given to young children would be beneficial 
in increasing their understanding of intent, and thus would raise their scepticism levels. The 
studies in this thesis have found that, in terms of the celebrity effect, high liking towards a 
celebrity is directly related to an increase in celebrity brand preference - a relationship which 
emerges seemingly independent of scepticism. This suggests that such interventions would be 
more successful if they incorporated information to encourage a healthy dislike against 
advertising campaigns. However, research should now look at extending into other realms of 
advertising with various alternative tactics.  
 Overall, future research should now aim to expand upon the current work to address a 
number of further research questions, for example, the extent that celebrity disliking has on 
preferences and brand choice, and whether scepticism in this instance can be overridden. 
Additionally, it would also be of benefit to test the effect being asked to reflect on levels of 
affect-based scepticism (our “gut feeling”) towards advertising has on the developmental 
trajectory of advertising understanding, and it would be particularly beneficial to also 
examine young adults’ implicit preferences. Whilst one justification given to explain young 
adults’ lack of resistance to the celebrity effect in the earlier studies was that high liking of 
the celebrity operated independently of scepticism in the sample of young adults, an 
additional explanation offered in discussion of the older children’s ability to resist the 
celebrity effect was because their “gut feeling” was brought into line with their conceptual 
understanding of advertising intent. Whilst children completed a standalone scale to assess 
affect-based scepticism, which could have brought their feelings into conscious reflection, for 
the young adults it could be argued that their affect-based scepticism overrode propositional 
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processes which counteracted their scepticism. Exploring the effect of scepticism scales 
which test affective responses would be beneficial. Lastly, a longitudinal study to test the 
long term effects of celebrity advertising would be beneficial. Whilst Study 6 was a three-
week study, and brand preference was not shown to be maintained during this time, exploring 
the effect of repeated exposure over a longer time period would be beneficial and would add 
a valuable contribution to the literature. Testing children’s and young adults’ actual 
purchasing behaviour would also satisfy critics who identify that what consumers say they 
would do, and how they actually act, may be different. 
 In sum, this research has demonstrated that the celebrity effect is not straightforward 
– children and young adults respond differently to brands paired with celebrities they have 
high liking for compared with those that are simply known. Furthermore, evidence of a dual-
process approach emerged and, consequently, new models of celebrity advertising were 
created. Throughout the findings presented in this thesis, the effect of scepticism differed, 
highlighting that it is important to consider both accuracy-based and affect-based scepticism 
and the effect it has on brand preferences and brand choice. This has been captured in the 
new models created. Importantly, in relation to celebrity liking, a particular high liking for a 
celebrity was related to celebrity brand preference - seemingly independent of scepticism. 
This finding alone holds many implications for the way in which advertising literacy is 
approached, and the way in which advertisers may choose to market their products.   
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13 Appendices 
3.1 Study 1 – Novel brand logos used 
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3.2 Study 1 – Stimuli presented on screen 
*please note, images have been edited solely to ensure compliance with copyright legislation. The 
full, final, examined and awarded version of the thesis is available for consultation in hard copy 
via the University Library. 
 
Stage 1 - Initial explicit brand/celebrity/non-celebrity evaluation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How much do you like this person? 
Dislike Like 
 
Celebrity / Non-
celebrity face 
 
Celebrity / Non-
celebrity face 
Do you recognise this person? 
YES NO 
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Stage 1 - Initial explicit brand/celebrity/non-celebrity evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
 
Do you recognise this brand? 
YES NO 
How much do you like this brand? 
Dislike Like 
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Stage 2 - Presentation of selected brands paired with celebrity/non-celebrity images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dislike Like 
How much do you like this brand? 
 
Celebrity / Non-
celebrity face 
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3.3  Study 1 – Ethical approval letters 
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3.4  Studies 1 & 2 – Recruitment information for the Research Participation System 
 
Dear all, 
I am a PhD student in the School of Psychology, and I would like to tell you a bit about my 
interests, and a study which I am currently looking for participants. As undergraduate 
students in the school, I would like to give you the opportunity to participate in my study, in 
exchange for 30 minutes Research Participation Time (RPT) towards your course.  
In my research I want to get a better understanding of how individuals respond to advertising 
and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area suggests that 
by the age of 12 years most children are able to understand that the aim of ads is to persuade 
us to buy something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed enough to 
provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. However, this is based on the 
assumption that ads aim to influence our conscious judgments, whereas many aspects of 
advertising are actually aimed at influencing how we feel about products. By associating 
products with things that we like or people that we admire, advertisers hope that positive 
affective responses to the paired item will transfer onto our response to the brand – a process 
called ‘affect infusion’. Because our affective responses can occur below the level of 
conscious awareness, they may not be under conscious control. I am interested in whether we 
can detect evidence of affect infusion in responses to brands and the extent to which adults 
are able to guard against its influence in their conscious brand judgments. The proposed 
study looks at whether pairing a celebrity with a brand influences subsequent brand 
responses. 
If you would like to participate in this study then please log in to the on-line RPT system and 
choose a time slot suitable for yourself. This study will last for no longer than 30 minutes, 
and 30 minutes of RPT will be credited towards your course, after completion of the study. 
You will be required to read an information sheet before commencing with the study, and 
you will have the opportunity to ask any questions you may have. If you are then happy to 
participate, I will ask that you sign a consent form. A letter of debrief will be given after the 
study has been completed. If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, or would like 
more information, you can email me at h.gilman@keele.ac.uk   
 
Many thanks 
Hayley Gilman 
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3.5  Study 1 – Parental opt-out letter 
                                                                                                                                                  
Dear Parent / Guardian,  
 
My name is Hayley Gilman and I am a part-time PhD student in the School of Psychology at 
Keele University. I am writing to tell you about research that we are carrying out in schools 
across Staffordshire and Shropshire. Details of the research are given below. If, after 
reading this information, you decide that you do NOT wish your child to take part in 
the research then please complete the reply slip and return it to the school by (DATE). 
If you do not complete the reply slip I will assume that you are willing for your child to 
participate in the research. If you do not complete the reply slip but subsequently decide you 
do not wish your child to take part in the study please contact Hayley Gilman by email (see 
below) or contact (headteacher details). If your child has already taken part in the study it 
will not be possible to withdraw the data s/he provides as there will be no way of identifying 
the responses of any individual child from the information provided. 
 
In our research we want to get a better understanding of how children respond to advertising 
and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area suggests that 
by the age of 12 years most children understand that the aim of ads is to persuade us to buy 
something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed enough to provide them 
with protection from any unwanted influence. However, this is based on the assumption that 
ads aim to influence our conscious judgments, whereas many aspects of advertising are 
actually aimed at influencing how we feel about products. By associating products with 
things that we like or people that we admire, advertisers hope that positive affective 
responses to the paired item will transfer onto our response to the brand – a process called 
‘affect infusion’. Because our affective responses can occur below the level of conscious 
awareness, they may not be under conscious control. We are interested in whether we can 
detect evidence of affect infusion in children’s responses to brands and the extent to which 
children between the ages of 8 and 15 years are able to guard against its influence in their 
conscious brand judgments. The proposed study looks at whether pairing a celebrity with a 
brand influences children’s subsequent brand responses. 
 
All of the tasks will be presented on computer. There are five stages. At Stage 1 children will 
be presented with head and shoulder photographs of celebrities, non-celebrities, real brand 
logos and fake brand logos (that we have created). They will simply be asked to rate how 
much they like the person or brand. At Stage 2 we will assess children’s awareness of 
celebrity endorsement as an advertising technique using a small number of questions used in 
previous research. At Stage 3 the computer will automatically select eight fake brands that 
were rated neutrally and randomly pair them with four celebrities who were liked a lot and 
four non-celebrities who were rated neutrally. The pairs of photographs will be presented 
together on screen and children will be asked to look at the brand and rate how much they 
like it (Explicit Brand Evaluation). At Stage 4 children will take part in a standard Implicit 
Association Test (IAT). The 4 celebrity brands and 4 non-celebrity brands from Stage 2, plus 
4 positive attribute words (e.g. fun, happy) and 4 negative attribute words (e.g. fear, sad) will 
be presented in sequence. Participants will be required to identify each stimulus (e.g. as a 
celebrity brand, a bad word and so on) as quickly and accurately as possible using two 
computer keys. The IAT will detect if affect infusion has occurred by revealing any 
underlying preference for the celebrity brands. (Implicit Brand Response). Such tests have 
been widely used in research with adults and children as young as 4 years old and in our pilot 
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study children enjoyed taking part in the task. Finally, Stage 5 will require the children to 
select the three brands that they liked the most (in rank order). This study will allow us to 
compare children’s conscious and non-conscious responses to the brands and identify any 
relationship with pre-existing advertising knowledge and final brand choice. This dataset will 
be collected for use in its own stand-alone study, although naturally the data may be used in 
future research studies, to act as a baseline measure. It is expected that this data will provide 
a means of comparing the responses of adults and children, although this will be in future 
studies.  
 
All year 4, year 5 and year 6 children are being asked to take part and I would like to request 
your consent for your child to participate in this research. Taking part in this task should take 
up about 30 minutes per child. Before the start of the tasks it will be made very clear to each 
child what is going to happen and that they do not have to take part if they don’t want to and 
that they can opt out at any time without having to give a reason. The children’s responses 
will be treated in confidence. Anonymous numerical data from the questionnaires will be 
stored securely in an electronic database which will be made available for other researchers 
to use.  
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to Hayley Gilman 
(details below). You can also contact either of Hayley’s supervisors: Martin Rowley on 
m.g.rowley@keele.ac.uk or Sue Sherman on s.m.sherman@keele.ac.uk. If you remain 
unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that 
you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please contact: Nicola 
Leighton, Research Governance Officer, Research & Enterprise Services, Dorothy Hodgkin 
Building, Keele University. ST5 5BG; Tel: 01782 733306. 
 
If you have any queries regarding this research please do not hesitate to contact me: Hayley 
Gilman  Email: h.gilman@keele.ac.uk  
 
Yours faithfully, 
Hayley Gilman 
 
 
REPLY SLIP: 
 
Please return to XXXX 
  
I  DO NOT give permission for (child’s name)  ________________________ to take part. 
 
Child’s year group:________  Child’s Class:_____________ 
 
PRINT NAME:_____________________________    
 
SIGNED:___________________________                         DATE:_________________ 
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3.6  Studies 1 & 2 – Information sheet for young adult participants 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet  
Study Title: Implicit and explicit effects of advertising on adults’ brand judgments. 
Introduction 
This research is being undertaken by Hayley Gilman – a PhD student in the School of 
Psychology. Research into individual’s understanding of advertising has tended to focus upon 
the age at which they develop ‘advertising literacy’ skills (Young, 2003). The ability to 
recognise advertising and understand its persuasive and commercial intent (i.e. realising that 
ads aim to influence people to buy something) has been seen as providing children with 
protection against advertising’s potential adverse effects. Because it has been assumed that 
such skills are based upon the ability to consciously process and reflect upon information 
about advertising, most of the work investigating the development of advertising literacy 
skills has examined children’s explicit knowledge of advertising. Recently, however, 
researchers have begun to question whether the possession of advertising literacy skills, as 
demonstrated in their explicit judgments, actually does make individuals less susceptible to 
the effects of advertising. Heath and Feldwick (2007) have argued that much of advertising 
works by influencing consumers’ emotional responses by encouraging them to acquire 
positive affective associations with brands at a non-conscious, ‘implicit’ level. Implicit 
knowledge is not available to conscious reflection, involves automatic processes, and may 
influence a person’s behaviour without them being aware of it. Hayley’s research is currently 
looking at whether adults show a disassociation across a range of advertising techniques, and 
will investigate how explicit and implicit attitudes influence their final brand judgments.  
 
Aims of the Research 
In our research we want to get a better understanding of how children and adults respond to 
advertising and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area 
suggests that by the age of 12 years most children understand that the aim of ads is to 
persuade us to buy something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed 
enough to provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. However, this is based 
on the assumption that ads aim to influence our conscious judgments, whereas many aspects 
of advertising are actually aimed at influencing how we feel about products. The proposed 
study looks at whether pairing a celebrity with a brand influences subsequent brand 
responses. 
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Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study Implicit and explicit effects 
of advertising on adults’ brand judgments.  This project is being undertaken by Hayley 
Gilman, supervised by Martin Rowley and Sue Sherman. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this 
information carefully and discuss it with the researcher if you wish. Ask if there is anything 
that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We have recruited a group of Psychology undergraduate students to participate in this 
project. As a Psychology student you were eligible to volunteer. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part you 
will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for my 
records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
You will be asked to complete a series of short computer tasks. Firstly you will be shown a 
series of faces and brands, and for each one you will be asked to state how much you “like” 
the person or brand. The programme will randomly pair a previous face with a brand, where 
you will again be asked how much you like the brand. During stage 3 you will be asked to 
complete an Implicit Association Test (IAT) where you will be asked to identify certain 
stimuli as quickly and as accurately as possible. Such tests have been widely used in research 
with adults and children as young as 4 years old and in our pilot study participants enjoyed 
taking part in the task. Finally you will be asked to select the three brands that you liked the 
most (in rank order). 
 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
By participating in this study you will receive 30 minutes of Research Participation Time 
(RPT) towards your course credit.  
 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no known risks of taking part in this study. 
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How will information about me be used? 
The computer programme will record all responses given, and will be used in my PhD thesis. 
It is also possible that that I will use the data collected in a research article to be submitted for 
publication in a journal. Anonymous numerical data from the questionnaires will be stored 
securely in an electronic database which will be made available for other researchers to use. 
This dataset will be collected for use in its own stand-alone study, although naturally the data 
may be used in future research studies, to act as a baseline measure. It is expected that this 
data will provide a means of comparing the responses of adults and children, although this 
will be in future studies.  
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Only my two supervisors and I will have access to the data. Anonymity can be assured – all 
names will only be used on the consent forms, which will be locked in a secure filing cabinet, 
so that you cannot be identified in any way. Each participant will be given a participant 
number at the beginning of the study, so that you are able to withdraw your participation at 
any time. The computer programme will only have access to participant numbers, and no 
names will be inputted into the software. Only I will have access to the list of names 
corresponding to participant numbers. All of your responses will be treated as confidential, 
i.e. they will not be shared by the researchers with anyone outside of the group. We may use 
the collective dataset for publication purposes, but no individual data will be shared.  
I do however have to work within the confines of current legislation over such matters as 
privacy and confidentiality, data protection and human rights and so offers of confidentiality 
may sometimes be overridden by law. For example in circumstances whereby I am made 
aware of future criminal activity, abuse either to yourself or another (i.e. child or sexual 
abuse) or suicidal tendencies I must pass this information to the relevant authorities. 
 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
The research is being funded by the Research Institute of Social Sciences at Keele 
University. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher 
who will do their best to answer your questions.  You should contact Hayley Gilman on 
h.gilman@keele.ac.uk.  Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may 
contact either of the PhD supervisors: Martin Rowley on m.g.rowley@keele.ac.uk or Sue 
Sherman on s.m.sherman@keele.ac.uk  
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect 
of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please 
write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding research at 
the following address:- 
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Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
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3.7  Studies 1, 2, 3 & 4 – Young adult consent form 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project:  Implicit and explicit effects of advertising on adults’ brand judgments. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator:  
        
Hayley Gilman 
School of Psychology 
Keele University 
Staffordshire 
ST5 5BG 
 
h.gilman@keele.ac.uk 
 
         Please tick box if you agree 
          with the statement 
 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have 
had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
□ 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time. 
□ 
3 I agree to take part in this study. 
□ 
4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be anonymised before it is 
submitted for publication. 
 
□ 
6 I agree to allow the dataset collected to be used for future research projects 
□ 
7 I agree to be contacted about possible participation in future research projects. 
□ 
 
______________________ 
Name of participant 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
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3.8  Studies 1, 2 & 3 – Young adult debrief form 
 
The effects of advertising on adults’ implicit and explicit responses to brands. 
Research into the understanding of advertising has tended to focus upon the age at which 
children develop ‘advertising literacy’ skills (Young, 2003). The ability to recognise 
advertising and understand its persuasive and commercial intent (i.e. realising that ads aim to 
influence people to buy something) has been seen as providing children with protection 
against advertising’s potential adverse effects. Because it has been assumed that such skills 
are based upon the ability to consciously process and reflect upon information about 
advertising, most of the work investigating the development of advertising literacy skills has 
examined an individual’s explicit knowledge of advertising. Explicit knowledge is 
knowledge that is available to conscious reflection and therefore involves slow, effortful 
cognitive processes. Because it is possible, at least potentially, to articulate explicit 
knowledge researchers have typically used techniques such as self-report or rating scales to 
examine its development. There is still some dispute about exactly when children’s 
advertising literacy skills emerge but recent work has suggested that children begin to 
demonstrate explicit understanding of the selling intent of advertising (around 8-9 years of 
age) before understanding its persuasive nature (10-12 years), and that understanding may 
emerge earlier for some advertising techniques than for others (Rozendaal, Buijzen & 
Valkenburg, 2010; 2011). Due to the ambiguity of the age at which children develop 
‘advertising literacy’ it is important for us to know how much ‘literate’ adults are when it 
comes to advertising. 
Recently, however, researchers have begun to question whether the possession of advertising 
literacy skills, as demonstrated in their explicit judgments, actually does make individuals 
less susceptible to the effects of advertising. Heath and Feldwick (2007) have argued that 
much of advertising works by influencing consumers’ emotional responses by encouraging 
them to acquire positive affective associations with brands at a non-conscious, ‘implicit’ 
level. Implicit knowledge is not available to conscious reflection, involves automatic 
processes, and may influence a person’s behaviour without them being aware of it. Nairn and 
Fine (2008) identify a number of ‘stealth marketing’ techniques which may operate in this 
manner (e.g. celebrity endorsement, product placement) and claim that both children and 
adults may find it difficult to guard against their implicit effects. In line with this, Forehand 
and Perkins (2005) found that undergraduates who identified the celebrity in an advertising 
voiceover were alerted to the advertiser’s intention to influence their attitude to the brand. 
Consequently, their positive attitude towards the celebrity did not transfer to their explicit 
brand judgment. Despite this, their implicit affective response to the brand still changed in 
line with the advertiser’s intention (i.e. a positive relationship was seen between celebrity 
attitude and implicit brand response). In this research, I looked at whether adults show a 
similar disassociation across a range of advertising techniques and will investigate how 
explicit and implicit attitudes influence their final brand judgments.  
The proposed study examined whether simply pairing a well-liked celebrity with a brand 
influences adults’ implicit and explicit brand judgments. This simple pairing procedure (with 
no endorsement) was used in order to give the best opportunity to recognise that the celebrity 
is not relevant to brand evaluation.  
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I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for participating in my PhD research. May I 
remind you that you are able to withdraw your data at any time. If you have any questions 
about my research, or would like any further information then please don’t hesitate to contact 
me on h.gilman@keele.ac.uk 
Many thanks once again, 
Hayley 
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3.9  Study 1 – Verbal debrief given to children 
  
Verbal Debrief Script 
Thank you very much for taking the time to help me with my study. The study is looking at 
whether pairing a well-liked celebrity with a brand influenced your brand judgments or 
preferences, as I am interested in looking at whether children are easily influenced by 
television adverts, even if they don’t even know it! The computer tasks you just did will help 
me to see how much children are influenced by adverts, as well as allowing me to see what 
sort of brands children like the most. You have been very helpful by taking part today. 
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4.1  Study 2 – Novel brand logos used 
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4.2  Study 2 – Taglines to accompany novel brands 
 
Aqua - The colour of cool 
Avius - Ask for Avius. 
Boonex - Buy Boonex. The Number One 
Bravura - Modern. Stylish. Classic. BRAVURA! 
Cat and Mouse - Invest in the unlikely 
Costar - Depend on your Costar 
FL - Step into the future with FL 
Frooty - Experience the Frooty sensation 
Get wired - Feel the power 
Hourglass - Timeless quality 
Iguacv - Try a taste of the tropics 
Message in a bottle - The last word in fashion 
Metric - Measure the future 
Wilderness - A taste of the true outdoors 
Willow - Relax in style 
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5.1  Study 3 – Brands used 
*please note, images have been edited solely to ensure compliance with copyright legislation. The 
full, final, examined and awarded version of the thesis is available for consultation in hard copy 
via the University Library. 
 
Brands used: 
Aquafresh 
Lacoste 
Nivea 
Motorola 
Chanel 
Subway 
Puma 
Heinz 
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5.2  Study 3 – Questionnaire used 
 
Advertising Literacy 
 
 1. Please ask the experimenter to input your participant number. This is so we can 
 match your responses to this survey with your responses on the computer tasks. * 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 2. What is your gender? * 
 
   Male 
   Female 
  
 
 3. What is your age? * 
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 4. Please watch the following video. Is this an advertisement? * 
 
   Yes, definitely 
   Yes, I think so 
   No, I don't think so 
   No, definitely not 
  
 
 5. Please watch the following video. Is this an advertisement? * 
 
   Yes, definitely 
   Yes, I think so 
   No, I don't think so 
   No, definitely not 
  
 
 6. Please watch the following video. Is this an advertisement? * 
 
   Yes, definitely 
   Yes, I think so 
   No, I don't think so 
   No, definitely not 
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 7. The following statements describe five possible reasons why celebrities are 
 used in advertisements. Please rank the statements in order of importance (with 1 
 being the most important). * 
 
To make you buy the advertised product     
 
To help people learn about the products     
 
To get people to recall the products     
 
To get people to believe what the ad says    
 
To make people like the product     
 
 
 
 8. Advertisements costs money. Who do you think pays to make ads? * 
 
   
The TV network, magazine, website etc. that carries the ads 
   
The people who created this questionnaire 
   
The companies that make the products in the ads 
   
The people featured in the ads 
   
Other (please specify): 
  
 
 
 
 9. Please look at the following ad. Who do you think is the intended audience of 
 this ad? Please be as precise as possible. * 
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 10. Please look at the following ad. Who do you think is the intended audience of 
 this ad? Please be as precise as possible. * 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 11. Please look at the following ad. Who do you think is the intended audience of 
 this ad? Please be as precise as possible. * 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 12. Are advertisements there to make you want the advertised products? * 
 
   Yes, definitely 
   Yes, I think so 
   No, I don’t think so 
   No, definitely not 
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 13. Are advertisements there to make you feel positively about the advertised 
 product? * 
 
   Yes, definitely  
   Yes, I think so  
   No, I don’t think so  
   No, definitely not 
  
 
 14. Are advertisements there to make you think positively about the advertised 
 product? * 
 
   Yes, definitely  
   Yes, I think so  
   No, I don’t think so  
   No, definitely not  
  
 
 
 15. Advertisements often show happy people together with the advertised product. 
 The following statements describe five possible reasons for this. Please rank the 
 statements in order of importance (with 1 being the most important). * 
 
To help people learn about the products     
 
To get people to recall the products     
 
To get people to believe what the ad says     
 
To make people like the ad     
 
To make people buy the advertised product    
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 16. Advertisements are often funny. The following statements describe five 
 possible reasons for this. Please rank the statements in order of importance (with 
 1 being the most important). * 
 
To help people learn about the products     
 
To get people to recall the products     
 
To get people to believe what the ad says     
 
To make people like the ad     
 
To make people buy the advertised product    
 
  
  
 17. Advertisements are often promise a ‘freebie’ (free product) if the advertised 
 product is purchased. The following statements describe five possible reasons for 
 this. Please rank the statements in order of importance (with 1 being the most 
 important). * 
 
To help people learn about the products     
 
To get people to recall the products     
 
To get people to believe what the ad says     
 
To make people like the ad     
 
To make people buy the advertised product    
 
  
 
 18. How often do you think that what you see in advertisements is like things are 
 in reality? * 
 
   Never  
   Sometimes  
   Often  
   Very often  
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 19. How often do you think advertisements are truthful? * 
 
   Never  
   Sometimes  
   Often  
   Very often  
  
 
 20. How often do you think you can believe advertisements? * 
 
   Never  
   Sometimes  
   Often  
   Very often  
 
 
 
 21. How often do you think advertisements are boring? * 
 
   Never  
   Sometimes  
   Often  
   Very often  
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 22. How often do you think advertisements are stupid? * 
 
   Never  
   Sometimes  
   Often  
   Very often  
  
 
 23. How often do you think advertisements are irritating? * 
 
   Never  
   Sometimes  
   Often  
   Very often  
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5.3  Study 3 – The scoring system used 
 
Q1. Is this an advertisement? (YouTube clip of an ad) 
- Yes, definitely (scores 4) 
- Yes, I think so (scores 3) 
- No, I don’t think so (scores 2) 
- No definitely not (scores 1) 
 
Q2. Is this an advertisement? (YouTube clip of an ad) 
- Yes, definitely (scores 1) 
- Yes, I think so (scores 2) 
- No, I don’t think so (scores 3) 
- No definitely not (scores 4) 
 
Q3. Is this an advertisement? (YouTube clip of an ad) 
- Yes, definitely (scores 4) 
- Yes, I think so (scores 3) 
- No, I don’t think so (scores 2) 
- No definitely not (scores 1) 
 
Q4. Please rank (with one being the most important) the reasons that advertisements use 
celebrities) 
- To make people buy the advertised product (ranked 1 by the advertiser) 
- To help people learn about the products (ranked 4 by advertiser) 
- To get people to recall the products (ranked 2 by advertiser) 
- To get people to believe what the ad says (ranked 3 by advertiser) 
- To make people like the product (ranked 2 by advertiser) 
* As with the following ranking Qs also, we will only be interested in what the participant 
ranks as the most important (what they put as number 1). If this matches the advertisers’ 
FIRST intention then they will score 4 … if it matches their SECOND ranked intention they 
will score 3 – and so on. This matches the original paper. 
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Q5. Advertisements cost money. Who do you think pays to make ads? 
- The TV network, magazine, website that carries the ads (scores 0) 
- The people who created the questionnaire (scores 0) 
- The companies that make the product in the ads (scores 1) 
- The people featured in the ad (scores 0) 
 
Q6. Please take a look at the following ad. Who do you think is the intended audience of this 
ad? 
 
Q7. Please take a look at the following ad. Who do you think is the intended audience of this 
ad? 
 
Q8. Please take a look at the following ad. Who do you think is the intended audience of this 
ad? 
* For each of the above 3 Qs a score of 1 is given for basic answers and a score of 2 given for 
elaborate answers. 
 
Q9. Are advertisements there to make you want the advertised products? 
- Yes, definitely (scores 4) 
- Yes, I think so (scores 3) 
- No, I don’t think so (scores 2) 
- No, definitely not (scores 1) 
 
Q10. Are advertisements there to make you feel positively about the advertised products? 
- Yes, definitely (scores 4) 
- Yes, I think so (scores 3) 
- No, I don’t think so (scores 2) 
- No, definitely not (scores 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
Q11. Are advertisements there to make you think positively about the advertised product? 
- Yes, definitely (scores 4) 
- Yes, I think so (scores 3) 
- No, I don’t think so (scores 2) 
- No, definitely not (scores 1) 
 
Q12. Advertisements often show happy people together with advertised products. Please rank 
(with 1 being the most important) why you think this is. 
- To help people learn about the products (ranked 3) 
- To get people to recall the products (ranked 2) 
- To get people to believe what the ad says (ranked 2) 
- To make people like the ad (ranked 1) 
- To make people buy the advertised product (ranked 1) 
 
Q13. Advertisements are often funny. Please rank (with 1 being the most important) why you 
think this is. 
- To help people learn about the products (ranked 4) 
- To get people to recall the products (ranked 2) 
- To get people to believe what the ad says (ranked 4) 
- To make people like the ad (ranked 1) 
- To make people buy the advertised product (ranked 3) 
 
Q14. Advertisements often promote a “freebie” (free product) when purchasing the 
advertised product. Please rank (with 1 being the most important) why you think this is. 
- To help people learn about the products (ranked 3) 
- To get people to recall the products (ranked 2) 
- To get people to believe what the ad says (ranked 3) 
- To make people like the ad (ranked 2) 
- To make people buy the advertised product (ranked 1) 
 
* In line with the Rozendaal, Opree and Buijzen’s (2014) paper, a mean score will be 
computed for Q12-14 for each participant. 
** As with the previous ranking question we will only be interested in what the participant 
ranks as the most important (what they put as number 1). If this matches the advertisers’ 
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FIRST intention then they will score 4 … if it matches their SECOND ranked intention they 
will score 3 – and so on. This matches the original paper. 
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5.4  Study 3 – Ethical approval letter 
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5.5  Study 3 – Recruitment information for the Research Participation System 
 
 
Letter of Invitation 
 
Dear all, 
 
I am a PhD student in the School of Psychology, and I would like to tell you a bit about my 
interests, and a study which I am currently looking for participants. As undergraduate 
students in the school, I would like to give you the opportunity to participate in my study, in 
exchange for 30 minutes Research Participation Time (RPT) towards your course.  
In my research I want to get a better understanding of how individuals respond to advertising 
and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area suggests that 
by the age of 12 years most children are able to understand that the aim of ads is to persuade 
us to buy something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed enough to 
provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. However, this is based on the 
assumption that ads aim to influence our conscious judgments, whereas many aspects of 
advertising are actually aimed at influencing how we feel about products. By associating 
products with things that we like or people that we admire, advertisers hope that positive 
affective responses to the paired item will transfer onto our response to the brand – a process 
called ‘affect infusion’. Because our affective responses can occur below the level of 
conscious awareness, they may not be under conscious control. I am interested in whether we 
can detect evidence of affect infusion in responses to brands and the extent to which adults 
are able to guard against its influence in their conscious brand judgments. The proposed 
study looks at whether pairing a celebrity with a brand influences subsequent brand 
responses. 
If you would like to participate in this study then please log in to the on-line RPT system and 
choose a time slot suitable for yourself. This study will last for no longer than 30 minutes, 
and 30 minutes of RPT will be credited towards your course, after completion of the study. 
You will be required to read an information sheet before commencing with the study, and 
you will have the opportunity to ask any questions you may have. If you are then happy to 
participate, I will ask that you sign a consent form. A letter of debrief will be given after the 
study has been completed. If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, or would like 
more information, you can email me at h.gilman@keele.ac.uk   
 
Many thanks 
 
Hayley Gilman 
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5.6  Study 3 – Information sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet  
Study Title: Implicit and explicit effects of advertising on adults’ brand judgments. 
 
Introduction 
This research is being undertaken by Hayley Gilman – a PhD student in the School of 
Psychology. Research into individual’s understanding of advertising has tended to focus upon 
the age at which they develop ‘advertising literacy’ skills (Young, 2003). The ability to 
recognise advertising and understand its persuasive and commercial intent (i.e. realising that 
ads aim to influence people to buy something) has been seen as providing children with 
protection against advertising’s potential adverse effects. Because it has been assumed that 
such skills are based upon the ability to consciously process and reflect upon information 
about advertising, most of the work investigating the development of advertising literacy 
skills has examined children’s explicit knowledge of advertising. Recently, however, 
researchers have begun to question whether the possession of advertising literacy skills, as 
demonstrated in their explicit judgments, actually does make individuals less susceptible to 
the effects of advertising. Heath and Feldwick (2007) have argued that much of advertising 
works by influencing consumers’ emotional responses by encouraging them to acquire 
positive affective associations with brands at a non-conscious, ‘implicit’ level. Implicit 
knowledge is not available to conscious reflection, involves automatic processes, and may 
influence a person’s behaviour without them being aware of it. Hayley’s research is currently 
looking at whether adults show a disassociation across a range of advertising techniques, and 
will investigate how explicit and implicit attitudes influence their final brand judgments.  
 
Aims of the Research 
In our research we want to get a better understanding of how children and adults respond to 
advertising and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area 
suggests that by the age of 12 years most children understand that the aim of ads is to 
persuade us to buy something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed 
enough to provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. However, this is based 
on the assumption that ads aim to influence our conscious judgments, whereas many aspects 
of advertising are actually aimed at influencing how we feel about products. The proposed 
study looks at whether pairing a celebrity with a brand influences subsequent brand 
responses. 
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Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study Implicit and explicit effects 
of advertising on adults’ brand judgments.  This project is being undertaken by Hayley 
Gilman, supervised by Martin Rowley and Sue Sherman. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this 
information carefully and discuss it with the researcher if you wish. Ask if there is anything 
that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We have recruited a group of Psychology undergraduate students to participate in this 
project. As a Psychology student you were eligible to volunteer. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part you 
will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for my 
records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
Firstly you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire before completing a series of short 
computer tasks. During the computer tasks you will be shown a series of faces and brands, 
and for each one you will be asked to state how much you “like” the person or brand. The 
programme will randomly pair a previous face with a brand, where you will again be asked 
how much you like the brand. During stage 3 you will be asked to complete an Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) where you will be asked to identify certain stimuli as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. Such tests have been widely used in research with adults and children 
as young as 4 years old and in our pilot study participants enjoyed taking part in the task. 
Finally you will be asked to select the three brands that you liked the most (in rank order). 
 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
By participating in this study you will receive 30 minutes of Research Participation Time 
(RPT) towards your course credit.  
 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no known risks of taking part in this study. 
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How will information about me be used? 
The computer programme will record all responses given, and will be used in my PhD thesis. 
It is also possible that that I will use the data collected in a research article to be submitted for 
publication in a journal. Anonymous numerical data from the questionnaires will be stored 
securely in an electronic database which will be made available for other researchers to use. 
This dataset will be collected for use in its own stand-alone study, although naturally the data 
may be used in future research studies, to act as a baseline measure. It is expected that this 
data will provide a means of comparing the responses of adults and children, although this 
will be in future studies.  
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Only my two supervisors and I will have access to the data. Anonymity can be assured – all 
names will only be used on the consent forms, which will be locked in a secure filing cabinet, 
so that you cannot be identified in any way. Each participant will be given a participant 
number at the beginning of the study, so that you are able to withdraw your participation at 
any time. The computer programme will only have access to participant numbers, and no 
names will be inputted into the software. Only I will have access to the list of names 
corresponding to participant numbers. All of your responses will be treated as confidential, 
i.e. they will not be shared by the researchers with anyone outside of the group. We may use 
the collective dataset for publication purposes, but no individual data will be shared.  
 
I do however have to work within the confines of current legislation over such matters as 
privacy and confidentiality, data protection and human rights and so offers of confidentiality 
may sometimes be overridden by law. For example in circumstances whereby I am made 
aware of future criminal activity, abuse either to yourself or another (i.e. child or sexual 
abuse) or suicidal tendencies I must pass this information to the relevant authorities. 
 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
The research is being funded by the Research Institute of Social Sciences at Keele 
University. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher 
who will do their best to answer your questions.  You should contact Hayley Gilman on 
h.gilman@keele.ac.uk.  Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may 
contact either of the PhD supervisors: Martin Rowley on m.g.rowley@keele.ac.uk or Sue 
Sherman on s.m.sherman@keele.ac.uk  
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If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect 
of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please 
write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding research at 
the following address:- 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
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6.1  Study 4 & 5 – Scepticism scale 
 
 
Please circle one answer to identify how much you agree with each statement. 
  
1. Most adverts tell the truth  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
2. Adverts aim to tell people about a brand or product  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
3. Adverts give accurate information  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
4. Adverts are usually truthful  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
5. I can rely on the information given in adverts  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
6. Adverts give a true picture of the product  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
7. After viewing most adverts I feel I’ve been given the correct information  
 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
8. Most adverts tell people what they need to know about a brand or product  
 
Strongly agree  Agree   Disagree  Strongly disagree 
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6.2  Study 4 &5 – Stimuli used 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
*please note, images have been edited solely to ensure compliance with copyright legislation. The 
full, final, examined and awarded version of the thesis is available for consultation in hard copy 
via the University Library. 
 
You will now see a series of pictures of brands. Please circle one number to identify how 
much you like each brand. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - images of Declan Donnelly and Lacoste (logo) can be seen here in appendix of 
printed thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - image of Nivea (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - images of Cheryl Cole and Mastercard (logo) can be seen here in appendix of 
printed thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - image of Chanel (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as 
pictorial example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - images of Harry Styles and Puma (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed 
thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - image of Motorola (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as 
pictorial example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - images of Taylor Swift and Subway (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed 
thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - image of Aquafresh (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as 
pictorial example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - images of Rupert Grint and Heinz (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed 
thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
 
* For information - image Adobe (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
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*please note, images have been edited solely to ensure compliance with copyright legislation. The 
full, final, examined and awarded version of the thesis is available for consultation in hard copy 
via the University Library. 
 
Brand Advertisement Ranking 
 
Please have a look at the advertised brands. 
 
(Brand logos presented here: Nivea, Mastercard, Subway, Puma, Chanel, Aquafresh, Heinz, 
Adobe, Lacoste, Motorola) 
 
 
Which of these shown above is your favourite brand? 
For what reason did you make your first choice? 
 
 
 
Which of these shown above is your second favourite brand?  
For what reason did you make your second choice? 
 
 
 
Which of these shown above is your third favourite brand?  
For what reason did you make your third choice? 
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6.3  Study 4 – Ethical approval letter 
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6.4  Study 4 – Recruitment information for the Research Participation System 
 
Dear all, 
I am a PhD student in the School of Psychology, and I would like to tell you a bit about my 
interests, and a study which I am currently looking for participants. As undergraduate 
students in the school, I would like to give you the opportunity to participate in my study, in 
exchange for 30 minutes Research Participation Time (RPT) towards your course.  
In my research I want to get a better understanding of how individuals respond to advertising 
and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area suggests that 
by the age of 12 years most children are able to understand that the aim of ads is to persuade 
us to buy something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed enough to 
provide them with protection from any unwanted influence.  
If you would like to participate in this study then please log in to the on-line RPT system and 
choose a time slot suitable for yourself. This study will last for no longer than 30 minutes, 
and 30 minutes of RPT will be credited towards your course, after completion of the study. 
You will be required to read an information sheet before commencing with the study, and 
you will have the opportunity to ask any questions you may have. If you are then happy to 
participate, I will ask that you sign a consent form. A letter of debrief will be given after the 
study has been completed. If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, or would like 
more information, you can email me at h.gilman@keele.ac.uk   
 
Many thanks 
Hayley Gilman 
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6.5  Study 4 – Information sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet  
Study Title: The effects of advertising on adults’ explicit brand judgments. 
 
Introduction 
This research is being undertaken by Hayley Gilman – a PhD student in the School of 
Psychology. Research into individual’s understanding of advertising has tended to focus upon 
the age at which they develop ‘advertising literacy’ skills (Young, 2003). The ability to 
recognise advertising and understand its persuasive and commercial intent (i.e. realising that 
ads aim to influence people to buy something) has been seen as providing children with 
protection against advertising’s potential adverse effects. Because it has been assumed that 
such skills are based upon the ability to consciously process and reflect upon information 
about advertising, most of the work investigating the development of advertising literacy 
skills has examined children’s explicit knowledge of advertising. Recently, however, 
researchers have begun to question whether the possession of advertising literacy skills, as 
demonstrated in their explicit judgments, actually does make individuals less susceptible to 
the effects of advertising. Heath and Feldwick (2007) have argued that much of advertising 
works by influencing consumers’ emotional responses by encouraging them to acquire 
positive affective associations with brands at a non-conscious, ‘implicit’ level. Implicit 
knowledge is not available to conscious reflection, involves automatic processes, and may 
influence a person’s behaviour without them being aware of it. Hayley’s research is currently 
looking at whether adults show a disassociation across a range of advertising techniques, and 
will investigate how explicit attitudes influence their final brand judgments.  
 
Aims of the Research 
In our research we want to get a better understanding of how children and adults respond to 
advertising and how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area 
suggests that by the age of 12 years most children understand that the aim of ads is to 
persuade us to buy something and that by this age their thinking skills have developed 
enough to provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. However, this is based 
on the assumption that ads aim to influence our conscious judgments, whereas many aspects 
of advertising are actually aimed at influencing how we feel about products. The proposed 
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study looks at whether pairing a celebrity with a brand influences subsequent brand 
responses. 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study The effects of advertising 
on adults’ explicit brand judgments.  This project is being undertaken by Hayley Gilman, 
supervised by Martin Rowley and Sue Sherman. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this 
information carefully and discuss it with the researcher if you wish. Ask if there is anything 
that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We have recruited a group of Psychology undergraduate students to participate in this 
project. As a Psychology student you were eligible to volunteer. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part you 
will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for my 
records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
Firstly you will be presented with a series of brand images and for each one you will be asked 
how much you like the brand. You will then be asked to complete a short online 
questionnaire before being shown a PowerPoint presentation of brands. Finally you will be 
asked to select the three brands that you liked the most (in rank order). 
 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
By participating in this study you will receive 30 minutes of Research Participation Time 
(RPT) towards your course credit.  
 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no known risks of taking part in this study. 
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How will information about me be used? 
The computer programme will record all responses given, and will be used in my PhD thesis. 
It is also possible that that I will use the data collected in a research article to be submitted for 
publication in a journal. Anonymous numerical data from the questionnaires will be stored 
securely in an electronic database which will be made available for other researchers to use. 
This dataset will be collected for use in its own stand-alone study, although naturally the data 
may be used in future research studies, to act as a baseline measure. It is expected that this 
data will provide a means of comparing the responses of adults and children, although this 
will be in future studies.  
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Only my two supervisors and I will have access to the data. Anonymity can be assured – all 
names will only be used on the consent forms, which will be locked in a secure filing cabinet, 
so that you cannot be identified in any way. Each participant will be given a participant 
number at the beginning of the study, so that you are able to withdraw your participation at 
any time. The computer programme will only have access to participant numbers, and no 
names will be inputted into the software. Only I will have access to the list of names 
corresponding to participant numbers. All of your responses will be treated as confidential, 
i.e. they will not be shared by the researchers with anyone outside of the group. We may use 
the collective dataset for publication purposes, but no individual data will be shared.  
I do however have to work within the confines of current legislation over such matters as 
privacy and confidentiality, data protection and human rights and so offers of confidentiality 
may sometimes be overridden by law. For example in circumstances whereby I am made 
aware of future criminal activity, abuse either to yourself or another (i.e. child or sexual 
abuse) or suicidal tendencies I must pass this information to the relevant authorities. 
 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
The research is being funded by the Research Institute of Social Sciences at Keele 
University. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher 
who will do their best to answer your questions.  You should contact Hayley Gilman on 
h.gilman@keele.ac.uk.  Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may 
contact either of the PhD supervisors: Martin Rowley on m.g.rowley@keele.ac.uk or Sue 
Sherman on s.m.sherman@keele.ac.uk  
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect 
of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please 
write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding research at 
the following address:- 
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Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
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6.6  Study 4 – Debrief form  
 
The effects of advertising on adults’ explicit responses to brands. 
 
Research into the understanding of advertising has tended to focus upon the age at which 
children develop ‘advertising literacy’ skills (Young, 2003). The ability to recognise 
advertising and understand its persuasive and commercial intent (i.e. realising that ads aim to 
influence people to buy something) has been seen as providing children with protection 
against advertising’s potential adverse effects. Because it has been assumed that such skills 
are based upon the ability to consciously process and reflect upon information about 
advertising, most of the work investigating the development of advertising literacy skills has 
examined an individual’s explicit knowledge of advertising. Explicit knowledge is 
knowledge that is available to conscious reflection and therefore involves slow, effortful 
cognitive processes. Because it is possible, at least potentially, to articulate explicit 
knowledge researchers have typically used techniques such as self-report or rating scales to 
examine its development. There is still some dispute about exactly when children’s 
advertising literacy skills emerge but recent work has suggested that children begin to 
demonstrate explicit understanding of the selling intent of advertising (around 8-9 years of 
age) before understanding its persuasive nature (10-12 years), and that understanding may 
emerge earlier for some advertising techniques than for others (Rozendaal, Buijzen & 
Valkenburg, 2010; 2011). Due to the ambiguity of the age at which children develop 
‘advertising literacy’ it is important for us to know how much ‘literate’ adults are when it 
comes to advertising. 
Recently, however, researchers have begun to question whether the possession of advertising 
literacy skills, as demonstrated in their explicit judgments, actually does make individuals 
less susceptible to the effects of advertising. Heath and Feldwick (2007) have argued that 
much of advertising works by influencing consumers’ emotional responses by encouraging 
them to acquire positive affective associations with brands at a non-conscious, ‘implicit’ 
level. Implicit knowledge is not available to conscious reflection, involves automatic 
processes, and may influence a person’s behaviour without them being aware of it. Nairn and 
Fine (2008) identify a number of ‘stealth marketing’ techniques which may operate in this 
manner (e.g. celebrity endorsement, product placement) and claim that both children and 
adults may find it difficult to guard against their implicit effects. In line with this, Forehand 
and Perkins (2005) found that undergraduates who identified the celebrity in an advertising 
voiceover were alerted to the advertiser’s intention to influence their attitude to the brand. 
Consequently, their positive attitude towards the celebrity did not transfer to their explicit 
brand judgment. Despite this, their implicit affective response to the brand still changed in 
line with the advertiser’s intention (i.e. a positive relationship was seen between celebrity 
attitude and implicit brand response).  
In this research, I looked at whether adults show a similar disassociation across a range of 
advertising techniques and will investigate how explicit attitudes influence their final brand 
judgments. This study examined whether celebrities advertising brands could influence 
explicit brand judgments. 
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I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for participating in my PhD research. May I 
remind you that you are able to withdraw your data at any time. If you have any questions 
about my research, or would like any further information then please don’t hesitate to contact 
me on h.gilman@keele.ac.uk 
 
Many thanks once again, 
Hayley 
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7.1  Study 5 – Ethical approval letter 
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7.2  Study 5 – Letter of invitation sent to local schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear insert name of headteacher, 
My name is Hayley Gilman and I am a part-time PhD student of Dr Martin Rowley in the 
School of Psychology at Keele University. In my research I aim to get a better understanding 
of how children respond to advertising and how advertising influences their brand judgments. 
Past research in this area has suggested that by the age of 12 years most children are able to 
protect themselves from any unwanted influence of ads. This is based upon the assumption 
that by this age children have developed advertising literacy skills which allow them to 
recognize ads and provide them with an understanding that the aim of ads is to influence or 
judgments and persuade us to buy something. Despite these assumptions, however, 
remarkably little research which has tested how children’s knowledge and skepticism about 
ads impacts on their responses to brands and products.   
I would like to request your consent for me to come into your school and talk to children 
about my research and to give them the opportunity to complete an advertising questionnaire. 
If you agree I would talk to all children aged 9- years, 11- years, 13- years and 15- years 
(delete ages as appropriate) about my research and, should they wish to participate, present 
them with a short questionnaire which assesses their skepticism about ads and how they 
respond to brands presented with and without images of popular celebrities. I aim to examine 
whether celebrity influence on brand judgments varies in participants with different levels of 
ad skepticism and in different age groups.  All the materials I aim to present have been used 
before with children as young as 7 years old and have been approved by the Ethics Review 
Panel at Keele University. Whilst there is no ethical requirement for parents to give consent 
for their child to complete my questionnaire, I would like to make parents/guardians aware of 
my presence at your school and the research which is taking place. Therefore if you do give 
me your consent to talk to children at your school about my research, I would like to discuss 
with you how I could inform parents/guardians that this research is taking place, for example 
whether it would be possible for you to notify parents of my research through your website or 
via newsletters that are sent home.  
Firstly participants will be asked to complete a short questionnaire that measures their 
advertising literacy competence. Children will then be presented with a series of brand logos 
either independently or accompanied by a celebrity and for each one they will be asked how 
much they like the brand. This will enable us to gather their brand preference scores. A final 
brand choice task will be given in order to look at the relationship between advertising 
literacy, reported preference for brands and final brand choice. This will require participants 
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to select the three brands (in rank order) that they have the most preference for. I would 
come into the class to explain the questionnaire and administration of the questionnaire 
should take up no more than 20 minutes of class time. If any child chooses not to participate 
in this research then they will be given a piece of paper and asked to design a poster ad to 
advertise a new brand of toothpaste. Alternatively I would be happy for an activity to be 
given by the relevant class teachers. If you would be happy for your pupils to take part in my 
questionnaire or if you would like any further information then please don’t hesitate to 
contact me, Hayley Gilman on h.gilman@keele.ac.uk. I would be very happy to give you 
more information on the study and provide you with a copy of the questionnaire for you to 
look through.  
 
Regards 
Hayley Gilman 
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7.3  Study 5 – Letter to parents 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Dear Parent / Guardian,  
My name is Hayley Gilman and I am a part-time PhD student of Dr Martin Rowley in the 
School of Psychology at Keele University. I am writing to tell you about research that I am 
currently conducting. 
In my research I aim to get a better understanding of how children respond to advertising and 
how advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area has suggested 
that by the age of 12 years most children are able to protect themselves from any unwanted 
influence of ads. This is based upon the assumption that by this age children have developed 
advertising literacy skills which allow them to recognize ads and provide them with an 
understanding that the aim of ads is to influence or judgments and persuade us to buy 
something. Despite these assumptions, however, remarkably little research which has tested 
how children’s knowledge and skepticism about ads impacts on their responses to brands and 
products.   
Children aged 9- years, 11- years, 13- years and 15- years are being asked to take part. 
Taking part in this study will involve children being presented with a short questionnaire 
which assesses their skepticism about ads and how they respond to brands presented with and 
without images of popular celebrities. I aim to examine whether celebrity influence on brand 
judgments varies in participants with different levels of ad skepticism and in different age 
groups.  I will be present in the class to explain the questionnaire and administration of the 
questionnaire should take up no more than 20 minutes of class time. If any child chooses not 
to participate in this research then they will be given a piece of paper and asked to design a 
poster ad to advertise a new brand of toothpaste. All the materials presented have been used 
before with children as young as 7 years old and have been approved by the Ethics Review 
Panel at Keele University.  
Before the start of the questionnaire it will be made very clear to each child what is going to 
happen and that they do not have to take part if they don’t want to and that they can opt out at 
any time without having to give a reason. The children’s responses will be treated in 
confidence. Anonymous numerical data from the questionnaires will be stored securely in an 
electronic database which will be made available for other researchers to use. 
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If you have any queries regarding this research please do not hesitate to contact me: Hayley 
Gilman  Email: h.gilman@keele.ac.uk  
 
Yours faithfully, 
Hayley Gilman 
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7.4  Study 5 – Verbal debrief given to children 
 
Verbal debrief 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire. In my research I want to get a better 
understanding of how people respond to advertising and how advertising influences their 
brand judgments. Past research in this area suggests that by the age of 12 years most children 
understand the aim of ads is to persuade us to buy something and by this age their thinking 
skills have developed enough to provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. 
In my research I will be asking people aged between 9 – 15 years to complete this 
questionnaire so that I can get a better understanding of the age at which people fully 
understand advertising and the effect that it may have on us. Thank you again for taking the 
time to complete this questionnaire. 
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9.1  Study 6 – Accuracy-based scepticism scale 
 
 
1. Most adverts tell the truth 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
2. Adverts aim to tell people about a brand or product 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
3. Adverts give accurate information 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
4. I can rely on the information given in adverts  
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
5. After viewing most adverts I feel I’ve been given the correct information 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
6. Most adverts tell people what they need to know about a brand or product 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
9.2  Study 6 – Affect-based scepticism scale 
 
 
  
1. I like adverts 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
2. I think adverts are nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
3. I think adverts are funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
4. I think adverts are boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
5. I think adverts are stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
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9.3  Study 6 – Stimuli used 
   
Week 1 - 
 
Advertising Questionnaire 
Thank you for taking part. In this questionnaire you will be asked some questions about your 
thoughts on advertising.  
If there are any questions that you do not wish to answer then please leave them blank. You 
are asked to give details of your gender and date of birth because I am looking at whether 
there are any differences between males and females, or different age groups. You are also 
asked to give your name so that I can match your answers with answers you give in other 
weeks. 
As a reminder, you are able to withdraw your participation any time within the next couple of 
weeks. If you have any questions then please put up your hand, and if you decide not to 
complete the questionnaire, or that you don’t want me to look at your answers, then please let 
me know before I leave the class today. 
 
 
Name: 
Gender: 
Date of Birth:                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 
 
7. Most adverts tell the truth 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
8. Adverts aim to tell people about a brand or product 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
9. Adverts give accurate information 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
10. I can rely on the information given in adverts  
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
11. After viewing most adverts I feel I’ve been given the correct information 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
12. Most adverts tell people what they need to know about a brand or product 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
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13. I like adverts 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
14. I think adverts are nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
15. I think adverts are funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
16. I think adverts are boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
17. I think adverts are stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
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Celebrity rating 
 
1. How much do you like (Celebrity A)? 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
2. How much do you like (Celebrity B)? 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
3. How much do you like (Celebrity C)? 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
4. How much do you like (Celebrity D)? 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
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Brand rating 
Please identify how much you like each of the following brands: 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9       Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9        Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9        Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9      Very much 
 
Brand logo Nivea presented 
Brand logo Chanel presented 
Brand logo Motorola presented 
Brand logo Subway presented 
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Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9           Very much 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If you are finished, please hand it to the 
researcher. 
 
Brand logo Aquafresh presented 
Brand logo Heinz presented 
Brand logo Lacoste presented 
Brand logo Puma presented 
289 
 
Week 2 –  
 
Advertising Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for completing my questionnaire last week. Today I have some computer based 
tasks for you to complete, if you would like to take part. You will firstly be shown some 
brands and you need to decide how much you like or dislike them. You will then be 
presented with a series of brand images and for each one you will be asked how much you 
like the brand. You will also be asked to select the three brands that you liked the most. 
Finally you will be asked a few more questions about advertising. You will then be asked to 
participate in a computer based task. As a reminder, you are able to withdraw your 
participation at any time within the next week. If you have any questions then please put up 
your hand, and if you decide not to complete the questionnaire, or that you don’t want me to 
look at your answers, then please let me know before I leave the class today. 
If you’re happy to continue then please start filling in the questionnaire. If you do not want to 
fill in the questionnaire then let me know and I’ll take you back to the classroom. 
 
Name: 
Gender: 
Date of Birth:                  
 
 
Participant number (for IAT) -  
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You will see a series of pictures of brands, for each one please look at it and answer the 
questions. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here * For information - images Ant McPartlin 
and Aquafresh (logo) can be seen here in 
appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
 
 
* For information - image Chanel (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
 
 
* For information - images Jade Thirlwall and Lacoste (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed 
thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
 
 
* For information - image Nivea (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
 
* For information - images Ariana Grande and Subway (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed 
thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
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brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
 
 
* For information - image Heinz (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
 
296 
 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                          
 
 
 
* For information - images Declan Donnely and Puma (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed 
thesis (as pictorial example of study setup). 
 
Celebrity face 
was presented 
here 
 
Celebrity face 
presented 
here 
297 
 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
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logo, brand logo, brand logo, 
brand logo, brand logo, brand 
logo, brand logo, brand logo 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
How much do you like the advertised brand? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much 
 
I like this advert 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
I think this advert is stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree                                                         
 
* For information - image Motorola (logo) can be seen here in appendix of printed thesis (as pictorial 
example of study setup). 
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Brand Advertisement Ranking 
 
Please have a look at the advertised brands. 
 
(Brand logos presented here: Nivea, Mastercard, Subway, Puma, Chanel, Aquafresh, Heinz, 
Adobe, Lacoste, Motorola) 
 
 
Which of these shown above is your favourite brand? 
For what reason did you make your first choice? 
 
 
 
Which of these shown above is your second favourite brand?  
For what reason did you make your second choice? 
 
 
 
Which of these shown above is your third favourite brand?  
For what reason did you make your third choice? 
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Week 3 – 
 
Advertising Questionnaire 
Thank you for taking part. In this questionnaire you will be asked some questions about your 
thoughts on advertising.  
If there are any questions that you do not wish to answer then please leave them blank. You 
are asked to give details of your gender and date of birth because I am looking at whether 
there are any differences between males and females, or different age groups. You are also 
asked to give your name so that I can match your answers with answers you give in other 
weeks. 
As a reminder, you are able to withdraw any of your previous participation before I leave 
today. After today your questionnaires will be made anonymous and so your responses will 
not be able to be identified. If you have any questions then please put up your hand, and if 
you decide not to complete the questionnaire, or that you don’t want me to look at your 
answers, then please let me know before I leave the class today. 
 
 
Name: 
Gender: 
Date of Birth:                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 
 
*please note, images have been edited solely to ensure compliance with copyright legislation. The 
full, final, examined and awarded version of the thesis is available for consultation in hard copy 
via the University Library. 
 
Brand rating 
Please identify how much you like each of the following brands: 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
Brand logo Lacoste presented 
Brand logo Puma presented 
Brand logo Subway presented 
Brand logo Aquafresh presented 
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Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9         Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Very much 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brand logo Heinz presented 
Brand logo Motorola presented 
Brand logo Nivea presented 
Brand logo Chanel presented 
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1. Most adverts tell the truth 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
2. Adverts aim to tell people about a brand or product 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
3. Adverts give accurate information 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
4. I can rely on the information given in adverts  
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
5. After viewing most adverts I feel I’ve been given the correct information 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
6. Most adverts tell people what they need to know about a brand or product 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
7. I like adverts 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
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8. I think adverts are nice 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
9. I think adverts are funny 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
10. I think adverts are boring 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
11. I think adverts are stupid 
 
Strongly agree       Agree          Disagree                Strongly disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If you are finished please hand it to the 
researcher. 
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9.4  Study 6 – Ethical approval level 
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9.5  Study 6 – Letter sent to local schools 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Dear insert name of headteacher, 
I am a PhD student in the School of Psychology at Keele University. In my research I aim to 
get a better understanding of how children respond to advertising and how advertising 
influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area has suggested that by the age of 
12 years most children are able to protect themselves from any unwanted influence of ads. 
This is based upon the assumption that by this age children have developed advertising 
literacy skills which allow them to recognize ads and provide them with an understanding 
that the aim of ads is to influence or judgments and persuade us to buy something. Despite 
these assumptions, however, remarkably little research has tested how children’s knowledge 
and scepticism about ads impacts on their responses to brands and products.   
I would like to request your consent for children at your school to participate in my research. 
If you agree, all year XX and year XX children would be given the opportunity to participate 
in a study, over 3 consecutive weeks. In weeks 1 and 3 I would present a short, printed 
questionnaire to the whole class which assesses children’s scepticism towards advertising in 
general. This part of the study would take no longer than 10 minutes of class time, and is 
often completed in a registration or PSHE session. In week 2 children would one-by-one 
participate in a computer based task which would measure the explicit (conscious) and 
implicit (automatic) responses to specific brands paired with celebrities. This part of the task 
takes, on average, 15 minutes per child, and I could arrange to bring a team of researchers 
with me so that multiple testing is possible. I aim to examine whether celebrity influence on 
brand judgments varies in participants with different levels of ad scepticism and in different 
age groups.  All the materials I present have been used before with children as young as 7 
years old and have been approved by the Ethics Review Panel at Keele University. As a way 
of thank you there is a £50 voucher available for participating schools. 
If you would be happy for your pupils to take part in my questionnaire to students or if you 
would like any further information then please don’t hesitate to contact me, Hayley Gilman 
on h.gilman@keele.ac.uk. I would be very happy to give you more information on the study 
and provide you with a copy of the questionnaire for you to look through.  
 
Regards 
Hayley Gilman 
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9.6  Study 6 – Parental opt out letter 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Dear Parent / Guardian,  
My name is Hayley Gilman and I am a part-time PhD student of Dr Martin Rowley in the 
School of Psychology at Keele University. I am writing to tell you about research that we are 
carrying out in schools. Details of the research are given below. If, after reading this 
information, you decide that you do NOT wish your child to take part in the research 
then please complete the reply slip and return it to the school by (insert date). If you do 
not complete the reply slip I will assume that you are willing for your child to participate in the 
research. If you do not complete the reply slip but subsequently decide you do not wish your 
child to take part in the study please contact Hayley Gilman by email (see below) or contact 
(name of headteacher) at (headteachers contact details). After all the tasks have been 
completed the data will be anonymised and therefore it will not be possible to withdraw your 
child. 
Children aged 8- years, 10- years, 12- years and 14-years are being asked to take part and I 
would like to request your consent for your child to participate in this research. Taking part in 
this study will involve children being presented with a short questionnaire distributed in class 
on two separate occasions (taking approximately 10 minutes of class time) and some 
individual computer based tasks (lasting approximately 15 minutes) which assesses their 
scepticism about ads and how they respond to brands presented with and without images of 
popular celebrities. I aim to examine whether celebrity influence on brand judgments varies 
in participants with different levels of ad scepticism and in different age groups.  All the 
materials I aim to present have been used before with children as young as 7 years old and 
have been approved by the Ethics Review Panel at Keele University.  
Before the start of the tasks it will be made very clear to each child what is going to happen 
and that they do not have to take part if they don’t want to and that they can opt out at any time 
without having to give a reason. The children’s responses will be treated in confidence. 
Anonymous numerical data from the questionnaires will be stored securely in an electronic 
database which will be made available for other researchers to use.  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to Hayley Gilman 
(details below). You can also contact either of Hayley’s supervisors: Martin Rowley on 
m.g.rowley@keele.ac.uk or Sue Sherman on s.m.sherman@keele.ac.uk. If you remain 
unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that 
you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please contact: Nicola 
Hayley Gilman 
Keele University 
Keele 
Newcastle-under-Lyme 
ST5 5BG 
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Leighton, Research Governance Officer, Research & Enterprise Services, Dorothy Hodgkin 
Building, Keele University. ST5 5BG; Tel: 01782 733306. 
If you have any queries regarding this research please do not hesitate to contact me: Hayley 
Gilman  Email: h.gilman1@keele.ac.uk  
 
Yours faithfully, 
Hayley Gilman 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   
REPLY SLIP: 
 
Please return to (insert school name) 
  
I  DO NOT give permission for (child’s name)  ________________________ to take part. 
 
Child’s year group:________  Child’s Class:_____________ 
 
PRINT NAME:_____________________________    
 
SIGNED:___________________________                         DATE:_________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
308 
 
9.7  Study 6 – Verbal debrief given to children 
 
Week 1 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire. In my research I want to get a better 
understanding of how people respond to advertising. Next week I will be back to ask you to 
take part in some computer tasks, so I will give you more information about my study then. 
 
Week 2 
Thank you for taking part in these tasks. In my research I want to get a better understanding 
of how people respond to advertising and how advertising influences their brand judgments. 
Past research in this area suggests that by the age of 12 years most children understand the 
aim of ads is to persuade us to buy something and by this age their thinking skills have 
developed enough to provide them with protection from any unwanted influence. In my 
research I will be asking people aged between 9 – 15 years to complete this questionnaire so 
that I can get a better understanding of the age at which people fully understand advertising 
and the effect that it may have on us. Thank you again for taking the time to help me out with 
my research. 
 
Week 3 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in my study over the last few weeks. In my 
research I want to get a better understanding of how people respond to advertising and how 
celebrity advertising influences their brand judgments. Past research in this area suggests that 
by the age of 12 years most children understand the aim of ads is to persuade us to buy 
something and by this age their thinking skills have developed enough to provide them with 
protection from any unwanted influence. In my research I will be asking people aged 
between 9 – 15 years to complete this questionnaire so that I can get a better understanding of 
the age at which people fully understand advertising and the effect that it may have on us. 
Thank you again for taking the time to help me out with my research. 
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11.1 - Summary of thesis hypotheses and findings 
 
Hypotheses Findings 
 T-tests and ANOVAs Correlations and Regressions 
 
Study 1: Young adults 
1. Young adults would have an explicit 
preference for brands paired with non-
celebrities. 
2. In line with Forehand and Perkins (2005) 
young adults could find implicit preferences 
difficult to overcome (show celebrity 
preference).  
3. In line with Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) 
recognition of manipulation transfers to 
implicit preferences (resist celebrity effect). 
 
 
- Young adults had an explicit preference for 
brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
 
- Young adults had an implicit preference for 
brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
 
Study 1: 10-year-olds 
1. Young children would have an explicit 
preference for brands paired with well-liked 
celebrities. 
 
- Young children had an explicit preference 
for brands paired with a well-liked celebrity.  
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Hypotheses Findings 
 T-tests and ANOVAs Correlations and Regressions 
 
2. Young children would have an implicit 
preference for brands paired with well-liked 
celebrities. 
- Young children had an implicit preference 
for brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
 
Study 2: Young adults 
1. Young adults would have an explicit 
preference for brands paired with non-
celebrities. 
2. In line with the results of Study 1, young 
adults could find implicit preferences difficult 
to overcome (show celebrity preference).  
 
 
 
- Young adults had an explicit preference for 
brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
 
- Young adults had an implicit preference for 
brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
 
Study 3: Young adults 
1. Young adults would have an explicit 
preference for brands paired with non-
celebrities. 
 
 
- Young adults had an explicit preference for 
brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
- Young adults had an implicit preference for 
brands paired with a well-liked celebrity. 
 
 
- Overall attitudinal ad literacy was related to 
both explicit (propositional) and implicit 
(associational) brand preference, yet 
scepticism more specifically is only related to 
explicit, propositional brand preference. 
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Hypotheses Findings 
 T-tests and ANOVAs Correlations and Regressions 
 
2. In line with previous results, young adults 
could find implicit preferences difficult to 
overcome (show celebrity preference).  
3. It was expected that scores would be at 
ceiling for both Conceptual and Attitudinal 
literacy. 
 
 
 
- General attitude to advertising was a little 
lower overall than might have been expected 
from a sample of young adults. 
-  Scepticism (rather than overall attitudinal 
ad literacy) was negatively correlated with 
explicit celebrity brand preference. 
Scepticism was not correlated with implicit 
brand preference. 
- Young adults scoring higher on the 
accuracy-based scepticism scale had a lower 
explicit preference for celebrity paired 
brands. There was no significant correlation 
between implicit preference and accuracy-
based scepticism.  
- There was no significant correlation 
between affect-based scepticism and explicit 
brand alone preferences. Young adults who 
had higher affect-based scepticism had lower 
implicit preference for brands paired with 
celebrities.  
-  Explicit celebrity brand preference and 
implicit celebrity brand preference were 
significant positive predictors of brand 
choice. 
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Hypotheses Findings 
 T-tests and ANOVAs Correlations and Regressions 
 
 
Study 4: Young adults 
1. Young adults would show an explicit 
preference to brands presented alone. 
2. High levels of scepticism to advertising 
would be related to lower explicit celebrity 
brand preference. 
 
 
- Young adults had an explicit preference for 
brands presented alone. 
 
- Young adults who scored higher on the 
scepticism scale before and after brand 
presentation had lower explicit preferences 
for brands presented with celebrities. There 
was no significant correlation between 
scepticism scores and brand preference scores 
when brands were presented alone. 
-  Explicit celebrity brand preference was a 
positive predictor of brand choice. Explicit 
brand alone preference was a negative 
predictor of celebrity brand choice. 
 
 
Study 5: Children aged eight- to 14-years 
1. Older children (aged 12- to 14-years) 
would match the explicit responses of the 
young adults of Study 4 and show explicit 
 
 
- Overall explicit preference (total sample) for 
brands presented alone. 
 
 
Overall sample (all children):  
- A negative correlation between preference 
for explicit celebrity brands and scepticism. 
No significant correlations between 
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Hypotheses Findings 
 T-tests and ANOVAs Correlations and Regressions 
 
preference for brands presented alone 
(celebrity resistance). 
2. Younger children (aged eight- to 10-years) 
would be less sceptical of advertising than the 
older age groups which could lead eight-year-
olds to prefer celebrity brands more than 
older children. 
 
 
 
- Preference for brands decreased with age. 
- Explicit brand preference was lower in the 
two older age groups (12- to 14-years) 
compared to the younger age groups (eight- 
to 10-years) suggesting that older children 
may be less susceptible to advertising. 
- Eight-year-olds were less sceptical than the 
other age groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
scepticism and explicit brand alone 
preference. 
 
12- to 14-year-olds:  
- A positive relationship between explicit 
brand alone preference and explicit celebrity 
brand preference.  
- A negative relationships between explicit 
celebrity brand preference and both 
scepticism before and scepticism after testing 
for the older children. 
 
Eight- to 10-year-olds:  
The above finding in the older children did 
not emerge in the younger children. This 
supports the fact that maybe eight- to 10-
year-olds have scepticism but are unable to 
use it. 
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- In both the older and younger children 
sample explicit brand alone preference was a 
negative predictor of brand choice. In 
comparison, explicit celebrity brand 
preference predicted a high brand choice 
score. 
 
 
Study 6: Children aged eight- to 14-years 
1. Older children’s (12- to 14-years) 
resistance to advertising could be overridden 
by liking of well-liked celebrities meaning 
they should show an explicit preference for 
celebrity paired brands in the well-liked 
group. When paired with known rather than 
well-liked celebrities this preference is likely 
to disappear.  
2. With lower cognitive ability younger 
children (aged eight- to 10-years) should 
show an explicit preference for celebrity 
 
 
- Eight-year-olds, 10-year-olds and 12-year-
olds showed no significant difference in 
explicit preference for brands presented alone 
or with well-liked celebrity brands and no 
preference between brand alone and known 
celebrity brands.  
 
 
 
- 14-year-olds in the well-liked celebrity 
group there was a significant explicit 
 
 
Well-liked group, overall sample: 
- Higher accuracy-based scepticism is  
related to lower well-liked celebrity explicit 
preference and brand alone explicit 
preference. 
- Higher affect-based scepticism is related to 
lower well-liked celebrity explicit preference 
and brand alone explicit preference. 
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brands in both the well-liked and known 
celebrity groups. 
3. In line with Forehand and Perkins (2005) 
older children could find implicit preferences 
difficult to overcome (show celebrity 
preference).  
4. In line with Rozendaal, Buijs et al. (2016) 
recognition of manipulation transfers to 
implicit preferences (resist celebrity effect) in 
older children. 
5. Younger children in both conditions will 
have both an implicit preference for celebrity 
brands 
6. Older children should have higher levels of 
accuracy-based scepticism than younger 
children. This may trigger resistance in older 
children’s explicit celebrity brand 
preferences. 
 
 
preference for brands alone over celebrity 
brands. In contrast, in the known celebrity 
group there was a significant preference for 
celebrity brands over brand alone. 
- Younger children had an implicit preference 
for celebrity brands in the known celebrity 
group. 
- 14-year-olds had a significant implicit 
preference for brands presented alone. 
- 14-year-olds had a higher level of affect-
based scepticism than the other age groups. 
- As explicit preference of celebrity brands 
increased, so too did the likelihood of these 
brands being selected as favourites. 
- Explicit preference for well-liked celebrity 
brands is related to implicit preference. 
- Explicit brand alone preference was a 
negative predictor of brand choice. In 
comparison, explicit celebrity brand 
preference predicted a high brand choice 
score. 
 
12- to 14-year-olds: 
- Children with increased scepticism (both 
accuracy-based and affect-based) have lower 
explicit preferences for brands presented with 
well-liked celebrities. The negative influence 
of scepticism was only seen when a celebrity 
was present.  
- The higher the brands presented alone were 
rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to 
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7. Eight-year-olds may have the same level of 
affect-based scepticism as the 14-year-olds. 
 
be chosen within the top three favourite 
brands. 
- As explicit celebrity brands preference 
increased, so too did the likelihood of these 
brands being selected as favourites. 
- Negative relationship between affect-based 
scepticism and brand choice which fits with 
the 14-year-olds having higher affective 
scepticism than younger children 
- Children with lower explicit celebrity 
preference were more likely to have lower 
implicit preference for well-liked celebrity 
paired brands also. 
- The higher celebrities are rated as being 
well-liked, the more likely a celebrity brand 
is to be explicitly preferred. 
 
Eight- to 10-year-olds: 
- Those with higher scepticism (both 
accuracy-based and affect-based) have lower 
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explicit preference for brands presented 
alone. 
- Higher explicit preference for celebrity 
paired brands related to higher likelihood of 
selecting a celebrity brand as one of their 
three favourites. 
- The higher celebrities are rated as being 
well-liked, the more likely a celebrity brand 
is to be explicitly preferred. 
 
Known group, overall sample: 
- Higher levels of affect-based scepticism are 
related with lower explicit brand alone 
preference. 
- The higher brands presented alone were 
rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to 
be chosen within the top three favourite 
brands. 
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- As explicit preference for celebrity brands 
increased, so too did the likelihood of these 
brands being selected as favourites. 
- Explicit brand alone preference was a 
negative predictor of brand choice. In 
comparison, explicit celebrity brand 
preference predicted a high brand choice 
score. 
 
12- to 14-year-olds: 
- No significant correlations to report. 
 
Eight- to 10-year-olds: 
- The higher the brands presented alone were 
rated, the less likely celebrity brands were to 
be chosen within the top three favourite 
brands. In contrast, as the explicit celebrity 
brands preference increased, so too did the 
likelihood of these brands being selected as 
favourites. 
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